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Barnes v Barnes (1867) L.R. IP. 8 D. 463 44.43
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C (an infant), In re (1970) 114 Sol.Jo. 12 41.36
C (an infant), In re (1971) 1 Fam. Law 21 42.15
C(A)(an infant), Re [1966] 1 All E.R. 560 16.11, 16.14, 16.15
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31.17, 44.31, 44.35, 44.37
44.40, 44.44, 44.53, 44.55
45.8, 45.18, 45.26
C(A), Re: C v C [1970] 1 All E.R. 309 42.36-42.39, 44.30
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Carlton, Re: Naturalisation Act 1870 [1945] 1 All E.R.559 8.19
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Cartlidge v Cartlidge (1862) 2 Sw. 5 Tr. 567 34.100, 34.105, 45.57
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26.40, 26.42
G v G (1962) 106 Sol.Jo. 858 41.58
lxxiii
G v G (1975) 6 Fam.Law 43
Galloway v Galloway [1955] 3 All E.R. 429
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H v H [1947] K.B. 463
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Infant (An), In re [1965] 1 W.L.R. 754 45.61
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L(an infant), Re (1974) 5 Fam. Law 24 30.68
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Langworthy v Langworthy (1886) 11 P.D. 85 34.95, 34.105
Laxton v Laxton [1966] 2 All E.R. 97 41.58, 41.67, 41.70, 41.73
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v Liddell [1936] Ch. 365 45.65
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Welfare is the centrifugal concept in much of the law
relating to children. Sometimes it is identified in terms of
certain objective components, for example, health, morals, education,
maintenance and even the viability of relationships; sometimes in
terms of welfare itself. In either case the criteria are flexible
and attract a considerable degree of discretion at the stages of
interpretation and application. The system as a whole comprises
a series of legal persons with authority to make decisions affecting
the child. They include parents, step-parents, foster parents,
relatives, strangers, local authorities, children's hearings,
juvenile courts and other executive and judicial institutions.
Their powers are distinctive and, although parents may be granted
a stronger status they are not intrinsically different. Such
persons, including parents, have interests liable to be given effect
in terms of their legal authority rather than rights liable to
be enforced judicially. Parents thus hold office with certain duties
and responsibilities. Parental failure may justify suspension or
deprivation of authority.
These authorities are not exercisable simultaneously. Neverthe¬
less overall authority over the child may be fragmented, thus
permitting different persons to exercise limited authority at the
same time. The approach of the legal system is to provide
machinery for resolving these potential conflicts. There are two
techniques. Has the holder of the authority, normally a parent or
a guardian, so conducted himself that his exercise of the power
should be suspended or terminated: the threshold question. This
is largely an adjudicative function, frequently but not always
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given to a judicial body, and as such the criteria are normally
the objective components of welfare. If the threshold question
is answered positively, the second stage is to determine what
thereafter should happen to the child: the discretionary
question. This is largely an administrative function, speculative
in nature and sometimes given to a judicial body.
Welfare plays a part in these processes, whether relating to
official care, adoption, custody or guardianship and whether the
source is statutory or common law. The executive bodies are
constrained by the legislation and the judicial bodies have
frequently imposed constraints upon themselves. The attitude
of the courts has been influenced by the development of parental
authority and by Parliamentary policy. The discretionary stage
exhibits a number of approaches: namely, the threshold approach
itself, the presumptive and subsumptive approaches and the
balancing approach. Welfare plays a distinct role in these
approaches in each of the contexts in which it is relevant.
1
CHAPTER 1
THE CONTEXT AND BACKGROUND
Section 1 - The purpose of the study
1.1 A casual glance at any statute dealing with
children or at any reported judicial decision on a similar
matter discloses that the welfare or interest of the child
more often than not has some part to play in the decision¬
making process. The purpose of this study is simply to
ascertain what part the welfare of the child does play in
the legal system. The corollary of that purpose is much
more complex: to see whether there are any trends or
movements in the way welfare has been treated by Parliament
and by the courts.
1.2 Although the intention is to examine the system as
it is, the law relating to children is subject to such
continual modification and so liable to be affected by
non-legal considerations that it cannot be conceived as a
static body of rules. It needs to be seen against the
background of its own development to enable its dynamic
perspective fully to emerge. This has necessitated
examining some of the fundamental origins of the system
and in so doing it may be possible to perceive some
coherent concepts against which the development as a whole
is sensible. So the initial simplicity of examining the
role of welfare has involved a review of some of the main
principles of the law of children.
2
1.3 The fundamental principles of the law of
children are so closely related to the concept of welfare
that it is impossible to separate them. One of the rather
startling aspects of the law relating to children is that
no attempt has been made in modern times to trace the
development of current doctrines and to place them in some
overall perspective. Certainly some attention had been
paid to fundamental principles prior to the second half of
the nineteenth century, particularly by certain of the
Scottish institutional writers and to a lesser extent by
1
Blackstone. But none of these studies analysed in detail
the position of children. They were regarded as unimportant
except when they had some interest in property. This
element of disregard was probably not in any way an
inhuman approach. The system, whether social, political
or legal, directed attention elsewhere.
1.4 Some important studies were made during the
middle of the nineteenth century, particularly those of
2 3
Macpherson and Chambers for the law of England and that
of Fraser for the law of Scotland. But they were
systematic statements of the law or practical guides to
1 Chapter 32.
2 Macpherson W., A treatise on the law relating to
infants (London"^ 1842) .
3 Chambers J.D., A practical treatise on the
jurisdiction of the High Court of Chancery over
the person and property of infants (London, 1842).
3
the system rather than perspective analyses of the role
of the law and of its nature. Although these works are a
mine of information, they tend to lack any synthetic
statement of principle.
1.5 The modern law began to be conceived only about
the date of publication of these works and almost entirely
at the instance of Parliament. It was during the second
half of the Victorian era that the State began to take a
more positive part in relation to children by enabling
statutory interference with parental rights and interests,
by attempting to influence the administration of justice
by the courts and finally, but not until the second
quarter of this century, by recognising and validating the
adoptive status. Since then, many changes have been
enacted. They tend to follow the same pattern set by the
late Victorian legislatures and the differences between
them and now are more of degree than of principle.
1.6 These features have been recorded in the several
works dealing with the law of children. But they take as
their starting point the supremacy of parental rights
which was alleged to exist in law during, the second half
of the nineteenth century. Since then the development of
the law has been seen as a waning of parental rights and
4 Hall J.C., "The waning of parental rights" (1972)
31(1) Cambridge Law Journal 248.
u
a greater arid growing emphasis on the interests of the
5
child. This may be an over-simplification, particularly
in Scotland, and the second purpose of this study has
become, in addition to the original objective of
identifying the role of welfare, an attempt to elicit the
overall pattern of development of some of the fundamental
principles of the law.
Section 2 - The nature of the study
1.7 The unified Parliament of the United Kingdom
enacted much of the relevant statute law in similar if not
identical form for Scotland and England. This legislation
was imposed upon systems which were in many respects quite
different in principle. This is certainly true in relation
to custody and guardianship and, most importantly, the
legal relationship between parent and child was not the
same in the two jurisdictions. This is not to suggest that
Parliament should not have intervened. But, it is
submitted, Parliament should have been more careful,
particularly in regard to Scotland, how it intervened.
1.8 Official guardianship, whether at the instance of
local authorities, juvenile courts in England or children's
hearings in Scotland, and adoption are both the creatures
of statute. Much of the jurisdiction of courts in
5 Bevan, p. 257. See also Stone J., Social
Dimensions of Law and Justice (Sydney, 1966),
pp. 237 and 238.
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relation to custody, guardianship and similar matters is
now statutory and any decision on these matters, whether
the jurisdiction is statutory or not, is affected by one
or more statutory directions, particularly the paramountcy
of welfare principle. It would appear therefore that no
decision relating to children can be made without
reference to one statutory provision or another.
1.9 Although almost all law relating to children is
statutory, many of the most important provisions bearing
upon the substantive decision to be reached by a court or
by an executive body are drafted in a relatively flexible
manner. In consequence the operation of the law is
affected as much by the views of the decision-maker on the
nature of his functions and on the meaning of the
legislation as by the formal rules of law themselves.
This is both the strength and the weakness of the system.
It is on the one hand an attempt to do justice in the
individual case and on the other hand the quality of the
decision lies in the hands of the nominated decision¬
maker.
1.10 This study falls for these reasons into two
categories. It is possible to consider the legislation
purely in terms of its phraseology. Such an analysis
would be purely static. It is perhaps more important, and
perhaps more difficult, to ascertain how those who apply
the legislation actually see their functions. This study
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is, of course, a legal investigation. It is therefore
concerned to see not whether the system is achieving what
may be regarded as its social objective but only whether
the approach of the decision-makers falls within their
statutory framework. Interpretation is thus as vital to
this part of the analysis as it is to the static part of
the study. Questions of interpretation and application
are in a sense the link between the static law and its
dynamic operation.
1.11 The law under investigation is functional and
structural. It is also flexible in content, particularly
as regards welfare. Its basic characteristic is thus
discretion. That being so, there may be considerable
debate on how such discretions, whatever their form,
should be exercised. The legislation frequently does not
say so. Courts in particular like some assistance .in
exercising discretions and seek out schemes, policies,
principles or ideas implicit in the legislation to assist
in this way. In doing so they may be going beyond the
traditional judicial function. But they cannot be
regarded as going beyond the law, for Parliament has
given them this sort of function. Much of the discussion,
then, is in terms of policy, purposes and objectives. It
is easier for this study to do so than for a court to do
so. A good deal of reliance is thus placed upon material
which a court would not use or at least which it would
hesitate to use. No apology is given for using this
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information. It is part of the nature of the study and
implicitly part of the nature of the law which is the
subject of the study.
1.12 The nature of the law under review thus
influences the nature of this study. Statute law
predominates. A great deal of attention is paid to the
minutiae and the precise language of the legislation. The
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analysis revolves around interpretation and construction,
policies and objectives, discretions and functions. This
is as true for the earlier law as it is for the
contemporary system. Much of the earlier law has often
been discussed more in terms of rights than of powers and
functions, especially during the nineteenth century. To
some extent this is regarded in this study as a Victorian
aberration, as a reversion to the original concepts of the
law governing children will show. The nature of this
study is thus threefold: a consideration of the
legislation, of its historical evolution and of its
operation.
1.13 What of the courts? They are not seen as the
centre around which the whole system revolves; they are
merely one among a number of decision-makers recognised
by the system. The legal issues are who may make
decisions affecting children and how they should be made.
The law generally is not concerned with the decision
itself; it is concerned at most with its validity. It is
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for these reasons that the law has been described as
structural. The range of decision-makers is wide:
parents, guardians, local authorities, central government,
children's hearings, friends, relatives, interested third
parties or agencies, and, of course, courts invested with
relevant jurisdiction. The law does little more than
settle competitions for power or authority among these
various decision-makers. Once the legal system has
indicated which person or body is appropriate to make the
decision, its function is complete.
1.14 The complexity so far as the courts are
concerned is that they may operate at two different
levels within the system. Firstly, the court itself may
be the appropriate decision-maker, as in the case of
conferring or suspending custody, guardianship or similar
"rights". Here the court is functioning in much the same
way as, for example, a children's hearing. In addition,
the court, acting in its more traditional judicial role,
may be asked to ensure that the decision has been made by
the relevant body and that that body has remained within
the boundaries of the authority set for it by the legal
system. Confusion may easily arise when a court is
acting in this way both executively and adjudicatively.
Such confusion arises most frequently in custodial matters
where the roles of the court are often blurred, while in
adoption cases the courts are much concerned to separate
questions of competency from those affecting the merits of
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the decision. This difficulty is the foundation for the
distinction which recurs frequently in this study between
the threshold and discretionary stages of the decision¬
making processes.
1.15 This double judicial function causes technical
problems. Decisions of courts on such matters are normally
V
reported in only slightly modified form. Decisions of
other bodies exercising similar functions are not reported
at all. There is no harm in this but it means that reported
judicial decisions must be handled with extreme care. A
decision on the merits, that is where the court is
exercising a direct and authoritative decision-making
function, is binding in a legal sense only on the parties.
But a judicial decision may also contain propositions of
law which may be binding in the wider sense recognised by
the doctrine of precedent. In practice it is often
difficult to distinguish between the two. Hence much of
this analysis is concerned with the "approach" of the
court to the decision made by it rather than with the
decision itself: a technical and sophisticated point but
vital to this study.
Section 3 - Methodology
1.16 The methodology, as the purpose, of this study is
entirely legal. There is no question of any discussion or
comment on the value of the system as a social or political
institution. The consequence is that reported cases are
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important not for the quality of their decisions but for
the legal approach inherent in the decisions. Frequently
the sources for analysis go beyond the statutes and the
reported cases, so far as they may be regarded as
traditional, and include questions of policy elucidated
in Parliamentary proceedings and official reports. Text¬
books and periodical contributions have tended to avoid the
main issues of this study and have thus generally little to
contribute.
1.17 The approach in the first instance is twofold:
to consider the system as a static set of rules and powers
and then to treat the system as a dynamic operation. The
study is completed by considering some of the consequences
and incidentals of the concept of welfare which also
operate to serve as a final overall perspective view of
the whole study. The main theme is expounded in chapter 2
and the detailed remainder serves to expand and justify
that theme in the various contexts.
1.18 The three parts of the static analysis comprise
firstly a classification of the various roles of welfare
as they emerge from the legislation and the subordinate
legislation. The welfare or the interest of the child is
sometimes referred to as such in the legislation. The
welfare of the child is also frequently referred to in the
legislation in terms of its more objective component
parts; for example, health, moral or spiritual well-
11
being, education, security of relationship, or more
obliquely, parental unfitness, abandonment or neglect.
In either case the concept or component of welfare forms
part of a threshold requirement or part of the more open
discretionary stage of the decision-making process.
1.19 Policy is, indirectly at least, a vital element
in the process, particularly as it affects the
interpretation placed upon the individual word or the
phrase in the legislation. In many respects the
possibility of flexible interpretation is one of the
techniques used by Parliament to give effect to its
underlying objectives. In that sense interpretation is
one of the main links between the static and dynamic
approaches to welfare.
1.20 The contribution of the criminal law completes
the static analysis. The criminal law operates only ex
post facto. In itself it is unlikely to produce a
solution to the problems of a child, whether the offender
is the parent or the guardian or even the child. But the
criminal law is important, for its approach reinforces
the fundamental distinction drawn by this analysis into
the threshold and discretionary stages of the overall
decision-making process. It does so in a remarkably clear
way: the proof of guilt, on the part either of the parent
or the child, and the subsequent decision as to what to do
with the child thereafter, in terms either of the penal or
quasi-penal system or in terms of the system of official
guardianship or care. For that reason it is discussed
early in the study. It also serves as a link between the
static and dynamic elements of the total system.
1.21 The most important part is the dynamic analysis.
It looks at official care, adoption, then custody and
guardianship matters in that order. The order and method
of dealing with the subject matter are not fortuitous.
If chronological development were the criterion, custody
and guardianship matters would have come first. But the
order chosen most clearly demonstrates the theme which the
study is designed to illustrate. The official care
legislation, the expression used to include the Children
and Young Persons Acts and the Children Acts in England
and the Social Work (Scotland) Act in Scotland, contains
several clear examples of the division into the threshold
and discretionary stages, partly because the functions in
Scotland are conferred upon different bodies, while in
England their different nature is made clear by
implication. This is less true for adoption where' the
courts are responsible for both functions, although they
are fairly clearly differentiated. Custody and
guardianship matters are altogether different. All the
functions are exercised by the courts and it is by no means
clear when and to what extent the court is acting adjudic-
atively or executively.
1.22 A different method could have been adopted.
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Instead of looking at official care, adoption and custody,
it would have been possible to consider the threshold
approach in its several contexts followed by the
discretionary approach in its various contexts. Other
methods could have been selected. But the one selected,
it is suggested, is likely to have the greatest impact in
establishing the theme to be examined and for that reason
it has been selected.
1.23 There are fundamental differences between the
concepts of official care, adoption, and custody and
guardianship. But whether the approach has been created
directly by Parliament, as with official care and
adoption, or whether it has evolved in consequence of an
interaction between the common law and statute law, as in
the case of custody and guardianship matters, it remains
in many important respects similar in each context. The
division into the threshold and discretionary stages is
fundamental. Sometimes it is clearer in one case than in
another. That is simply a question of emphasis. But the
underlying division, it is suggested, is clear on careful
analysis.
1.24 This division recurs in different ways in the
various contexts. On the one hand there may be a decision
which is formal or legalistic. Whether it is made by a
court or an executive body is largely unimportant for
present purposes. It is the nature of the decision which
is important. Such a decision is followed by a second
decision which is much more flexible in nature. On the
other hand it may be significant to stress the retros¬
pective nature of the first decision where it is based
upon past events or behaviour, as against the prospective
or indeed speculative nature of the second decision. To
some extent the quality of the final outcome depends upon
the relationship between the two parts of the process: a
matter largely unregulated by the law. Another alternative
is to see the first decision as adjudicative and the
second as executive.
1.25 However it may be analysed, the law concerning
children is concerned with decisions, decision-making
processes and authorities to make decisions rather than
with standards, rules or regulations in the more
traditional, normative sense. Not that standards are
irrelevant: they are vital. But they are directed to
the quality of the decision-making process rather than to
the legal quality of what has happened. The latter has a
bearing upon the former but it is not normally decisive.
The law and this study are thus concerned more with issues
of authority than with the application of general standards.
This again is a consequence of the clear but unstated
policy of the law to achieve a solution satisfactory less
in general terms and more in relation to the individual
case. In this sense the threshold stage contains the
attempt to comply with the minimum stated requirements
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while the discretionary stage emphasises the individuality
of the circumstances. Each of the three substantive areas
of the law postulates a different balance between the two
parts of the process.
1.26 Finally, the method in seeking to analyse this
division of approach is wideranging. Although the ultimate
objective is to examine the role of welfare, this in
practice necessitates considering the historical evolution
of the principles of the law together with a view of the
current perspective of these principles. This too could
have been done by looking at the historical development
and current perspectives overall rather than treating
official care, adoption and custody separately. Again the
method adopted has been to examine these matters in the
context of the three substantive areas, the reason being
to emphasise the similarity of approach in each context
rather than to lose that impact in a total overview.
1.27 This means that the discussion ranges over
legislation no longer effective and legislation not yet
fully in force. This is not a weakness in the method
adopted. On the contrary it demonstrates, it is suggested,
the underlying strength and validity of the scheme
constructed by this study, simply because it transcends
the detail of the law from day to day in force. It is
based ultimately however upon the system as it is now.
1.28 The other aspect is that this study embraces the
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law of Scotland and the law of England. Although the
foundations of the two systems are different, the
statutory superstructure is so similar that one might
almost be excused for anticipating a similar if not
identical approach to children by the courts. This has
not happened. It is one of the incidental purposes to
ascertain these practical differences and to suggest why
they may have come about. But overall there can be
little doubt that the two systems recognise and apply the
fundamental division into the threshold and discretionary
stages. Sometimes one jurisdiction is used to illustrate
a point; sometimes the other system; sometimes both are
mentioned. Usually reference is made to the position in
the other jurisdictions but not always. Again this is not
an important defect, even if it is regarded as a defect.
For this study is not intended to be a comprehensive
statement of the law in force at a certain date in both
jurisdictions. It is conceived only as an attempt to
examine the role of welfare in the law relating to
children in Scotland and in England: a point incapable of
overemphasis.
Section U - The definition of expressions
1.29 Even this chapter has used several expressions
not normally used in this context; for example, the word
"threshold". There are several such words and expressions
used in this study. It is probably as well to mention them
now at the outset to give some indication of what they are
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intended to mean.
1.30 The word "welfare" is used with regularity
thoughout this study. It is employed in a general sense
unless the context clearly requires a narrower meaning.
But in that event reference is usually made to the
relevant component element of welfare. Although "welfare"
is not synonymous with the interests of the child, these
two expressions are used interchangeably. If not, some
specific reference is intended, for example, a statutory
provision using either word, and that will be clear from
the text. Any reference to the welfare concept or the
welfare doctrine simply means the totality of the idea of
the welfare of the child without in any way dividing it
into its various aspects. On the other hand by the
principle of the paramountcy of welfare is meant the
approach contained in section 1 of the Guardianship of In-
e
fants Act 1925 and in section 1 of the Guardianship of
7
Minors Act 1971. By the principle of the primacy of
welfare is meant the approach directed by section 3 of
8
the Children Act 1975 and by section 6 of the Adoption
9
Act 1976; that is similar to but clearly not the same
as the idea now embodied in section 12(1) of the Children
6 15 S 16 Geo. 5, c. 45.
7 1971 c. 3.
8 1975 c. 72.
9 1976 c. 36.
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Act 1948 and in section 20(1) of the Social Work
i I
(Scotland) Act 1968 as substituted by sections 59 and
79 of the Children Act 1975 respectively. Any reference
to welfare as a test means welfare or an aspect of welfare
as part of a wider process. In this sense the principles
of the paramountcy and the primacy of welfare are both
tests, but tests of a rather special kind.
1.31 The study distinguishes between the protection
and promotion of welfare. This terminology appears
occasionally in legislation and more frequently in reported
judicial decisions, but perhaps not always with the same
meanings. Here, however, protection means safeguarding a
child from persons who have harmed or are likely in some
way to harm the child or safeguarding a child against some
known or anticipated harm. Protection or safeguard is thus
essentially a negative solution from the child's point of
view. Promotion on the other hand is a positive idea. It
means making a decision which it is anticipated will not
only protect the child against harm but also achieve a
solution desirable from the child's point of view. It
implies a choice from among several possibilities intended
to improve the child's condition.
1.32 The distinction between protection and promotion
10
11
11 S 12 Geo. 6, c. 43.
1968 c. 49.
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is an element in the division of the total process into the
threshold and discretionary stages. "Threshold" implies a
first step prior to the later part of the process. Such a
first step may relate either to requirements which must be
fulfilled before the second stage can be reached or it may
relate to the first stage of a process in which for some
reason it is desirable to consider a certain matter first.
In that event the first step is not a threshold require¬
ment but only a threshold consideration. It is ultimately
a matter of law whether it is a requirement or a consider¬
ation but one of the features of the development of the
law is the judicial tendency to afford certain consider¬
ations, including at times welfare, a greater status in
practice than the law has formally required.
1.33 There has been one particular example of that
judicial technique. Where the law has not apparently
formally created threshold requirements, some courts have
nevertheless treated certain considerations as if they
were, if not legal principles, at least legal consider¬
ations which should be given presumptive effect. This is
called the presumptive approach. In practice it is
similar to the threshold approach, the term used to
describe the more formal division into the fulfilment of
threshold requirements followed by the exercise of a
dis cretion.
1.34 The presumptive approach should be distinguished
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from the subsumptive approach. This takes place when the
court subsumes under the heading of welfare everything of
relevance to the issue but considered only from the point
of view of the welfare of the child. The presumptive
approach, for example, treats the position of the parent
as a matter of priority in terms of principle; the
subsumptive approach treats the position of the parent as
one among a number of considerations regarded only from
the welfare point of view. From this it follows that
there is an important difference between requirements and
considerations.
1.35 There is one further kind of approach in
addition to the threshold, presumptive and subsumptive
approaches: namely, the balance approach. This is no
more than a direction, either legal or administrative, to
take into account all relevant considerations and to reach
a decision on the basis of affording to each its due
weight and assessing the one against the others. The
matter may be complicated by a legal direction on what
weight should be given to certain factors; for example,
the paramountcy or primacy of welfare principle. Sometimes
an even more complex situation may arise when two or more
different approaches are being canvassed simultaneously.
1.36 It is worth noting that none of these approaches
may be found in any statute. Nor are they mentioned in
terms by the courts. The expressions have been used to
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describe the function of the court, either implicitly in
terms of the relevant legislation or generally in
contemplation of the system as apparently conceived by
the courts.
1.37 Since none of these approaches is the subject of
direct legal prescription, they are legally valid only to
the extent that they fall within the discretionary stage
of the process. The exception to that proposition, if it
is properly an exception, is the threshold approach. But
that expression is used rather to describe the division
into threshold and discretionary stages than to create a
separate approach per se. Even so, there are discretionary
aspects of the threshold stage of the process. The word
"discretion" is taken to mean the existence of a choice
between two or more alternatives. Any discretion may be
circumscribed in various different ways. Even these
restrictions are in some respects discretionary.
1.38 It is possible to identify at least four types of
discretion. An applicational discretion arises when the
decision-making body is determining whether a certain
provision applies to an identified set of circumstances.
This is a quite normal procedure. It is not a "legal"
issue but it is part of the adjudicative and executive
processes. If there is a problem about the meaning of any
words or expressions in the provision, that raises the
possibility of "interpretational discretion", especially
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in relation to such words as "relevant", "appropriate",
"reasonable", "interests" and "welfare" itself.
1.39 If the issue in question is merely whether a
threshold requirement has been satisfied, then the
solution of these applicational and interpretational
problems ends the matter. It may be that the same or a
different body is obliged to reach a decision on the
merits or the substance of the dispute. For example, the
child has been neglected by his parent: should he be
received into care? Or, where the applicants are
competent to adopt the child and the parent has agreed,
should an adoption order be made? More controversially
perhaps, where the mother has committed adultery, should
custody be awarded to the father? The substantive or
dispositional question is the last. It is more an
administrative than an adjudicative issue. In either case
it is fundamentally a discretion, whether the exercise of
the discretion is limited or not. This is referred to as
a substantive or dispositional discretion. The quality of
the final decision in that case lies in the way in which
it has been made. That is rarely regulated in any clear
and concise fashion. If it were, it would scarcely be a
discretion. No matter. The link between the circumstances
of the case and the ultimate substantive decision is a
rational process on the part of the decision-maker. The
law does not govern rational processes in that sense.
The discretionary element in that part of the process is
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described as an intellectual or administrative discretion.
1.40 The expressions described in the preceding
paragraphs are fundamental to this study. They are not
all used at once nor in every context. The static part
of the study sets the background to the dynamic part of
the analysis and has little or no need for these special
expressions. Even in the dynamic part they are used only
gradually as the complexity of the legal system grows,
culminating in the confusing context of custody and
guardianship where, it is suggested, the terminology
affords some benefit to the conceptual analysis of the
system. The terms are much simpler than they may appear
at first sight. There are three categories: aspects of
welfare; the different approaches; the various types of
discretion. The common denominator is a flexible structure
and an absence of form: that is the nature of the system
which they purport to describe.
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CHAPTER 2
THE ROLE OF WELFARE IN THE LEGAL SYSTEM
Section 1 - Introduction
2.1 Although the preceding chapter discussed the
purpose, nature, methodology and terminology of this
study, it was impossible to exclude some of the ideas
forming elements of the theme which this study hopes
to establish. One of the remarkable features is the
unity of structure, unity of approach and unity of
substance of welfare in the law of children. This is
particularly significant when the diverse origins and
development of official care, adoption, custody and
guardianship are considered. There has been an inter-
raction between institutional principles and statute in
Scotland and between common law, equity and statute in
England. The legal structure is a carefully conceived
blend of private law and public law. The influence
of the United Kingdom Parliament, particularly since the
mid 1850s, has been immense. But it took a long time
indeed for that influence to be effective. The peculiar
difficulty facing Parliament was to allow the circumstances
of each case to dictate the decision and at the same time
to guide the decision-makers in the direction along which
Parliament wanted the system to develop. It was very
much a running battle between Parliament and the courts
for a hundred years or so. For only in the last decade
/
may it be said with some justification that the contemporary
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approach has become established.
2.2 The law relating to children may be analysed in
a number of different ways. It could be treated as a
simple statement or description of the series of propositions
which constitute the corpus iuris; alternatively as a
historical account of its development; or, more speculative,
as a series of general principles deduced from the detailed
rules and underlying the law; finally, most difficult of
all, as a total jurisprudential doctrine evincing a concept
of welfare which binds the propositions, principles and
their development together as an organic legal unit. This
study may be considered in any of these ways, separately
or together. It is the specific purpose of this chapter
to set out the total jurisprudential doctrine which emerges
from the later detailed discussion of the law.
Section 2 - The historical evolution of current principles
2.3 Most modern text writers and commentators usually
begin their discussion of the law no earlier than the middle
of the nineteenth century. The development of the law
is seen as either the waning of parental rights or the
increasingly greater attention being paid to the welfare of
i
the child. In 1969 the House of Lords saw no need to
examine the devlopment of the law prior to 1848. That is
understandable if the grundnorm of the legal system was
the parental right to custody. That parental right was
treated in that way by the courts in England and to a lesser
extent in Scotland during the latter period of the
1 Para. 1.6.
nineteenth century and even for much of the twentieth
century. Equally important, legislation was drafted
on the basis of that same parental right; for example,
the Acts dealing with industrial and reformatory schools,
those affecting custody and guardianship and later
the adoption legislation. Even today parental rights
underly much of the legislation although the Children Act
2
1975 goes some way to restoring the idea of parental duty
as part of the parent-child relationship in law.
2.4 It is true that for the last hundred and twenty
years or so the parental right to custody has been the
fundamental principle of the law. But where did that right
come from? It is no accident that even today there is
considerable dispute about custody as a concept within the
law. The word was rarely if ever used in a legal context
before and during the medieval period. The first time
the word seems to have been used in legislation was in
3
section 8 of the Tenures Abolition Act 1660 which merely
enabled an unmarried person to dispose by will of the
"custody and tuition" of certain children under twenty
one years of age. That provision did not create a
parental right to custody nor did it make clear what
custody was. The word has probably always meant some
sort of relationship between the parent or substitute
parent and the person of the child That per se does not
create a right.
2 1975 c. 72 .
3 12 Car. 2, c.24.
2 7
2.5 Similarly the Scottish institutional writers did
not write in terms of custody or a parental right to
custody. The concept recognised by them was the patria
potestas and that expression was used quite regularly
until the law of Scotland became increasingly influenced
by the law of England and the doctrine of parental rights
in the late nineteenth century. Since then the parental
right to custody has been the foundation of the law in
both jurisdictions.
2.6 The directly relevant problem is not so much the
parental right to custody but rather the relationship
between it and the welfare and interests of the child. If
the last fifty to a hundred years are seen as a waning of
parental rights and a growing recognition of the welfare
of the child, that, while true stricto sensu, is only a
part of the development of current principles. It implies,
for example, that prior to 1848 welfare was irrelevant and
that the parental right to custody was the principal if not
the only effective proposition of the law. If that is
the implication, it is suggested, it is not justified.
Does it matter? Not if the parental right to custody is
consistent with the earlier law. But it is important if
the parental rights doctrine formed no part of the earlier
law.
2.7 The older law has often been accused of treating
children as mere chattels or pieces of property. This may
in some respects have been so but the political and social
institutions of the feudal system provided not only for
the protection of the property of children but also for
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the care and protection of the person of the individual
child. A guardian may be regarded as the holder of an
office, almost a public office, whose function is to
look after the child and his property. The guardian
originally may have been more concerned with his ward's
property than with his person and to that extent the
system was ineffective. But the need for better
enforcement techniques is altogether a different matter
from legal doctrine. The medieval concept of guardianship
was as much concerned with the child's person and hence
his welfare as with his property. Guardianship was
regarded principally as the source of duties owed to the
child rather than as a series of rights in the parents.
2.8 Guardianship in Scotland had different detailed
rules of legal regulation. But the same concept of duty
was its foundation. In both jurisdictions a parent was
regarded as a guardian for certain purposes. In that
sense the parent as guardian owed the same duties to the
child. It is thus intelligible why the Scottish
institutional writers and even Blackstone stressed the
duties of guardians and parent-guardians and made no
mention of any right to custody. The law of Scotland
acknowledged a modified form of the Roman patria potestas.
This comprised more than ample Dowers for the parent-
guardian to give effect to his duty to care for the child.
But again it was not regarded as inter alia a parental
right to custody. That came later under English influence.
Until that came about, a Scottish parent-guardian was some¬
thing in the nature of an office-holder owing duties to the
child and endowed with the necessary powers to give effect
to these duties. If so, the parental interest in the
child was fundamentally fiduciary and not personal to the
parent.
2.9 The concept of the patria potestas never became
established in England. Guardianship and parent-guardian¬
ship did not seem to develop. The withering-away of the
feudal structures, growing urbanisation, the intervention
of the State in the form of the Poor Law no doubt helped
to break down the medieval family concept. People perhaps
acquired different attitudes to their children, especially
as an agrarian economy gave way to a commercial and then
an industrial one. These tendencies were probably less
significant in Scotland where the feudal institutions coupled
with the Romanistic legal influence remained longer. This
is historical and social speculation but it may explain why
the family as a social unit changed more quickly in England
than in Scotland. If this is so, then the feudal institutions
of the law probably became obsolete for England by the
eighteenth century. The concept of duty lacked any means
of enforcement. There was a gap in the law as regards
children within the family. That gap was quietly and
unobtrusively filled by the parental right to custody during
the eighteenth century.
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2.10 The parental right to custody was probably never
regarded by the law as absolute. But by the second half
of the nineteenth century it had become very difficult
indeed to justify suspending its operation by the parent.
The parental rights doctrine was fortified by another
creation of the nineteenth century, the parental control
over the child's religious education, which together with
the parental rights doctrine made the position of the parent
almost absolute.
2.11 This was the background against which Parliament
began to legislate in the nineteenth century. There was
clearly some concern for the welfare of the child during
the Victorian era, although it did not always emerge
directly in the legislation. Some of the reforming
legislation was inspired by private members and during most
of the nineteenth century the government was obviously most
reluctant to promote change. Equally it hesitated to be
seen blocking change. To some extent the period from about
1850 to 1930 or 1940 was a conflict between Parliament and
the courts. Parliament was attempting to extend the role
of the legal system in children's matters and the courts
were enforcing as far as possible the parental rights
doctrine. The legislature was caught in a dilemma. The
legislation could not be too specific; that would destroy
the flexibility needed to deal with each case on its merits.
But unlimited discretion would enable the courts to apply
existing principles. That is what happened, for example,
in the matrimonial context.
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2.12 The use of the criminal sanction against parents
had always been difficult, particularly in England, and the
technique of more specific statutory offences for abuse of
children was introduced towards the end of the century.
This was not always successful, for the courts were still
able to reduce the impact of the legislation by adopting an
appropriate line of interpretation. The same was true to
some extent of the legislation enabling children to be taken
away from culpable parents. But the opportunity to implement
this legislation probably did not fully arrive until 1908
when juvenile courts were for the first time set up. It
is probably fair to conclude that the traditional courts
felt compelled to give effect to the parental rights doctrine
in all contexts, while Parliament hesitated to force the
welfare doctrine in a total sense upon the system.
2.13 It is strange that two branches of the legal system
were simultaneously giving effect to different basic
principles. But the conflict appears to have been rather
unreal. Only a limited group of persons had in practice
access to the courts. Yet abuse of children was not limited
to any one group in society. For practical reasons the
judicial system was unable to help the social groups most
in need of assistance. That is as much a question of
political will and resources as of legal doctrine. This
did not come about until 1948 when administrative intervention
was extended. The argument is still raised, however, that
a parent cannot be deprived of his rights except by order of
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a court. But in practice, while still acknowledged, the
argument is gradually being ignored.
2.14 What principle emerges from this brief historical
preamble? Firstly, custody as a concept known to this law
appeared late in the development of the English legal system,
whence it later spread to Scotland, and then by some unknown
legal process it became the foundation of the parental
rights doctrine. That development enabled the legal system
to become strictly and almost absolutely paternalistic by
the middle of the nineteenth century. The courts favoured
this paternalistic approach at the expense of moves by
Parliament in a rather different direction.
2.15 Next, an examination of the earlier lav; indicates
that legal doctrine supported a concept of guardianship
couched in terms of parental duties rather than rights. The
guardian or parent-guardian was endowed with the powers
necessary to give effect to that duty. Conceivably custody
could have developed in the same way but it did not do so.
Guardianship as a fiduciary responsibility originated from
a concept of welfare. This notion of fiduciary responsibility
remained even during the era of the parental rights doctrine
but the scope for its application was narrow. Procedural
changes have in recent years in England widened the scope of
its application again. Thus concern for the child and his
property was the legal basis of the guardianship concept which
remained in emasculated form while society created the doctrine
of parental rights which in its own turn has been modified
by the restoration of a different form of the welfare concept.
2.16 The development may be put briefly in summary form:
(a) Prior to the eighteenth century the welfare doctrine took
the form of a duty placed upon guardians and parent-guardians
and enforced by the feudal institutions recognised by the law.
(b) During the nineteenth century the welfare doctrine was
largely overshadowed by the doctrine of parental rights
created and enforced directly by the judicial system.
(c) The current system recognises a modified version of the
parental rights doctrine and a much strengthened welfare
doctrine enforced to some extent by administrative means even
when the enforcement agency is a court.
(d) The current system is thus a compromise of the potentially
conflicting doctrines which preceded it. This, it is
suggested, is the cause of the complex doctrinal and procedural
difficulties of the present system.
Section 3 - The concept of authority
2.17 The recognition by the courts of custody effectively
distorted the simple pattern of guardianship based on a regard
for the interest of the child. If this is correct, it
demonstrates one important principle: that the law generally
speaking has not treated the parent-child relationship as an
enforceable parental legal claim "to" the child coupled with
a duty on the child to comply and a further duty on everyone
else not to interfere. Rather the law simply creates an
authority over the child exercisable by certain persons or
bodies in certain circumstances and in a certain way. Except
during the Victorian era and to the extent that Victorian
doctrines still influence the law, the law concerning
children is not a matter of rights, parental or otherwise,
enforceable or not. It is only a system enabling persons
to make decisions relating to children. The law does not
state absolutely or objectively what decisions must be made
or not, as the case may be. Provision is made for the
person competent to make the decision and how that decision
should be made. Powers and processes are the indicia of the
law of children; not rights and duties. It is thus a system
of authorities.
2.18 This proposition is quite clear in relation to the
feudal concept of guardianship with its sense of duty and
fiduciary responsibility and its idea of a public office.
It may even be applied to the Victorian idea of custody.
Although in practice difficult, it was possible for a parent
to be divested of custody. Since the parental right was
always liable to removal, it could in a sense be regarded
as an authority rather than as a right, even in the context
of the private legal regime of children. The real difficulty
with the Victorian system, which no doubt was intended to
fortify parental authority so as to strengthen the family
unit, was the practical incapacity of controlling the parental
authority so created. It in effect became much more nearly
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absolute than perhaps even medieval guardianship.
2.19 The pattern of authority has since been considerably
modified. Further restrictions on the exercise of parental
authority have been introduced but they are not generically
different from earlier restrictions imposed during the
nineteenth century. The modern approach has been to
increase the number of authorities or potential authorities
in competition for control of the child. The range is
wide: natural parents, guardians, step-parents, foster
parents, relatives, applicants for adoption, local authorities,
juvenile courts, children's hearings, adoption agencies,
voluntary and official caring bodies, even the courts
themselves. Not that in every case each authority is
competent. Most will not even be interested except in the
special case. In other words the static legal relationship
is sufficient in almost every instance. There is a conflict
of authority only occasionally.
2.20 The doctrine of parental rights exerts an influence
upon this system of authorities. It seems to give to parental
authority a residual significance not afforded to any other
authority. This is perhaps stating no more than that
legislation assumes a parental right to custody, at least in
the static sense. It may be more significant than that, for
the courts, particularly in England, have from time to time
created a presumption in favour of parental care which must
be rebutted before the possibility of conferring authority
36
elsewhere arises. What is interesting is that this presumptive
approach is often justified by reference to the welfare of
the child.
2.21 Even where a parent is given a privileged position
of authority, perhaps only as a threshold consideration, that
does not mean that other authorities are incompetent. The
present system thus provides the opportunity for greater
conflict than the Victorian system. It also means that the
position of a parent as a holder of one among a number of
authorities is in a vastly different position from a parent
with practically sole authority. The current parent-child
relationship is much closer to its feudal counterpart than
its Victorian analogue. It is probably odd indeed to think
of a parent as a holder of an authority, almost like an office¬
bearer who is liable to be removed from office at any time.
The administrative superstructure of the present system is
quite different from anything in the feudal and pre-Victorian
period but the idea of authority and of the parent as an
office-holder with fiduciary responsibility towards the child
is not inconsistent with the way the law has developed since
1948.
2.22 The policy of recent legislation has been not to
destroy the concept of authority but to fragment it to an
increasing extent. Even the earlier judicial system acknowledged
a form of fragmentation, by permitting access to a non¬
custodial parent. But the law has become much more complicated.
37
Total authority over the child resides somewhere but so many
persons, bodies and institutions may now be involved that to
search for that total authority is unreal. It should be
recalled, of course, that the parental rights doctrine
remains valid in a static sense as indicating the parents
jointly as the source of total authority. The resolution
of conflicts in the exercise of authority, which is now what
the legal system attempts to do, is the dynamic reality of
the system. Sometimes this is regarded as an exercise in
legal pathology but it is more than that. For the legal
system creates as well as regulates relationships. The
actual parent-child relationship creates the legal parent-
child relationship until some change takes place. Adoption,
for example, is the process whereby a new legal relationship
is substituted for an existing one. So, although the process
is dynamic, it creates a novel status for the parties involved.
It is less accurate to ascribe this pattern to the relationship
created when a child is in the care of a local authority.
The local authority has in a sense a statutory status but it
involves the parents as well as the child; an example
therefore of a more complex fragmentation of authority. The
reason why Parliament has legislated in this complex fashion
is to preserve as much of the parental rights doctrine as is
possible without sacrificing the aim of protecting and promoting
the welfare of the child. This compromise permeates the
whole operation of the law.
2.23 There is probably no better example of this twofold
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approach than the law of adoption. It seeks to protect the 1
interests of the natural parents by incorporating their
agreement to the proposed adoption. At the same time the
system safeguards the position of the child. Yet neither
interest is absolute. Parental agreement is liable to
dispensation and no applicant for adoption has a right to
adopt any child or the child in question. Nor can a child
insist upon adoption. The same is true, but in more complex
fashion, of official care. So too of custody and guardian¬
ship. Each of the various contexts exhibits this duality
of approach: dealing with parental interests and identifying
the interests of the child. Often they are examined in
that order, especially by the courts, and for reasons which
are often probably historical only. This is the origin of
the adjudicative and administrative or threshold and
discretionary stages of the various processes. They are
concerned respectively with the existence and exercise of
authority.
Section 4 - The function of the legal system
(a) The creation of authority
2.24 The legal system has two functions: it either
recognises or creates decision-making persons or bodies; and
it indicates how such authority should be exercised. The
common law of England and the institutional principles of
Scots law recognised the authority of parents and guardians.
The subsequent legislation has been drafted on that basis and
almost every other authority has been created by statute.
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Certain authorities may have been confirmed rather than
created by legislation and in other contexts the influence of
the legislation has been less than direct. These functions
are exercisable either by courts or executive bodies, in the
sense that a court may confer authority by awarding custody
or access, by making an adoption order or by committing the
child to the care of the local authority; a children's
hearing by making a supervision requirement in relation to
the child; a local authority by receiving him into care or
assuming parental rights in respect of him. These authorities
are created against the background of the doctrine of parental
rights and the authority of the parent is attenuated to the
extent that authority is thereby conferred upon that other
person or body.
2.25 These decisions on the one hand either confirm or
deny the authority of the parent pro tanto and from the other
point of view either deny or confirm the authority of the
other competing person or body. This is true in the application
of the common law, equity or statute and in each different
context. Welfare plays some part in these processes. If the
quality of parental care is in issue, the welfare of the child
is relevant only in a negative sense. The decision-maker is
concerned principally with the conduct of the parent and by
implication only with the effect of that conduct on the child.
The tendency however is for the threshold requirements or
criteria to reflect increasingly the interests of the child, a
policy largely brought about by legislation. This is true
uo
of adoption and official care. The position in custody and
guardianship is much the same but it has evolved judicially
but probably under the influence of the associated but strictly
irrelevant legislation.
2.26 Custody evolved from guardianship but the consequential
concept was altogether different. Nevertheless just as a
guardian could be removed from office, so a custodial parent
could be suspended in the exercise of his right of custody.
The grounds for suspension were very narrow at common law,
while equity was probably more sympathetic to the wider interests
of the child. But in either case the court adopted a threshold
approach by treating the grounds as requirements to be satisfied
before the suspension of parental rights could even be
contemplated. Where there were no parental rights to indicate
such an approach, as in the case of an orphan, the threshold
stage was unnecessary and a more open approach possible. It
has only been in relatively recent years that the threshold
stage has been to some extent bypassed. What is particularly
significant is the similarity of approach adopted by the courts
and that dictated by Parliament.
(b) The exercise of authority
2.27 So much for the first, mainly adjudicative, function
of the legal system. It considers in terms of past behaviour
and conduct whether the holder of an authority over the child
has disqualified himself from continuing to exercise that
authority. Welfare plays at most a negative role and usually
hi
identified in specific rather than general terms. The second
function of the legal system indicates how authorities should
be exercised. Again the clearest examples are to be found
in the official care legislation. There are two distinct
aspects of legal control over the exercise of authority over
a child. The first relates to changing the static condition
of the child. That is itself a dynamic process. The question
is, once the threshold requirements have been satisfied,
whether some inroad should be made into the exercise by parents
of their authority. More technically, using Scotland as the
example, once it has been decided that a child may be in need
of compulsory measures of care, the issue is whether the child
needs such care and, if so, what course is in the best
interests of the child. That may involve making a supervision
requirement which involves an adjustment of legal authority
in relation to the child. Welfare then plays an important,
probably vital, part in determining where authority over the
child should lie. That is very much a positive question,
coloured by issues of policy and individual circumstance.
2.28 Adoption provides another example. Having applied
the threshold requirements regarding the competency of the
application, the court has to decide whether or not to grant
an adoption order. In practice courts rely heavily upon the
information provided by the supporting administrative services
but the legal responsibility whether to transfer legal authority
over the child is firmly theirs. The dispensation process
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which itself operates within the adoption process may be
similarly analysed. Once the threshold requirements for
dispensing with parental agreement have been met, the court
comes under an obligation to decide whether or not to dispense
with agreement. The welfare of the child plays a part in
all of these decisions.
2.29 These decisions change the static condition of the
child. But the exercise of authority so confirmed, recognised
or created is also liable to regulation. Once a child is in
the care of a local authority; where a child has been put on
probation; when a child is in a community home or a residential
establishment; if a child is being cared for by official
foster parents; in all of these cases the relationship between
the child and the holder of the authority is governed by the
relevant legislation. Whether the word "status" is appropriate
or not in relation to such statutory guardians, the authority
of these guardians is set out in the legislation and effectively
reduces pro tanto, and in some cases eliminates ,the authority
of the parent. The making of an adoption order has much the
same effect but the consequences are more profound and more
permanent.
2.30 Custody fits into a similar pattern. But that pattern
is more complex because of the interaction between the common
law and statute. The status of parent and child was created
by the common law and extended in 1973 to equalise the rights
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of both parents. Over the years the courts in both Scotland
and England created a series of requirements enabling them
to interfere with the exercise of these parental rights.
Welfare as such was never really a ground of intervention.
The process, at least before the twentieth century, was almost
entirely adjudicative in nature. Satisfaction of these
threshold requirements per se operated to suspend the parental
right to custody and the competitor for authority normally
succeeded. There was little discussion on the question where
the child's best interest lay, except in the absence, physically
or legally, of parental rights.
2.31 Parliamentary intervention, though no doubt desirable,
made the matter more complex. The legislature intervened by
making welfare an administrative consideration in a judicial
process which had hitherto been almost totally adjudicative.
The contemporary law probably does not directly indicate how
a parent should exercise his authority. This is the consequence
of the parental rights doctrine, compared with the earlier
situation which could be regarded as a recognition of the
fiduciary basis of the exercise of parental authority.
Parliament intervened not to direct how a parent should exercise
his powers but to indicate how a court should exercise its
supervisory authority over children. This is why the courts
face the dilemma of parental rights on the one hand and the
child's welfare on the other hand: in other words, the
4 Guardianship Act 1973 (1973 c.29).
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compromise of policy mentioned earlier.
(c) The approach to welfare
2.32 In practical terms the simplicity of the adjudicative
function of the courts, tied to rights and the enforcement of
rights, was confused by the complexity of the administrative
function conferred upon the courts, related to interests and
the resolution of conflicting interests. That being so, as
Willmer L.J. implied in 1966, the function of the legal system
is restricted to indicting the approach to be adopted to the
5
resolution of such conflicts. Although welfare plays different
roles at different stages of the official care and adoption
processes, the legislation has indicated quite clearly the
division into the threshold and discretionary stages. Generally
the custody and guardianship legislation has been drafted
differently but its operation by the courts suggests a similar
division into the threshold and discretionary stages. The
confusion in this context has been created by the much closer
interaction between the two stages in custodial disputes than
in official care and adoption issues. This qs partly because
of the nature of the Parliamentary intervention, partly because
the courts sometimes act adjudicatively'and sometimes executively
and partly because of the historical evolution of the relevant
principles.
2.33 It cannot be said that in contemporary practice the
5 Re C(MA)(an infant) [1966] 1 All E.R. 838 at p. 853 per
Willmer L.J.
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courts in England have adopted a uniform approach. The
Scottish courts have perhaps been more consistent in recent
years. The courts in both jurisdictions have been somewhat
reluctant to exercise a discretion in relation to the
circumstances of the individual case and they have turned to
principles, maxims, presumptions and similar guidelines to
. *
assist in their decision-making processes. There is much
less evidence of this in the adoption process where the
legislation is more precise and in which administrative support
is a part of the process and also in the official care context
where the role of the higher courts is more supervisory than
executive.
2.34 It is possible to discern four broad approaches
adopted from time to time by the courts in the resolution of
these conflicts. Many of the earlier judgments distinguished
between the threshold stage and the discretionary stage of
the process. The threshold stage operates either to deprive
a person, usually a parent but sometimes a guardian, of a right
conceded to him by the law or to disqualify him from exercising
that right either temporarily or permanently. The consequence
of such a decision at the threshold stage is to remove that
person's authority in contemplation of its exercise either
J'-u:re or de facto by a substitute. If a new legal authority
is created, that decision is taken at the discretionary stage
of the process. For example, a father may have so conducted
himself that he is no longer fit to have custody which is
consequently conferred upon the mother. Or a juvenile court
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may decide that inter alia the parent has ill-treated the
child and then decides to commit the child to the care of the
local authority.
2.35 During the nineteenth century the threshold stage
more often than not concerned a recognised legal right. One
of the principal developments of English law in particular
was the judicial tendency to substitute a principle of child
care for a legal right as the threshold element. Sometimes
this is referred to as the modified threshold approach or the
presumptive approach. The distinction is whether the principle
is introduced at the commencement or at the conclusion of the
argument. In either case the principle is not a matter of
law but at best a creation of the judicial imagination. It
is simply a guideline to assist the court in reaching its
decision at the discretionary stage. More often than not,
the principle is justified in terms of the welfare doctrine:
for example, that it is better for a young child to be with
his or her mother or that a child is better to remain where
he or she is rather than risk a change. This emphasises
that the presumptive approach and its justification are
largely within the discretion of the judiciary.
2.36 This is not true of the subsumptive approach. This
view has proved more popular with the Scottish courts, probably
because it may be justified in terms of section 1 of the
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Guardianship of Infants Act 1925. The Scottish courts, it
6 15 and 16 Geo. 5, c.45.
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will appear, have been more faithful to the legislation than
their English counterparts. The subsumptive approach
acknowledges that the legal system does not sacrifice
everything to the welfare doctrine but it does give some
meaning to the concept of paramountcy. This approach does
not limit what may be relevantly considered in reaching the
decision. It simply requires each factor to be considered
from the point of view of the child's welfare. That is
the widest aspect of the approach. Section 1 of the 1925
Act effectively limits the subsumptive approach to parental
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claims of superiority. That is not an important limitation
in practice for the legal system effectively is a means for
settling competitions between parental claims and the claims
of the welfare doctrine.
2.37 The contemporary law is based essentially upon the
balance approach. This recognises that all relevant factors
should be taken into account. Even if the welfare of the
child is not specifically mentioned in the legislation, it
would normally be taken into account. There is no reason to
believe that this is an invalid approach. But sometimes the
legislation requires welfare to be included in the decision¬
making process and occasionally a special priority is afforded
to the welfare of the child. Neither directive undermines
the need to achieve a balance; it simply indicates pro tanto
how that balance is to be achieved. Thus, whether or not
the balance is statutorily weighted, this approach contains
7 Para. 35.90.
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the most open and unrestricted discretions of all the
identifiable attitudes. In practice, although the courts
often formally acknowledge their balancing function, they
frequently modify it in fact by annexing the presumptive
approach to it. Each aspect of the present system is thus
flexible in essence.
(d) The role of welfare
2.38 Although the balance approach, which permeates the
current law, is flexible, welfare plays a number of different
roles in such a discretionary system. If welfare is relevant
at the threshold stage, it operates only negatively. The
child's welfare is relevant only as the object of the parental
conduct which forms the basis of the threshold requirement.
At the discretionary stage welfare may operate positively as
well as negatively. The fundamental question is whether
welfare is part of the decision-making process or whether it
stands outside or beyond the process. Generally welfare
is regarded as part of the process. There are several
possibilities. The welfare of the child may not be legally
relevant, in the sense that the legislation confers an open
discretion. Even so, the courts have frequently introduced
welfare and related factors into the process, perhaps even
as the policy implicit in the whole system.
2.39 If welfare is of direct legal relevance, it may
operate within the decision-making process in four ways. The
courts or the legislature may insist that welfare shall form
part of the decision: in other words, a factor in the
balance approach. The next step is for welfare to be given
a certain weight or priority in the process. Statute has
created the principles of the primacy of welfare and the
paramountcy of welfare. One of the problems is the
distinction, if any, between the two principles. Clearly
in either situation welfare is not the only consideration.
If it were, it would scarcely be a consideration; it would
stand outside the process. It has however from time to
time been described as "overriding" or even "decisive".
Assuming that these descriptions purport to retain welfare
as part of the process, they probably mean no more than that
welfare, as Lord MacDermott said, "determines the course to
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be followed". The decision-maker thus sets out on the
rationalisation process with the intention of giving effect
to the welfare of the child rather than employ the welfare
of the child as a factor of last resort. Occasionally the
approach is described so as to give the impression that welfare
falls outside the process. But the general trends are against
such a view.
2.40 These generalised distinctions are something of an
oversimplification. In practice it may be misleading to
separate the role of welfare in the discretionary processes
from the overall approach to the decision-making as conceived
by the courts. The authority may, for example, adopt two or
more approaches at the same time and welfare may play several
8 J v C [1970] A.C. 668 at p.711.
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roles in one or more of these approaches. Each situation
needs to be analysed separately. The custodial context is
the most complex and yet the most illuminating in respect
of these generalisations. But they are valid also in
relation to adoption and official care. Statute has
intervened more directly in these two areas and the courts
have had less opportunity to construct complicated models
for welfare than in custody issues. The emphasis in the
adoption and official care legislation has been on the
threshold stage of the process. But overall the pattern
in the three main areas of substantive law is consistent and
coherent. This unity of approach is quite remarkable.
(e) The nature of welfare
2.41 Finally, what of the nature of welfare? Where
Parliament has enacted specific components of welfare, for
example, health, accommodation or education, the legal issues
are mostly related to application. But when the expression
"welfare" or "interests" is used, that injects a greater
degree of discretion of various kinds into the process. The
simple use of these more general expressions gives to the
courts an opportunity to adopt a creative role. The English
courts in particular have from time to time accepted this
challenge and in so doing have considerably extended the
substance of welfare to include not only the traditional
elements of physical and moral well-being but also the
viability of relationships and notions of psychological risk
and security. This has come about partly by judicial
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initiative and partly by the ancillary policies enacted by
Parliament of providing the relevant information, of relaxing
certain rules of procedure and of extending the range of
sources of care for the child in question. Without these
ancillary provisions, the doctrine of welfare would in
practice be devoid of real meaning and effect.
2.42 The substance of welfare is closely related to the
structural aspects of the legal system which provide the
relevant approaches and authorise the most appropriate
discretions. Welfare, of course, is a part of these approaches
and discretions. In that sense welfare is of direct legal
consequence. But, although the part played by welfare within
the legal system is a matter of law, the welfare of the
individual child is a matter of fact, not of law. It is
moreover a fact in at least two senses. Once the relevant
decision-making body has decided what is best for the child
or where his welfare lies or whatever language is used, that
decision becomes a fact within the legal system and thus a
fact to which the law attaches a series of consequences.
Most of this analysis is concerned to examine these consequences.
Such a decision is a fact in another sense. It represents
the judgement of the decision-maker on what the child's
welfare requires. This is a consequence, itself not a legal
matter, of all the circumstances affecting the child. In
other words, this judgment is the substantive decision for
the child's future. It is not a matter of legal expertise.
But the function of that judgment is a matter of law*'/*^
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2.43 These are important distinctions. Welfare as a
fact relates to the individual child; welfare as a matter of
law indicates the part played by that fact in the legal system
without reference to the individual child. But this
distinction breaks down to some extent when the law provides
that the welfare of the individual child plays whatever role
the welfare of the individual child rather than the legal
system indicates. The recognised approach closest to that
objective is the balance approach tempered by the paramountcy
of welfare principle. But the stage has not been reached
which treats individual welfare alone without reference to
its legal context. Once that stage is reached, the role
of the legal system would for all practical purposes have
disappeared. Welfare would then become a fact related only
to the individual child and, for that reason, alone binding
in the legal sense. Whether Parliament intended to bring
that about or not, the courts have striven successfully to
avoid reducing the role of the legal system to nil.
53
CHAPTER 3
THE OBJECTIVE TREATMENT OF WELFARE
Section 1 - Classification: general
(a) Introduction
3.1 Almost every judicial or administrative decision
dealing with children is likely to be affected in one way
or another by an enactment of Parliament. The current
legislation is extensive and complex. Welfare plays a very
large part in these statutory schemes, either directly as
an item generally or specifically written into the legislation
or indirectly as an aspect of the policy underlying the
enactment. Welfare as a matter of policy is legally
irrelevant except only in certain circumstances as an aid
to interpretation. But welfare and its derivatives are
so frequently of such direct legal relevance that, before
the dynamic effects of the legislation are examined, an
attempt may be made to gather together the many statutory
provisions bearing upon welfare and to identify any possible
heads of classification.
3.2 This is, to say the least, a rather challenging
task. It is important in itself so far as it discloses the
current statutory patterns. It is also important not only
as a foundation for an examination of the individual
provisions in their own context but even as a statutory
model against which the approach of the courts to the
welfare doctrine may be compared. This is particularly
illuminating, it is suggested, for the overall pattern
created by Parliament is in many respects fundamentally
similar to the approaches devised by the courts. No doubt
an interaction between the judicial and legislative
functions has occurred, probably sub silentio. Nevertheless
the underlying similarity is quite remarkable.
(b) Policy
3.3 To begin with matters of policy: legislative
policy, particularly the protection of children, may be
i
relevant to the interpretation of the statute in question.
Normally that applies to the construction of a word or a
phrase. To use that device, it may be necessary to identify
the objective of the whole or part of the statute in addition
to the objective of the relevant provision. These objectives
may relate to the welfare of the child either directly or
by some oblique method. The welfare of the child may be
governed, for example, by legislation which does not refer
to welfare as such. For that reason the use of the several
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interpretational techniques may prove useful in ensuring a
construction of the statute consistent with its objective.
Otherwise policy may be sacrificed in the name of legalism.
On the other hand statutes may include within their provisions
references to welfare as such. It is likely that such
provisions would be drafted in more discretionary form:
firstly, the word "welfare" itself is sufficiently imprecise
to permit a certain amount of interpretational discretion;
secondly, welfare may be a factor relevant to the fulfilment




interpretation will remain and policy may even in that
context prove helpful in solving such problems. Thus policy
has a significant part to play and welfare as a policy
supported by Parliament has a multi-functional role in
the overall system. It is the purpose of this Part to
identify these functions.
(c) Welfare models
3.4 Legislative policy as such, even in the context of
children, is not a matter with which the courts are normally
concerned. But they are very much concerned with the
specific provisions of statutes affecting welfare. There
are several different approaches to this question and the
role of the concept of welfare varies accordingly. Some
deal with welfare as a general concept; others are based
upon specific factors obviously related to welfare. Some
are enforced by means of criminal sanctions; others are
found in an administrative structure. $ome operate in a
positive direction; others negatively. Many provisions
in the legislation are simple prescriptive canons which
cannot be classified in any real sense. Nevertheless it
is possible to discern several trends in the legislation
purely on the basis of the language used and without
reference to judicial authority. Such an analysis suffers
from being static; the dynamic effect will be considered
later.
3.5 The statutory rules affecting the welfare of
children are to be found firstly in a wide range of statutes
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which are frequently amorphous and unrelated and also in
3
the appropriate statutory instruments. Some, statutes also
i*
apply to persons other than children. Even within any one
statute the provisions may similarly lack logical form and
5
cohesion. Certain provisions may regulate matters not
6
necessarily consistent with the welfare of the child. Their
presence in the statute emphasises that legislation
affecting children is largely a balance between the interests
of the children on the one hand and the interests and
sometimes the rights of parents on the other hand, while
interested third parties are often required or empowered
to exercise various functions affecting the parent-child
relationship.
3.6 The classification of welfare as a statutory concept
must be approached with caution. If it is made too rigid,
it will break down. Even if a flexible view is taken a
certain structural coherence appears through the mass of
legislative rules. This, it is suggested, is helpful to
an understanding of welfare, even if it lacks absolute
3 E.g. The children and young persons legislation;
adoption legislation; guardianship legislation;
matrimonial and consistorial legislation; education
legislation; legislation affecting the treatment of
offenders.
4 E.g. the Criminal Justice Acts.
5 Particularly some aspects of the children and young
persons legislation: cf. the adoption legislation.
6 E.g. where rights are conferred upon third parties, as
in adoption legislation; or where some other interest
is recognised, for example, that of other inmates in an
institution or that of the public at large.
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precision. Its significance lies in the pattern disclosed
across the whole range of legislation. This emphasises the
distinctive uses of welfare within each separate piece of
legislation.
3.7 As may be expected, there are many ways of
classifying welfare and its use in statutes. For example,
the basis could be content: it could be the objective of
the provision. None of these has been adopted. The approach
used, one which is intrinsically more complex, is to
classify welfare according to the function which it appears
to perform in the statute. For example, if welfare is
articulated in the Act, does it operate as a requirement
to be satisfied before a court or other body may competently
exercise a power or is it the goal to which the court or
other body is directed when exercising such a power? On
the other hand if welfare as such is not articulated but
is nevertheless involved, is the behaviour objectively
prescribed or is there an element of discretion? .. These
questions appear vague and complicated. The essence of the
classification however is simple. Welfare operates as
a gradation from provisions which objectively secure welfare
in direct terms, through provisions which use welfare as
a concept of growing generality in the exercise of statutory
functions conferred upon various bodies, to provisions
which are intended in indirect ways to advance the interests
of children.
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3.8 Several different expressions are used in the
legislation to convey the concept of welfare. That word
itself is probably the most common. There are others:
for example, interests, best interests, benefit, well-being
or advantage. These words are used in a relatively positive
sense. Detriment and prejudice are used more negatively.
It is not suggested that these words are synonymous.
Clearly they are not. There are differences of degree and,
emphasis. But any reference here to welfare includes
whichever expression is used generally to describe the
concept in question. Nor is it suggested that the
expressions have been used synonymously by Parliament.
The draftsman may seem to have used theft in a rather
haphazard fashion, for it is difficult, probably impossible,
to discern any rational use of the various words. This
present classification pays no regard to these differences.
They will be more significant in the subsequent dynamic
analysis of the welfare concept.
Section 2 - Objective welfare treated directly
(a) Table 1
3.9 This chapter considers in detail the enactments
which deal with aspects of a child's welfare which may be
regulated by the law either directly or in terms of a
function created by statute. The first set of provisions
to be considered comprises rules which directly and
objectively set standards which bear upon the welfare of
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children. They are set out in the following Table.
The contents of this or any other Table are not intended
necessarily to be comprehensive but they indicate typically
the provisions in question and include the most significant
rules. It is a feature of this Table and of the other
Table in this chapter that the word "welfare" and similar
expressions are not used. The reason is that such words
are too general to treat the subject objectively.
TABLE 1
OBJECTIVE WELFARE TREATED DIRECTLY
Part 1 - Provisions of Acts of Parliament
o . • _. . . Means ofSection Provision _ -fEnforcement
Offences against the Person Act 1861 (2H S 25 Vict., c.lOO):Eng,
1861 s.27 Prohibition against un- Criminal proceedings
lawfully abandoning or
exposing any child, being
under the age of two years,
whereby the life of such
child shall be endangered,
or the health of such child
shall have been or shall be
likely to be permanently
injured.
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Section Provision Means of
Enforcement
1861 s.56 Prohibition against unlawfully, Criminal
either by force or fraud, leading Proceedings
or taking away, or decoying or
enticing away or detaining, any
child under the age of fourteen
years, with intent to deprive any
parent, guardian, or other persons
having the lawful care or charge of
such child or the possession of
such child; and against with any
such intent, receiving or harbouring
any such child, knowing the same
to have been by force or fraud, led,
taken, decoyed, enticed away, or
detained.
Custody of Children Act 1891 (51 £ 55 Vic., c.3) : G.B.
1891 s.l Parental abandonment, desertion or Civil
misconduct as ground for refusal to Proceedings
enforce parental rights.
1891 s.3 Parental abandonment, desertion or
excessive delegation as ground for




Section Provision Means of
Enforcement
Infant Life (Preservation) Act 1929 (19 S 20 Geo. 5, c.34); Eng.
1929 s.1(1) Prohibition of child Criminal
destruction (i.e., where a proceedings
person, with intent to destroy
the life of a child capable of
being born alive, by any
wilful act causing a child to
die before it has an existence
independent of its mother).
Children and Young Persons Act 1933 (23 S 21 Geo.5,c.12):Eng,
Children and Young Persons (Scotland) Act 1937 (1 Edw.8 S
1 Geo.6 , c.37): Scot.
1933 s.l(l) Prohibition of cruelty to
1937 s.12(1) persons under 16 (assault,
ill-treatment, neglect,
abandonment, exposure) at
instance of certain persons
Criminal
proceedings
1933 s.3(l) Prohibition against allowing








Prohibition against causing or Criminal
allowing persons under 16 to proceedings
be used for begging.
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Section Provision Means of
Enforcement
1937 s.13(1) Prohibition against causing Criminal
or encouraging the seduction, Proceedings
unlawful carnal knowledge,
prostitution of or the
commission of an indecent
offence upon a girl under
16 .
1933 s.5 Prohibition against giving




1933 s.7(l) Prohibition of sale of Criminal
1937 s.18(1) tobacco to persons under 16. Proceedings
1937 s.20(l) Prohibition against purchasing Criminal
old metals from persons under Proceedings
16 .
1933 s.ll Prohibition against exposing Criminal
1937 s.22 children under 12 (under 7 in Proceedings









Section Provision Means of
Enforcement
1933 s.20(l) Prohibition against street Criminal
and (3) trading by persons under 17 Proceedings
1937 s.39(l) (under 18 on Sunday),
and (2)
1933 s.23 Prohibition against persons Criminal
1937 s.33 under 16 taking part in Proceedings
performances endangering
life or limb..
Infanticide Act 1938 (1 S 2 Geo.6, c.36) : Eng.
1938 s.1(1) Prohibition of infanticide Criminal Proceedings
(i.e. where a woman by any
wilful act or omission causes
the death of her child being
a child under the age of
twelve months, but at the
time of the act or omission
the balance of her mind was
disturbed by reason of heir not
having fully recovered from
the effect of giving birth to
the child or by reason of the
effect of lactation consequent
upon the birth of the child).
Section Provision Means of
Enforcement
Education Act 1944 (7 £ 8 Geo. 6, c.31) : Eng.
Education (Scotland) Act 1962 (10 S 11 Eliz.2, c.47):Scot
1944 s.39(l) Duty placed upon parents to
1962 s.35(l) secure regular attendance at
school of registered pupils.
Criminal
Proceedings
1944 s.54(6) Prohibition against person
1962 s.61(5) or clothing of pupil (after
first cleansing) being found
to be infested with vermin
or in foul condition due to




Children Act 1948 (11 8 12 Geo■6, c.43):Eng.
Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968 (1968 c.49):Scot.
1948 s.l(l) Absence of or abandonment of Administrative
(a)













Section Provision Means of
Enforcement
1948 s.2(l) Abandonment of child by
(b)
parent or guardian;






National Assistance Act 1948 (11 £ 12 Geo■6, c.29): G.B.
1948 s.51(l) Persistent refusal or Criminal
neglect to maintain. proceedings.
Children and Young Persons (Harmful Publications) Act 1955
(3 S 4 Eliz.2, c.28) : G.B.
1955 s.2(l) Prohibition against printing, Criminal
publishing, selling or letting Proceedings
on hire any relevant work
likely to fall into the hands
of children or young persons.
1955 s.4 Prohibition of the Criminal
importation of works to which Proceedings
the Act applies.
Sexual Offences Act 1956 (485 Eliz.2, c.69) : Eng.
Criminal Law Amendment Act 1885 (48 8 49 Vict., c.69) : Scot.
1956 s.5 Prohibition against a man Criminal
1885 s.4 having unlawful sexual Proceedings
intercourse with a girl under








a man having unlawful
sexual intercourse with a






1956 s.19(1) Prohibition subject to one Criminal
1885 s.7 exception against taking an Proceedings
unmarried girl under the age
of eighteen out of the
possession of her parent or
guardian against his will,
if she is so taken with the
intention that she shall have
unlawful sexual intercourse
with men or with a particular
man.
1956 s.20(l) Prohibition against a person Criminal
acting without lawful Proceedings
authority or excuse taking an
unmarried girl under the age
of sixteen out of the
possession of her parent or
guardian against his will.
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Section Provision Means of
Enforcement
1956 s.23(l) Prohibition against procuring Criminal
1885 s.2(l) a girl under the age of Proceedings
twenty one to have sexual
intercourse in any part of
the world with a third
person.
1956 s . 25
1885 s.6(1)
Prohibition against a person Criminal
who is the owner or occupier Proceedings
of any premises, or who has,
or acts or assists in, the
management or control of any
premises, inducing or
knowingly suffering a girl
under the age of thirteen to
resort to or be on those
premises for the purposes of
having unlawful sexual




Prohibition against a person Criminal
who is the owner or occupier Proceedings
of any premises, or who has,
or acts or assists in, the
management or control of any
premises, inducing or






under the age of sixteen,
to resort to or to be on
those premises for the
purpose of having unlawful
sexual intercourse with men
or with a particular man.
Means of
Enforcement
1956 s.28(l) Prohibition against causing Criminal Proceedings
or encouraging the
prostitution of, or the
commission of unlawful sexual
intercourse with, or of an
indecent assault on, a girl
under the age of sixteen for
whom he is responsible.
Affiliation Proceedings Act 1957 (5 S 6 Eliz. 2, c.55) : Eng.
1957 s.ll(b) Prohibition against
withholding proper
nourishment from or otherwise
abusing or maltreating an
illegitimate child on the part
of a person appointed
judicially to have his custody
Criminal Proceedings
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Section Provision Means of
Enforcement
Adoption Act 1958 (7 Eliz.2, c.5) : G.B.
1958 s.43(l) Unfitness of custodian, or Civil Proceedings
detrimental environment as
ground for removal of
"protected" child from
unsuitable surroundings.
Licensing (Scotland) Act 1959 (7 S 8 Eliz.2, c.51) : Scot.
Licensing Act 1964 (1964 c.26) : Eng.
1959 s.143(1) Prohibition against allowing, Criminal Proceedings
and (3).
causing or procuring persons
1964 s.168(1) under 14 to be in the bar
and (2) ^ ,. . . .of licensed premises during
permitted hours.
Prohibition of the employ- Criminal Proceedings
ment of persons under 18
in the bar of licensed
premises.
Prohibition against selling, Criminal Proceedings
allowing the consumption of
or sale, consuming or buying
of intoxicating liquor to,
by or for persons under 18.
Betting, Gaming and Lotteries Act 1963 (1963 c.2) : G.B.
1963 s.21(l) Prohibition against betting Criminal Proceedings
with or through a young
person or employing a young









Section Provision Means of
Enforcement
1963 s.22(1) Prohibition against sending Criminal Proceedings
or causing to be sent to a
person known to be under the
age of 18 any betting
circular.
Ministry of Social Security Act 1966 (1966 c.20): G.B.
1966 s.30 Persistent refusal or neglect Criminal Proceedings
to maintain.
Abortion Act 1967 (1967 c.87) : G.B.
1967 s.1(1) Not abortion if the Defence to
(a)
continuance of the Criminal Proceedings
pregnancy would involve
risk of injury to the physical
or mental health of any
existing children of the
family of the pregnant woman
greater than if the pregnancy
were not terminated.
1967 s.1(1) Not abortion if there is a Defence to
(b)
substantial risk that if the Criminal Proceedings
child were born it would
suffer from such physical or
mental abnormalities as to be
seriously handicapped.
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Section Provision Means of
Enforcement
Children and Young Persons Act 1969 (1969 c.51*) : Eng.
Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968 (1968 c.U-9) : Scot.
1969 s.l(2) Prevention of proper Civil Proceedings
(a) and (c)
development, impairment
of health, ill-treatment of
child or exposure to moral
danger as ground for care
proceedings.
1968 s.32(2) Bad association, exposure to Children's hearing
(b) and (c)
moral danger, unnecessary proceedings
suffering, impairment of
health or development as
ground for compulsory measures
of care.
Tattooing of Minors Act 1969 (1969 c.24) : G.B.
1969 s.l Prohibition of the tattooing Criminal Proceedings
of persons under the age of
18 except for medical reasons.
Children Act 1975 (1975 c.72) : Scot.
Adoption Act 1976 (1976 c.36) : Eng.
1975 s.lO(l) Adoption by major married Civil Proceedings
1976 s.14(1) couple.
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Section Provision Means of
Enforcement
1975 s.ll(l) Age and status of applicant Civil Proceedings
1976 s.15(1) for adoption.
1975 s.12(2) Parental absence or Civil Proceedings
1976 s.16(2) incapacity, persistent
parental failure, abandonment,
neglect, persistent or
serious ill-treatment as a
ground for dispensation with
agreement.
Part 2 - Provisions of Statutory Instruments
Rule or Regulation Provision
Approved School Rules 1933 (S.R. S 0. 1933 No.77U) : Eng.
1933 r.23 Separate bed and suitable clothing for
each boy.
1933 r.24 Sufficiency and variety of food and diet.
1933 r.28 Restriction upon employment of boys in
school.





1933 rr. 34 to Restrictions upon methods of punishment
3 6
1933 r.44 (1) Provision of medical, hygenic, and
(a) (d) and (e)
dietary examinations and inspections.
1933 r.45(l) Provision of dental services.
Remand Home Rules 1939 (S.R. £ 0. 1939 No.12): Eng.
1939 r.3 Separation of boys likely to exercise
bad influence over others.
1939 r.4 Separation of girls from boys; separate
sleeping accommodation.
1939 r.5 Separate bed for each boy.
1939 r.6 Sufficient and varied food.
1939 r.7 Suitability of clothing.
1939 r.8 Cleanliness; medical examination.
1939 rr.14 Restrictions upon methods of punishment,
and 15
1939 r.16 Prohibit ion of corporal punishment
for girls.
1939 r.19 Dispensation with consent of parent




Approved Probation Hostel and Home Rules 19*49 (S.I. 1949
No.1376) : Eng.
1949 r.17 Separate bed and suitable clothing.
1949 r.18 Sufficient and varied food.
1949 r.23 Adequate provision for free time and
recreation.
1949 r.28 Prohibition of corporal punishment.
Borstal (Scotland) Rules (S.I. 1950 No.1944) : Scot.
Borstal Rules 1964 (S.I. 1964 No.387) : Eng.
1950 r.10 Detailed requirements of sleeoing
1964 r.25
accommodation; size, light, heating,
ventilation, capacity of a dormitory,
1964 r.ll(l) Separation of male and female inmates
1950 r.ll Separate bed and adequate bedding.
1964 r.26
1950 r.42(l) Prohibition of excisable (intoxicating
1964 r.24(1)








1950 r.66(l) Care of health of inmates
1964 r.19(1)
1950 r.76 Provision of dental treatment,
1950 r.80 Washing, shaving and hair cutting,
1964 r.27(2)
and (3)
1950 r.81 Provision of toilet articles.
1964 r.27(1)
1950 r.83 Quality of food.
1964 r.2 3(3)
1950 r.87 Provision of adequate clothing.
1964 r.22(1)
Administration of Children's Homes Regulations 1951 (S.I. 1951
No. 1217) : Eng.
Administration of Children's Homes (Scotland) Regulations 1959
(S.I. 1959 No. 834) : Scot.
1951 r.5 Provision of medical services, including
1959 r.6
supervision of health and hygiene, medical
examination and attention.
1951 r.6 Arrangements for dental care.
1959 r.7






Detention Centre Rules 1952 (S.I. 1952 No.1432) : Eng.
Detention Centre (Scotland) Rules 1960 (S.I. 1960 No.870):Scot,
1952 r.5 Detailed requirements of sleeping
1960 r.5
accommodation : light, warmth, ventilation.
1952 r.7 Separate bed and adequate bedding.
1960 r.7
1952 r.12 Medical examination of each inmate on
1960 r.12
reception.
1952 r.25 Prohibition of use of unnecessary force,
1952 r.41 Restrictions upon use of intoxicating
1960 r.37
(excisable in Scotland) drink and tobacco.
1952 r.46 Participation in physical training and
1960 r.42
organised games.
1952 r.67 Provision of sick bay for medical care
and treatment : removal to hospital.
1952 r.76 Arrangements for cleanliness, sanitation,
1960 r.76
heating, lighting and ventilation.
1952 r.77
1960 r.77





1952 r.78 Provision of toilet articles
.19 6 0 r.7 8
1952 r.79 Prescription of quality of food.
1960 r.79
1952 r.83 Provision and wearing of clothing,
1960 r.83
Boarding-out of Children Regulations 1955 (S.I. 1955 No.l377):Eng
Boarding-out of Children (Scotland) Regulations 1959 (S.I. 1959
No.8 3 5): Scot.
1955 r.2 Restrictions on persons with whom
1959 r.3(1)
children may be boarded out.
1955 r.6 Medical examination required before
1959 r.2(2)
boarding out.
1955 r.7 Medical examination required during boarding
1959 r.12(1)
and (2) out.
1955 r.8 Arrangements for medical and dental
1959 r.12(1)
and (2) attention.
Children (Performances) Regulations 1968 (S.I. 1968 No.1728)
G.B.
1968 r.6 Restriction upon number of performing
s days for children of certain ages.
1968 r.8 Medical examination required to establish




1968 r.13 Suitability of lodgings for child living
away from where he normally lives.
1968 r.16 Restrictions upon number of days for
performances without a prescribed break.
1968 r.21 Restrictions upon number of days in a week
on which a child may take part in
performances and rehearsals.
1968 r.22 Restriction on maximum number and length
of performances and rehearsals daily.
1968 r.23 Prescription of earliest and latest hours
for child to be present at place of
performance and place of rehearsal.
(b) Independent provisions
3.10 The first type of provision in Part 1 of this Table
which treats welfare directly is completely self-contained
and independent. Examples of it rely entirely upon the
criminal sanction. Section 1(1) of the Children and Young
7
Persons Act 1933 makes it an offence"if any person who has
7 23 Geo. 5, c.12.
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attained the age of sixteen years and has the custody,
charge or care of any child or young person under that age,
wilfully assaults, ill-treats, neglects, abandons, or
exposes him, or causes or procures him to be assaulted, ill-
treated, neglected, abandoned, or exposed, in a manner likely
to cause him unnecessary suffering or injury to health
(including injury to or loss of sight, or hearing, or limb,
or organ of the body, and any mental derangement)." This
important provision is a fairly comprehensive code protecting
the physical and mental integrity of any child or young
person. Naturally some of the words attract their own
interpretational problems; for example, what amounts to
"neglect" or "exposes" or when does "suffering" become
"unnecessary"? These difficulties are not exceptional.
The issues are clear; the criteria are objective; the
provisions directly protect the welfare of children.
3.11 Section 1(1) of the 1933 Act is supported by a
criminal sanction. Hence the statutory protection of
children operates retrospectively as it applies to events
which have allegedly happened and prospectively as a deterrent.
It may for this reason be to some extent ineffective as a
8
socially preventive measure and susceptible to the criticisms
of the criminal sanction as an inadequate positive social
9
regulator. In this sense it protects rather than promotes
welfare.
8 See Walker pp. 163, 203 to 207.
9 E.g. that an administrative system backed by appropriate
resources is more likely to change social habits than
criminal convictions.
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3.12 This analysis also applies to the other provisions
set out in Part 1 of this Table which constitute criminal
offences; for example, the various sexual offences and
offences against the person, the provisions relating to the
supply of liquor, sale of tobacco, risk of burning,
employment, participation in dangerous public performances,
and certain education and licensing and other offences. Indeed
the whole of the criminal law, whether it originates in
10 11
statute or in the common law, in so far as it relates to
offences against children, attracts similar comments. The
essential feature is that the criminal law directly protects
the welfare of children by identifying objectively conduct
detrimental to children which is sufficiently reprehensible
to warrant the imposition of a penalty.
(c) Dependent provisions
3.13 These considerations apply only partially to the
second type of provisions in Part 1 of this Table. They treat
welfare directly and objectively but they operate in
conjunction with other provisions of which they are an integral
part and from which they cannot be separated. These
dependent provisions set out fundamentally how welfare is
directly and objectively treated. A functional aspect is
however introduced. For example, section 1(1)(a) of the
Children Act 1948 places a duty upon the local authority to
receive a child .into their care where it appears to them
10 E.g. these offences.
11 Chapter 13.
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"with respect to a child in their area appearing to them
to be under the age of seventeen that he has been and remains
abandoned by his parents or guardian." One ground or
requirement in both section 1(1) of the 1933 Act and section
1(1) (a) of the 194-8 Act is abandonment. The 1948 Act does
not contain the further requirement of "unnecessary
suffering or injury"; nor does the abandonment under the
1948 Act have to be wilful. To that extent it is wider.
There is no prima facie reason to suppose that the common
concept of abandonment is any different in either of these
two contexts. A parent may be convicted under the 1933 Act
and may also be deprived of the care of his child under the
1948 Act. But abandonment under the 1948 Act does not per
se attract a penalty. The remedy in each case is radically
different. Under the 1933 Act the defaulting parent or
guardian is guilty of a criminal offence; under the 1948
Act he is liable to lose his parental right to the care
of the child.
3.14 The factor in section 1(1)(a) of the 1948 Act
which distinguishes it from section 1(1) of the 1933 Act
is that the power of activating the remedy under the 1948
Act is a local authority function. The common element in
the two provisions is their clear issues and objective
criteria. The welfare of the children is thus directly
protected. These comments also apply to the other instances
in Part 1 of this Table of the objective and directly
enforceable protection of the welfare of children, whether
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the administrative functionary is a local authority, a
13 14
court or a children's hearing.
(d) Subordinate legislation
3.15 A different but equally important detailed
prescription of welfare may be found in subordinate legislation,
examples of which are set out in Part 2 of this Table. All
these provisions, except those referred to in the next
paragraph, form part of the administrative code for the
management of various types of residential centres. The
regime in such houses and institutions is designed to promote
the welfare of their inmates to the extent that such an
object is not inconsistent with any other purpose of the
1 5
treatment. Each set of rules is limited by the terms of its
empowering provision, but the scope of the various rules is
broadly similar. They cover matters of direct concern for
the health and well-being of the child or young person; for
example, personal and bed clothing, food and diet, medical
and dental services, punishment, cleanliness and recreation.
3.16 The second type of regulation in Part 2 of this
Table relates to the protection of children in the context
of employment for public performances rather than to the
12 Children Act 1948, s.l(l)(a) and (b).
13 Adoption Act 1958, s.43(l): Custody of Children Act 1891, ss.l
and 3; Children and Young Persons Act 1969, s.l(2)(a)
and (c); Children Act 1975 s,12(2)(c) to (f).
14 Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968, ss.l5(l)(a) and (b)
and 32(2) (b) and (c).
15 See e.g. Bevan pp. 156 to 166.
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promotion of the child's well-being. Their enforcement is
also administrative in character. As in the case of the
other provisions in Part 2 no remedy is prescribed for
breach of the rules or regulations or for any questionable
exercise of any of the powers conferred by them. Control is
presumably exercised administratively by means of central
1 6
governmental supervision or through the common law at the
17
instance of the affected inmate. The common law remedy
never seems to have been used, no doubt because of the extreme
difficulty in proving what had happened and is of no practical
significance.
3.17 Certain of the provisions in Part 2 of Table 1 go
further than prescribing objectively the aspect of welfare
which is directly protected. They state in a slightly more
generalised form how the aim is to be achieved in addition
to stating the aim itself. In a limited sense the approach
is functional. For example, certain rules simply require
the provision of medical or dental services. The welfare
of the child is directly protected by the provision of such
services, and the provision of such services is in itself
a reasonably objective standard. Admittedly it is less
specific than, for example, the requirement of a separate
bed for each inmate. To that extent the provision may
also be classified in a different part of the graduated scale
16 E.g. the appointment of visitors or inspectors.
17 E.g. perhaps where the institution had failed to provide
the prescribed food or accommodation; less likely where
the treatment proved unsuccessful; more likely where
unauthorised punishment was inflicted.
8 k
1 8
already discussed. The same provision may thus be
considered in two different ways. It is not a defect of
this classification that some provisions may and in fact
do appear in different Tables. It is, it is suggested, a
realistic record of the legislation. In any event objectivity
is a matter of degree. Thus it is a finely balanced question
which Table should contain certain provisions. These
marginal difficulties illustrate the strength of this
fundamental classification.
(e) An inchoate threshold approach
3.18 The same is true of the provisions in Part 1 of
Table 1 which do not attract a criminal sanction. There
are normally two aspects of these provisions. The statute
confers a function. Then it prescribes objectively in what
circumstances the function may be fulfilled. For example,
section 12(2) of the Children Act 1975 enables the court to
dispense with the agreement of a parent if inter alia the
parent has abandoned, neglected or ill-treated the child.
These criteria are as objective as the behaviour proscribed
by section 1(1) of the Children and Young Persons Act 1933.




19 Except at most an interpretational discretion.
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Section 12(2) of the 1975 Act clearly provides for the
exercise of a judicial discretion once the objective criteria
have been satisfied.
3.19 A similar example may be found in section 1(1)(a)
of the Children Act 1948. This requires a local authority
to receive a child into their care inter alia where the
2 o
child has been abandoned by the parents or guardian. Again
there are two elements: the detailed statement of the
circumstances in which the function may be fulfilled and the
creation of the duty placed upon the local authority.
Section 1(1)(a) of the 1948 Act may be distinguished from
section 12(2) of the 1975 Act only in the sense that the
former function is mandatory and the latter discretionary.
Significantly each provision is classified in two different
2 1
ways. This is an indication that many of the most important
statutory provisions contain two distinct elements: the
satisfaction of threshold requirements prior to the
fulfilment of a function.
3.20 The preceding paragraphs have discussed the ways
in which statutory provisions directly treat welfare when
welfare is defined objectively. The capacity of one
statutory provision to be analysed in two distinct ways
indicates how welfare objectively defined may simultaneously
be treated functionally. That means simply that welfare is
20 The additional requirement in s.l(l)(c) is ignored
for the moment.
21 Both provisions are contained in Table 1. S .1(1)(a)
of the 1948 Act also appears in Table 2 and s.12(2)
of the 1975 Act in Table 4 in Chapter 5.
not immediately protected by the legislation. The
intervention of some person or body is necessary to protect
welfare. In other words the functional law does not operate
automatically; an administrative or similar process is
involved. This recognises the individuality of circumstances
affecting the welfare of .the particular child as distinct from
the generality of a rule of law applied objectively. This
leads to a consideration of the ways in which objective
welfare is treated functionally.
Section 3 - Objective welfare treated functionally
(a) Table 2
3.21 Some legislation affecting children does not prescribe
objectively the appropriate standard of conduct although the
welfare of the child is directly affected by the standard
otherwise implied by Parliament. A great deal of such
legislation is partly administrative in character in that it
confers various powers or imposes certain duties upon such
2 2
bodies as local authorities, courts (including juvenile courts)
and children's hearings. The relationship between the
function conferred and the welfare of the child is always
close although it has not always been articulated in detail
by the Parliamentary draftsman. It takes many forms. For
present purposes this is described as the functional approach
and it means basically the conferment of functions upon the
more appropriate body to achieve a specified objective. This
analysis is concerned more with the objective rather than
with the means of achieving that objective.
22 I.e. when courts are not adjudicating upon rights.
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TABLE 2
OBJECTIVE WELFARE TREATED FUNCTIONALLY
Part 1 - Provisions of Acts of Parliament
Section Function Welfare
Children and Young Persons Act 1933 (23 S 24 Geo.5, c.12): Eng.
Children and Young Persons (Scotland) Act 1937 (1 Edw.8 S 1
Geo . 6 , c.37); Scot.
1933 s.25(2) Duty placed upon police Unless the child is fit
magistrate not to grant a for the purpose and
licence to allow persons proper provision has
under 18 to go abroad been made to secure his






and training (except in
Scotland).
Education Act 1944 (7 S 9 Geo.6, c.31):Eng.
Education (Scotland) Act 1962 (10 S 11 Eliz.2, c.t47):Scot.
1944 s.8(l) Duty placed upon local Primary and secondary
1962 s.l(l) education authority to education,
secure the availability
of sufficient schools.
1933 s.44(l) Duty placed upon court to
1937 s.49(l) take certain steps in




1944 s.33(2) Arrangements to be made by Special educational
1962 s. 5(2) local education•authority treatment,
for pupils with some
disability.
1944 s.34(l) Duty placed upon local




1944 s.36 Duty placed upon parents
1962 s.31 to cause their child to







1944 s.54(l) Medical examination of





National Health Service Act 1946 (9 & 10 .Geo. 6, c.81): Eng.
National Health Service (Scotland Act)1947^1^ & 11 Geo. 6, c.27):
1946 s.22(l) Duty placed upon local
1947 s . 22(1) health authority with
regard to children under










Children Act 19*48 0.1 £ 12 Geo. 6, 0.93): Eng.
Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968 (1968 c.49): Scot.
1948 s.l(lMa) Duty placed upon local Absence of or
1968 s.15(1)(a) authority to receive abandonment of child
child into their care. by parent or guardian,
1948 s.l(l)(b) Duty placed upon local
1968 s.l5(l)(b) authority to receive






Means by which local Provision of accommo-
authority shall discharge dation and maintenance
their duty towards
children in their care
(boarding out,
maintenance in community
or voluntary home, etc.).
Criminal Justice Act 1948 (II S 12 Geo.6, c.58): Eng.




Duty placed upon court
to obtain and consider
information and to take








Nurseries and Child-Minders Regulation Act 1918 (11 S 12
Geo . 6 , c . 53 ) G.B.
1948 s.l(3) Power of local health
authority to refuse to
register premises.
If the persons employed or
the premises are not fit.
1948 s.l(4) Power of local health
authority to refuse to
register person.
If any person or any
persons employed or the
premises are not fit.









Secure visiting and giving
advice.
1958 s.4(2) Requirements which may
be imposed upon foster
parents by the local
authority.




protecting the health of
the children.
Adoption Act 1958 (788 Eliz.2, c.5): Scot.
Adoption Act 1976 (1976 c,36): Eng.
1958 s.38 Duty placed upon local Advice as to care and
1976 s.33 authority to secure that maintenance,
protected children within
their area are visited
from time to time.
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Section Function Welfare
Children and Young Persons Act 1963 (3963 c.37) : G.B.
1963 s.3(2) Investigation by local






character of child or
young person.
1963 s.37(H) Duty placed upon local Unless the child is fit
authority not to grant to do so, proper provision
a licence for persons has been made to secure
under 16 to take part in his health and kind
a public performance. treatment.
1963 s.58 Power of local authority Visit, advise, befriend
in certain circumstances or give financial assistance
to assist persons formerly
under their care.
Children and Young Persons Act 1969 (1969 c.5H): Eng.
1969 s.9(l) Investigation by local
authority for report to




character of child or
young person.
1969 s.12(2) Requirements which may Place of residence;
be imposed upon a presenting of person;








Requirements which may be
imposed upon a supervised
person by the court.
Duty placed upon the
supervisor.
Duty placed upon the
visitor appointed to a
person subject to a care
order.
Proposals to be contained


















in care and for the
assessment of the most
suitable accommodation
and treatment for those
children.
1969 s.38 Duty placed upon local
authority in relation to
community homes.
Provide, manage, equip
and maintain the home.
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Part 2 - Provisions of Statutory Instruments
Rule or Function Welfare
Regulation
Approved School Rules 1933 (S.R. S 0. 1933 No.774): Eng.
1933 r,10(2) Duty placed upon approved Training, welfare and
school managers to ensure education of the boys,
satisfactory condition of
school and to pay visits
to school.
1933 r.44(l) Duties placed upon medical Health, diet and
officer appointed by hygiene,
approved school managers.
1933 r. 4-5(1) Duties placed upon dentist Examination of teeth
appointed by approved and dental work,
school managers.
Approved Probation Hostel and Home Rules 19*49 (S.I. 1949
No.1376): Eng.
1949 r.6(l) Duty placed upon the Condition of the hostel
committee of management of or home; training and
the hostel or home. welfare of the residents,
1949 r.29(l) Duties placed upon Health, diet and
medical officer appointed hygiene,
by committee.






Rule or Function Welfare
Regulation
Borstal (Scotland) Rules 1950 (S.I. 1950 No.1944):Scot.
Borstal Rules 196*4 (S.I. 1964 No.387): Eng.
1950 r.4(l) Objects of borstal
1964 r.l(2) training.
To lead to a good and useful
life; to abstain from
crime; to develop his
character, ability and sense
of personal responsibility.
1950 r.66(l) Duty placed upon
1964 r.l9(l) medical officer.
General care of the health
of the inmate.




1964 r.45(l) Power of Governor to Prevention of injury to
order inmate to be put self,
under restraint.
1964 r.75(l) Duty placed upon
Board of Visitors,
Premises, administration
and treatment of the
inmates.
1950 r.82(l) Inmates to be given
1964 r.28(l) regular physical
recreation, training
and exercise.




Rule or Function We Ifare
Regulation
Administration of Children's Homes Regulations 1951 (S.I. 1951
No.1217): Eng.
Administration of Children's Homes (Scotland) Regulations 1959
(S.I. 1959 No . 83*4 ) : Scot.
1951 r.5(2) Duties placed upon medical Health and hygiene
1959 r.6(2) officer appointed by
administering authority.
1951 r.6 Duty placed upon administering Dental care.
1959 r.7 authority.
1951 r.9 Duty placed upon Saving life in case
1959 r.9(2) administering authority of fire.
to secure fire drill.
Detention Centre Rules 1952 (S.I. 1952 No.1432): Eng.
Detention Centre (Scotland) Rules 1960 (S.I. 1960 No.870): Scot.
1952 r.5 Certification (approval in . Size, light, warmth,
1960 r.5 Scotland) of sleeping ventilation and
accommodation for inmates. health.
1952 r.58(l) Duty placed upon Board of After-care of inmates,
1960 r.58(l) Visitors (Visiting Committee
in Scotland).






Rule or Function Welfare
Regulation






Duty placed upon medical
officer to supervise the





Prison (Scotland) Rules (S.I. 1952 No.565): Scot.




Boarding-out of Children Regulations 1955 (S.I. 1955 No.1377): Eng.
Boarding-out of Children (Scotland) Regulations 1959 (S.I. 1959
No. 8 3 5) : Scot.




Arrangements to be made
for medical and dental
attention for child boarded
out.
Health,
1955 r,17(l) Restriction on boarding-out Satisfactory sleeping
(a)
of foster children without









1955 r.22(l) Duty placed upon local
authority or voluntary








Duty to obtain medical










Attendance Centre Rules 1958 (S.I. 1958 No.1990): Eng.
1958 r.2(l) Purpose of the occupation Health of mind and
and instruction given at body,
attendance.
Probation Rules 1965 (S.I. 1965 No.723): Eng,
1965 r.36(l) Duty placed upon probation







1965 r.36(2) Duty placed upon probation








Children's (Performances) Regulations 1968 (S.I. 1968
No.1728): G.B.
1968 r.2(1) Power of licensing
authority to request
that child be medically
examined.
To see if he is fit and
his health will not
suffer.
1968 r.l2(5) Reason for confiding





1968 r.14 Duty placed upon local
authority not to approve
place of performance or
rehearsal.
Unless arrangements




1968 r.15 Duty placed upon licencee Getting child home,
after last performance
or rehearsal.
1968 r.l7(l) Duty placed upon licencee Fitness and health,
(a)
to ensure medical
examination of child at
certain times.
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(b) The nature of the functional approach
3.22 Table 2 contains several examples of the functional
approach. Each provision has two aspects: the conferment of
a function, either a power or a duty, and a statement of the
aim or purpose of the function. Normally they are distinct.
Sometimes the method of fulfilling the function is also
specified.23 Occasionally the two aspects are merged. In the
examples in Table 2 the aim of the function is directly related
to the welfare of the child, although welfare is not described
2 i*
as such or in similar general terms but more specifically.
These examples may be compared to those in Table 1. The
latter describe the legal consequences of conduct affecting
children detrimentally. The former set out to bring about
some change in the situation of the relevant children,
unquestionably to their advantage, usually by contemplating
future action, but sometimes with reference also to what has
happened in the past. The instances in Table 1 thus protect
welfare by preventing avoidable consequences and Table 2
contains a pattern for protecting children by changing some
aspect of their lives. In this sense the Table 2 pattern tends
to promote actively the welfare of children.
23 E.g. s.13(1) and (2) of the Children Act 1948; r.l0(2)
of the Approved School Rules 1933.
24 E.g. health, character, education, accommodation,
maintenance, fitness, after-care, training, comfort.
Occasionally they are more specific: dental care,
medical care, cleanliness, sanitation. Often they are a
combination of such factors.
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3.23 Consider, for example, section 3(2) of the
Children and Young Persons Act 1963. This places a duty
upon the local authority in certain circumstances to make
such investigations as may be necessary and the objective of
the function is to provide information for the court as to
the home surroundings, school record, health and character
of the child or young person in question. This objective
itself contemplates certain specific instances of welfare.
There would however appear to be further unarticulated
objectives. Section 3(2) of the 1963 Act applies where a
complaint has been made for an order against a local authority
by a parent or guardian directing the local authority to bring
the child or young person before a juvenile court under
section 1 of the Children and Young Persons Act 1969. The
immediate purpose is to establish whether care proceedings
are justified on the ground that the child or young person
is inter alia in need of care or control while the ultimate
purpose is to decide, if necessary, what course should be
taken in the best interests of the child or young person.
3.24 Each aspect of the statutory function is part of
a series of graduated links in a complicated statutory chain.
All the links in the chain are normally found in some relevant
statutory provision. The ultimate link however need not
necessarily be found in the same provision. It may be found
2 5
in a different section or even in a different Act of Parliament.
25 E.g. Children and Young Persons Act 1933, s.44; Children
Act 1948, s.12; Guardianship of Minors Act 1971, s.l.
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Welfare plays some part in each of these provisions and the
part played is by no means uniform. In a sense therefore
these ultimate links related to welfare act as a form of
grundnorm in their particular circumstances.
3.25 To look at some other examples: section 36 of the
Education Act 1944 places a duty upon parents to cause their
child to attend school regularly or otherwise receive efficient
full-time education. The objective is to ensure that the
child receives full-time education suitable to his age, ability
and aptitude. A provision which is susceptible to similar
analysis, although it operated rather differently before its
repeal, is section 7(2) of the Adoption Act 1958. This sets
out certain of the factors to which the court' should have
regard in determining whether an adoption order would be for
the welfare of the child, namely the health of the applicant
and the wishes of an infant of sufficient age and understanding.
The health of the applicant clearly has a bearing upon the
welfare of the child and it would be difficult to deny the
relevance of the wishes of such a child. This has been
superseded partly by section 3 of the Children Act 1975 which
pro tanto may be similarly analysed. These factors are thus
part of the statutory process whose objective is the promotion
of the welfare of the child, a point clearly emphasised by
the heading given to section 3 of the 1975 Act.
3.26 Some provisions in Part 1 of Table 2 fit into this
pattern less easily. In these instances the operation of
the function is restricted by the fulfilment of certain
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conditions. These conditions, although restrictive,
nevertheless operate obliquely as an objective of the exercise.
To some extent they may overlap marginally with some
2 6
provisions in Table 4 in chapter 5. Again it may be a
27
question of degree. But even so the examples in Table 2 may
reasonably be distinguished from those in Table 4. The
feature of the distinction is the direction in which the
condition operates. For instance, section 37(4) of the
Children and Young Persons Act 1963 restricts a local authority
from granting a licence for persons under sixteen to take part
in a public performance unless they are satisfied inter alia
that the child is fit to do so and that proper provision has
been made to secure his health and kind treatment. Section
1(3) of the Nurseries and Child-Minders Regulation Act 1948
authorises a local health authority to refuse to register
premises under the Act if they are satisfied inter alia that
any person employed or proposed to be employed in looking
after children at the premises is not a fit person to look
after children. These provisions are protective of welfare
in the sense that they apply to existing circumstances. Both
however contain indications relevant to the promotion of the
child's future welfare: namely, the future security of the
child's health and kind treatment in section 37(4) of the 1963
Act and, perhaps less strongly, the fitness to care for
children in section 1(3) of the 1948 Act.
26 Which deals with the fulfilment of welfare considerations
as a sine qua non of the exercise of a discretion.
27 As in the marginal differences between Tables 1 and 2.
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2 8
3.27 This analysis suggests that these provisions may be
classified as examples of the objective treatment of welfare
operating in a functional context. They are perhaps less
amenable to this classification than the other provisions set
out in Table 2. It is nevertheless suggested that their
inclusion in this Table is not a distortion of their role.
Rather it indicates marginally how Table 2 differs from the
other classifications adopted. Such marginal confusion once
again does not destroy but helps to emphasise the essential
character of the various provisons categorised in the Table.
(c) Subordinate legislation
3.28 The structure of the subordinate legislaton instanced
in Part 2 of Table 2 follows broadly the pattern of the Acts
themselves. It is thus not surprising that all the provisions
in Table 2 are administrative in character. Otherwise their
context would not be functional. The main point of distinction
between Parts 1 and 2 of the Table is that sometimes in Part 2
it is less easy to separate the function from the objective.
The draftsman has sometimes merged the two aspects as part of
a single process. In such cases this classification has
introduced a rather artificial duality where in practice none
exists. But it does not destroy the foundation of the
classification which is fundamentally static. On the other
hand there are instances in Part 2 where the dual aspects of
28 I.e. those discussed in the preceding paragraph.
10i+
the classification could not be clearer. The Borstal Rules
confer various functions individually but the introductory
2 9
rules also specify what are the prescribed objects of borstal
training. The Attendance Centre Rules do likewise for
attendance centres and rule 151 of the Prison (Scotland) Rules
1952 sets out a general objective for the treat ment of young
prisoners in Scotland. The last three examples in effect
operate as statements of official policy couched in precise
Parliamentary form. No doubt they would be invaluable to
those administering the rules but it is perhaps questionable
whether and to what extent they comply with current rules
3 o
governing subordinate legislation. The question is probably
academic since they are unlikely ever to be enforced through
the legal process.
(d) Enforcement
3.29 It is a further feature of the provisions contained
in Table 2 that means for their enforcement are not normally
3 1
prescribed. The same anolies to the more functional provisions
in Table 1. This is arguably an advantage, not a defect. The
criminal law and legal remedies would be largely out of place
3 2
in such a context, at least according to current doctrine.
29 E.g. Borstal (Scotland) Rules 1950, r.4(l).
30 E.g. are they intra vires; do they constitute "rules";
are they enforceable; are they precise enough?
31 Except in the case of breaches of the provisions of the
Education Acts.
32 Because the law is dealing with the welfare of children,
flexibility is necessary, technicalities are to be
avoided and administrative procedures are more likely to
be effective: i.e. the concept of "individualised justice".
See e.g. Polier J.W., The rule of law and the role of
psychiatry (Baltimore, 1968), chapter IV.
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Control is no doubt largely administrative or political in
3 3
practice. This would be entirely consistent with the nature
of the provisions. Most of those in Part 1 apply to local
34 3 5
authorities or their constituent bodies; a few to courts;
3 6
only one to individual persons at large. Generally Part 2
sets out standards implemented functionally by or through
officials or official bodies, such as probation officers,
medical officers, dental officers, Governors, school managers,
Boards of Visitors, committees of management, administering
authorities or local authorities. Most of these functional
standards relate to institutional establishments of one kind
37
or another.
33 E.g. as a series of links in a chain of responsibility
within the local authority structure and then subject
to further links attaching the local authority to central
government responsibility.
34 Including certain officials, e.g. probation officers.
35 E.g. Children and Young Persons Act 1933, s.25(2);
Criminal Justice Act 1948, s,17(2).
36 E.g. Education Act 1944, s.36.
37 E.g. prisons, borstals, detention centres, attendance
centres, homes, etc. The exceptions are the Adoption
Agencies Regulations and the Children's (Performances)
Regulations. R.14 of the latter regulations is also
an example of the specification of the objective of the
function as a condition to be satisfied before the
function can be performed.
io6
CHAPTER 4
THE GENERALISED TREATMENT OF WELFARE
Section 1 - Introduction
4. 1 The preceding chapter considered the welfare of
children regulated in specific terms by statute, both
directly and functionally. It was a feature of that
classification that the expression "welfare" had no part
to play. That expression is used frequently in Acts of
Parliament and delegated legislation. Its significancce
and role vary depending upon the terminology and grammatical
structure of the provisions. It is the purpose of this
chapter to classify and analyse statically the various ways
in which the generalised concept of welfare operates in
legislation affecting children.
4.2 The word itself is relatively indeterminate. It is
susceptible of different shades of meaning; its application
varies according to individual sets of circumstances. No
doubt Parliament selected it by reason of its adaptability.
Its very nature suggests that in whatever context it appears,
either discretionary or mandatory, a certain degree of
interpretational discretion cannot be avoided. For example,
if statute places a duty upon an institution to do something
for the well-being of the child, there is despite the
obligatory nature of the directive, an inherent discretion
involved in contemplating the welfare of the child. On the
other hand, if the institution is empowered to do something
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for the well-being of the child, there is a substantive
as well as an interpretational discretion. It is not
therefore surprising that most of the examples of the use
of the expression are functional in character, in the sense
that they are related somehow to the implementation of an
obligation or the exercise of a discretion. This is
confirmed, in theory at least, by the absurdity of Parliament
enacting that it shall be an offence for any person to affect
detrimentally the welfare of a child or for any person not
to secure and promote the welfare of a child. Direct
prescription of welfare obviously requires a much greater
degree of precision.
4.3 Table 3 in this chapter and Table 4 in Chapter 5
attempt to set out the most significant examples of the
statutory uses of the word "welfare" and its equivalents.
It is a feature that all the examples are functional. In
the case of Table 3 welfare is either contemporaneous with
or follows upon the function; in the examples in Table 4
welfare precedes the function. The classification is
rendered more complex because in the examples in Table 3,
although they all operate functionally, the relationship
between welfare and the function is not 'uniform. There
are three aspects of this relationship. Firstly, welfare
may be the objective or aim of the fulfilment of the function.
In that sense welfare has a role to play which embraces the
whole process. Secondly, the role of welfare may be less
total. The statute or regulation may direct that the
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welfare of the child is a factor or consideration to which
the functionary, whether court or administrative body, must
pay attention or have regard. Finally welfare may operate
negatively as the justification for releasing a functionary
from an otherwise binding statutory duty. This final
aspect of the examples in Table 3 comes closest to the
classification in Table 4. In that Table the welfare of
the child is a requirement which must be fulfilled before
a power can be exercised: in other words, a threshold
requirement. In Table 3 it is the factor which prevents
a duty from being implemented.
TABLE 3
GENERAL WELFARE OF A CHILD AS A FACTOR IN THE
FUNCTIONAL APPROACH
Part 1 - Provisions of Acts of Parliament
Section Function Welfare
Custody of Chidren Act 1891 (54 S 55 Vict.,c.3): G.B.
1891 s.3 Duty placed upon court not To have regard to
to order delivery of child the welfare of the
to parent unless parent is child,
fit person to have custody.
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Section Function Welfare
Children and Young Persons Act 1933 (23 S 24 Geo.5 , c.12):Eng.
Children and Young Persons (Scotland) Act 1937 (1 Edw.8 6 1
Geo.6 , c.37 ) : Scot.
1933 s.44(l) Duty placed upon the court To have regard to the
1937 s.19(1) in dealing with a child welfare of the child,
or young person as
offender or otherwise.
1937 s•40(1) Duty placed upon police Unless it is necessary
officer to liberate an in his interests to




Education Act 1944 (7 £ 8 Geo. 6, c.31):Eng.
Education (Scotland) Act 1962 (10 S 11 Eliz.2, c.47):Scot.
1944 s.59(l) Power of (duty placed
1962 s.17(1) upon in Scotland) local
education authority to
impose restrictions upon
the employment of a
child in certain
circumstances.






■Children Act 1948 (11 & 12 Geo.6, c.43): Eng.
Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968 (1968 c.49): Scot.
Intervention is1948 s.l(l) Duty placed upon local
(c)
authority to receive child necessary in the
1968 s.15(1) into their care,
(c)
interest of the welfare
of the child.
So long as the welfare1948 s.l(2) Duty placed upon local
1968 s.15(2) authority to keep in their of the child appears
care the child already to require it.
received into their care.
1948 s.l(3) Duty placed upon a local
1968 s.15(3) authority to secure that
the parental care of the
child already received
into care is restored.
If it appears con¬
sistent with the welfare
of the child.
1948 s.2(5) Duty placed upon court
(c)
court not to order
Unless it is in the
interests of the child,




1948 s.12(1) Duty placed upon a local
1968 s.20(l) authority in reaching
decisions relative to
children in their care.
To give first
consideration to the




1948 s.17(2) Duty placed upon Secretary Unless it would





made for his welfare.
1948 s.34(l) Duty placed upon local
1968 s.26(l) authority to advise and
befriend child formerly
in their care.
Unless the welfare of
the child does not
require it.
1948 s.54(3) Duty placed upon local
authorities to cause
children in voluntary
homes to be visited.
In the interests of
the well-being of the
children.
Nurseries and Child-Minders Regulation Act 1948 (II S 12
Geo.6, c.53): G.B.
1948 s.7(l) Power of authorised person Arrangements for the
to enter and inspect welfare of the children,
premises and children.
Criminal Justice Act 1948 (11 £ 12 Geo.6, c.58): Eng.
Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 1949 (12, 13 S 14 Geo.6,
c . 9 4): Scot.
1948 s.17(2) Duty placed upon court not Unless there is no
1949 s.18(2) to impose imprisonment on other appropriate




Children Act 1958 (6 8 7 Eliz.2, c.65): G.B.
1958 s. 1: Duty placed upon local To satisfy themselves
Eng.
authority as regards as to the well-being
foster children in their of the children.
area.
1958 s . 1A: Duty placed upon local To secure the welfare
Scot.
authority as regards of the children.
foster children in their
area.
Adopt ion Act 1958 (7 8 8 Eliz.2, c.5): Scot
Adopt ion Act 1976 (1976 c . 36) : Eng.
1958 s.38 Duty placed upon local
1976 s.33 authority to secure that
'protected' children
within their area are
visited by their officers.
Children and Young Persons Act 1963 (1963 c.37): G.B.
1963 s.l(l) Duty placed upon the local To promote welfare by
authority to make available diminishing the need
advice, guidance and to receive or keep
assistance. children in care.
To satisfy themselves




Social Work (ScotlandC Act 1968 (1968 c.49) : Scot.
1968 s.12 Duty placed upon local
authority in respect of
specified persons in¬
cluding children under
the age of 18.




1968 S.15C4) Duty placed upon local
authority not to take
over the care of a child
from another local
authority.
Unless they are satisfied
that the taking over will
not be detrimental to
his welfare.
1968 s.43(l) Duty placed upon
children's hearing after
the referral of a case.
To consider on what
course they should
decide in the best
interests of the child,
1968 s. 4-7(1) Restriction upon duration No longer than is
of a supervision
requirement.
necessary in the interest
of the child.
1968 s.52 Power of Secretary of
State to terminate a
supervision requirement
in force in respect of a
child.
Having regard to the
interests of the child,
llU
Section Function Welfare
1968 s.68(l) Duty placed upon local In the interests of
authority from time to the well-being of such
time to cause persons persons,
in establishments in
itsarea to be visited.
Children and Young Person Act 1969 (1969 0.5^): Eng.





to the interests of
child or young person,
1969 s.28(5) Duty placed upon
justice to release
child detained in
place of safety except
in certain
circumstances.
Unless child ought to be
further detained in his
own interests.
1969 s.29(l) Duty placed upon police Unless child ought to
(i)
officer to release be further detained in






Matrimonial Proceedings (Children) Act 1958 (6 S 7 Eliz. 2,
c.40): Scot.
Matrimonial Proceedings and Property Act 1970 ( 1970 c. 4 5) : Eng.
1958 s.8(1)
(a)
Duty placed upon court not
to grant (in England make
absolute) certain decrees
1970 s.17(1) unless certain arrange-
(b)(i) ments have been made for
the children.
Satisfactory arrangements
for the welfare of every
child over whom the court
has jurisdiction.
Guardianship of Minors Act 1971 (1971 c.3): Eng.
Guardianship of Infants Act 1886 (49 S 50 Vict., c.27): Scot.
Guardianship of Infants Act 1925 (15 S 16 Geo. 5, c.45): Scot.
Illegitimate Children (Scotland) Act 1930 (20 S 21 Geo. 5, c.33):Sco
1971 s.l
1925 s.l
Duty placed upon court in
proceedings involving the
custody or upbringing of
a minor.
To regard the welfare
of the minor as the first
and paramount consideratio




To have regard to the
welfare of the minor.




custody and access when
a person has been
appointed sole guardian
by the court.
To have regard to the
welfare of the minor.
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Section Function Welfare
1971 s.11(a) Power of court to make To have regard to the
an order regarding welfare of the minor,
custody and access
where one of the joint
guardians is the mother
or the father.
1930 s.2(l) Power of court to make To have regard to the
an order regarding welfare of the child,
custody and access in
relation to an
illegitimate child.
Guardianship Act 1973 (1973 c.29): G.B.
1973 s.l(2): Inter-parental agreement If it will not be for
Eng.
affecting an infant shall the benefit of the
1973 s.10(2): not be enforced. infant.
Scot.
Children Act 1975 (1975 c.72): Scot.
Adoption Act 1976 (1976 c.36): Eng.
1975 s.3 Duty in reaching
1976 s.6 adoption decisions to
have regard to all the
circumstances.








Approved School Rules 1933 (S.R. £ 0. 1933 No.774): Eng.
1933 r.10
(2)
Duty placed upon managers
as regards the approved
school and the residence.




Approved Probation Hostel and Home Rules 1949 (S.I. 1949
No.13 7 6): Eng.
1949 r.6(l) Duty placed upon managing
committee as regards the
hostel or home and the
residents.




Borstal (Scotland) Rules 1950 (5.1. 1950 No,1944): Scot.
Borstal Rules 1964 (S.I. 1946 No.387): Eng.
1950 r.57(l) Special attention to be
1964 r.32(l) paid to the maintenance
of the relations between
an inmate and his family.
As desirable in the
best interests of both
1950 r.57(2) Maintenance or establish-
1964 r.32(2) ment of relations with
persons or agencies out¬
side the institution.
As may promote the




1964 r.35(2) Power of Governor to





Administration of Children's Homes Regulations 1951 (S.I.
1951 No.1217): Eng.
Administration of Children's Homes (Scotland) Regulations








To secure the well-




Duty placed upon visitor
appointed by the
administering authority
to satisfy himself and
to report on the conduct
of the home.
Whether it is conducted
in the interests of the
well-being of the
children.
Detention Centre Rules 1952 (S.I. 1952 No.1432): Eng.
Detention Centre (Scotland) Rules 1960 (S.I. 1960 No.870):Scot,
1952 r.57(l) Duty to pay special
1960 r.52(l) attention to the
maintenance of relations
between an inmate and
Such as desirable in





1952 r.6(l) Power to impose certain As they consider
1960 r.56(l) restrictions upon and necessary for the
supervision over letters welfare of individuals
and visits.
Prison (Scotland) Rules 1952 (S.I. 1952 No.565): Scot.
1952 r.152 Power to modify these As desirable in relation




Boarding-out of Children Regulations 1955 (S.I. No.1377):Eng.
Boarding-out of Children (Scotland) Regulations 1959 (S.I.
1959 No.835): Scot.
1955 r.4 Duty placed upon authority If no longer in best
1959 r.l6(l) not to allow child to interests of child,
remain boarded out.
1955 r.9 Duty placed upon visitor






1955 r.l7(l) Duty not to board-out
(d)
child unless the avail¬
able history of the












As often as the
welfare of the child
requires.
1955 r.22(l) Duty placed upon local
authority to ensure a
regular review in





1955 r.25 Duty not to board-out




would be suitable to
the needs of the child
Probation Rules 1965 (S.I. 1965 No.723): Eng.
1965 r.36(l) Duty placed upon
probation officer to
encourage a person under
his supervision in
certain matters.




Magistrates' Courts (Children and Young Persons) Rules
1970 (S.I. 1970 No.1792): Eng.
1970 r.10
(1Kb)
Duty placed upon court
to take into consider-
To enable court to
deal with the case
.121
Section Function Welfare





history of child or
young person found guilty
of an offence.
in his best interests
1970 r.20(l) Duty placed upon court
(a)
to take into consider¬




history of child or young
persons proved to be in
need of care.
To enable court to
deal with the case in
his best interests.
Children's Hearings (Scotland) Rules 1971 (S.I. 1971 No.*492):
Scot.






with respect to the







If it would not be
detrimental to the
interests of the child.
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Section 2 - Welfare as a statuto'ry objective
4.4 The two clearest examples of general welfare,
however it may be phrased, as the positive objective of the
exercise of a statutory function may be found in section 1(1)
of the Children and Young Persons Act 1963 and section 12(1)
of the Children act 1948. The former provision places a
duty upon every local authority to make available such
advice, guidance and assistance as may promote the welfare
of children by diminishing the need to receive children into
or keep them in care. To analyse this provision: the
function conferred upon the local authority is to make
available advice, guidance and assistance. The function is
supplemented by the power conferred by the last limb of the
sub-section to give assistance in kind or in cash. This
power adds nothing to the function. It simply interprets
epexegetically the forms of assistance available in the
first limb of the sub-section. The objective of the function
is stated to be the promotion of the welfare of children.
A qualification is added that the obligation is effective
only if the objective is to be achieved by diminishing the
need to receive children into care. The significant feature
is the clarity with which the objective is expressed.
4.5 This is true also of section 12(1) of the 1948 Act
which imposes upon the local authority a duty to exercise
their powers with respect to a child in their care so as
to further his best interests. The function is largely
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unspecified as it refers to the general powers of a local
authority with respect to a child in their care but the
objective clearly relates to the general concept of a child's
best interests. The policy of Parliament in 1948 was clear:
the local authority was obliged to further the best interests
of the child in their care. This was modified in 1969.
Section 27(2) of the Children and Young Persons Act 1969
introduced a potentially conflicting consideration, namely
the protection of the public. Thus if it is necessary to
do so to protect members of the public, a local authority
is empowered to disregard what still must be regarded as its
primary duty, namely to further the best interests of the
child. The clarity of the objective of section 12(1) of
the 1948 Act is not affected but the introduction of a
secondary objective may make the administration of the Act
more difficult.
4.6 The legislative code dealing with children and
young persons in Scotland used to be similar to that in
England. Since the Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968 there
has been a considerable divergence. The Children and
Young Persons Act 1963 applied to Scotland and England when
i
it was enacted. Section 1(1) of that Act no longer applies
2
to Scotland. It has been replaced by section 12 of the
1 S • 6 5 .
2 Repealed for Scotland: Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968,
Sched.9, Part 1.
Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968 and the scope of that
provision has been considerably extended to include persons
3
other than children and young persons. It places a duty
upon each local authority to promote social welfare by making
available advice, guidance and assistance. The concept of
social welfare in this context is at once both wider and
narrower than welfare in section 1(1) of the 1963 Act. It
is wider as it applies more generally than to children and
young persons; it is narrower in that the addition of the
word "social" is a limiting factor to which the expression
"welfare" is not subject. There would seem little doubt
that the social welfare of a child excludes factors which
would be included in a reference to his welfare. Does it
exclude physical and mental health, the material aspects
of life or his education? "Social" is not a precise word.
Is it restricted to a child's relationship with other people?
The issues do not seem to have been considered. It is
suggested nevertheless that the introduction of the word
"social" may, perhaps unintentionally, restrict the scope
of the provision.
4.7 Statute also treats differently as between England
and Scotland the duty placed upon local authorities to
ensure the well-being of foster children. The Scottish
provision, section 1A of the Children Act 1958 which
antedates the English provision, requires every local
3 S . 12 (2 ) .
4 S.1A was introduced by virtue of s.19 of and para. 1
of Sched. 1 to the Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968.
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authority "to secure the welfare" of foster children in
5
their area. Section 1 of that Act, which applies in
England, requires every local authority "to satisfy
themselves as to the well-being" of such children.
Discounting any difference between "welfare" and "well-
being", the Scottish provision is more direct and purposeful.
To "secure" something is a clearer and stronger function
than to "satisfy yourself" about it. Both are undeniably
objectives of a statutory function. Perhaps in practice
there may be little difference between them but the draftsman,
whether intentionally or not, has introduced a difference
of emphasis and degree.
4.8 There are also several examples of this type of
approach in subordinate legislation. Statistically there
are probably more such examples than those derived from
legislation directly enacted by Parliament. This is perhaps
odd, given the greater freedom of form available,
theoretically at least, to Parliament and on the other hand
the more restrictive formal rules applying to subordinate
legislation. The best instance is probably rule 1 of the
Administration of Children's Homes Regulations 1951 which
requires the administering authority to make arrangements
for every home on such principles as are calculated to
secure the well-being of the children in the home. The
5 As substituted by virtue of s.72(5) of and para. 1 of
Sched. 7 to the Children and Young Persons Act 1969.
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function is not specified but the objective is stated
unequivocally and in very general terms. There are other
examples of delegated legislation which demonstrate this
6
approach. They follow a similar pattern. Other ways of
reaching the same or similar objectives may be found in
Table 3. The distinguishing characteristic is that the
following provisions relate more obliquely to the objective
of the function. Section 1(3)(a) of the Children Act 1948
for example, places a duty upon the local authority to
endeavour to secure that the care of a child in their care
shall be restored to his parent or guardian where it appears
to them consistent with the welfare of the child to do so.
The objective of securing the welfare of the child is thus
expressed as a condition attached to the exercise of the
function. Rule 36(1) of the Probation Rules 1965 requires
a probation officer to encourage a person under his
supervision to make use of any statutory or voluntary agency
which might contribute to the welfare of a child under his
supervision. Welfare is obviously the object of the exercise,
although it is not couched in direct and positive terms.
The drafting is different; the approach is the same.
6 E.g. Approved Probation Hostel and Homes Rules 1949, v .6
(1); Borstal (Scotland) Rules 1950, r.57(l) and (2);
Detention Centre Rules 1952, r.57(l); Prison (Scotland)
Rules 1952, r.152; Magistrates' Courts (Children and
Young Persons) Rules 1970,fr.8. 10(l)(b) and 20(l)(a).
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Section 3 - Welfare as a statutory factor
4.9 There are many examples in Acts of Parliament
which direct some appropriate body "to have regard" to the
welfare of the child in coming to their decision. It does
not appear to be a technique used much, if at all, in
7
subordinate legislation. Several direct statutory examples
8
are set out in Table 3. Statistically they are the most
important type of statutory provision in Table 3; analytically
they are the easiest provisions to locate, identify and
classify. The language tends to be uniform. The phrase
normally used is "having regard to". This directive is
addressed normally to a court, sometimes to an administrative
9
authority. In either case the Act merely declares in effect
that the welfare of the child is a relevant consideration
1 o
without, subject to one vital exception, indicating the
signficance of that consideration.
4.10 The simplest instances of this technique may be
found in sections 9(1), 10(1)(a) and 11(a) of the
Guardianship of Minors Act 1971, section 3 of the Custody
of Children Act 1891 and section 2(1) of the Illegitimate
Children (Scotland) Act 1930. These provisions all
instruct the court to have regard to the welfare of the
child in reaching a decision about custody. In each case
7 At least none has been found for inclusion in Table 3.
8 In the sense that most decided cases tend to deal with
one or other of these provisions, particularly the
section embodying the concept of the paramountcy of
welfare.
9 E.g. Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968, s.52.
10 The section embodying the concept of the paramountcy of
welfare.
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other considerations are declared relevant by statute.
Similarly, but in a different context, section 34 of the
Adoption Act 1958 requires the court to have regard to the
welfare of the infant when deciding whether to authorise a
parent who has consented or agreed to the adoption of the
infant to remove him from the care and possession of the
applicant. Finally section 44(1) of the Children and Young
Persons Act 1933 requires every court in dealing with a
child or young person brought before it, as an offender
or otherwise, to have regard to his welfare.
4.11 There are two particularly significant features
about these examples. They all relate to courts and in
each case the court is faced with a decision affecting the
future of the child. The court is thus not adjudicating
upon a past dispute. Parliament has felt justified in
giving to the courts in these circumstances a considerable
degree of flexibility. The provisions considered in sections
2 and 4 of this chapter, dealing with welfare as a
statutory objective and as a release from a statutory duty,
should be contrasted. They relate on the whole to
administrative "bodies and the circumstances in which these
bodies are free to act are much more closely circumscribed.
In other words they lack the flexibility conceded to the
courts.
4.12 The only instance in Table 3 of a directive issued
solely to an administrative body is section 52 of the Social
129
Work (Scotland) Act 1968. This enables the
Secretary of State to terminate a supervision requirement11
in force in respect of a child where he is satisfied it
should be terminated "having regard to all the circumstances
of the case and the interests of the child." This is a
broad discretion and Parliament clearly has directed a wide
investigation to enable a decision to be reached. The odd
aspect of the provision is the word "and" conjoining "all
the circumstances" and "the interests of the child". The
interests of the child, it is suggested, would normally be
part of the circumstances of the case. But Parliament seems
to contemplate that the interests of the child represent a
factor over and above all the circumstances of the case.
Perhaps the intention was to emphasise the interests of the
child. This however would have been correctly achieved by
the use of "including" in place of "and". Whether that
1 2
is correct or not, Parliament has not subsumed the child's
interests as part of the overall circumstances. The two
criteria must therefore be treated separately. Whatever
view is taken, section 52 of the 1968 Act is in several
respects exceptional.
4.13 The principal exception however is section 1 of
the Guardianship of Minors Act 1971. This provision applies
widely and the court is directed to "regard the welfare of
11 See s.44(l) of the 1968 Act.
12 For the doctrine of subsumption, see paras. 1.34, 35.90 and
40.20 to 40.22.
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the infant as the first and paramount consideration."
Welfare is thus not only relevant but Parliament has stated
the significance to be attached to it. Whatever the
1 3
directive means, welfare is required to play a role different
from any other. It is given a privileged position. Its
significance has caused it to be the subject of frequent
judicial analysis; its apparent simplicity has led to a
number of difficulties. But except for the priority afforded
to the consideration, welfare remains along with the other
instances in Table 3 referred to in this section, simply a
factor to which the appropriate body must have regard. In
this sense welfare as a statutory factor plays a neutral role;
neither positive in the case of welfare as an objective of
the exercise nor negative as a release from a statutory
duty.
i 4
4.14 The most recent example of this formula is unique.
What has become the grundnorm of the adoption process applies
to decision of courts as well as to decisions of adoption
agencies. The statutory directive is not to take welfare
into consideration; it is to have regard to all the
circumstances and in that process to give "first consideration"
not to welfare in a general way but to the "need to safeguard
and promote the welfare of the child throughout his
childhood." This is a complex provision. It contains a
hitherto unused formula. The introduction of a priority
13
14
A recurring question in this analysis.
Children Act 1975, s.3; Adoption Act 1976 s.6.
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makes it comparable with section 1 of the Guardianship
of Minors Act 1971 but at the same time the content of the
welfare duty is made more precise without in any way
reducing its generalty. Whether the courts will recognise
and give effect to these semantic differences remains to be
seen.
Section 4 - Welfare as justification for release from a duty
4.15 Welfare as the justification for the release of a
statutory functionary from the obligation to fulfil a
statutory duty operates negatively to protect the child.
1 5
It does not present an opportunity, for example by selecting
one or other more advantageous course, to advance or promote
the child's welfare; it simply prevents the fulfilment of
a function which would otherwise harm the child. It may be
argued that such a prophylactic approach is positive in the
sense that the prevention of harm is as direct as bringing
about a better state of affairs for the child. This may be
so but the present classification of the legislation is
1 6
nevertheless meaningful. The examples of this in Table 3
place duties, normally positive but sometimes of a negative
or prohibitory nature, upon various bodies. It is open to
15 Available when statute confers a power or several
powers supplemented by a stated objective.
15 This part is concerned not with the practical
consequences of the legislation but simply with the
purely formal structure of the provisions. To that
extent it is an exercise in language.
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them to escape this statutory duty where its implementation
would harm the child. This is normally achieved by the
fulfilment of a negative condition. The significance of
the negative element of the provision applies to the
condition but not to the duty, the fulfilment of which thus
depends upon the implementation of the condition.
4.16 This description of the provisions in Table 3 falling
under this classification appears complicated. But it is
not. The examples are quite straightforward and an
examination of one or two should be sufficient. The three
instances derived from the Children and Young Persons Act
1969 place positive duties upon certain persons except where
1 7
a negative condition is fulfilled. Section 2(2), for
example, places a duty upon the local authority in certain
circumstances to bring care proceedings unless they are
satisfied inter alia that "it is neither in his interests
nor the public interest to do so." The public interest
does not presently "have any relevance. It is clear that
the local authority are released from their statutory duty
to bring care proceedings where that course would be in
the interests of the child or young person. A statutory
duty is transformed into a more discretionary function
on the fulfilment of a negative condition which operates
directly to protect the child . Section 28(5) and 29(1)(i)
of the 1969 Act may be similarly analysed although their
welfare content, as it were, is different.
17 Children and Young Persons Act 1969, ss.2(2), 28(5)
and 29 (1)(i).
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4.17 Another example of considerable practical
significance is section 8(1)(a) of the Matrimonial
Proceedings (Children) Act 1958. This places a duty upon
the court not to grant certain consistorial decrees unless
inter alia satisfactory arrangements have been made for
the welfare of the child over whom the court has jurisdiction.
This is a negative duty, or in other words a prohibition,
which may be obviated where the child's welfare has in effect
been secured. Expressed more directly, but changing the
statutory phaseology, if the child's welfare is secure,
the court may grant the decree otherwise open to it. Put
that way, the grammatical structure of the provision
1 8
resembles that of the examples in section 2 of chapter 5
of the use of welfare as a jurisdictional requirement for
the exercise of a power. But Parliament has seen fit to
enact the provision in a different form. It has been
classified differently here. This, it is suggested, is
correct. The grammatical structure of a provision is vital.
Even a slight change could produce a different statutory
scheme. A negative duty followed by an enabling negative
condition is fundamentally different from the conferment
of a power exercisable after the fulfilment of certain
requirements. The emphasis is different; the point of
departure differs; the approach to the problem is not the
same. In practice the most significant distinguishing
feature is that a prohibition followed by an enabling
18 See para. 5.20.
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condition is orientated more to the child's future; hence
it approximates to a statement of a statutory objective.
On the other hand, the exercise of a power following the
fulfilment of certain requirements tends more to look
1 9
backwards. If welfare in a general way is associated with
the condition or requirements, its role and significance
thus varies depending upon this facet of grammatical
structure.
4.18 Four other examples demonstrate this argument
forcibly. Two, being instances of subordinate legislation,
are more administrative in character. Regulations 17(1)
(d) and 25 of the Boarding-Out of Children Regulations 1955
prohibit boarding-out except where certain steps have been
taken to secure the child's welfare. This involves the
interposition of a further function. In these examples
a history of the child and relevant reports must be made
available to enable a decision to be made whether boarding-
out would be in the best interests of the child. This
emphasises how closely this aspect of the classification
approximates to welfare as a statutory objective.
4.19 The same is broadly true of section 17(2) of the
Children Act 1948 and section 3 of the Custody of Children
Act 1891. The former provision prevents the Secretary
of State from consenting to the emigration of a child under
19 There are broad generalisations. It should not be
expected that they will be true in every case.
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2 0
section 17 unless satisfied inter alia that emigration
would benefit the child and that suitable arrangements have
been or will be made for the child's reception and welfare
in the country to which he is going. In that grammatical
form the child's future welfare is obviously the objective
of the provision.
4.20 Section 3 of the 1891 Act declares that in certain
circumstances, which are indicative of direct and objective
2 1
protection of the child, the court shall not make an order
for delivery of the child to the parent unless the parent
has satisfied the court that, having regard to the welfare
of the child, he is a fit person to have custody of him.
This example also indicates the relevance of welfare as a
2 2
consideration to which the court shall have regard in
determining the fitness of the parent for custody. Thus the
imposition of proving parental fitness in a welfare context
suggests that the aim of the provision is the future welfare
of the child. This is thrown vividly into relief
when it is recalled that the duty is placed upon the court
"where a parent has abandoned or deserted his child", a
requirement directly protecting the present interests of the
child in precise terms. Section 3 of the 1891 Act is thus
a complex provision in terms of this classification, for
it exhibits three separate and distinct aspects of the use
20 Which' enables local authorities and in Scotland voluntary
organisations to arrange or assist in arranging the emigration
of children in their care. For Scotland see s.23 of the
Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968.
21 Hence their inclusion in Table 1.
22 Thus falling within section 3 of this chapter, namely
welfare as a statutory factor.
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2 3
of welfare in legislation. Its very complexity also
demonstrates, it is suggested, the fundamental strength of
this classification.
4.21 One final provision in Table 3 is something of a
specialty in this context. It does not'in fact refer in
terms to welfare or any of its equivalents. Section 17 (2)
of the Criminal Justice Act 1948 directs a court not to
impose imprisonment upon a person under twenty one unless there
is no other appropriate method of dealing with him.
Undoubtedly the condition will release the court from the
obligation imposed upon it by the earlier part of the
provision. The appropriate method of dealing with young
offenders is thus determined partly by their interests as
distinct from the interests of the public and of society at
large. It is thus not stretching the provision too much
to conclude that it is designed partly at least to promote
the interests of the young person. If that is so, it falls
neatly into this aspect of the classification.
23 I.e. firstly, welfare treated objectively and directly
(Table 1); secondly, welfare as a statutory factor
(section 3 of this chapter, Table 3); finally, welfare
as justification for release from a duty (this section
of this chapter, Table 3).
137
CHAPTER 5
WELFARE AND THE EXERCISE OF DISCRETIONS
Section 1 - Introduction
5.1 So far consideration has been given to welfare as
a concept treated by statute firstly objectively and then
generally. A different, though consistent and at times
overlapping, approach is to consider the part played by
welfare in the exercise of a statutory discertion. This is
particularly important as much of the statutory law affecting
welfare is discretionary even if it is not drafted in strict
discretionary form. Welfare may operate firstly to restrict
the exercise of a discretion by forming the whole or part of
a requirement which must be satisfied before the discretion
can be exercised: that is, as a threshold requirement.
Alternatively welfare may have a part to play in the exercise
of the discretion.
5.2 This classification is fundamentally different from
those already considered. Discretion in those cases was
technically irrelevant. The examples in chapter 3 of
welfare treated objectively were enforced mostly by criminal
proceedings; those enforced civilly, which were to some
extent regarded as an anomaly, were linked to the fulfilment
of a function. It is the discretionary element in the
function which is significant here; it was the objective
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element which was significant for the purposes of chapter
3. Take one example. Section 1 of the Custody of Children
Act 1891 confers a power on the court to decline to enforce
a parental right to custody if the parent has abandoned
or deserted the child. The condition contains the. objective
element; the judicial power falls under the discretionary
classification. If the two parts are conjoined, a statutory
discretion depends for its lawful exercise upon the
fulfilment of a condition whose requirements protect the
child objectively. This chapter looks at such provisions
from the discretionary point of view.
Section 2 - Welfare as a threshold requirement
(a) General
5.3 Many of the statutory provisions affecting children
confer discretions upon various bodies. Such discretions
are administrative in character to the extent that they
grant powers to bodies which are clearly administrative; for
example, those conferred upon local authorities or Ministers
of the Crown. Moreover many of the functions of juvenile
i
courts in England and most if not all of the functions of
children's hearings in Scotland may also be regarded as
administrative in this sense. If that proposition goes
too far, functions of this nature sit uneasily, at least
on the margin, between those which are administrative on the
one hand and judicial on the other hand. But even that
1 E.g. those relating to the future treatment of the
child once the threshold requirements have been met.
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proposition is probably not necessary to establish that
in any event many of the powers conferred upon the bodies
cannot be exercised without the fulfilment of certain
requirements which inter alia relate clearly to the welfare
of children. For present purposes they are termed
threshold requirements.
5.4 These requirements comprise references either to
welfare as a general concept or to specific instances of
welfare. The latter are unlikely to, and for the most part
do not, relate to welfare or its equivalents in terms;
they merely take into account considerations which cannot
be interpreted other than as specific references to a child's
welfare or well-being. The entries in the third column of
Table 4 bear witness to this proposition.
TABLE 4
DISCRETION RESTRICTED BY WELFARE CONSIDERATIONS
Part I - Provisions of Acts of Parliament
Section Provision Restrictive Features
Custody of Children Act 1891 (54 £ 55 Vict.,c.3): G.B.
1891 s.l Power of court to decline to If parent has
enforce parental right to abandoned or deserted
custody. child.
i U o
Section Provision Restrictive Feature
Children and Young Persons Act 1933 (23 S 24 Geo.5, c.12): Eng,
Children and Young Persons (Scotland) Act 1937 (1 Edw.8 £
1 Geo.6 , c.37): Scot.
1933 s.24(4) Power of local authority If child is fit and
1937 s.34(4) to grant licence to
allow persons under 16
to take part in
dangerous performances
willing to be trained
and proper provision
has been made to secure
his health and kind
treatment.
If he has been or is
being assaulted, ill-
1933 s.40(l) Power of justice to
1937 s.47(l) authorise child or
young person to be taken treated or neglected
or removed to a place of
safety.
Education Act 1944 (7 S 8 Geo.6, c.31 c.31): Eng.
Education (Scotland) Act 1962 (10 £ 11 Eliz.2, c.47): Scot.
1944 s.59(l) Power of local education If it is prejudicial
1962 s.137(1) authority to prohibit or to his health or
restrict the employment rendering him unfit
of a child. to obtain the full
benefit of his education.
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Section Provision Restrictive feature
Criminal Justice Act 1948 (11 S 12 Geo. 6, c.58): Eng.
Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 1949 (12, 13, S 14 Geo.6,
c . 9 4 ) : Scot.
1948 s.3(1)
1949 s.2(1)
Power of court in case
of person who has
attained 17 to sub¬
stitute probation order
for a sentence.
Having regard to the
nature of the offence




Power of court to make
order for absolute




Having regard to the
nature of the offence
and the character of
the offender.
Children Act 1948 (11 S 12 Geo.6, c.43): Eng.
Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968 (1968 c.49): Scot.
1948 s.(2)(l) Power of local authority If there is no parent
1968 s.16(1) to assume by resolution or guardian or if parent
parental rights of a or guardian has
child in their care. abandoned child or is
incapable or unfit to
have care of the child.
1948 s.4(2) Power of local authority If it will be for the
1968 s.18(2) to rescind a resolution benefit of the child,
assuming parental rights
of a child.
Section Provision Restrictive features
1948 s.4(3) Power of court to If it is in the interest
1968 s.18(3) determine a resolution of the child.
Prison Act 1952 (15 S 16 Geo.6 £ 1 Eliz. 2, c.52): Eng.
Prison (Scotland) Act 1952 (15 S 16 Geo.6 S 1 Eliz. 2, c.61):
Scot.
19 52 s.4|4(l) Power of Secretary of If he might with
Eng.
State to transfer (in advantage be so
1952 s.32(l) England authorise a detained.
Scot.
transfer of) a person
under 21 serving a
sentence of imprisonment
to a borstal institution.
Children Act 19 5 8 (6 S 7 Eliz. 2 , c.6 5): G.B
1958 s.4(3) Power of local authority If the premises or the
to impose prohibition on person are or is not
keeping foster children. suitable or it would
be detrimental to the
child to be kept by
that person in those
premises.
1958 s.7(l) Power of court to
remove a foster child
to a place of safety.
If he is being kept by
an unfit person or in
any detrimental premises
or environment.
Section Provision Restrictive Feature
1958 s.7(l) Power of justice to If there is imminent
remove a foster child danger to the health
to a place of safety. or well-being of the
child.
Adoption Act 1958 (7 Eliz.2, c.5): G.B,
1958 s.41
(repealed)
Power of local authority If it would be detrimenta
to prohibit the receipt to the child,
of certain children for
adoption.
1958 s.43(l) Power of court to remove If he is being kept by
'protected' children to
a place of safety.
an unfit person or in
any detrimental premises
or environment.
1958 s.43(l) Power of justice to
remove 'protected'
children to a place of
safety.
If there is imminent
danger to the health
or well-being of the
child.
Children and Young Persons Act 1963 (1963 c.37): G.B.
1953 s.41(2) Power of local authority If child is no longer
to revoke or vary licence fit to be trained or
granted to allow persons proper provision is no
under 16 to take part in longer being made to
dangerous performances. secure his health and
kind treatment.
Ikh
Section Provision Restrictive Feature
Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968 (1968 c.^9): Scot.
1968 s.17(3) Power of local authority to Where it appears to
allow the care of a child be for the benefit
who is the subject of a of the child,
resolution assuming parental
rights to be taken over by
a parent, guardian,
relative or friend.
1968 s,17(4) Power of local authority by If their intervention
whom a resolution assuming is necessary in the
parental rights was passed interests of the
to receive the child back welfare of the child,
into their care.
1968 s.37(4) Power of children's hearing If further detention
to require a child to be is necessary in his
detained in a place of own interest,
safety for such a period
not exceeding 21 days as
may be necessary.
1968 s.40(2) Power of children's hearing Where they are
to consider certain cases satisfied that it
in the absence of the child, would be detrimental
tothe interest of
the child to be
present at the hearing
of his case.
lU>
Section Provision Restrictive Feature
1968 s.44(6) Power of director of
social work to direct
the transfer to another
place of a child
required to reside in a
certain place.
In any case of urgent
necessity in the interest
of the child.
1968 s.62(3) Power of local authority Unfitness of any person
to refuse to register an employed or inadequate
establishment. establishment or
premises.
Children and Young Persons Act 1969 (1969 c.5D: Eng.
1969 s .1(1) Power of local authority Satisfaction of the
to bring child or young statutory conditions
person before a juvenile in s.l(2) directed
court (care proceedings), towards welfare.
1969 s.1(2) Power of court to make





1969 s.21(l) Power of court to order
that a care order shall
continue in force until
the person obtains the
age of 19 (where he is
accommodated in a
community home).
If it is in his interest
for him to continue to
be so accommodated.
Ih6
Section Provision Restrictive Feature
1969 s.28(l) Power of any person to
apply to justice to
authorise detention of
child or young person
in place of safety.
Satisfaction of the
statutory conditions
in s.l(2) (a) to (e),
1969 s.31(2) Power of court to order
child of 15 in care of
local authority and in
a community home to be
removed to borstal
institution.
If his behaviour is
detrimental to the
other children in the
community home.
Guardianship of Minors Act 1971 (1971 c.3): Eng.
Guardianship of Infants Act 1886 (U_9 S 50 Vict., c. 27): Scot.
Guardianship of Infants Act 1925 (15 8 16 Geo.5, c.45): Scot.
1971 s.6 Power of the court to If it is for the welfare




Guardianship Act 1973 (1973 c.29): G.B.
1973 s.l(3): Power of court to make Where a minor's father
Eng.
order regarding the and mother disagree on
1973 s. 10 (3) : .. . . . . •
gco_j_ matters in difference any point affecting his
between a minor's father welfare.
and mother.
lUT
Section Provision Restrictive Feature
Children Act 1975 (1975 c.72) Scot.






with agreement to the
making of an adoption
order




Part 2 - Provisions of Statutory Instruments
Guardianship of Infants (Summary Jurisdiction) Rules
1925 (S.R. & 0. 1925 No.960) : Eng.
1925 r.3(1)
1925 r.4(4)
Power of court to hear If it is expedient
proceedings in camera. in the interests of
the child.
1955 r.5(1)









Borstal Rules 1964 (S.I. 1964 No.387) : Eng.








Section Provision Restrictive Feature
Magistrates' Courts (Children and Young Persons) Rules
1970 (S.I. 1970 No.179) : Eng.
1970 r.lO(l) Power of court to
(e)
require child o.r young





1970 r,18(l) Power of court to hear
the whole or part of
the evidence in the
absence of the infant
in certain circumstances.
Power of court to If necessary in the
require the infant interests of the





Act of Sederunt (Social Work) (Sheriff Court Procedure
Rules) 1971 (S.I. 1971 No.92) : Scot.
If necessary in the
interests of the
child.





1971 r.8(3) Power of sheriff to
hear evidence in the
absence of the child.




Children's Hearings (Scotland) Rules 1971 (S.I. 1971
No.492 : Scot.
1971 r.11(3) Power of the chairman of










Reporter's Duties and Transmission of Information etc
(Scotland) Rules 1971 (S.I. 1971 No.525) : Scot.
1971 r.4(l)(b) Power of reporter to
authorise the person
in charge of the
place of safety to
liberate a child.
If further detention
of the child is
unnecessary in
his interest.
(b) The nature of the threshold requirements
5.5 The provisions set out in Table 4 may be looked
at in several different ways. It is concerned only with
statutory powers. Powers may be conferred so as to be
exercised in a more or less discretionary fashion: ranging
from an unfettered or absolute discretion, through those
which are restricted in relation to welfare, however
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expressed, or other considerations, to those which are
so narrowly delimited as to afford little or no scope for
choice except in relation to the construction or application
of the precise provisions. Chapters 8 to 10 deal with the
latter aspect and, in particular, with how interpretation
may be affected by welfare as a policy. This chapter is
concerned with the other two situations. Table 4 contains
examples of statutory discretions which are restricted
inter alia in relation to the welfare of children; Table
5 exemplifies statutory discretions which are not restricted
as to welfare but which may be limited in other ways.
5.6 The powers classified in Table 4 fall into two
fundamental categories. Welfare considerations restrict
the exercise of the discretion either retrospectively or
prospectively. There are other possible categories; for
example, the degree of generality or objectivity of welfare
but they are not presently relevant. The most significant
aspect is whether the existing welfare situation, based
upon past conduct, is a ground for the exercise of the
power or whether the future well-being of the child is at
once the present justification for and also the principal
objective of the use of the discretion.
5.7 Where proof of an existing situation is a requirement
for the exercise of a power, there can be little doubt that
this constitutes a threshold requirement. On the other
hand at first sight it seems odd that the future welfare
of the child can be such a requirement. It is understandable
however if the discretion is regarded as a continuous
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process, not easily susceptible to compartmentalisation,
so that in this sense the object of the exercise, not just
the protection of the child but also the promotion of his
welfare, operates partially to justify its use. Thus the
end justifies the means.
5.8 To some extent this crystallises a general dilemma
facing the law of children. If the grounds for interfering
with existing parental relationships are restricted to
an examination of the status quo, there is no jurisprudential
problem. As soon as the future welfare of the child
becomes a ground for such interference, a subjective
prognostication of what will or may be good for the child
becomes the criterion. No doubt such a prediction will
usually be founded upon the existing factual situation.
But the future welfare of a child must by its very nature
be largely speculative.
5.9 Table 4 demonstrates how far this distinction is
reflected in legislation of the British Parliament. To
some extent that legislation has hesitated to accept the
full consequences of the distinction:hence in many cases
the exercise of a statutory discretion turns upon a
parental rights approach rather than the prospective
welfare approach. The correct approach is governed,
naturally, by the precise words of the statute but the
tense of the relevant verb is not necessarily the clue to
the meaning of the provision. The future tense normally
indicates the prospective welfare approach but there is
no guarantee that the present tense necessarily postulates
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a forfeiture of the parental rights approach. Nor is it
true that courts are empowered to deal only with the
forfeiture of parental rights and administrative bodies only
with prospective welfare. There is no overall pattern of
this nature. Each provision seems to have been considered
pragmatically, as one would expect of a British Parliament,
and not in purely logical terms.
5.10 One of the more complex provisions in Table 4
turns upon a consideration of the status quo in conjunction
with an element of speculation about the child's future
well-being. Consider, for example, section 1(2) of the
Children and Young Persons Act 1959 and section 32(2) of
the Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968. They set out
2
respectively the requirements for care proceedings and
those identifying the children in need of compulsory measures
3
of care. Once these requirements have been satisfied,
b
the relevant machinery can be set in motion. Paragraphs
(a) and (c) to (f) of section 1(2) of the 1969 Act and
paragraphs (a), (b) and (d) to (h) of section 32(2) of the
1968 Act refer to existing fact situations capable of
proof in the ordinary way. On the other hand paragraphs
(b) and (bb) of section 1(2) of the 1969 Act and paragraph
(c) of section 32(2) of the 1968 Act introduce an element of
prospective probability. The former, paragraph (b), enables
2 See Children and Young Persons Act 1969, s.1(6).
3 See Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968, s.32(l).
4 See Part I of the 1969 Act and Part III of the 1968 Act.
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an order under section 1 of the 1969 Act to be made if
the court is satisfied that it is probable that the proper
development of the child or young person will be avoidably
prevented or neglected or that he will be ill-treated,
having regard to the fact that the court or another court
has found that that condition was satisfied in the case of
another child or young person who was a member of the
household to which he belongs. Similarly a child may be
in need of compulsory measures of care under section 32(2)
(c) of the 1968 Act where lack of parental care causing
the child to fall into bad associations or be exposed to
moral danger is likely to cause him unnecessary suffering
or seriously to impair his health or development. It is
significant that the English legislation requires the
fulfilment of an additional condition for the purposes of
section 1(2) of the 1969 Act, namely "that he is in need
of care or control which he is unlikely to receive unless
the court makes an order under this section."
5.11 There is one element common to paragraph (b) of and
the additional condition in section 1(2) of the 1969 Act and
paragraph (c) of section 32(2) of the 1968 Act. They enable
parental rights to be restricted by reason of the probability
or likelihood that the continuation of the status quo will
affect detrimentally the future welfare or interests of the
child. This is clearly the effect of the two nominated
paragraphs. It is perhaps less clearly true of the
additional condition in section 1(2) of the 1969 Act.
In that situation the court in England is directed to
consider the likelihood of the child receiving proper
care and control. Anticipation of future parental conduct
will presumably be based to some extent upon how parents
have behaved in the past towards their children. It must
however be recalled that, even if the court is satisfied
that one of the nominated conditions and the additional
condition have been fulfilled, it is then merely open to
the court to make an order under section 1 of the 1969 Act.
The same is true of satisfying the criteria in section 32(2)
of the 1968 Act for children in need of compulsory measures
of care. The examples considered so far, therefore,
although they direct an investigation into the future
welfare of the child, do so only to protect the child.'s
future welfare. In no sense do they promote his future
well-being.
5.12 Most of the other examples in Table 4 are less
complicated. Sections 1(1) of the 1969 Act and 32(2) of
the 1968 Act are directed very generally to the lack or »
inadequacy of parental care or control. This is also
true of section 2(1) of the Children Act 1948, section
16(1) of the Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968, section 12
(l)(b)(ii) of the Children Act 1975, and even of section
1 of the Custody of Children Act 1891. The future
welfare of the child, however, is not relevant to the
threshold requirements for the exercise of these statutory
discretions. The assumption of parental rights by local
authority resolution, the dispensation with the agreement
of a parent to an adoption order or a refusal to enforce
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a parental right to custody may be exercised only if the
present integrity of the child's welfare is prejudiced by
5
the lack or inadequacy of parental care or control.
5.13 Even simpler to analyse and classify are various
powers directed towards the child and his environment and
towards the child involved in legal proceedings. For
6
example, the provisions of the Children Act 1958 which
protect foster children take into account the suitability
or otherwise not only of the persons involved but also
of the premises and general environment in which the child
7
will find himself. The same is true of children protected
8
by the adoption legislation and those whose educational
9
integrity is safeguarded by the education legislation.
5.14 Children affected by proceedings of one type or
another may be protected by the exercise of an appropriate
discretion. On the whole these are to be found in
subordinate legislation. Rule 8(3) of the Act of Sederunt
(Social Work) (Sheriff Court Procedure Rules) 1971 enables
5 That conclusion is based only upon a static view of
the statutes : these provisions have been judicially
interpreted and a degree of dynamism has been introduced.
6 Particularly ss.4(3) and 7(1).
7 Within the meaning of s.37(l) of the Adoption Act 1958
or s.32 of the Adoption Act 1976.
8 Adoption Act 1958?Part IV; Adoption Act 1976, Part III.
9 E.g. Education Act 1944, s.59(l); Education (Scotland)
Act 1962, s.137(1).
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the sheriff to hear evidence in the absence of the child when
that is in in the interests of the child. That formula is
1 o
typical. A greater degree of specification is unusual in this
context, although rule 11(3) of the Children's Hearings (Scot¬
land) Rules 19 71 authorises the chairman of a children's hearing
to exclude a representative if that person is persisting in
behaviour which is likely to be detrimental to the interests of
the child. The criterion however is fundamentally the same,
namely the interests of the child. It is interesting that the
latter example introduces an element of anticipation of the
child's future interests. In doihjso however the rule merely
seeks immediately to protect the child. This is an obvious
example of the future being the form of the protection afforded
to the child, while the present is effectively the substance of
the protection. Thus the word "likely" probably adds very little
to the rule.
(c) The question of choice
5.15 The foregoing examples of threshold requirements are
reasonably precise in the criteria to which they refer, although
sometimes they are fairly general. The role which certain other
criteria play is less clear; perhaps they are threshold require¬
ments only in a very marginal sense. It is significant that
examples of such criteria come from the control and regulation
of penal powers. The problem is whether the criteria are con¬
ditions which must be satisfied before the power can be exercised
or objectives to which Parliament has directed that attention
should be paid.
5.16 Sections 3(1) and 7(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 1948
10 See e.g. Guardianship of Infants (Summary Jurisdiction)
Rules 1925, rr. 3(1) and 4(4); Magistrates' Courts





employ a formula already analysed. The court is empowered to
substitute a probation order for a sentence or to make an order
for absolute discharge as a substitute for punishment or probation.
The power is qualified by the statutory direction to the court
to have regard to the nature of the offence and the character of
the offender. The nature of the offence and the character of
the offender are related to presently discernible circumstances.
But since the court is given an alternative method of dealing
with the offender, a future element is also injected into the
process. The statutory criteria represent the springboard, as
it were, for the choice confronting the court.
5.17 An element of choice is also implicit in rule 42(1)
of the Borstal Rules 1964. The Governor of a Borstal institution
is thereby authorised to arrange for the removal of an inmate
from association with other inmates where it is desirable in his
own interests. The desirability of such a removal is probably a
condition which must be satisfied before the power can be exercised
At the same time, on an analytical but not a purely temporal
basis, the desirability of .such a removal involves a
decision founded upon a choice of whether the existing association
would be preferable in the interests of the inmate himself. In
this sense the Governor must face a choice, based upon existing
circumstances but extended into the future, by balancing the
inmate's best interests against his present difficulties. The
scheme or formula of the rule does not make this approach obvious.
It seems arguable nevertheless that the deceptive simplicity
of rule 42(1) conceals the analytical complexity of the
decision facing the Governor. The qualification added
11 Para. 4.21.
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to the power, namely that its exercise should be desirable
in the inmate's interests, thus operates in at least two
different ways.
5.18 Finally in this context section 32(1) of the
Prison (Scotland) Act 1952 enables the Secretary of State
to transfer a person under twenty one serving a sentence
of imprisonment to a Borstal institution "if he might with
advantage be so detained." The minister has an undoubted
choice: keep the offender in prison or detain him in
Borstal. Parliament might have employed the formula used
1 2
in the example from the Criminal Justice Act 1948. It was
decided however to use a drafting device which, it is
suggested, encapsulates a much more powerful qualification.
The power is available "if he might with advantage be so
detained". The phraseology of the condition is couched
in futuristic terms and the minister is bound to ascertain
where the balance of advantage lies. His statutory
concern is not with the existing situation but with the
future of the inmate. Nevertheless the existing
situation must in practical terms be the foundation of
an intelligible decision. Parliament went further than
to direct the minister to have regard to the advantages
of Borstal. The duty is much more positively to bring
about the result which would be best for the child. That
goes slightly beyond the specific requirement of the Act
12 Particularly ss.3(l) and 7(1).
/
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and to that extent it is a misinterpretation of the
provision. The overemphasis upon the "best result" is
irfended merely to draw attention to the distinctive
approach of Parliament in this instance.
5.19 The range.of approaches contained in the Table 4
examples becomes apparent. Some restrictions upon
statutory discretions represent conditions to be fulfilled
before the power can be exercised, namely threshold
requirements in the terms already postulated. Other
restrictions simply indicate factors which Parliament
considers it desirable to take into account. A third
approach is to indicate, at times rather obliquely, a
desirable objective of the exercise of the discretion.
An element of choice is thus introduced. The final approach
may be to conjoin the restriction as a jurisdictional
requirement with the same restriction as a future objective.
The possible lines of approach are thus varied and various.
(d) The problem of future welfare
5.20 One of the two fundamental categories into which
the powers set out in Table 4 may be classified is the
future welfare of the child as a ground for interference
with existing parental relationships. An analysis of
this classification is the consequence of the preceding
paragraphs. Future welfare is both the most difficult
and the most rewarding aspect of welfare to analyse. It
is increasing in significance as time goes on. The
distinction between the relevance of existing and future
i6o
welfare to the exercise of a statutory discretion is
twofold. If the present welfare of a child is being
detrimentally prejudiced, largely a question of interpreting
existing circumstances, the way may be open to exercise a
discretion. The decision in that event is simple :
whether or not to exercise the discretion or use the
available power. There is no statutory obligation to take
any welfare considerations into account or aim at a
particular welfare objective. The first point of
distinction is thus factual.
5.21 Future welfare, it should be recalled, involves
an element of speculation. The second point of
distinction is the nature of the choice presented by
Parliament. There is clearly an element of choice in the
exercise of any discretion; whether or not to exercise it.
But where there is the possibility of a substantial
alternative, the choice is no longer simply whether or not
to use the power. A qualitative requirement is added
by statute. Which alternative will or is more likely to
produce a stated result? In this sense the result
becomes a condition of the exercise of the power to achieve
that very objective. Thus existing and future welfare
are distinguishable in terms of the factual basis of
existing welfare compared with the speculative nature of
future welfare and by reason of the differing nature of the
choices open to the decision-maker.
5.22 The nature of choice as the determinant throws
further light upon the distinction between existing and
l6l
future welfare. Statutory references to existing
welfare tend to be phrased in relatively objective terms;
for example, abandonment, parental unfitness, danger to
health, detrimental environment or premises. Some of these
expressions are sufficiently general to cause interpretational
problems in an individual set of circumstances. But they
have the benefit of a degree of precision which is lacking
when the reference to welfare relates to future welfare.
In that context the tendency is for Parliament to use words
such as "welfare" or "interests". This is surely no
accident. It is possible for the legislature to conceive
of circumstances in which it would be justifiable to permit
the exercise of a discretionary power aimed at protecting
a child by interfering with existing parental relationships.
Indeed the removal of a child from his parents against
their will may arguably be a matter of such significance,
not only for the parents but also for the child, that it
should be as closely regulated by objectively identifiable
legal norms as the deprivation of liberty under the
criminal law. That view would be inconsistent with the
contention that a child should be able to be removed from
his parents simply because it would be of advantage to his
future well-being. The law in this country has hesitated
to acknowledge the latter proposition. If this is true,
one would not expect to find the promotion of a child's
future welfare forming the threshold requirement for the
exercise of a statutory discretion.
162
5.23 It is not inconsistent with these propositions
that future welfare has a role to play in the exercise of
a discretion. That concept tends to apply however once
the way is open for the discretion to be exercised, not
as a condition for its exercise. This fundamental
distinction must not be pressed too far. The preceding
paragraphs show how analytically complicated are some of
the statutory provisons. Nevertheless there is sufficient
evidence to justify these propositions; the marginal
problems cannot be denied.
5.24 The instance in Table 4 selected to draw specific
attention to the role of future welfare was section 32(1)
of the Prison (Scotland) Act 1952. The two distinctive
criteria were present : the generality of the reference
to welfare, namely "advantage", and the existence of a
substantial alternative for the decision-maker, namely,
detention in prison or in a Borstal institution. The
nature of the choice is not so starkly obvious in all the
examples in Table 4 but it will be found on closer
examination that a subtantial alternative exists. Section
44(6) of the Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968, for example,
enables a director of social work, in case of urgent
necessity in the interests of the child, to direct the
transfer to another place of a child required to live in
a certain place. This is an instance which can probably
be approached in two ways. The test of "urgent necessity"
applies to existing circumstances and hence the criterion is
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existing welfare. But the phraseology is not such
that an element of future welfare can necessarily be
ruled out. The director is given a real choice. He may
change, in effect, the place of residence of the child.
The alternatives are thus the range of residences in which
this child may be housed. The selection of the appropriate
residence will no doubt depend upon how the .interests
of the child are at that moment conceived.
5.25 On the other hand in section 37(4-) of the 1968
Act the choice is limited but the relevance to future
welfare more obvious. A children's hearing is thereby
empowered to require a child to be detained in a place
of safety for a limited period "if further detention is
necessary in his own interests". The choice is detention
in a place of safety or not. The only alternative,
which is not a substantial alternative as contemplated
here, is presumably the status quo. The power of
detention can be exercised only if it is necessary in the
child's interests. In this sense the necessity of '
further detention is a threshold requirement for the
exercise of the power. But the requirement of "further
detention" being "necessary in his own interests"
introduces an element of future welfare, as in a practical
sense the decision must be based to some extent upon
likely future considerations. The need for further
detention must be assessed in the light of present
circumstances in relation to likely developments affecting
the child's interests. This example in particular shows
16b
the difficulties in determining the meaning of the words
used by Parliament, and hence their legislative intention,
when conceptually complicated words are used in close
proximity in a syntactical context which does little to
help to clarify the meaning.
5.26 Four examples of statutory powers affecting the
assumption of parental rights by a local authority
demonstrate the role of future welfare. The assumption
of parental rights by resolution of a local authority is
governed by section 16(1) of the Social Work (Scotland)
Act 1968. The threshold requirements which must be
satisfied before the power can be exercised are
objectively identifiable and founded upon present or
existing circumstances. There is no suggestion that
parental rights may be assumed simply because to do so
would be of benefit to the child. To alter the status
quo brought about by a local authority assumption of
parental rights is a different matter. Section 17(3) enables
a local authority with parental rights to permit the care of
the relevant child to be taken over by a parent, guardian,
relative or friend, "where it appears to be for the benefit
1 3
of the child". The logic of the provision, its
grammatical structure and the definite use of the word
"for" indicate that the child's future welfare is the
reason for and the aim of the exercise of the power.
Section 17(4) authorises a local authority with parental
13 Emphasis added.
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rights to receive the child back into their care "if
their intervention is necessary in the interests of the
welfare of the child". The function and relevance of
future welfare are less clearly rehearsed by the legislature
in section 17(4) than in section 17(3) but it is suggested
that fundamentally the same analysis is true of both
provisions.
5.27 Section 18(2) and (3) also deals with local
authority parental rights. The subsections provide for
similar situations but the precise words used to qualify
the discretion differ, much as in section 17(3) and (4).
Section 18(2) authorises a local authority with parental
rights to rescind their resolution assuming those rights
"if it will be for the benefit of the child". Not only
is the word "for" used but the condition is expressed in
the future tense. Nothing could indicate more clearly
a reference to future welfare. Section 18(3) enables
a court to determine a resolution of a local authority
assuming parental rights "if it is in the interests of the
child". The circumstances contemplated by the two
subsections are essentially the same; the differences
are technical. It is probably safe to assume that the
intention of Parliament was the same in both cases. Why
the phraseological difference? The answer is not known
but it does not matter. It is suggested that section
18(3) also contemplates future welfare. If the condition
is extended by the words "to do so", the meaning is not
distorted. Rather it is clarified and the reference to
future welfare is fully justified.
166
5.28 It is regrettable that Parliament has decided,
for whatever reason, not to use uniform language in
uniform circumstances. The reason may be that welfare
and similar expressions have been scattered throughout
so many different statutes over a period of so many years
and in countless different ways with complex nuances of
meaning that the logic and pattern are not easy to uncover.
Three further references however should be made to specific
provisions to demonstrate to a very limited extent a
uniformity of language. Section 4(3) of the Children Act
i <♦
1958 and section 41 of the Adoption Act 1958 empower a local
authority to prohibit respectively the keeping of foster
children in certain circumstances and the receipt of
certain children for adoption. A condition common to both
provisions is "if it would be detrimental to the child".
The language is drafted in future terms and there can be
no doubt about the reference to the detriment to the
future well-being of the child in each case. Finally
section 6 of the Guardianship of Minors Act 1971, a relatively
simple and open-ended provision, enables a court to remove
a testamentary or statutory guardian and to substitute
another. The condition to be satisfied is "if it is for
the welfare of the child". It has already been suggested
that the word "for" indicates an element of future welfare.
This would be particularly true for the appointment of a
substituted guardian. It must in the nature of the
appointment be speculative whether he will prove
14 Before its repeal by the 1975 Act.
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satisfactory. This argument does not, it is suggested,
apply to the removal of an existing guardian. In that
event the court's concern will be to remove an unsatisfactory
guardian and the criteria are likely to be the past
conduct and behaviour of the guardian. Conceivably, it
must be conceded, the likelihood of the continuation of
such detrimental conduct may also be a relevant factor.
But taken as a whole section 6 of the 1971 Act provides
for the future well-being of the child.
Section 3 - The exercise of a discretion
(a) Introduction
5.29 So far this chapter has been concerned to
consider welfare, either generally or objectively
identified, as a requirement sine qua non a statutory
power is available. It may do so either as a threshold
requirement stricto sensu or more obliquely as the
statutory objective of the exercise of the power. All
the examples of this in Table 4 contain two fundamental
parts : a discretion and a restriction. If the
restriction operates as the objective of the exercise of
the discretion, normally in relation to future welfare,
the body upon whom the power is conferred must give effect
to that statutory discretion. But if Parliament has not
spelled out the objective of the discretion, even where
threshold requirements must be satisfied, the exercise of
the discretion would appear to be unlimited and the way in
which the discretion may be exercised open-ended. This
situation should be distinguished from the earlier one
where there is a need to fulfil requirements before the
power can be exercised in the first place. This section
is concerned only with the discretionary elements of the
provision.
5.30 Take section 40(1) of the Children and Young
Persons Act 1933 as an example. This enables a justice
of the peace, if it appears to him that there is reasonable
cause to suspect that a child or young person has been
or is being assaulted, ill-treated or neglected in a manner
likely to cause him unnecessary suffering or injury to
1 5
health, to issue a warrant authorising a search for the
child or young person. He is further enabled, if his
suspicions are well-founded, to issue a warrant authorising
the child or young person to be taken to a place of
safety. The analytical pattern of section 40(1) is clear.
Once the condition, which objectively prescribes
circumstances referring directly to the welfare of the
child, has been fulfilled, the way is open for the justice
to issue the respective warrants. This condition takes
the form of a threshold requirement. There is no
restriction in section 40(1) affecting the way in which
the power should be exercised. In this sense the
1 6
exercise of the statutory discretion is open-ended.
15 It is interesting how this language reflects that
also used in section 1 of that Act.
16 At least on the face of the provision. Paras.5.38 to
discuss the general possibility of other restrictions.
l6y
The pattern of section 40(1) is typical and is repeated
frequently in the examples in Table 4.
TABLE 5
DISCRETIONS NOT RESTRICTED BY WELFARE CONSIDERATIONS
Part 1 - Provisions of Acts of Parliament
Section Provision
Conjugal Rights (Scotland) Amendment Act 1861 (24 S 25
Vict. , c . 86) : Scot.
1861 s.9 Power of court to make such provision as it
shall seem just and proper with respect to
the custody, maintenance and education of
any pupil children of the marriage to which
the action relates.
Custody of Children Act 1891 (54 S 55 Vict., c.3) : G.B.
1891 s.l Power of court to decline application for
production of a child by an unfit or
delinquent parent.
Guardianship (Refugee Children) Act 1944 (788 Geo.6,
c.8) : G.B.
1944 s.l(l): Power of Secretary of State to appoint
Eng.





Criminal Justice Act 19*48 (11 S 12 Geo. 6, c.58) : Eng.
Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 1949 (12, 13 S 14 Geo.6,
c . 9 4 ) : Scot.
1948 s.3(l) Power of court to make a probation order
1949 s.2(l) instead of sentencing a person 17 or
over convicted of an offence.
1948 s.7(l) Power of court to make an order discharging
1949 s.l absolutely (or in England conditionally) a
person convicted of an offence.
1948 s.20 Power of court to substitute Borstal training
1949 s.20 for any other sentence in case of a person
between 15 and 21 convicted on indictment of
an offence punishable with imprisonment.
Affiliation Proceedings Act 1957 (5 S 6 Eliz.2, c.55) : Eng.
1957 s.5(4) Power of two justices to appoint by order
some person (with his consent) to have the
custody of a child in respect of whom an
affiliation order has been made.
Matrimonial Proceedings (Magistrates' Courts) Act 1960
(8 S 9 Eliz, 2, c.48): Eng.
1960 s.2(l)(d) Power of court to make a matrimonial order
providing for the legal custody of a child
of the family under 16.
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Section Provision
1960 s.2(l)(e) Power of court to make a matrimonal
order providing for the committal of the
care of a child to the local authority.
1960 s.2(l)(f) Power of court to make a matrimonal order
providing for the independent supervision
of a child.
1960 s.2(l)(g) Power of court to make a matrimonal
order providing for access by a party or
any other person who is a parent.
Matrimonal Proceedings (Children) Act 1958(6 £ 7 Eliz.2,c.UP): Scot,
Matrimonal Causes Act 1973 (1973 c.18): Eng.
1958 s.lO(l) Power of court to commit the care of
1973 s.43(1)
a child to the local authority (or an
individual in Scotland).
1958 s.l2(l) Power of court to provide for the
1973 s.44(1)
supervision of any child committed to
the custody of any person.
1958 s.l3(l) Power of court in certain
circumstances to grant interim
interdict prohibiting the removal
Section Provision
furth of Scotland or out of the control
of the person in whose custody the child
is.
Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968 (1968 c.49): Scot.
1968 s.65(l) Power of local authority to remove forthwith
from an establishment all or any of the
persons for whom accommodation is being
provided therein.
Family Law Reform Act 1969 (1969 c.M-6) : Eng.
1969 s.7(2) Power of court to make an order committing
the care of a ward of court to a local
authority.
1969 s.7(4) Power of court to order that a ward of
court will be under the supervision of a
welfare officer or of a local authority.
1969 s.20(l) Power of court to give a direction for the
use of blood tests for establishing or
otherwise paternity.
Children and Young Persons Act 1969 (1969 c.54) : Eng.
1969 s.l(3) Powers of the juvenile court in care
proceedings.
1969 s.12(2) Power of the court to include in a
supervision order requirements to comply
with certain directions of the supervisor.
Section Provision
1969 s.15(1) Power of the court to vary or discharge
supervision orders.
1969 s.2l(2) Power of the court to substitute a
supervision order for a care order.
Guardianship of Minors Act 1971 (1971 c.3) : Eng.
Guardianship of Infants Act 1886 C49 S 50 Vict., c.27) :
Scot.
Guardianship of Infants Act 1925 (15 £ 16 Geo. 5, c.45) :
Scot.
1971 s.3(l) Power of court to appoint guardian to
1925 s.4(l) act jointly with mother.
1971 s.3(2) Power of court to appoint guardian to
1925 s.4(2) act jointly with father.
1971 s.4(4)(b) Power of court to appoint a guardian to
1925 s.5(4) act with a parent or alone.
1971 s.5(l) Power of court to appoint a guardian of
1925 s.4(2A) a minor without a parent or guardian.
1971 s.7 Power of court to settle disputes between
1925 s.6 joint guardians.
Guardianship Act 1973 (1973 c.29) : G.B.
1973 s.2(2) : Power of court to order that a minor
Eng.
the subject of a custody order under the
17 U
Section Provision
1973 s.11(1) : Guardianship Acts shall be under the
Scot.
supervision of a local authority (or probation
officer in England) or to commit the care
of the minor to a local authority.
Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 (1973 c.18) : Eng.
1973 s.42(l) Power of court to make an order for the
custody and education of any child of the
family under 18 in matrimonial proceedings.
1973 s.42(3) Power of court to declare that either
party to the marriage is unfit to have
custody.
Children Act 1975 (1975 c.72) : Scot.
Adoption Act 1976 (1976 c.36) : Eng^
1975 s.8(7) Power of court to insert terms and
1976 s.12(6) conditions in an adoption order.
1975 s.12(1) Power of court to dispense with agreement
(b)(ii)




Power of court to vest legal custody in
applicants for adoption for a probationary
period.
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Part 2 - Provisions of Statutory Instruments
Rule Provision
Magistrates' Courts (Children and Young Persons) Rules
1970 (S.I. 1970 No.1792) : Eng.
1970 r.l8(2) Power of the court to require a parent
or guardian to withdraw from the court
while the infant gives evidence or makes
a statement in care proceedings.
Act of Sederunt (Social Work) (Sheriff Court Procedure
Rules) 1971 (S.I. 1971 No,92) : Scot.
1971 r.8(4) Power of sheriff to exclude the parent
while the child is giving evidence.
Children's Hearings (Scotland) Rules 1971 (S.I. No.492) :
Scot.
1971 r.9(l) Discretion conferred upon the chairman
to determine the procedure at any children's
hearing.
5.31 A different pattern is discernible in the
examples in Table 5. That Table is intended to emphasise
the discretionary aspect of the provisions. Most of the
examples in that Table are on the face of them unrestricted
in terms. Some however tend to follow the pattern of
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section 40(1) of the Children and Young Persons Act
1933. In that case the discretion must be carefully
distinguished from the restriction. Section 12(1)(b)
(ii) of the Children Act 1975 confers a discretion upon
the court to dispense with the agreement of a parent but on
on the fulfilment of certain conditions : hence the
inclusion of that section and also of section 40(1) of
the 1933 Act in Table 4. Some examples in Table 5 also
contain limiting factors. It is suggested however that the
are more descriptive than prescriptive in the sense of
threshold requirements. No discretion however can be
17
completely absolute; otherwise it would not exist.
(b) Discretions and their context
5.32 Every discretion is limited by the context in
which it operates. For example, sections 10(1) and
12(1) of the Matrimonial Proceedings (Children) Act 1958
respectively enable the court in a consistorial context
to commit the care of a child to an individual and to
provide for the child's supervision. These powers are
ex facie unrestricted. They are however likely to be
affected by the general context in which they are intended
to operate. Their statutory derivative is section 9 of
the Conjugal Rights (Scotland) Amendment Act 1861. It
would be reasonable to expect that the 1958 Act would be
interpreted in a way consistent with the principles of
the 186.1 Act. It may therefore be concluded that
sections 10(1) and 12(1) of the 1958 Act are merely
enabling provisions. They do not include any threshold
17 In the sense that it would lack a context in which
to operate.
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requirements nor do they specify the objective of the
exercise of the power.
5.33 It might be argued, in contradiction of this
conclusion, that the introductory words are more than a
type of preamble to the conferment of the power and rather
in the nature of a threshold requirement. The power in
section 10(1) is preceded by the words "where it appears
to the court as respects any child for whose custody,
maintenance and education it has jurisdiction to make
provision in connection with an action for divorce, nullity
of marriage or separation brought before it that there are
exceptional, circumstances making it impracticable or
undesirable for the child to be entrusted to either of the
parties to the marriage." These words are a mere
description of the situation in which the power applies;
in other words, they set the context of the exercise of the
discretion. The reference to "exceptional circumstances
making it impracticable or undesirable for the child to be
entrusted to either of the parties to the marriage" contains
very obliquely an inference of parental inadequacy which
may be detrimental to the child's welfare. But this
reference is largely a reflection of the context of the
exercise of the power: namely the committal of a child
to the care of an individual or a local authority. It is
thus more descriptive of the power rather than a
restriction upon its exercise. Ultimately the issue is
one of fact and largely a matter of degree.
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5.34 Section 12(1) contains similar words in
advance of the conferment of the power. It is suggested
that the introductory words in section 12(1) are probably
more clearly descriptive than those in section 10(1).
They simply set the context. It is probably not a
distortion to paraphrase them as follows
"If it appears desirable to the court to
do so, it may in exceptional circumstances
place the child under supervision."
This represents the essence of the subsection after the
purely descriptive matter has been removed. The largely
unfettered quality of the discretion becomes manifest.
The same fundamental analysis is thus applicable to both
section 12(1) and section 10(1) of the 1958 Act.
5.35 Similar considerations apply to section 20(1)
(d) to (g) of the Matrimonial Proceedings (Magistrates'
Courts) Act 1960. These paragraphs describe the powers
available to a magistrates' court in matrimonial
proceedings. Indeed paragraphs (e) and (f) merely
reflect the powers contained in sections 10(1) and 12(1)
l c
of the Matrimonial Proceedings (Children) Act 1958 in a
different context. The scheme of the 1960 Act itself
emphasises the relevance of this analysis. Section 1 is
headed "Jurisdiction of magistrates' courts in matrimonial
proceedings" and the heading represents a close analogy
to threshold requirements in the sense used in this
chapter. It should however be noted that the word
18 Now to be found for England in the Matrimonial
Proceedings Act 1973, ss.43 and 44.
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"jurisdiction" in the heading of the section is used slightly
more broadly than "threshold" in this chapter by virtue of
1 9
the provisions in section 1(3). Section 2, on the other hand,
deals fundamentally with the powers of the magistrates' court
after the requirements of section 1 have been satisfied. Section
2 of the 1960 Act thus describes the powers in the same way
as sections 10(1) and 12(1) of the 1958 Act and the additional
provisions in section 2 of the 1960 Act play a role similar to
that of the introductory words in the provisions of the 1958 Act.
The formal layout of the statute thus bears witness to the
distinction drawn between the requirements for the exercise of
the power and the exercise of the power itself.
5.36 Section 7(2) and (4) of the Family Law Reform Act 1969
confers powers upon the court in wardship proceedings similar to
those conferred in matrimonial or consistorial proceedings by
sections 10(1) and 12(1) of the Matrimonial Proceedings (Children
Act 1958. The same analysis applies and there is no need to
2 o
rehearse the arguments. Section 20(1) of the 1969 Act is however
somewhat different. It confers upon the court a power to require
the use of blood tests in determining paternity. The provision
describes the proceedings in which the power is available and
states the use which may be made of the blood tests. The last
requirement may operate as a limitation upon the power by ref¬
erence to its objective. It does not however limit the way in
which the power may be exercised once the circumstances for its
exercise have been established. There is no statutory restrictioi
upon or reference to the factors to be taken into account in the
exercise of the power. In that sense the discretion is largely
unfettered.
19 Which deals with jurisdiction in the sense of judicial
power over the defendant qua litigant.
20 The same is true of the Guardianship Act 1973, ss.2 (2) and
11(1) in relation to a minor who is the subject of a custody
order.
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5.37 That conclusion is manifestly true of the
powers in the Guardianship Acts set out in Table 5. They
are concerned largely with the appointment of guardians
in various circumstances. The relevant factors governing
the exercise of the discretion are not described, prescribed
or even implied in the sections which actually confer
the relevant powers. The sections merely describe the
circumstances in which the powers may be exercised; there
is no question of the sections prescribing threshold or
other requirements. Such powers are clearly unrestricted.
These comments apply also to section 8(7) of the Children
Act 1975 and before its repeal, to section 8(1) of the
Adoption Act 1958 which enable the court respectively to
impose such terms and conditions in an adoption order as
it may think fit and to postpone the determination of an
adoption application by giving the applicant temporary
custody.
(c) Restrictions upon the exercise of discretions
5.38 Section 2 of this chapter considered the
restrictions upon the discretions conferred by statute in
the form of threshold and similar requirements. The
earlier paragraphs of this section of this chapter analysed
the restrictions imposed upon the exercise of a discretion
by the context of the power and went on to consider
examples of apparently unfettered discretions. So far
each statutory provision has been considered in relation
to the specific terms in which it has been drafted. That
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approach is frequently too narrow, for many of the
statutes affecting children interlock in a remarkable way
and the exercise of an apparently unfettered discretion
may prove to be more limited than the terms of the section
suggest.
5.39 The integral relationship between sections 1
and 2 of the Matrimonial Proceedings (Magistrates' Courts)
2 1
Act 1950 has already been noticed. Section 2 contains
the various powers available to the court; section 1 sets
out the threshold requirements which must be satisfied
before the powers can be exercised. The same is true of
subsections (1) and (3) of section 1 of the Children and
Young Persons Act 1969 in relation to subsection (2) of
that section. In that instance the relationship exists
between different subsections in one section. That is
a closer nexus than one between sections in the same part
of a statute, as in the other example.
5.40 That statutory structure is not uncommon. Of
particular significance is the relevance to the exercise
of a statutory discretion of a direction contained in
a different part of the Act or in a different statute.
The generality of the application of statutory provisions
differs according to the precise phraseology of the
provision and its statutory context. Por example, the
duty placed upon local authorities by sections 1 and 1A
2 2
of the Children Act 1958 applies only to foster children
21 Paras. 5.35 and 5.36.
2 2 As defined in s.2(l) of the. Children Act 19 58.
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within their areas. Similarly only protected children
2 3
within the meaning of Part IV of the Adoption Act 1958
are entitled to the benefit of the duty placed upon local
authorities by section 38 of that Act. Again, the duty
cast upon the court by section 7(1)(b) of the Adoption Act
2 4
1958 to be satisfied that an adoption order "will be for
the welfare of the infant" applied only where application
was made for an adoption order. Finally, section 8(1)(a)
of the Matrimonial Proceedings (Children) Act 1958 disables
a court from granting certain consistorial decrees unless
certain arrangements have been made for the welfare of the
affected children. There are other examples but the
pattern is clear. Even where the concept of welfare is
expressed in general and broad terms, the specific
application of the rule is restricted in terms of the
provision itself. The context of the rule does likewise
and thus reinforces this restriction.
5.41 Not all the provisions concerning welfare are so
precise in their application. The reason may be that they
appear to form part of an administrative code setting out
broadly the policy to be followed in the exercise of the
various functions. This relates these provisions clearly
to the earlier paragraphs of this section of this chapter.
The first group of such provisions applies to local
2 5
authorities. Before their amendment in 19 7 5 section 12(1)
23 Or Part III of the Adoption Act 1976.
24 Before its repeal.
25 Children Act 1975, ss.59 and 79.
of the Children Act 1948 and section 20(1) of the Social
Work (Scotland) Act 1968 each required the local authority
"to exercise their pwoers with respect to hirn [a child in
their care] so as to further his best interests." The
statutory duty is now to "give first consideration to the
need to safeguard and promote the welfare of the child
throughout his childhood". This is more precise than
the earlier enactment. Both clearly operate to restrict
the exercise of the local authority's powers.
5.42 The application of these provisions is rather
complex. The Scottish provision refers to "a child in
the care of a local authority under any enactment." The
English provision, more specifically, refers in section
11 of the 1948 Act to a child in the care of a local
authority "under section 1 of this Act or by virtue of a
care order within the meaning of the Children and Young
Persons Act 1969 or a warrant under section 23(1) of that
Act." The English provision also applies to children
in the care of a local authority by virtue of section 3(2)
(a) of the Matrimonial Proceedings (Magistrates' Courts)
Act 1960, section 43 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973
and section 7(2) of the Family Law Reform Act 1969. The
simplicity of the Scottish drafting compares favourably
with the complexity of the English phraseology. This
administrative direction thus applies in several contexts
not apparent from the principal section or even the principal
Act. Its importance in the law of children is fundamental.
It is the basis for the approach to be adopted by any
local authority to a child in their care.
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5.43 Section 1(1) of the Children and Young Persons
Act 1963 and section 12(1) of the Social Work (Scotland)
Act 1968 are part of the administrative code applying to
children. The 1963 Act provision imposes a duty upon
every local authority "to make available such advice,
guidance and assistance as may promote the welfare of
children by diminishing the need to receive children into
or keep them in care .... or to bring [them] before a
juvenile court." The Scottish provision extends beyond
children and the duty is "to promote social welfare by
making available advice, guidance and assistance on such
a scale as may be appropriate for their [local authority]
area, and. in that behalf to make arrangements and to
provide or secure the provision of such facilities (including
the provision or arranging for the provision of residential
and other establishments) as they may consider suitable
and adequate." The Scottish provision probably more
positively sets out the fundamental policy inherent in the
provision. These duties are general and not
necessarily related to one statutory context. In that
sense they probably pervade all the discretionary powers
conferred by this legislation, although in an oblique and
complex manner.
5.44 Whatever their juridical status, children's
hearings have a fundamental role to fulfil under the
Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968. That Act invests
2 6
children's hearings with various powers but the structure
26 See Part III.
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of the legislation is such that the aim of these hearings
lacks emphasis. Section 43(1) directs a children's
hearing, after they have considered certain facts, grounds
and information, to "proceed in accordance with the
subsequent provisions of this section to consider on what
course they should decide in the best interests of the
child." The action which a hearing should take is clearly
what is in the best interests of the child. The oblique
reference to this objective in the legislation does not
disguise its importance. Children's hearings are neither
courts nor local authorities; they make fundamental
decisions about children referred to them; and it would
be consistent with the philosophy justifying their existence
that the child's interests represent their sole concern.
5.45 If, despite its apparent formal context, section
43(1) of the 1968 Act is as important as suggested, it
contrasts quite remarkably with section 49(1) of the
Children and Young Persons (Scotland) Act 1937 and its
English counterpart, section 44(1) of the Children and
Young Persons Act 1933. These provisions direct "every
court in dealing with a child or young person who is
27
brought before it, either as an offender or otherwise,
to have regard to the welfare of the child or young person".
27 The words "or otherwise" were repealed for Scotland
by the Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968, s.95(2) and
Sched.9.
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An additional duty is imposed to "take steps in a proper
case for removing him from undesirable surroundings."
Most of the functions of courts in Scotland with regard
to children have been transferred to children's hearings
and the policy of the 1968 Act is largely to remove
children from contact with the criminal law and the
criminal authorities. A court may nevertheless exercise
a residual jurisdiction over children for an offence under
section 31(1) of the 1968 Act. To that very limited extent
section 49(1) of the 1937 Act may operate in practice.
5.46 The comparison between the approach to welfare
in section 43(1) of the 1968 Act and section 49(1) of the
1937 Act and its English equivalent is understandable in
the context of the different functions of children's
hearings and courts. A children's hearing is not
concerned with deciding whether the conditions justifying
2 8
compulsory measures of care have been established. A
hearing decides only what measures are appropriate for the
child after the need for compulsory measures has been
2 9 3 0
established. A court decides both matters. It is
unlikely however that welfare is relevant when the court
is determining whether an offence has been committed or
3 1
care proceedings are otherwise justified. On the other
28 Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968, s.42(2)(c).
29 Ibid. , s.43.
30 Children and Young Persons Act 1969, Part I.
31 At least in Scotland.
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hand the English requirements for care proceedings include
establishing "need of care or control which he is unlikely
3 2
to receive unless the court makes an order." Welfare
may well be a factor to which the court should relevantly
have regard in determining that question. That does not
entirely justify the retention of section 49(1) of the
1937 Act for Scotland as "need of care or control" is not
a requirement for compulsory measures of care. In any
event, whatever their difficulties, section 43(1) of the
1968 Act, section 44(1) of the 1933 Act and section 49(1)
of the 1937 Act are relevant broadly in their application
to the various powers conferred by the legislation.
5.47 The final provision in this context is the
creation of the paramountcy of welfare principle.
Parliament has directed that "where any proceedings before
any court .... the custody or upbringing of an infant ...
is in question, the court, in deciding that question, shall
regard the welfare of the infant as the first and paramount
3 3
consideration." It is a wide but not unrestricted
provision. It applies to "any proceeding" in "any court".
It cannot therefore apply to local authorities, central
government or children's hearings. It relates to any
question concerning the custody or upbringing of an
infant. It thus applies to a claim for custody in
non-custodial proceedings; for example, matrimonial or
consistorial cases. "Custody" is not defined. This
matters little, since it is normally possible to decide
32 Children and Young Persons Act 1969, s.l(2)
33 Guardianship of Infants Act 1925, s.l;
Guardianship of Minors Act 1971, s.l
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whether custody is in issue without the benefit of a
precise definition. "Upbringing" is a more elastic
concept and could cover almost all aspects affecting a
child. Finally the court must "regard" welfare as
paramount in deciding that question. The problems thrown
up by these few words are immense and will be considered
later. In summary,therefore, the paramountcy of welfare
principle applies when any court is deciding any question
concerning a child. That would appear to be the meaning
of the provision. Whether it accords with the views
expressed by the courts is another matter. In any event,
that principle founded upon those provisions pervades the
law affecting children applied by the courts.
5.48 This section of this chapter has so far dealt
with increasingly general restrictions upon the exercise
of a statutory discretion. One very specific point
should be noted for the sake of completeness. Some of
the powers set out in Table 5 are little more than formal,
although they are no doubt necessary in a technical sense.
Such powers tend to be procedural. Many of the powers
are more substantial and have direct bearing upon the
future of the child. Most of them are administrative in
character. It is a feature of administrative powers
that the status quo may be infinitely variable in the light
of changing circumstances. Often a power to vary the
existing regime is directly conceded. For example,
section 15(1) of the Children and Young Persons Act 1969
enables the court to vary or discharge a supervision order.
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Section 90(3) of the Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968 more
broadly provides for the variation or revocation of any
order made under the Act. The last example requires the
power to vary or revoke to be exercised "in the like manner
and subject to the same conditions" as the original order.
This is true of any power to vary, modify or revoke by
3
virtue of section 32(3) of the Interpretation Act 1889.
Thus an unrestricted discretion may be subject to the
fulfilment of certain requirements not apparent on the face
of the provision conferring the power.
5.49 Such powers, largely formal in character, are
different from powers of review. Section 48 of the Social
Work (Scotland) Act 1968 enables a supervision requirement
made by a children's hearing under section 44 of that Act
3 5
to be subject to review. In particular section 48(3)
provides that a supervision requirement shall cease to have
effect if it has not been reviewed within a period of one
year. These powers of review are fundamental to the
functions of children's hearings. They relate more directly
to the substance of the statutory discretion in comparison
with those referred to in the preceding paragraph. The
significant provision in this context requires that the
restrictions governing the making of a supervision
requirement apply also to a review of a supervision
3 6
requirement. In this case the advantage is that the
requirement is explicit in the legislation.
34 52 8 53 Vict., c . 63 -
35 Supervision and care orders in England are variable
in terms of the Children and Young Persons Act 1969,
ss. 15 and 21.
36 Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968, s.48(6).
190
CHAPTER 6
THE SUBSTANCE OF WELFARE
Section 1 - Introduction
6.1 The preceding chapters have been concerned to
classify and explain the role of welfare in legislation as
it has evolved in a largely functional context. This
chapter cuts across that approach. The existence of
various statutory approaches has been noticed and it will
be helpful to consider now the substance of welfare rather
than its function. A glance at the examples in Table 1
in Chapter 3 shows how diversified are the types of welfare
regulated by statute. Modt instances cover what may be
described as material or physical welfare; for example,
physical integrity, health, medical and dental care,
accommodation, environment, hygiene, food, sanitation.
Others relate to the moral well-being of the child; for
instance, sexual integrity, betting, gaming, indulgence
in or access to alcohol. Such specification may not
always be possible. Emotional and psychological welfare
are not referred to in terms in any statute but in view
of the flexibility inherent in the word "welfare" such
aspects may be within Parliamentary contemplation. These
various aspects of the substance of welfare are quite
obvious and need no further elaboration in this context.
1.91
6.2 There are however several other aspects of
welfare which recur frequently throughout the legislation.
They deserve individual classification. They have as
direct and obvious a bearing upon the child and his welfare
as the instances in the preceding paragraph. The interests
of a child may be protected indirectly by creating the
appropriate decision-making context. This is an important
aspect of welfare in the broadest sense and it appears to
be attracting increasing official attention. It may be
called the procedural protection of a child and it operates
in an administrative or judicial context. Rules have been
devised to ensure to a limited extent that the interests
of the child are neither neglected nor overriden in the
course of official proceedings.
6.3 This chapter also considers two other individually
significant aspects of welfare; religion and education.
Finally, note should be taken of rules governing the
position of others. Legislation regarding children
normally seeks to safeguard their welfare and interests
but it may be that their welfare can be protected by
conferring rights upon or safeguarding the interests of
other persons, notably parents. Such protection may be
intended to protect such other persons themselves in ad¬
dition to or in place of any protection afforded obliquely
thereby to the child. As a postscript this chapter,
largely for the sake of completeness, looks at the
statutory powers enabling subordinate legislation affecting
children to be enacted.
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Section 2 - Procedural safeguards
6.14 The interests of children may be protected not
only by making them the centre piece of the decision¬
making process, but also by creating appropriate procedures
which indirectly but nevertheless clearly help to achieve
the same overall objective. Table 6 exemplifies
statutory procedures relating largely to judicial proceedings
which are designed to protect the interests, including the
emotional stability, of the child. These provisions are
direct and objectively ascertainable in the same way as
those in Table 1. They do not refer to the welfare or
interests of the child as such but it takes little
imagination to conclude that the safeguarding of such
interests is the objective of the legislation. Table
6 may thus be said to be the procedural counterpart of
the substantive provisions classified in Table 1.
TABLE 6
PROCEDURES PROTECTING THE INTERESTS OF CHILDREN
Part 1 - Provision of Acts of Parliament
Section Provision
Children and Young Persons Act 1933 ( 23 S 2k Geo. 5, c,12);Eng.
Children and Young Persons (Scotland) Act 1937 (1 Edw. 8 S
1 Geo.6, c.37): Scot.
1933 s.31 Separation of children and young persons
1937 s.39 from adults in police stations, courts, etc.
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Section Provision
1933 s.36 Prohibition against children being present
1937 s.44 in court during trial of other persons.
1933 s.37(l) Clearance of court while child or young
1937 s.45(l) person is giving evidence in cases
involving questions of decency or morality.
1933 s.39(l) Concealment of identity of child involved
1937 s.46(l) in judicial proceedings.
1933 s.43 Admission of deposition of child or
young person in evidence in certain
circumstances.
1933 s.47(2) Procedure in juvenile courts: court not
1937 s.52(l) to sit in room where a non-juvenile court
has or will convene within an hour;
restriction on who may be present.
1933 s.49(l) Restriction on newspaper reports of
1937 s.54(l) proceedings in juvenile courts.
Criminal Justice. Act 1948 (11 S 12 Geo. 6, c.58) : Eng.
Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 1949 (12, 13 E 14 Geo.6,
c.94) : Scot.
1948 s.l7(2) Court to obtain and consider information about
1949 s.l8(2) character and physical and mental condition
of person under 21 for purpose of determining
whether a method other than imprisonment
is appropriate.
19b
Magistrates' Courts Act 1952 ( 15 6 16 Geo. 6 6 1 Eliz.2,
c.5 5): Eng.
1952 s.57(l) Hearing and determination of domestic
proceedings to be separated from other
business of the courts.
1952 s.57(2) Restriction on persons who may be present
during domestic proceedings.
1952 s.58(l) Restriction on newspaper reporting of
domestic proceedings.
Children and Young Persons Act 1963 (1963 c.37) : G.B.
1963 s.27 Restriction on use of evidence of children
in committal proceedings for sexual
offences.
Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968 (1968 c.M-9) : Scot.
1968 s.3(l) Prohibition against prosecuting a
child for any offence except on the
instructions of the Lord Advocate or at
his instance. .
1968 s.34(3) Accommodation and facilities for children's
hearings to be dissociated from criminal
courts and police stations.
1968 s.35(1) Restrictions upon persons who may be
present at a children's hearing.
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Section Provision
1968 s.40(2) Consideration of case by children's
hearing in the absence of the child.
1968 s.58(l) Restrictions upon the publication of
reports of proceedings in any children's
hearing.
Children and Young Persons Act 1969 (1969 C.5M-) : Eng.
1969 s.6 Persons under 17 to be tried summarily
except in special circumstances.
1969 s.8(l) Restrictions upon fingerprinting of
suspected young persons.
Children Act 1975 (1975 c.72) : G.B.
Adoption Act 1976 (1976 c.36) : Eng.
1975 s.20 Appointment of curator (guardian) ad litem
1976 s.65 in adoption proceedings.
1975 s.21 Hearing of adoption application in
1976 s.64 camera.
1975 s.64: Eng. Representation of children in certain
1975 s.66: proceedings when there is a conflict of
Scot.
interest between parent and child.
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Part 2 - Provisions of Statutory Instruments
Rule Provision
County Court Rules 1936 (S.R. S 0. 1936 No.626) : Eng.
1936 r.l(l) Proceedings under the Guardianship Acts
to be heard and determined in Chambers
unless the court otherwise directs.
Rules of the Supreme Court 1965 : Eng.
1965 Ord. 90.7 Applications under Guardianship Acts
may be disposed of in Chambers.
Magistrates' Courts (Children and Young Persons) Rules
1970 (S.I. 1970 No.1792) : Eng.
1970 r.6 Duty placed upon court to explain the
substance of the charge to the child or
young person in offence proceedings.
1970 r.8(2) Duty placed upon court to ask questions
on behalf of the child or young person where
the child or young person is not legally
represented in offence proceedings.
1970 r.10(1)(a) Opportunity of making a statement to the
juvenile court to be afforded to the child
or young person after a finding of guilty.
1970 r.lO(l)(e) Power of court to require the child or
young person or parent or guardian to withdraw
from the court after a finding of guilty.
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Rule Provision
1970 r.l0(2) Right of the child or young person or
parent or guardian to be told the substance
of certain information given to the
juvenile court in certain cases after a
finding of guilty.
1970 r.ll(l) Duty placed upon court to provide information
of the proposed manner of the disposal of
the case and to allow representations
(in the case of juvenile offenders).
1970 r.l6(l) Duty placed upon court to explain the
nature of care proceedings and the grounds
on which they are brought.
1970 r.l.8(l) Power of court in care proceedings to
hear whole or part of evidence in the
absence of the child or young person.
1970 r.20(l) Power of court to require the parent or
(d)
guardian to withdraw from the court in
care proceedings.
1970 r.21(l) Duty placed upon court to provide
information of the proposed manner of the
disposal of the case and to allow




Act of Sederunt (Social Work) (Sheriff Court Procedure
Rules) 1971 (S.I. 1971 No.92) : Scot.
1971 r.6(l) Service on child by reporter of a copy of
the application and warrant,
1971 r.8(3) Power of sheriff to hear evidence in the
absence of the child.
1971 r,15(2) Power of sheriff to adjourn the diet
to enable further evidence to be produced
as a result of information disclosed in
the course of an appeal.
Children's Hearings (Scotland) Rules 1971 (S.I. 1971
No.i+92) : Scot.
1971 r.7(l) Duty placed upon the reporter to give to
the child notification of the hearing.
1971 r.l7(2) Duty placed upon the hearing to consider
(a)
a report of the local authority on the
child and his social background.
1971 r.l7(2) Duty placed upon the hearing to discuss
(c)
the case with the child.
1971 r.l7(2) Duty placed upon the hearing to endeavour
(d)
to obtain the views of the child.
1971 r.21 Duty placed upon the reporter to make
available a report of the local authority
on the child and his social background
where the child is in interim detention.
6.5 There are essentially six different types of
statutory provision in this Table. Some of the examples
regulate the physical environment in which children and
young persons are dealt with officially. Others prescribe
who may attend the official hearings and in what
circumstances a child or young person may be exempt from
attendance. Confidentiality and restriction upon
publicity are another feature of the examples in Table 6.
Provision is made for the court itself to assist the
conduct of the case on behalf of the child or young
person. Finally, there are two examples of making the
rulesof evidence more flexible to assist in promoting the
objectives of safeguarding the interests of the child and
of positively advancing the child's welfare. The former
objective may be achieved by rendering admissible the
depositions of children and the latter by the judicial
requisition of information on certain topics which will
assist the court in deciding how best to deal with the
child or young person.
6.6 There are thus several ways in which Parliament
has amended the normal rules of procedure and evidence to
enable the special position of children to be taken into
account. Broadly they ensure that the sensibilities of
young children will not be prejudiced by their participation
in judicial proceedings and that the court will have as
much relevant information as possible in coming to a
decision on the treatment of the child. These aspects of
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the legislation demonstrate the essentially administrative
character of the examples in Table 6. The rules are
designed not to resolve conflicts but to indicate lines
of policy to enable the court to create a sensitive
environment for dealing with children.
Section 3 - Education
6.7 Education is one of the most important aspects
of the upbringing of a child. The law concerning
education is now very much a matter of public interest.
Table 7 contains several instances of the ways in which
statute regulates the secular education of children. They
are on the whole expressed in fairly general language.
They confer and impose powers and duties upon parents,
education authorities and other educational administrative
bodies. The structure of the provisions is thus
essentially administrative. It is not surprising that most
of the provisions are analysed in functional terms.
TABLE 7
STATUTORY REGULATION OF EDUCATION
Part 1 - Provisions of Acts of Parliament
Section Provision
Children and Young Persons Act 19 33 (23 S 2'4 Geo. 5, c.12):
Eng.
Children and Young Persons (Scotland) Act 1937 (1 Edw.8
£ 1 Geo. 6 , c.37): Scot.
1933 s.lO(l) Offence for vagrants to prevent children
1937 s.21(l) from receiving education.
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Section Provision
Education Act 1944 (7 £ 8 Geo.6, c.31): Eng.
Education (Scotland) Act 1962 (10 S 11 Eliz.2, c.47):
Scot.
1944 s.8(l) Duty placed upon local education authority
to provide sufficient schools for the
individual needs of the pupils.
1962 s.1(1) Duty placed upon education authority
to secure that adequate and efficient
provision is made throughout their area
of all forms of primary, secondary and
further education.
1944 s.36 Duty placed upon parent to cause every
1962 s.31 child of school age to receive efficient
and suitable education.
1944 s.76 Pupils to be educated in accordance with
1962 s.29(l) the wishes of their parents.
Children and Young Persons Act 1969 (1969 c.54): Eng.
1969 s.1(1) Lack of efficient full-time education
and (2)(e)
suitable to his age, ability and aptitude
as a ground for care proceedings.
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Part 2 - Provisions of Statutory Instruments
Rule or regulation Provision
Approved School Rules 19 3 3 (S.R. S 0. 1933 No.??1-!): Eng.
1933 r.l0(2) Duty placed upon managers to ensure
satisfactory education of the boys
resident in the school.
1933 r.26(l) Education to be provided according to
the principles of the Education Act 1944.
Remand Home Rules 1939 (S.R. S 0. 1939 No.12): Eng.
1939 r.10 Provision of suitable schoolroom
instruction or of practical work for
boys over school age.
Approved Probation Hostel and Home Rules 1949 (S.I.1949
No.1376): Eng.
1949 r.6(l) Duty placed upon committee to ensure
satisfactory training of the residents.
1949 r.19 Every hostel and home to be provided
with an approved scheme of training.
Borstal (Scotland) Rules 1950 (S.I. 1950 No.1944): Scot.
Borstal Rules 1964 ( S.I. 1964 No.387): Eng.
1950 r.45(l) Inmate to be instructed in occupations
which may fit him to earn his livelihood
on release.
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Rule or regulation Provision
1964 r.29(2) Inmate's work to help to fit him to
earn his living on release.
1964 r.29(3) Provision for technical training of
suitable inmates in skilled trades.
1950 r.54(l) Provision of continued education of inmates
1964 r.30(l) by class teaching, individual study and all
such cultural influences.
Detention Centre Rules 1952 (S.I. 1952 No.1432): Eng.
Detention Centre (Scotland) Rules I960 (S.I. 1960 No.870):
Scot.
1952 r.45(l) Provision of full-time education for
1960 r.41(l) inmates of compulsory school age.
1952 r.45(2) Provision of part-time education for
1960 r.41(2) inmates not of compulsory school age.
Children (Performances) Regulations 1968 (S.I. 1968
No.1728): G.B.
1968 r.10 Duty placed upon licensing authority
not to grant a licence unless child's
education will not suffer and arrangements
for the child's education have been
approved.
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6.8 The scheme revealed by Table 7 involves four
elements. The principle around which the system revolves
is the duty placed upon the parent to cause every child
of school, age to receive efficient and suitable education.
The parent is given a certain discretion in deciding how
to fulfil this duty but the foundation of the administrative
structure is the statutory duty placed upon the local
education authority to provide sufficient schools for the
individual needs of the pupils. It is open to a parent
to delegate his statutory duty to educate; most parents
implement their duty in this way. Parental wishes are
relevant to the way in which their children are to be
educated.
6.9 The legislation leaves largely unregulated the
method by which these objectives may be achieved. This
is no doubt deliberate policy. Parliament has confided to
the local education authorities the means of securing
the detailed implementation of their statutory duties.
There are however two important restrictive factors.
Firstly the combined effect of sections 8(1) and 36 of
the Education Act 1944 requires the individual educational
needs of each child to be secured. The duty is thus
general, but it is specific .in relation to each individual
child. Secondly, section 76 of the 1944 Act requires
the administrative authority to have regard in exercising
their functions to the general principle that "so far
as is compatible with the provision of efficient
instruction and training and the avoidance of unreasonable
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public expenditure, pupils are to be educated in
accordance with the wishes of their parents." The wishes
of parents are thus relevant. But it is difficult to
assess how significant in practice they are, as they are
considerably restricted by these inhibitory qualifications.
The two statutory criteria described in this paragraph
are the only instances of legislative assistance to
administrative bodies in implementing their duties.
6.10 The third element to note concerns the legal
effect of failure to educate a child in terms of the
Act. Parental failure to secure the education of a child
under section 36 of the 1944- Act attracts the sanction
of a school attendance order. This is essentially an
administrative sanction but ultimately failure to comply
constitutes a criminal offence. The local education
authority scheme of education is supported by a parental
duty to secure regular attendance; failure is an offence
against section 39 of the 1944 Act. Somewhat differently,
the lack of proper educational arrangements for a child is
a bar to the granting of a license authorising a child to
take part in a performance to which section 37 of the
Children and Young Persons Act 1963 applies. A further,
and potentially powerful, weapon available to support the
educational duty is to be found in section 1(1) and (2)(e)
of the Children and Young Persons Act 1969. Lack of
efficient full-time education suitable to his age, ability
and aptitude coupled with need of care or control renders
a child or young person liable to be brought before a
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juvenile court in care proceedings. This language
reflects that used in section 36 of the Education Act
1944 which creates the parental duty to secure the
education of their children. Section 1 of the 1969 Act
operates, therefore, as a further method of enforcing
the parental duty to secure education.
6.11 The last point to draw attention to is the
nature of the provisions in Part 2 of Table 7, namely those
contained in statutory instruments. Apart from
regulation 10 of the Children (Performances) Regulations
1968, all the examples in Part 2 merely prescribe the
educational function to be exercised in various
institutional establishments. Obviously an educational
regime is considered to be an important and integral part
of the training in such establishments. The
requirements are expressed in general functional terms;
much is thus left to the administrative imagination of
the staff of these establishments and the requirements
of the general law, already discussed, insofar as they
apply to the young persons in question.
6.12 The instances in Table 7 demonstrate a point
already anticipated. Education is merely one aspect of
welfare. The analysis implicit in Table 7 sets out the
scheme of the Act in relation to one unit of welfare.
It also shows by reference to the preceding Tables how
varied and complex and yet interdependent are the ways in
which education as one unit of welfare has been handled
by Parliament. Most of the examples in Table 7 have
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been treated as administrative. It is consistent with
earlier analysis that they are also functional in the
sense that the legislation specifies what is intended rather
than how it should be implemented.
Section 1 - Religion
6.13 At one time religion and religious education
were much more closely regulated by the legal system than
secular education. Religious education, to some extent
now built into the system of public education, has become
less important. But the law nevertheless provides for
it in some detail. The pattern of legal regulation of
religious education has changed over the years. The
present approach of the legal system may be discerned
from an examination of Table 8.
TABLE 8
STATUTORY REGULATION OF RELIGION
Part 1 - Provisions of Acts of Parliament
Section Provision
Custody of Children Act 1891 (54 & 55 Vict., c.3): G.B.
1891 s.4 Power of court to make an order to
secure that a child shall be brought up
in the religion in which the parent has
a legal right to require that the child
should be brought up where the parental




Education Act 1944 (7 £ 8 Geo.6 , c.31): Eng.
1944 s. 39(2) Absence of a child from school on any
day exclusively set apart for religious
observance by the religious body to which
his parent belongs not to amount to
failure to attend regularly.
Children Act 1948 (11 6 12 Geo. 6, c.43): Eng.
Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968 (1968 c.49): Scot.
1948 s.l(3)(b) Relatives or friends of a child received
1968 s.15(3) into care may take over the care of the
(b)
child and preference to be given to
persons of the same religious persuasion
as the child.
1948 s.3(7) Inability of local authority to cause child
1969 s.17(7) to be brought up in any religious creed
other than that in which he would have
been brought up but for a resolution by the
local authority assuming parental rights
of the child.
1948 s.l8(l) Local authority not to cause body of child
1968 s.28(l) in care to be cremated where not in




Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968 (1968 c.49): Scot.
1968 s.44(2) Children's hearing to have regard to the
religious persuasion of a child in making
a supervision requirement requiring the
child to reside in a residential
establishment.
Children and Young Persons Act 1969 (1969 c.54): Eng.
1969 s.24(3) Person in the care of a local authority
not to be caused to be brought up in any
religious creed other than that in which
he would have been brought up apart from the
care order.
Children Act 1975 (1975 c.72): Scot.
Adoption Act 1976 (1976 c.36): Eng.
1975 s.13 Duty placed upon adoption agency to
1976 s.7 have regard (so far as is practicable) to
any wishes of the parent and guardian as
to the religious upbringing of the child.
Part 2 - Provisions of Statutory Instruments
Rule or regulation Provision
Approved School Rules 1933 (S.R. S 0. 1933 No.774): Eng.
1933 r.29 Provision for daily worship; religious
instruction suitable to age and capacity;
preference for religious instruction in
religious persuasion to which child belongs.
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Section Provision
Remand Home Rules 1939 (S.R. £ 0. 1939 No.12): Eng.
1939 r.12 Provision for Sunday worship; provision
for visits by minister of religious
persuasions to which the child belongs.
Approved Probation Hostel and Home Rules 1949 (S.I. 1949
No.1376): Eng.
1949 r.22 Provision of facilities for the practice
of religion and for Sunday worship
according to individual religion.
Borstal (Scotland) Rules 1950 (S.I. 1950 No.1944): Scot.
Borstal Rules 1964 (S.I. 1964 No.387): Eng.
1950 r.47 Determination of religious denomination
1964 r.12 of inmate.
1950 r.51 Duty placed upon chaplain to visit inmates
1964 r.13 in prescribed circumstances.
1950 r.49 Provision of religious services
1964 r.15
1950 r.50 Availability and provision of religious
1964 r.18 books.




Administration of Children's Hones (Scotland) Regulations
1959 (S.I. 1959 No. 83*4) : Scot.
1951 r.4 Duty placed upon administering authority
1959 r.5 to secure that the child receives religious
instruction appropritate to the religious
persuasion to which he belongs.
Detention Centre Rules 1952 (S.I. 1952 No.1432): Eng.
Detention Centre (Scotland) Rules 1960 (S.I. I960 No.870:
Scot.
1.9 52 r.48 Ascertainment and recording of religious
1960 r.44 denomination of every inmate.
1952 r.49 Facilities for visits by ministers of
1960 r.45 religion to which inmate belongs (if not
Church of England in England).
1952 r.50(l) Provision for periodical religious
1960 r.46(l) worship or instruction.
1952 r.52 Provision of books of religious observance








Boarding-out of Children Regulations 1955 (S.I. 1955
No.1377): Eng.
Boarding-out of Children (Scotland) Regulations 1959
(S.I. 1959 No.835); Scot.
1955 r.ll(2) Registration of particulars of children
1959 r.l7(4) boarded-out, including religious persuasion
(a) and (b)
of child and of foster-parents.
1955 r.l7(l) Duty to obtain information on the religious
(b)(i)
persuasion of foster-parents.
1955 r.l7(2) Notification of the religious persuasion
1959 r.ll(3) of a foster child for certain purposes.
(a) and (b)
1955 r.19 Preference for a child to be boarded-out
1959 r.4 with foster-parents of the same religious
persuasion as the-child or who give an
undertaking to that effect.
1955 r.27 Undertaking by fester parents of a child
boarded-out for a short term relating to
the religious persuasion of the child.
6.14 A breakdown of the contents of Table 8 disclose
three types of statutory provision. Most of the provisions
in Part 2, namely statutory instruments, are administrative
in character. They relate largely to the provision of
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facilities for religious observance and instruction in
institutional establishments, supported by the administrative
information-gathering processes.
6.15 So far as the substantive provisions are concerned,
the basic question is how effect may be given to the
religion in which the child is to be brought up. The
statutory rules do not offer any assistance in determining
which religion is appropritate for the child in question.
It is nevertheless significant that reference is made in
some form or another to the religion of the child, not to
the religion of the parent. The two are not necessarily
the same. The only exceptions are to be found in
section 4 of the Custody of Children Act 1891 and
section 39(2) of the Education Act 1944. They refer
respectively to the religion in which the parent has a
legal right to require that the child should be brought
up and to the religious body to which the child's parent
belongs. Exceptionally therefore the objective is to
protect or enforce the parent's interest in the child's
religion; the more normal provision enforces the child's
own interest in his religious education.
6.16 These interests are enforced and protected in
different ways. The statutory provisions may directly
and objectively state that in the prescribed circumstances
the child shall be brought up in the religion to which
he belongs; for example, where the child is in the care
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of a local authority. In a similar direct mariner
before 1975 power was given to a person whose consent
was required for an adoption order to attach conditions
with regard to the religion of the child. This has
been superseded by the duty placed upon adoption agencies
to have regard at the placement stage to any wishes of
the child's parents and guardians. The first example
is the duty placed upon the authority administering a
children's home to secure that the child receives religious
instruction appropriate to the religious persuasion to
which he belongs.
5.17 The other statutory approach does not prescribe
objective rules; it merely provides a statutory preference.
For example, section l(3)(b) of the Children Act 1948
places upon a local authority a duty to endeavour to
secure that the care of the child should be taken over
inter alia by a relative or friend of his, "being where
possible, a person of the same religious persuasion as
the child." The contents of this duty, albeit mandatory
in itself, are more in the nature of a statutory
exhortation. The weakness of the provision is in the
"possibility" of giving preference to the child's
religious persuasion. The other two examples of the
preferential approach are to be found in rule 29 of the
Approved School Rules 1933 and regulation 19 of the
Boarding-out of Children Regulations 1955 , both of which
are drafted in terms similar to those of section 1(3)(b)
of the 1948 Act. They are self-analytical and no
further explanation is necessary.
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Section 5 - Protection of interests other than those
of children
6.18 These rules on religion are a compromise between
the interests of the parent and of the child. It is indeed
axiomatic that to some extent the law of children creates
a delicate balance between the interests of the child and
those of the other persons, particularly the child's
parents. It is probably a matter of debate whether the
conferment of rights upon parents and other persons is
intended to benefit the recipient of the right or the child,
although in the latter case the benefit for the child
would be only obliquely identifiable. Table 9 contains
examples of such provisions.
TABLE 9
PROVISIONS PROTECTING THOSE OTHER THAN CHILDREN
Part 1 - Provisions of Acts of Parliament
Section Provision Other Person
Children and Young Persons Act 1933 (23 S 2H Geo.5,
c.12): Eng.
Children and Young Persons (Scotland) Act 1937 (1 Edw.8
S 1 Geo. 6, c.37): Scot.
1933 s.l(7) Punishment of a child or Parent, teacher




Section Provision Other Person
1933 s.34(l)
1937 s.42(l)
Attendance at court of
certain persons when a
child or young person
is brought before the
court.
Parent or guardian
Education Act 1944 (7 S 8 Geo.6, c.31): Eng.
1944 s.37(3) Duty placed on local Parent
education authority to give
notice of intention to
apply to the minister for
a direction determining
what school is to be named
in an attendance order.
1944 s.38(3) Duty placed on the minister Parent
not to make a direction
determining what special
school is to be named in
a school attendance order
unless the parent consents
or there is a certificate
of disability.
Guardianship (Refugee Children) Act 1944 (7 8 8 Geo,6,
c . 8 ) : G . B .
1944 s.l(2): Power of Secretary of Parent
Eng.
State to give notice of
an appointment of a ward
(tutor in Scotland) to
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Section Provision Other Person
1944 s . 2(2)
Scot.
any parent whose name
and address are known,
Children Act 19*48 (11 6 12 Geo. 6, c.43):Eng.





Restriction on power of
local authority to keep





Duty placed on local Parent or guardian,
authority after resolution
assuming parental rights
to serve notice on person
on whose account the
resolution was passed.
1948 s.12(1A) Modification of the
general duty placed
upon the local authority




1968 s.2 3(2 )
Restriction on Secretary
of State consenting to
the emigration of a child




Section Provision Other Person
Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968 (1968 c.M-9): Scot.
1968 s.41(l) Right to attend at all Parent.
stages of a children's
hearing.
1968 s.M-4(6) Power of director of Any other child
social work to transfer in the place,
a child to another place
of residence.
Children and Young Persons Act 1969 (1969 c.5LQ:Eng.
1969 s.2(9)
1969 s.18(3)
Power of court in
relation to an infant
not before the court
and under the age of
5 in respect of whom it
is proposed to bring care
proceedings, after
affording opportunity to
be heard to certain
persons.
Duty placed on court to
send a copy of a
supervision order or an
order varying or
discharging a supervision













child or young person
in a place of safety




1969 s.28(4)(b) Duty placed on
constable detaining a
child or young person
in a place of safety to
take steps to inform
certain persons.
Parent or guardian,
Guardianship of Minors Act 1971 (1971 c.3):Eng.
Guardianship of Infants Act 1886 C49 S 50 Vict., c,27):
Scot.
Guardianship of Infants Act 1925 (15 S 16 Geo.5, c.H5):
Scot.
1971 s.9(l) Application for custody Mother and father,
1886 s.5 and access.







Children Act 1975 (1975 c.72): Scot.











Part 2 - Provisions of Statutory Instruments
Rule Provision Other Person
Remand Home Rules 1939 (S.R. S 0. 1939 No.12): Eng.
1939 r.19 Consent required to Parent or guardian,
operative treatment on
a boy.
Borstal (Scotland) Rules 1950 (S.I. 1950 No.19m): Scot.
Borstal Rules 1964 (S.I. 1964 No.387): Eng.
1950 r.38(3)
1964 r.45(1)
Power to put an inmate
under restraint
(mechanical restraint
in Scotland) to prevent
injury.
Other inmates.
1964 r.35(2) Power to allow inmate
an additional letter or
visit where necessary
for welfare of his
family.
His family,
Magistrates' Courts (Children and Young Persons) Rules
1970 (S.I. No.1792): Eng.
1970 r.5(1) Assistance for a child












a statement to the
juvenile court when a
child or young person
is found guilty of an
offence.
Parent or guardian
1970 r.ll(l) Duty placed upon the
court to provide
information of the
proposed manner of the











Duty placed upon the
court to allow the
case to be conducted
on behalf of the






Section Provision Other Person
1970 r.21(l) Duty placed upon the court Parent or guardian
to provide information of
the proposed manner of
the disposal of the case
and to allow representa¬
tions (care proceedings).
Act of Sederunt (Social Work) (Sheriff Court Procedure Rules)
1971 (S.1.1971 No.92): Scot.
1971 r.6(2) Duty placed upon reporter
to intimate hearing of an
application to any parent
whose whereabouts are
known to him.
1971(r.8(H) Duty placed upon sheriff
to inform the parent of
the substance of any
allegation made by the
child where the parent
is excluded while the
child is giving evidence.
Children's Hearings (Scotland) Rules 1971 (S.I. 1971
No . *+92 ) : Scot.
1971 r.8(l) Duty placed upon reporter Parent
to give notification of
the hearing to the parent




Section Provision Other Person
to be considered at a
children's hearing.
1971r.l7(2) Duty placed upon child- Parent
(c)
ren's hearing to discuss the
case with the parent if
attending the hearing.
1971r.l7(2) Duty placed upon child- Parent
(d)
ren's hearing to endeavour
to obtain the view of the
parent if attending the
hearing.
Reporter's Duties and Transmission of Information etc. (Scotland)
Rules 1971. (S.I. 1971 No. 525): Scot"
1971r.4(2) Duty placed upon the reporter Parent
(b)
to give notification to the
parent of a child where he
authorises liberation of the
child.
1971r.6(2) Duty placed upon the reporter Person responsible
(b)
to send a copy of a super¬
vision requirement to any
person responsible for the
child (not being the local
authority).
6.19 Most of the examples in Table 9 probably benefit
the parent by complementing parental common law rights,
while the others may no doubt be justified as beneficial
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to the child on the ground that, for example, parental
care is prima facie preferable to institutional or similar
upbringing. For instance section 1(3) of the Children
Act 1948 restricts in favour of a parent or guardian the
power of the local authority to keep a child in their
care. Similarly the power to punish a child reserved to
a parent, teacher or other person with lawful control
or charge of the child by section 1(7) of the Children
and Young Person Act .1933 may be justified by reference
to the possible beneficial aspects of punishment of a
child.
6.20 These examples, whether they relate either
obliquely or otherwise to the advantage of the child,
operate neither administratively nor procedurally but
substantively. There are several examples in Table 9
of the conferment of substantive rights, the beneficiary
of which is manifestly not the child. A particularly
clear instance is the modification by section 27(2) of
the Children and Young Persons Act 1969 of the duty
i
placed by section 12(1) of the Children Act 1948 upon
local authorities to give first consideration to the
need to safeguard and promote the welfare of children in
their care. The duty is elided where to do so would be
"necessary for the purpose of protecting members of the
public."
1 As substituted by the Children Act 1975, s.59.
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6.21 Parliament has conferred substantive rights
upon parents and others less spectacularly. For example,
section (1) of the Guardianship Act 1973 equalises parental
rights as between mother and father. Section 12(1) of
the Children Act 1975 makes parental agreement a condition
for the granting of an adoption order. In a different
context, rule 38(3) of the Borstal (Scotland) Rules 1950
authorises an inmate to be placed under mechanical restraint
to prevent injury to other inmates. Although it would
be difficult to argue that the child receives any benefit
or advantage from these provisions, it must be recalled
that the refusal of parental agreement to adoption is subject
to the judicial power to dispense with such agreement in
certain prescribed circumstances to which the welfare and
interests of the child are relevant.
6.22 Most of the examples in Table 9 simply confer
procedural rights upon parents and others. The instances
from the Magistrates' Courts (Children and Young Persons)
Rules 1970, the Act of Sederunt (Social Work) (Sheriff
Court Procedure Rules) 1971, the Children's Hearings
(Scotland) Rules 1971 and the Reporter's Duties and
Transmission of Information etc. (Scotland) Rules 1971
deal with procedures applicable in juvenile courts and
children's hearings. In almost all the examples the
parent of the child is the beneficiary of the provision.
Occasionally the child also receives an advantage from the
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rule; for example, rules 5(1) and 17(1) of the
Magistrates' Court (Children and Young Persons) Rules
1970 deal with the conduct of the case on behalf of the
child. Statute also confers procedural rights upon
parents; for example, section 41(1) of the Social
Work (Scotland) Act 1968, section 2(9) of the Children
and Young Persons Act 1969 and section 34(1) of the
Children and Young Persons Act 1933. These various
procedures are quite straightforward and need no further
analysis.
6.23 These examples highlight the conflict of interest
between parent and child without doing anything to resolve
the conflict. This is a fundamental problem not only of
procedure but also of substance. In 1975 Parliament made
an attempt to solve these problems by disabling a parent
from representing his child in care and similar proceedings
in England and under the Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968 in
2
Scotland. In effect where it appears to the court 4>r
the chairman of a children's hearing that there is such
a conflict of interest, a person to represent the child
shall be appointed "unless to do so is not necessary for
safeguarding the interests of the child." Independent
representation of a child in this way is a new concept
which does much to recognise that in practice substantial
interests are unlikely to be effectively protected without
adequate procedural safeguards.
2 Children Act 1975, ss.64 and 66.
2 27
6.24 The other method of protection revealed by Table
9 is functional in character. Some of the functions
are simply administrative; for example, sending copies,
giving notice, providing information. Others attract a
greater degree of substance. One way is to require the
parent to be consulted before an administrative decision
is made, as in section 17(2) of the Children Act 1948 where
the Secretary of State is considering whether emigration
would benefit the child. A stronger requirement is the
obtaining of parental consent or agreement; for example,
before an adoption order may be made, before a child may
be ordered to attend a special school or before a boy in
a remand home may be forced to undergo operative treat¬
ment. Finally the substance of the provision may be the
subject matter for a discretion. Section 9(1) of the
Guardianship of Minors Act 1971 enables the Court to make
an order for custody or access in favour of either parent;
section 44(6 ) of the Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968
authorises a director of social work to alter the place
of residence of a child laid down as a condition of a
supervision requirement but only "in any case of urgent
necessity in the interests of the child or of the other
children" in that place of residence; and rule 35(2) of
the Borstal Rules 1964 allows an inmate to receive an
additional letter or visit where it is necessary for the
welfare of the family. The beneficiaries of these three
statutory discretions go well byond the parents of the
child to include the other residents in some establishment
or institution and the child's family. It is perhaps
an open question who are included in that expression;
it probably goes beyond the nuclear family of the inmate.
Precision is probably unnecessary for the person exercising
the discretion will also have a discretion to adopt an
interpretation favourable to the child and even perhaps
to the child's "family".
6.25 The examples in this Table thus demonstrate
several different ways of protecting the .interests of or
conferring rights upon persons other than the child
himself. They are mostly procedural; some are
administrative; a few involve substantive rights. The
diversity of the persons benefited is matched by the diversity
of the means of conferring the benefit. The point is
clearly established that in legislation affecting children
other interests than those of the child are protected,
safeguarded, benefited or promoted. The reasons are not
uniform. Some may arguably include the child as an
indirect object of the legislation; others clearly do not.
Parliament seeks an acceptable balance of relevant interests;
the interests of the child frequently predominate.
Section 6 - Regulation making powers
6.26 The Tables in this and the three preceding
chapters contain many examples of subordinate legislation.
Such legislation fills in the details of the broad
structures contained in the Acts. Much of the subordinate
legislation is procedural or administrative; it regulates
the conduct of courts, children's hearings, adoption
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agencies and those responsible for the day-to-day
running of the various penal and non-penal institutions
and for the day-to=day care of the children in question.
The structure and nature of the subordinate legislation
reflects these various functions. The procedural rules
governing courts and children's hearings are on the whole
specific, concise and intelligible. This is not al ways
true of some of the administrative regulations. Admittedly
some are quite specific in their requirements but the
standard required is often expressed functionally; for
example, the provision of reasonable, adequate or
sufficient accommodation, food, hygiene, medical and
dental services and so on. Adequate or sufficient for
what? The standard is set functionally by reference to
stated objectives and principles. Courts do not
normally adjudicate upon such matters. But if a court
were involved, it could, depending upon the nature of its
jurisdiction, reach a proper decision on these matters.
6.27 The concept of justiciability is difficult.
Perhaps it should be treated widely. The public do not
normally question the legality or the adequacy of the
facilities, services and treatment provided in these
institutions by means of litigation. Other means of
criticism are probably easier to initiate arid more likely
to succeed. It is nevertheless suggested that there
is no reason in principle why the inmate of a prison,
Borstal, home or other institution should not query
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through the judicial process the adequacy of his
treatment in terms of the standard laid down by Parliament
or with Parliamentary approval and consent.
6.28 But such arguments go beyond the present legal
system. Probably very few items of delegated legislation
in the various Tables are in this sense justiciable, with
the important exception of the various rules of procedure.
C
The substance of the decision is likely to be beyond
legal challenge. The various rules and regulations
depend for their validity upon their enabling Acts. A
possible ground of challenge may be the relationship
between the Act and the subordinate legislation. Table 10
contains several of these enabling provisions.
TABLE 10
REGULATION MAKING POWERS
Provisions of Acts of Parliament
Section Provision
Children Act 1948 (11 £ 12 Geo, 6, c.43): Eng.
1948 s,14(l) Regulations to make provision for the
welfare of children boarded out by local
authorities.
1948 s.31(1) Regulations as to the conduct of
voluntary homes and for securing the
welfare of the children therein.
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Provision
Regulations to control the making and
carrying out by voluntary organisations
of arrangements for the emigration of
children, including suitable arrangements
for the children's reception and welfare
in the country to which they are going.
Criminal Justice Act 1948 (11 S 12 Geo. 6, c.58): Eng.
Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 1949 (12, 13 S 14 Geo.
6, c . 94): Scot.
1948 s.46(2) Rules for the regulation, management
1949 s.12(2) and inspection of approved probation
hostels and of approved probation homes.
Prison Act 1952 (15 S 16 Geo. 681 Eliz. 2, c.52): Eng.
Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 1949 (12, 13 S 14 Geo.6
c . 94 ) : Scot.
1952 s.47 Rules for the regulation and management
1949 s.53(l) of prisons, remand centres, detention
centres and borstal institutions
respectively and for.the classification,
treatment, employment, discipline and
control of persons required to be detained
therein.
Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968 (1968 c.49): Scot.
1968 s.5(3) Regulations to make provision for the







1968 s.35(H) Rules for the constituting and arranging
of children's hearings and for regulating
the procedure of those hearings.
1968 s.36(8) Rules in relation to the duties of the
reporter.
1968 s.60(l) Regulations as to the conduct of residential
and other establishments and for securing
the welfare of persons resident or
accommodated in them.
Children and Young Persons Act 1969 (1969 c.5H): Eng.
1969 s.H3(l) Regulations with respect to the conduct
of community homes and for securing the
welfare of the children in community homes.
1969 s.61(l) Rules relating to juvenile court panels
and composition of juvenile courts.
Children Act 1975 (1975 c.72): Scot.
Adoption Act 1976 (1976 c,36): Eng.
1975 s.20(l) Rules for providing for the appointment
1976 s.65(l) of a curator (guardian) ad litem and of a
reporting officer in adoption proceedings.
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6.29 Most of the examples in Table 10 are widely
drawn providing generally for the management of the
institution or the procedure to be followed by the court
or the hearing. It would be difficult to challenge
successfully any rules or regulations made under such
enabling powers. A few instances in Table 10 however
relate to the welfare of the child: for example, the
boarding out of children and the conduct of voluntary
homes under the Children Act 1948, the conduct of
residential establishments under the Social Work (Scotland)
Act 1968 and of community homes under the Children and
Young Persons Act 1969. The latter are very much part
of the concept of planning and management built into the
1969 Act and the regulations and the instrument of management
must be taken together in the individual case to enable
the specific pattern of treatment to emerge. This
emphasises the general tendency to deal administratively
with the individual problem rather to conceive of
potentially inappropriate or meaninglessly wide generalities.
6.30 These references to securing the welfare of
the children in the various establishments are sometimes
supported by more specific components of the regulations:
for example, sections 14(2) and 31(l)(a) to (f) of the
Children Act 1948, sections 5(3)(a) to (d) and 60(l)(a)
to (f) of the Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968 and section
43(2) of the Children and Young Persons Act 1969. Even
these more specific aspects are relatively general and
23^
include such obvious matters as the material and physical
well-being of the children and more often than not a
reference to their religious education. They confirm
rather than add to the classification contained in these
chapters. The generality of the enabling powers renders
the chance of successful challenge of the administering
authority's decision on the grounds of ultra vires very
remote indeed.
Section 7 - Conclusion
6.31 This and the three preceding chapters, it
should be recalled, have been concerned to analyse welfare
as a statutory phenomenon only in astatic fashion. The
discretionary nature of a great deal of the legislation,
either directly or implicitly, and the flexible meaning
of the word itself certainly enable the system to give
effect to the objective of individualised justice. This
is no doubt deliberate. Although this is true overall,
the system is not simply one of wide discretions, either
judicial or executive. The role of welfare, even in this
static context, is immensely complex. The restrictions
upon the exercise of the discretions are firstly the need
to satisfy the threshold requirements of the legislation
and secondly the careful series of priorities, preferences
and qualifications created by Parliament. But each of
these types of restriction itself involves welfare and
exhibits features of flexibility. Whether this static
picture remains true of the system in practice remains
to be seen. But the impression clearly is that a similar
pattern emerges when the system is analysed dynamically.
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CHAPTER 7
THE BACKGROUND TO WELFARE AS POLICY
Section 1 - Introduction
7.1 The mass of statutory rules affecting children,
their interests and their relationships with other people
is merely the reflection of the views of the legislature
at any moment of time how to achieve a proper balance
between the protection and promotion of the welfare of
the child and the claims of other members of society. It
is not the function of legal analysis to investigate the
motives of Parliament: it is rather to consider what has
been precisely enacted by the legislature. But in the law
affecting children Parliamentary motives and objectives are
more significant than in other areas of the law. It is
sometimes difficult to identify what are the policy objectives,
for the impression given by Parliament may not always appear
clear and unambiguous, particularly in a sensitive area such
as the regulation of the rights of parents and the interests
of their children. Policy may nevertheless be often
justifiably implied from the objective provision in issue.
7.2 It would be difficult to deny that the welfare
of the child in one way or another forms the justification
for many of the rules affecting children whether they
relate to the substance of the law or to the most effective
means of its administration in the best interests of the
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child. Judicial disinclination to become involved in a
search for policy objectives laid down by another body
is understandable. Parliamentary policy may be found in
the preamble to or the long titles of the statutes. They
are in any event available to assist in statutory
1
interpretation in the event of ambiguity and together with
2
Parliamentary debates and government reports and the like
they can be useful as indicative of general legislative
policy. This assumes, of course, that the report met with
the general approval of Parliament or the member was
supporting the measure.
Section 2 - Victorian legislative policy.
7.3 To begin by investigating briefly some of the
motives .inspiring nineteenth century legislation: much
remains effective in re-enacted and up-dated form and it
is indicative of the relationship between legislative
policy and the law. During the debate in the House of
I
Commons on the introduction of the Access of Parents to
3
Children Bill in 1837, the promoter of the measure stated
1 Maxwell, pp. 3 to 6 for the long title and pp. 6 to 9
for the preamble.
2 Not available to assist in interpretation: ibid, pp.
50 to 54.
3 Subsequently enacted as the Custody of Infants Act
1839 (253 Vict., c.54, "Talfourd's Act"). This Act,
which merely gave a non-adulterous mother a right to
apply to the court for access to her infant or for
custody of her infant of no more than seven years of
age, did not apply to Scotland, presumably because at
that point of time it was not considered necessary.
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the object to be "to confide to the judge at law and in
equity the discretionary power of so far mitigating the
law which enforces the right of one parent to refuse to
the other access, at fitting seasons, to a child of tender
age from whom she is divided by unhappy differences with
4 5
its father." The Bill's seconder considered that it was
6
designed "to afford fair protection to the weaker sex."
The policy of the Bill therefore was not solely or even
primarily to provide for the welfare of the child. The
promoter of the Bill would clearly have wished to do more
for the welfare of the children but he felt such a course
would have been unacceptable at that point of time. The
welfare of the child was later introduced, to some extent
indirectly, as an incident of extending maternal rights.
7.4 These contemporary comments are conservatively
Victorian in outlook but a small minority wished the law
to go further in providing for the welfare of the children.
7
For example, when an almost identical Bill, then entitled
the Custody of Infants Bill, was before the House of Commons
4 (1837) 39 Pari. Deb. (H.C.) 3 s. col. 1087 (Sergeant
Talfourd).
5 Mr. Leader.
6 (1837) 39 Pari. Deb. (H.C.) 3 s. col. 1090 (Mr. Leader).
7 The earlier Bill, after passing the Commons, was
rejected by the Lords "accidentally".
in 1839, there was opposition on the ground that "the
primary object of a Bill of this sort ought to be the care
B
of the children whom the parents were separated from".
Although there is a certain overlap in possible policies
underlying this Act, they are not necessarily in conflict
or inconsistent. This shows that the problems of ascertaining
legislative policy objectives are considerable. It is, for
example, in this instance impossible to be sure that the
relevant policy has been identified.
7.5 More positive recognition of the welfare of the
child in custodial legislation came later but it was
preceded in the middle of the nineteenth century by a more
child-orientated view of policy in the context of official
care. The code of legislation now known generally in
9
England as the Children and Young Persons Act and presently
contained for the most part for Scotland in the Social
1 o
Work (Scotland) Act 1968 had its origins partly in the
Reformatory Schools (Scotland) Act 1854^the Industrial
1 2
Schools Act 1857 and associated statutes and partly in
the Prevention of Cruelty to and Protection of Children Act
1 3
1889. The long and short titles of the 1889 Act are
almost identical and the legislative policy unquestionably
8 (1839) 48 Pari. Deb. (H.C.) 3s. col. 162 (Mr. Langdale).
9 In particular the Acts of 1933 (23 8 24 Geo. 5, c.12),
1963 (1963 c.37) and 1969 (1969 c.54).
10 1968 c.49: supported by the Children and Young Persons
(Scotland) Act 1937 (1 Edw. 881 Geo. 6, c.37).
11 17 8 18 Vict., c.74. 12 20 8 21 Vict., c.48.
13 52 8 53 Vict. , c.44.
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is the protection of children. Equally clear is the
concern implied in the preamble to the 1857 Act and in the
long titles of the 1854 and 1857 Acts for the care and
education by official means of vagrant, destitute and
disorderly children. Concern for the child was not the
sole Parliamentary consideration, for the preamble to the
1857 Act declared that "the responsibility of parents to
provide for the proper care of their children should be
enforced."
7.6 The late nineteenth century, it is generally
i <«
recognised, saw an increasing emphasis on the welfare of
the child in custodial statutes and other legislation
affecting children. In the House of Commons debate on one
of the earlier versions of the Infants Bill which became
1 5
the Guardianship of Infants Act 1886 Lord Advocate Balfour
suggested that the "primary and governing consideration
ought to be the welfare of the child, and where consideration
for either parent comes in, it ought to be subordinate and
16
collateral to that." Realisation of that hope, however,
17
was postponed, for it was not until 1925 that the principle
of the paramountcy of welfare was entrenched in statute.
The policy of the Bill was more accurately described in the
House of Lords as designed to recognise certain maternal
1 8
rights and the Bill overlooked the interests of children
1 9
which were thus "sacrificed to the mother's sentiment."
14 Bevan, pp.258 and 259. 15 49 & 50 Vict., c.27.
1.6 (1884) 286 Pari. Deb. (H.C.) 3s. col. 839.
17 Guardianship of Infants Act 1925 (15 S 16 Geo. 5,
c. 45), s . 1.
18 (1884) 291 Pari. Deb. (H.L.) 3 s. col. 1550 (Lord Fitzgerald).
19 (1885) 297 Pari. Deb. (H.L.) 3 s. col. 297 (Earl Beauchamp).
7.7 A different and more positive view of policy
in relation to welfare may be found in the Custody of
2 o
Children Bill in 1891:-
" the Bill is intended to
deal with . ... children who
have been thrown helpless on the
streets, and wickedly deserted
by their parents, and who are
taken by the hand by benevolent
persons or by charitable
institutions ...."21
Its purpose is to protect neglected children from their
neglectful parents civilly by not enforcing parental rights.
Such a policy anticipates to some extent considerations
affecting twentieth century legislation in relation to
custodial matters and it is entirely consistent with the
motives inherent in the series of statutes culminating in
the Children and Young Persons Acts and their Scottish
counterpart.
Section 3 - Modern legislative policy.
7.8 The much stronger concept of welfare underlying
legislative policy in the twentieth century emerges in a
number of ways. The most significant statutory provision
in relation to children generally is probably section 1 of
2 2
the Guardianship of Infants Act 1925, the statutory basis
20 Which became the Custody of Children Act 1891 (54 S 55
Vict. , c.3).
21 (1891) 350 Pari. Deb. (H.L.) 3 s. col. 120 (Earl of Heath).
22 This continues to apply in Scotland. The Guardianship of
Infants Acts have been consolidated for England and Wales:
Guardianship of Minors Act 1971 (1971 c.3), s.l.
idUl
of the principle of the paramountcy of welfare. During the
2 3
Commons debate one of the Bill's supporters described the
aim of the measure as "promoting the welfare of the children."
This may in some ways be an exaggerated claim but it does
clearly indicate the basic philosophy supporting the statute.
7.9 The principle of the paramountcy of welfare does
2 4
not apply in the context of adoption, principally because of
the weight placed upon the rights of the natural parents of
the child to be adopted. Nevertheless it was considered
2 5
appropriate to remark during the Parliamentary process of the
Adoption of Children Bill in 1926 that "the guiding principle
... must be the welfare of the child." This may have been
true as an administrative guideline but until 1975 it was of
doubtful validity in the context of a strict legal analysis.
2 6
Similarly on a wider plane the Hurst Committee in 1954
suggested that the "primary object ... in^the arrangement
of adoptions is the welfare of the child." The Houghton-
2 8
Stockdale Committee has now recommended not only that "the
long-term welfare of the child should be the first and
2 9
paramount consideration" but also that it should also be
23 (1925) 181 H.C. Deb. 5 s. col. 545 (Mr. Davies).
24 A new principle, the primacy of welfare, was created
in 1975: Children Act 1975 (1975 c.72), s.3.
25 (1926) 192 H.C. Deb. 5s. cols. 927 and 928 (Mr. Rentoul).
26 Report of the Departmental Committee on the Adoption of
Children (London, H.M.S.O., 1954) Cmnd. 9248.
27 Ibid. , p.4.
28 Report of the Departmental Committee on the Adoption
of Children (London, H.M.S.O., 1972) Cmnd. 5107.
29 Ibid., p.4., para. 17.
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3 9
a matter of legal prescription. The tendency in adoption
as in custody is towards the principle of the paramountcy
of welfare. In 1953 a study on adoption instigated by the
3 1
United Nations felt justified in concluding that United
Kingdom legislation "clearly aims at securing the welfare
3 2
of the child." It would be difficult to deny that there
have been clear indications to that effect but Parliament
decided in 1975 to enact the primacy of welfare rather than
the paramountcy of welfare as the guiding principle in
adoption. What is the distinction is another matter
3 3
altogether.
7.10 The policy,underlying twentieth century
legislation on children and young persons does not seem
essentially different from the ideas which gave rise to
the earlier industrial and reformatory schools legislation
and the prevention of cruelty to children statutes,
although the means of achieving such a policy have advanced
considerably. When discussing the multi-functional position
3 k
of juvenile courts in England, the Ingleby Committee commented
30 Ibid., p.4, para. 18.
31 Study on Adoption of Children: a study on the practice
and procedures related to the adoption of children.
(New York, United Nations, Department of Social Affairs,
1953).
32 Ibid., p.11. 33 See paras. 25.8 to 25.9.
34 Report of the Departmental Committee on Children and
Young Persons (London, H.M.S.O., 1960) Cmnd. 1191.
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"It must try at one and the same
time to protect the public, to
promote the welfare of the child
and to stress the responsibility
and respect the legitimate rights
of the parents. Finally it must
satisfy public opinion that
justice is being done . " 3 5;
One of these ideas is reflected in one of the purposes of
3 6
the Children and Young Persons Bill of 1968, described by
37
the Home Secretary in these words:-
" to build on the family and
on the parents, to try to ensure
that they assume the major
responsibility for the welfare,
control, care and discipline of
their children."36
7.11 The pursuit of similar motives influenced the
3 9
earlier Kilbrandon Report and the Social Work (Scotland) Act
1968 but the detailed solutions put forward for Scotland
9 o
contain basically different ideas. The long title of the
1968 Act discloses in the first few words a most ambitious
object: "to make further provision for promoting social
welfare in Scotland." The Act applies to the community at
large, not merely to children. This general object is
achieved partly by placing a duty on every local authority
4 1
"to promote social welfare" in the prescribed ways and
35 Ibid., p.39. 36 Which became the Children and Young
Persons Act 1969 (1969 c.54).
37 Mr. Callaghan. 38 (1968) 779 H.C. Deb. 5s. col. 1176.
39 Report of the Committee on Children and Young Persons:
Scotland (Edinburgh, H.M.S.O., 1964) Cmnd. 2306.
40 One of the most concise descriptions of the differences
may be found in Walker N., Sentencing in a Rational
Society (Pelican, 1972 ), pp.~~214 and 215.
41 .19 6 8 Act, s.12.
2kk
partly in relation to children by the powers confided to
the new institutions created by the Act, namely children's
4 2
reporters and children's hearings. Some of the provisions?
of the Act of 1968 were originally enacted in the Children
It
Act 1948 which still applies in England. The long title
of that Act discloses a more modest objective
"An Act to make further provision
for the care or welfare ... of
boys and girls when they are
without parents or have been lost
or abandoned by, or are living
away from, their parents, or
when their parents are unfit or
unable to take care of them, and
in certain other circumstances."
<♦ 5
Similarly the main object of the Children Act 1958, which
still largely applies to Scotland as well as to England, is,
in terms of the long title, "to make fresh provision for
protection of children living away from their parents ...."
7.12 More recent examples may be found in the
Parliamentary debates on the Indecency with Children Bill
6 147
in 1960. The speech of the Lord Chancellor centred largely
upon the welfare and the protection of children: "I believe
b 8
it is our first duty to protect children." Similarly in
relation to the Matrimonial Proceedings (Magistrates' Courts)
42 Ibid., Part III.
43 Particularly those relating to the reception of children
into the care of local authorities and the assumption
of parental rights by local authorities.
44 11 £ 12 Geo. 6, c.43. 45 6 £ 7 Eliz. 2, c.65.
46 Which became the Indecency with Children Act 1960
(869 Eliz. 2, c.33).
47 Viscount Kilmuir: see (1960) 221 H.L. Deb. 5s. cols.
34 to 39. 48 Ibid., cols. 38 and 39.
Bill in 1960 .he explained that "the whole basis of our
legislation ... is that the interest of the child must be
5 o
the governing factor." That Bill included the concept of
"accepting" a child as a child of the family for the purpose
of conceding jurisdiction to the court in custody and
other matters. In welcoming the Government amendment to
5 i
give effect to this concept Lord Silkin remarked: "It is
indeed evidence of the fact that we all regard the interests
5 2
of the child of the family as paramount." These are
strong words; it is perhaps questionable how far paramountcy
is relevant in that context, which concerns the application
rather than the implementation of the legislation.
7.13 On the other hand the paramountcy principle was
not an issue in the debates on one of the most recent
5 3
statutes affecting children, the Guardianship Act 1973.
5 4
Clause 1 had no bearing upon welfare at all. The sponsoring
5 5
Minister explained that clause 1 was intended to provide
"for equality between husband and wife in the matter of the
5 6
guardianship of their children." This is directed to the
49 Which became the Matrimonial Proceedings (Magistrates'
Courts) Act 1960 (8 S 9 Eliz. 2, c.48).
50 (1960) 221 H.L. Deb. 5s. col. 387.
51 By substituting "child of the family" for "child of
the marriage."
52 (1960) 221 H.L. Deb. 5s. col. 388. 53 1973 c.29.
54 Clause 10 for Scotland, becoming respectively sections
1 and 10 of the Act.
55 Viscount Colville, Minister of State at the Home Office.
56 (1973) 339 H.L. Deb. 5s. col. 19. Reflected in the
ministerial speech in the Commons: see (1973) 856
H.C. Deb. 5s. col. 425 (Mr. Mark Carlisle).
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static relationship between husband and wife; parental
equality is not the criterion in the event of an inter-
5 6
parental judicial dispute over the child. On the other
hand most of the other provisions in the Bill were more
positively directed towards the welfare of the child.
This result was achieved indirectly by the conferment of
powers on various bodies and by prescribing appropriate
5 9 6 0
procedures. Speaking of clauses 11 to 13, the Minister
61
clearly acknowledged the "needs of the child" as the object
of the legislation. The proceedings leading to the 1973
Act therefore disclose two points: welfare may be protected
62
or promoted by administrative and procedural means, and
legislation affecting children may be directed not towards
welfare but to parental rights and other interests.
7.14 The pattern disclosed by the preceding paragraphs
is to some extent clear. Welfare of children as a
desideratum of legislative policy is more significant now
than earlier and it is an item of increasing significance.
Its precise role depends on the legislation in question and
that is a matter for close legal analysis. On the other
hand policy in this area is rather vague and susceptible of
57 In the sense that the parties are not litigating about
the child.
58 Cf. Guardianship of Infants Act 1925, s.l for Scotland;
Guardianship of Minors Act 1971, s.l for England.
59 E.g. clauses 3, 4, 5 and 7 for England and clauses 11
and 12 for Scotland.
60 Viscount Colville. 61 (1973) 339 H.L. Deb. 5s. col. 26.
62 This is true also of the Children Act 1975.
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several interpretations. It is not suggested that there is
necessarily any uniformity of policy disclosed by these
various propositions in relation to the welfare of the
child. They would seem however not to be inconsistent.
Their common denominator is welfare in several different
respects. The legislation discussed may, and in many
instances does, purport to achieve objectives other than
63
securing or promoting the welfare of children. Welfare
as an item of policy is multi-facetted.
63 E.g. protecting parental and other rights and interests;
devising appropriate procedures; securing the interests
of justice so far as consistent with the other objectives.
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CHAPTER 8
THE RELEVANCE OF WELFARE A3 POLICY
Section 1 - Introduction
8.1 Policy as such is not normally a matter for legal
analysis but would appear that the welfare of the child as
an incident of legislative policy may be an exception to
that proposition. The welfare of the child is the subject
of statutory regulation in several different ways: the
court, for example, may be given an element of discretion
in reaching a particular decision or the Act itself may
prescribe in detail the standard of behaviour contemplated
by the legislature. In that event it would be normal for
the court to do little more than give effect to the literal
meaning of the words used by Parliament. Where the court
has a discretion on the merits of its decision, there will
be only limited scope for legislative policy to play a part
in interpretation. A middle course is where the Act itself
circumscribes the rule pertaining to the welfare of the child,
without prescribing it in detail; in that case there will
be greater scope for the court to adopt a more imaginative
approach to questions of interpretation. In the discretionary
situation, the question facing the court is to identify the
2h9
proper approach to the issue for determination; the latter
situation concerns the meaning and construction of particular
words. Policy may play a significant but different part in
each of these contexts.
8.2 There is another way of looking at interpretation.
A great deal of the law relating to children is structural;
that is, it creates the framework for making decisions
about the child. From that it is understandable that many
of the most important substantive decisions affecting
children are largely discretionary in nature. Even when
the legislation provides for the exercise of the discretion,
often in terms of welfare, the criteria for its exercise
are flexible, in the sense that the words used to describe
the criteria are neither certain nor precise! before the
statutory powers may be exercised, certain requirements
have to be met. Some of them relate to welfare and form
part of the overall approach to the issue in question?
Others have nothing to do with welfare. They are never¬
theless fundamental to the system and in that sense
jurisdictional. These requirements may be implicit"; for
example, the existence of relationship of parent and child,
guardian and ward, tutor and pupil and the consequential
matters of relationship® paternity*! legitimacy or illegitimacy
1 I.e. interpretational discretion.
2 With which most of this analysis is concerned.
3 Craig v. Craig S Macdonald (1863) 1 Macpherson 1172: AB and
1961 S.C. 347.
. , „ _ *
4 In Scotland, HcWhirter v Lynch (1908) 16 S.L.T. 526;
Sproat v HcGibney 1967 S.L.T. (Motes) 100: in England
Gordon v Gordon S Bell [1903] P.92; Re Wakeman.
Wakeman v Wakeman L1947] 1 Ch. 607.




appointment to the office or whatever. Welfare normally
plays no part in these questions, which are ultimately
issues of status. These requirements nay also be part of
the legislation; for example, is the child one to whom
• 8
the legislation applies, does the legislation apply to the
9
proceedings. Parliament has over the years attempted to
simplify these questions and extend the jurisdiction by
subjecting more children to it, particularly in matrimonial
1 o
and consistorial proceedings. The legislation has however
been drafted to some extent in fairly general and flexible
terms and the policy of the legislation has sometimes proved
helpful to the courts in construing expressions containing
such issues of "interpretational discretion" or linguistic
flexibility.
Section 2 - The Normal Approach.
8.3 Interpretation in the normal case is essentially
a question of identifying the literal meaning1of the words
6 In Scotland, Hume v Macfarlane (1908) 16 S.L.T. 123:
in England, Green v Green L1929] P.101; Colquitt v
Colquitt [1948] P.19.
7 A. S J. Robertson, Petitioners ( 186 5 ) 3 Macpherson 1077.
8 In Scotland, Hart v Hart 1961 S.L.T. (Notes) 14: in
England, Snow v Snow L1971] 3 A11E.R. 833.
9 E.g. does the Guardianship of Infants Act 1925 (15
S 16 Geo. 5, c.45) s.l apply to matrimonial and
consistorial proceedings?
10 Matrimonial Proceedings (Children) Act 1958 (6 £ 7
Eliz. 2, c.40).
11 Maxwell, pp. 28 and 29.
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used. Other techniques of interpretation are normally
available only in case of doubt, ambiguity or absurdity.
This does not necessarily imply an excessively rigid approach.
Indeed in 1966 Cross J. found it necessary to make a
1 2
practice direction that rule 11 of the Adoption (High
1 3
Court) Rules 1959 should be strictly complied with. The
rule in question prescribes a time limit for filing an
affidavit and regulates service of the affidavit. It is
obviously an important matter of procedure prompted perhaps
less by a desire to secure the welfare of the child and
more by a desire to achieve fair administration of the law.
8.4 A certain judicial strictness may be appropriate
when a statute attempts to interfere with recognised common
1 H
law rights or when a penalty is imposed. Education
legislation, for example, involves an invasion of parental
rights to some extent. This may be justified by a desire
to promote the educational welfare of children but in
1 5
MacAulay v MacDonald the High Court of Justiciary in
12 [1966] 1 A11E.R. 960.
13 S.I. 1959 No. 479. Rule 11 has now been re-enacted as
rule 12(1) of the Adoption (High Court) Rules 1971
(S.I. 1971 No. 1520).
14 Maxwell, pp. 251 to 256 and pp. 238 to 240 respectively.
15 (1887) 14 Rettie (J.C.) 43.
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Scotland chose to ignore that aspect of the legislation and
sought rather to protect the rights or interests of parents,
Lord Young put forward the view:-
"It is always a delicate matter to
interfere with a parent in the
education of his children, and
therefore the compulsory provision
of the statute ought to be enforced
with great discrimination and
forbearance."16
A procedural irregularity affecting the parent was sufficient
in that case for the High Court to suspend a conviction on
17
a charge of statutory failure to educate the children. It
indicates the dilemma which a court may have to face when
legislative policy may point in more than one direction. A
determination of one item of legislative policy is
sufficiently problematical without the need to ascertain
two such policies.
3.5 A similar attitude appears in the judgment of
18 19
the Lord Justice-Clerk in Tranee v Anderson where the
conviction of a parent for statutory failure to provide
2 0
education for his children was set aside by reason of a
procedural defect perpetrated by the school board. The
court proceeded upon the basis that the discretion of
16 Ibid. at p.44 per Lord Young.
17 Education (Scotland) Acts 1872 (35 £ 36 Vict., c.62)
and 1883 (46 6 47 Vict., c.56).
18 Lord Moncrieff. 19 (1877) 4 Rettie (J.) 42
20 Education (Scotland) Act 1872, s.70.
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parents in matters of education should not be subjected to
unwarrantable interference. An insistence upon a strict
compliance with the rules by the school board was, of course,
quite consistent with that view but the Lord Justice-Clerk
adopted a slightly abnormal approach when he said:-
" if I had thought that the
spirit of the statute had been
complied with, I might not have
been so careful to insist upon
the letter. But I think that
here the spirit of the s^tute
has been departed from."
Thus both the spirit and the letter of the lav; had been
infringed. There was no problem for the court. But the
germ of an idea begins to appear that strict compliance
with the rules of interpretation may not necessarily be the
most suitable approach. The concept of welfare may be the
justification for such a course. This analysis is intended
to ascertain in what ways the idea of welfare in different
respects bears upon the interpretation of statutes affecting
children.
Section 3 - The Exceptional Approach in England.
(a) Introduction.
8.6 These random examples are symptomatic of the usual
judicial approach to interpretation; special rules founded
on legislative policy are essentially exceptional. VJelfare
as a matter of legislative policy forms the justification
for this exception and policy generally is the vehicle for
21 (1887) 4 Rettie (J.) 42 at p.47.
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this rule of interpretation. The use of policy as an aid
to interpretation emerges in several ways: for example,
the court may take a liberal view of the enactment; they
may regard the protection of the child as the significant
aspect of the Act; or they may be inspired by what is
2 2
conceived to be the "spirit" of the law. This chapter,
however, is concerned not with the content of the policies
2 3
in question but with their relevance to interpretation.
8.7 There is in some respects a marked diversity of
approach between the courts of Scotland and those of England.
It is impossible to quantify this difference but the
impression is that the English judges on the whole, apart
from the mere numerical superiority of their reported
judgments, are inclined to be more imaginative in their
use of policy. Their Scottish counterparts favour the
more traditional methods of interpretation.
(b) English matrimonial legislation.
8.8 One of the more obvious uses of policy as the
basis of interpretation relates to the exercise of a
judicial discretion. This is at first sight rather
2 <»
inconsistent with the pattern already described but
this is not so, as the provision in question simply
circumscribes the power of the court by prescribing the
22 Chapters 9 and 10. 23 Idem.
24 Paras 8.1 and 8.2.
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essential conditions for its exercise without directing
2 5
how it should be exercised. In C amine 11 v Cammell the
English Divorce Court was concerned with the basis of its
jurisdiction to grant ancillary relief under section 26
2 6
of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1950. Scarman J. based his
decision to some extent upon the following proposition:-
"In my view, however, the court in
construing the statute should have
regard [not only to .... but also]
to the policy of the law that,
where in any proceeding before any
court the custody or upbringing of
an infant is in question, the court,
in deciding that question, shall
regard the welfare of the infant
as the first and paramount
consideration .... Such being the
policy of the law in relation to
children, I would be loth to ;-read
into section 26 of the Matrimonial
Causes Act 1950 a limitation on the
jurisdiction of the court which
Parliament lias not by express 27
words introduced into the section."
The paramountcy of welfare principle, by then embodied in
2 8
section 1 of the 1925 Act, was thus treated as a rule of
legal policy. As such it was used to justify an
interpretation favourable to children upon a statutory
provision conferring jurisdiction on the court.
25 [1964] 3 A11E.R. 255. 26 14 Geo. 6, c.25.
27 [1964] 3 A11E.R. 255 at p. 258.
28 Guardianship of Infants Act 1925 (15 S 16 Geo. 5,
c. 4 5 ) .
8.9 The same section of the 1950 Act was considered
2 9
by the House of Lords in 1955 in Galloway v Galloway.
The issue was different from that in the later case. A
3 0
majority of the House of Lords took the view that custody
could be competently regulated in divorce proceedings with
regard to the parties' illegitimate child born before their
marriage. The decision turned on two arguments. The
expression "children" normally included only legitimate
children unless the context otherwise required. The context
in question required a different interpretation. This was
supported by the second argument that the conferment of
jurisdiction with respect to illegitimate as well as
3 1
legitimate children was "more consonant with the object"
3 2
of the relevant Act. Lord Tucker also acknowledged that
the object of an Act might justify the decision and that
in the immediate context the concept of welfare was an aid
3 3
to statutory interpretation. Reliance upon this approach
may not be necessary, for according to Lord Tucker
"... where I find a strict construction
which results in enabling the court to
do that which justice clearly requires
in the interest of an infant child, I
am the less inclined to reject a
literal interpretation by attributing
a lack of enlightenment to- Parliament
in 1857."
29 [1955] 3 A11E.R. 429. 30 Lords Oaksey, Radcliffe
r , and Tucker; Lords Simond3.1 L19 5 5 J 3 A11E. R. 4 29 at , ~ . .
, and Cohen dissenting,
p. 4 35 per Lord Oaksey. 63
32 The statute in question was the Matrimonial Causes Act
1857 (20 £ 21 Vict., c.85) which in this regard was no
different from the legislation in force in 1.955 .
33 [1955] 3 A11E.R. 429 at p.441.
34 Idem.
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The majority of the House of Lords did not appear to feel
it necessary to analyse profoundly the object or policy of
the relevant statutory provisions. It seemed to be assumed,
however, that the Act was intended to protect children,
irrespective of their legal status. There would thus be
no logical reason to distinguish between legitimate and
illegitimate children in this context.
8.10 The basis of jurisdiction over children in
matrimonial proceedings has been amended by statute over
3 5
the years to substitute "child of the family" for "child
3 6
of the marriage." The current concept is defined to include
a child not of both parties to the marriage who has been
37
treated by both parties as a child of the family. The
context of these provisions is similar. It would, therefore
be reasonable to expect a similarity of approach to statutor
interpretation. Whatever the proper construction of section
26 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1950 apart from reliance
upon the policy of the Act, it is suggested that the
majority of the House of Lords has been proved right, at
least on a social and political plane, by virtue of- the
subsequent trend in the legislative provisions terminating
in the current concept "child of the family." It is
expected therefore that the current legislation will be
interpreted in a way consistent with the object of the Act.
35 Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 (1973 c.18), s.52(l).
36 Matrimonial Causes Act 1950, s.26 (now superseded):
Matrimonial Proceedings (Children) Act 1958 (C 8 7
Eliz. 2 c.40), s.7(l) (still in force).
37 Bevan, pp. 280 and 281: Clive 5 Wilson, pp. 578 to




0.11 The ease of W (RJ) v W ( CJ) was concerned with the
definition of "child of the family" in section 27(1) of
3 9
the Matrimonial Proceedings and Propex^ty Act 1970.
Similar provisions had been the subject of considerable
judicial analysis, including those already mentioned, but
9 0
in that case counsel for the children introduced a more
positive line of argument when he submitted that "the
legislature must have wanted to extend rather than to
restrict the categories of children who would be children
9 1
of the family." Park J. did not expressly endorse this
9 2
argument but his judgment implied acceptance of the essence
of the submission so that he clearly favoured an
interpretation favourable to the children and contrary to
the interests of the parties to the proceedings. This
approach is a direct use of policy to interpret the Act.
8.12 Corresponding provisions are to be found in the
legislation conferring jurisdiction upon magistrates' courts
in matrimonial proceedings. Section 16(1) of the 1960
9 3 9 9 9 5
Act was analysed in Kirkwood v Kirkwood and Snow v Snow.
38 [1971] 3 A11E.R. 303. 39 1970 c.45.
40 An interesting and significant procedural point.
41 [19 7.1] 3 A11E.R. 30 3 at p. 304 .
4? Which concluded that the children in question were
children of the family within the statutory definition.
43 Matrimonial Proceedings (Magistrates' Courts) Act 1960
(8 S 9 Eliz. 2, c.48).
44 [1970] 2 A11E.R. 161. 45 [1971] 3 A11E.R. 833.
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The issue again was the position of the court in relation
to children who were born to one party and allegedly
"accepted" by the other party to the proceedings. In
"4 6
Kirkwood v Klrkwood Ornrod J. expressed a clear view of
legislative policy
"The relevant provision in the Matrimonial
Proceedings (Magistrates' Courts) Act
1960, and the provisions in the Matrimonial
Causes Act 1965 of a corresponding nature,
are clearly designed primarily for the
protection of children who are in this
position of being children of one spouse
and not the other; and, if this court
were to lay down that acceptance involves
something approaching a contractual
arrangement so that it would be vitiated
by non-disclosure or something of that
kind, we might be driving a very large b7
wedge into this statutory provision "
<4 8
The view of Sir Jocelyn Simon P. was couched in similar
language.
8.13 It is clear so far that the protection of children
may well be the object or policy of the legislation in
question. But it may not necessarily lie the sole object or
policy, or even the predominant or paramount object, or
"4 9
policy. In Snow v Snow Sir Jocelyn Simon P. identified
5 o
two "clear" objects of the statutory provisions in question:
first, "to give protection to children"; and second "that
46 [1970] 2 A11E.R. 161.
47 Ibid, at p.164.
48 [1970] 2 A11E.R. 161 at p.167.
49 [1371] 3 A11E.R. 833.
50 Matrimonial Proceedings (Magistrates' Courts) Act
196 0 , ss.l, 2 , 4 and 16(1).
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justice shall be done as between the husband, the wife and
5 1
any other person concerned." It is, of course, a separate
and unresolved question which policy takes precedence. An
answer to that question may be unnecessary if there is in
the circumstances no conflict or inconsistency between the
policies. Nevertheless the relevance of protection of the
child as a statutory policy available to assist interpretation
has been established by these two cases. The relevance of
policy is only a secondary issue, although it is essential
to the use of policy as an aid to statutory interpretation.
The principal consideration is the substance of the policy.
It is recognised that in practice it may be difficult to
isolate the relevance of policy from the substance of
policy but that distinction is drawn at this point in this
analysis.
(c) English guardianship and custody legislation.
8.14 The difficulty if not the impossibility of
identifying the policy of an Act has been demonstrated
5 2
forcibly by Rigby J. In In re A and B (Infants) he was
obliged to consider the Guardianship of Infants Act 1886?3
fie took the view that the purpose of the Act was probably
the conferment of new rights on the mother, but rights not
necessarily equal to those of the father. The welfare of
5 k
the child was obviously a matter of importance to the
exercise of the discretion in section 5 of the Act but
51 [1971] 3 A11E.R. 833 at p. 854.
52 [1897] 1 Ch. 786 at p.792. 53 49 6 50 Vict., c.27.
54 [1897] 1 Ch. 786 at pp. 793 to 795.
Rigby J. failed to describe the welfare of the child as
even a secondary object of the Act. Later analysis will
55
show that such an assessment is probably correct.
(d) English adoption legislation.
8.15 The fundamental object of adoption legislation
may be. a matter of dispute, particularly with regard to
the significance or even relevance of the welfare of the
child and to the balance between welfare and parental rights.
But legislative policy, whatever its content, would seem to
be as relevant to the legal consequences of an adoption
order as it is to the desirability of such an order. In
5 6
Fletcher, for example, the issues were whether adopted
children were included as beneficiaries under the testator's
will and the admissibility of evidence of the testator's
relationship with the children in question. In his inter¬
pretation of section 5(2) of the Adoption of Children Act
57
1926, Roxburgh J. placed considerable weight upon his view
of what Parliament intended:-
''It is unthinkable that Parliament
intended to place an adopted child
in a worse position than an illegitimate
child I feel bound to hold that
s.5, sub.-s.2, does not exclude, in the
case of an adopted child under the Act
of 1926, any evidence which would have
been admissible in the case of an
illegitimate child."58
59 Ch. 34. 56 In re Fletcher deed., Barclays Bank Ltd. v
Ewing and others L1949] 1 Ch. 473.
57 16 8 17 Geo. 5, c.29.
58 [1949] 1 Ch. 473 at p. 481.
2o2
In the event t'ne evidence thus rendered admissible was
sufficient to enable the court to treat the adopted children
as the testator's intended beneficiaries.
(e) English criminal legislation.
8.16 The use of legislative policy for purposes of
interpretation may also be significant in a criminal context.
A looser approach to interpretation may be understandable
in civil proceedings, but perhaps less understandable in
criminal proceedings, for statutes creating crimes and
5 9
imposing penalties are normally construed strictly. But
the protection of children by means of the criminal law
operates by virtue of statutes which govern the behaviour
of parents and others vis-a-vis children. The court in
effect faces a dilemma of policy: whether to interpret
the provision strictly in favour of the offending parent
or other person maltreating the child; or whether to
interpret the provision in favour of the children in so far
as they are the beneficiaries of the legislation. In R. v
6 o
Hale the court resolved such a dilemma by selecting an
interpretation favourable to the accused. Section 16 of
6 1
the Prevention of Cruelty to Children Act 1894 provided
that a charge of wilful neglect could not be proceeded with
in the absence of the child allegedly neglected except where
the court was satisfied that attendance would involve danger
59 Maxwell, pp.238 to 240. 60 [1905] 1 K.B. 126.
61 57 S 58 Vict. , c.41.
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to the life or health of the child and that the evidence
of the child was not essential to a just hearing. Lord
Alverstone C.J. took the view that:-
"The section however may have been
enacted in the interests of the
prisoner to point out that where
the child's evidence was really
essential to the just hearing of
the case the court should not
dispense with its presence."62
An element of choice was thus introduced to solve the dilemma
by enabling the judge to select the predominant legislative
policy. The maxim of strict interpretation in a criminal
context was not disregarded; it was modified to meet the
special circumstances of legislation affecting children.
e a
8.17 In Williams, for example, a father was charged
with neglecting and exposing his children contrary to
6 i*
section 12(1) of the Children Act 1908. Counsel for the
father argued that a narrow view should be taken of "expose";
namely, "physically place children somewhere with intent
6 5
to injure." Darling J. declined to accept that argument
and dealt with the matter more broadly
62 [1905] IK.3. 126 at p.130.
63 (1910) 4 Cr. App. Rep. 89.
64 8 Edw. 7, c.67.
65 (1910) 4 Cr. App. Rep. 89 at p. 93.
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"The statute however tries to
prevent unnecessary suffering
and the prisoner had dragged the
children about the roads instead
of providing them witli shelter."66
The father's conviction stood.
8.18 Evidence of a similar approach is to be found
67
in R. v Connor where Lord Alverstone C.J. referred to
6 8
"the intention of the legislature as early as 18G8 to make
a parent who neglected to provide adequate food for his
6 9
children in his custody amenable to the criminal law," as
an aid to interpreting section 1 of the Prevention of
7 0 7 1
Cruelty to Children Act 1904. Again, in R. v Senior, the
father of a child who had died was charged with wilful
neglect by failing to provide medical aid and medicine for
the child contrary to section 1 of the Prevention of Cruelty
7 2
to Children Act 1894. The essence of the offence was
carefully analysed by the Chief Justice and his argument to
some extent was based on the view that:-
"... the provisions of the Act of 1894
shew an increased anxiety on the part
of the legislature to provide for the
protection of infants."73
The decision of the court in these two cases was thus
founded partially upon a construction of the statute
consistent with the judicial statement of legislative policy,
66 Idem.
67 [1908 ] 2 K. 13. 26.
68 Poor Law Amendment Act 1868 ( 31 8 32 Vict. , c.122),
s. 37 . 69 [1908] 2 K.B.26 at p.30.
70 4 Edw. 7, c.15 71 [1899] Q.B. 283.
72 57 8 50 Vict. c. 41 73 [1899] 1 Q.B. 283 at p. 290,
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(f) Miscellaneous English legislation.
8.19 The legislative policy underlying any statute
may be described in a number of different ways; for example,
policy, intention, purpose, object. A different method of
referring to policy was employed in Re Carlton: re the
7 "♦
Naturalisation Act 1870. The issue was whether the words
"children" or "child" meant any or every son or daughter
of a particular person or whether it included only infant
sons or daughters. If the former, British nationality
could be imposed upon a son or daughter of any age on the
application of the father; if the latter, only children
under the age of twenty one could be affected. Cohen J.
7 5
looked closely at the "context" of the provision and came
to the conclusion that the more restricted meaning was
7 6
intended. Reference to the "context" of a statutory
provision is perhaps a less unusual aid to statutory
interpretation than the use of policy as such. In practice
there is no doubt little difference between the two
approaches. Another interesting aspect of this case is that
welfare as an object of legislative policy does not necessarily
require a liberal reading of the statute;, a strict view,
as here, may conduce to the welfare of the child.
74 [1945] 1 A11E.R. 559. 75 Ibid, at p. 561.
76 Affirmed by the Court of Appeal: [1945] 2 A11E.R. 370.
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Section lt - The Exceptional Approach in Scotland.
(a) Introduction.
8.20 It has already been commented that the judges
in the Scottish courts rely more upon traditional and less
upon imaginative approaches to interpretation than their
7 7
English counterparts. Nevertheless there is a broad
consistency of approach within the two systems. It is
worthwhile to assert this point clearly as otherwise the
marginal differences may throw out of balance the basic
similarity. Uniform interpretation of identical statutory
provisions in English and Scottish legislation may be
7 8
desirable, particularly when children are affected.
(b) Scottish criminal legislation.
7 9
8.21 The issue in Henderson v Stewart was whether a
father had wilfully neglected his young son by declining
deliberately to maintain him contrary to section 12(1) of
80
the Children and Young Persons (Scotland) Act 1937. The
81
corresponding provisions in the Children Act 1908 had been
82
judicially interpreted in England and the Lord Justice-
77 Para. 8.7. For example, in L., Petitioner 1951 S.C.
605 at p.607 Lord Cooper L.P~ applied the doctrine of
precedent somewhat rigidly, although he was inclined
to doubt its validity.
78 Henderson v Stewart 1954 J.C. 94 at p. 98 per Lord
Cooper L.J.-G.
79 1954 J.C. 94. 80 1 Edw. 851 Geo. 6, c.37.
81 8 Edw. 7, c.67.
82 Liverpool Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to
Children v Jones L1914 J 3 K.B. 813; Brooks v Blount
L 19 2 3 JT K.B. 2 57.
26?
83
General founded upon the desirability of uniform
interpretation, particularly in relation to legislation
designed to promote welfare. Lord Cooper put his view very
concisely:-
"The interpretation so placed
upon the Act has stood for upwards
of thirty years, and, even if I took
a different view, which I do not, I
should regard it as quite impossible
now to apply a different construction
to provisions which are operative
throughout the United Kingdom and which
the English courts have so read as to
promote materially the furtherance of
child welfare and the prevention of
cruelty to children, which are the
objects to which this part of the
statute is directed."8
Legislative policy is thus relevant in Scotland to the
interpretation of statutes concerning children.
8.22 The welfare of the child as a policy factor does
85
not mean that a liberal interpretation of the relevant
statutory provision is necessary. It is more fundamental
than that. Section 120(1) of the Children Act 1908, for
example, provided that "the holder of the licence of any
licensed premises shall not allow a child to be at any time
in the bar of the licensed premises except during the hours
86
of closing " In Donaghue v Hclntyre the question
was whether a small partitioned box or apartment in the
corner of the bar was part of the licensed premises. The
87
Lord Justice-Clerk took the view that the purpose of the
83 Lord Cooper.
84 1954 J.C. 94 at p. 98. 85 Chapter 10. 86 1911 S.C.(J) 61,
87 Sir J.H.A. Macdonald.
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provision was "to prevent children being brought into
contact with peonle who freouent the bar and with what is
e s
called the atmosphere of the bar of the premises." That
objective was achieved by a literal interpretation of the
words in the statute since the "box" would not be physically
in contact with the frequenters of the bar. In this instance
the optimum had been achieved: the policy and phraseology
of the statutory provision were fully harmonious and
integrated.
89
8.?3 This may well be true of Donaghue v Mclntyre,
but the circumstances of that case imply a concept of
welfare which is narrowly founded upon "physical" well-being.
It takes little account of the wider effects which the
presence of a child in the proximity of licensed premises
may have upon that child. The substance of the idea of
welfare in the early period of its development related more
9 o
to physical well-being rather than to other aspects. But
given this narrow view of welfare, the decision illustrates
in a general sense welfare as an object of legislative
policy which was effective in that case, but the facts are
indicative of a view of the substance of welfare which is
now outdated. The Lord Justice-Clerk in effect acknowledged
this defect v;hen he commented that "a Judge lias no power to
9 I
extend the application of an Act of Parliament." Although
88 1911 S.C. (J.) 61 at p.66. 89 1911 S.C. (J.) 61.
90 Chapter 44. 31 1911 S.C. (J.) 61 at p.66.
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thin is consistent with the decision in that case, the
wider implications of the remark reflect a narrower view
of the relevance of legislative policy than the English
courts appear to have adopted.
8.24 There are two other criminal cases which denonstrat
the relevance of legislative policy to interpretation. They
deal with procedural issues rather than substantive law.
9 2
In H.il. Advocate v Fraser the panel was charged in the
alternative with culpable homicide of his child or with
wilful assault contrary to section 1 of the Prevention of
Cruelty to Children Act 1894. Section 4 of that Act
together with the Schedule made the wife of a panel a
competent witness against her husband in respect of the
statutory charge. The provisions of the Act said nothing
about the wife as a competent witness in relation to a
common law charge. The court however was prepared to admit
9 3
her evidence. The Lord Justice-General did not introduce
into the statute the limitation for which counsel for the
9 4
panel was contending; namely, that the more flexible
evidential rule applied only to conduct which would constitut
an offence if committed against children under sixteen but
not otherwise. His reason was that the Act was a "remedial
statute," one of the objects of which was "to facilitate
proof of offences committed against young children by their
9 5
parent^'. Hence the statutory provision applied to common
law as well as to statutory offences.
92 (1901) 3 Fraser (J.) 67. 93 Lord Balfour.
34 (1901) 3 Fraser (J.) 67 at p.68. 95 Ibid, at p.69.
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8.25 Legislation not only creates offences against
children but also regulates the situation where children
commit offences against others. Welfare of the child may be
relevant in interpreting provisions in each set of
circumstances but it will play a different role. In H.M.
9 6
Advocate v Crawford the accused reached the age of sixteen
between the date of the offence and the date of his conviction;
and section 102 of the Children Act 1908 prevented a young
person from being sentenced to penal servitude for any
offence. On the basis of a literal interpretation of the
97
Act the Lord Justice-General concluded that Crawford had
to be treated as an ordinary criminal and not as a young
person. Even so:-
" I should have been prepared to
stretch the Act so as to enable the
court to deal with the prisoner as if
he had been a 'young person'."98
Such a view was obviously in conflict with the literal
meaning of the Act. The justification for so 'stretching'
the Act would, at least impliedly, have been to satisfy the
needs of the offender as well as to safeguard the public
interest. Lord Sherrington explained that the purpose of
the statute in question was the reformation of youthful
offenders: "[Crawford] is, in fact, a youthful offender,
although, technically, he does not fall within the definition
9 9
of the Act of 1908." The court however did not feel it
96 1918 J.C. 1. 97 Lord Strathclyde.
9 8 .1918 J.C. 1 at p. 2. 9 9 Ibid. at pp. 2 and 3.
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necessary to adopt that argument, for the view was taken
that the court had power in any event to send the prisoner
to a Borstal Institution. It is apparent therefore that
the policy of the legislation as conceived by the court was
achieved by a proper exorcise of the court's power 'without
having to resort to legislative policy to justify their
potentially strained interpretation of the legislation.
That they would have been prepared to do so indicates
significantly the court's view of policy as a relevant aid
to interpretation of legislation affecting the welfare of
children.
(c) Other Scottish legislation.
. -
8.25 These Scottish criminal cases illustrate a
strong judicial preference for the ordinary canons of
interpretation. It may be significant that they are
criminal cases. If so, the approach nay have been influenced
by a tacit policy favouring freedom of the individual
rather than the welfare of children. There is however
evidence which shows an approach to interpretation
consistent with the imaginative techniques employed in
1
England. For example, the issue in Stokes v Stokes was
whether, ir. a consistorial cause where access had been
awarded to the pursuer (the husband and father), access
could also be competently awarded to the pursuer's own •
parents while he by nature of his absence abroad was unable
1 19G5 S.C. 247 to 249 (O.H.); 1965 S.C. 246 (I.E.);
reported sub nom. S. v S. 1967 S.C. (H.L.) 46 (H.L.).
2? 2
to exercise his judicial right of access. Lord Kissen in
2
the Outer House declined the request but his judgment was
3
reversed in the Inner House and the decision of the Inner
House was later affirmed in the House of Lords for quite
it
different reasons. In the Inner House of the Court of
s
Session the argument turned upon section 14(2) of the
6
Matrimonial Proceedings (Children) Act 1958 which clearly
enables custody to be committed to a person othe^ than the
parent of the child. There is no specific reference to
7
access. Both the Lord President and Lord Guthrie proceeded
upon a close analysis of section 14(7) and Lord Guthrie was
prepared to rely to some extent upon the "intention of the
legislature" which he identified as "to secure the welfare
8
of the child." Although this view is in the circumstances
of the case obiter, it nevertheless indicates a Scottish
judicial desire to see]; out the purpose of a statute dealing
with children and to make that purpose effective, if not
expressly, at least by ensuring that the decision is not
inconsistent with the statutory objective. It follows that
access nay competently be awarded to a pursuer's own parents
in a consistorial action. It is thus possible for persons
other than children to be the beneficiaries of the legislation
in addition to the children themselves, oil the assumption no
doubt that this nay obliquely be of advantage to the child.
2 1955 S.C. 247 to 249. 3 1965 S.C. 246.
4 S. v S_. 1367 3.C. (II.L.) 46: see particularly at p. 50
par Lord Reid. The reasoning of the House of Lords is
not presently relevant.
5 196 5 S.C. 24G at pp. 2 50 and 2 51 per' Lord Clyde L.P. and
at pp. 251 and 252 per Lord Guthrie.
6 687 Eliz. 2, c.40. 8 1965 S.C. 246 at p.252.
7 Lord Clyde.
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8.27 In similar fashion a judicial award in favour of
a parent may be of advantage not only to the parent but also
9
to the child. In Miller v Miller a wife sued her husband in
the Sheriff Court for custody of her children and for aliment
1 o
for them. It was argued before the sheriff-substitute that
i I
the Guardianship of Infants Act 188G enabled the sheriff to
deal only with custody and that the common law jurisdiction
of the sheriff was no wider. The judge concluded that on the
merits of the action the wife should be awarded custody and
that it would be anomalous for an innocent wife not to
receive aliment for the children. In the absence of a
specific statutory power, he argued:-
"No doubt the statute was chiefly aimed
to provide for the custody of the
children, and in the upper classes a
wife who has got the custody of her
pupil children may frequently have enough
money of her own to provide for their
support. But the Act was not passed
to provide for such mothers alone. And
if it were to be held that the terms
of the statute were not sufficient to
justify a court in ordering a husband to
pay aliment for his children, the Act
would be practically a dead letter 12
as regards women of the working classes."
A rather unique view of legislative policy therefore enabled
the judge to extend the narrow statutory powers of the court
in favour of both the mother and through her the children.
If legislative policy had been irrelevant, a different
decision may have been reached.
9 (1889) 5 Gh. Ct. Rep. 289. 10 Sheriff-substitute Lees.
11 M9 8 5 0 Vict. , c.27.
12 (1889) 5 Sh. Ct. Rep. 239 at p. 291.
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8.28 Legislative policy is merely an aspect of public
policy which lias met with Parliamentary approval and which
has subsequently been encapsulated in statutory form. There
is in principle no difference between these two aspects of
policy for present purposes, although the sources of public
policy may be even more uncertain than those of legislative
1 3
policy. In J S - Petitioner the sheriff-substitute at
1 k
Glasgow was invited to make an adoption order in favour of
a married man living with a married woman (not his wife) in
respect of their illegitimate child. If the parties had been
divorced and subsequently had inter-married, there would have
been no difficulty but the sheriff-substitute expressed the
view:-
" public policy prevents the adoption
in the present circumstances and
the Acts intend to maintain this policy.
The clearest indication of this is that
otherwise they would have authorised the
joint adoption by persons who were not
married, whereas such an adoption is
explicitly prohibited by section 1(3)
of the principal Act?5." 16
There being no judicial discretion, an adoption order was
refused.
8.29 It has already been recognised that the policy of
an Act affecting children may have nothing to do with the
17
protection or promotion of the welfare of children. The
13 1950 S.L.T. (Sh.Ct.) 3. 14 Sheriff-substitute S.G. Kermack.
15 Adoption of Children (Scotland) Act 1930 (20 8 21 Geo.
5, c.37) .
16 JS - Petitioner 1950 S.L.T. (Sh.Ct.) 3 at pp. 3 and 4.
17 Paras. 7.3 and 7.13.
welfare of the child may be inconsistent with the rights,
for example, of the child's parents. The legislation may
often seek to achieve an appropriate balance between
conflicting objectives and statutes may thus confer rights
upon the parents of children whose welfare the statute is
also designed to safeguard, either for the benefit of the
parents or obliquely for the advantage of the child. In
1 8
Page v General Board of Control for Scotland the mother of
a mentally defective child, whose detention had been continued
administratively, had not received intimation of the
continuance of the order as required by section 12 of the
1 9
Mental Deficiency and Lunacy (Scotland) Act 1913. The issue
was entirely one of statutory construction. Section 12
appeared to Lord Moncrieff to be ambiguous
"In such a case [of ambiguity] it
becomes permissible to have regard
to the general scheme and purport
of the Act, and to the function of
the clause in dispute in relation
to that purport and scheme. I
accordingly approach the problem of
construction under the guidance of
a recognition that this Act is
framed to operate by interfering
between parent and child, and the
function of the clause is to regulate
the requirements of intimation to the
parent as a probable opposer of such
an interference."20
2 1




1939 S.C. 182. 19 3 8 4 Geo. 5, c.38.
1939 S.C. 182 at p. 186.
Particularly section 7.
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interest in natters of enforced detention in addition to
the salutary effect for the child. Intimation to the parent
was thus necessary and the continuance of detention
consequently unlawful. According to Lord f■lo n c "p i o f "f h ow0 v c* 2? 5
such an approach was permissible only in the event of
ambiguity; no such limiting factor appears to have teen
introduced in any of the other cases analysed. The absence
of such a requirement in the other cases emphasises the
significance of the comment by Lord Moncrieff. The use of
policy as an aid to the interpretation of legislation
affecting the welfare of children appears to he unrestricted
and hence more potentially dynamic than otherwise.
3.30 Even in that unrestricted manner, the use of
policy us an aid to statutory interpretation is f undo.: .en tally
an exception. by far the majority of judgments construing
legislation affecting children have no need of it. notwith¬
standing that ambiguity is not a requirement, it is unlikely
that policy will override an anti-welfare interpretation
founded upon the clear literal meaning of the relevant
2 2 •
words and phrases. In McD. and McD., Petitioners a husband
and wife applied to adopt an illegitimate girl of twelve who
had been in their de facto custody since she was ten days
old. The child was unaware that the petitioners were not
her parents. do consent to the adoption on the part of the
2 3
child was lodged, although somewhat anomalous, a request to
22 (1943) 65 Sh. Ct. Rep. 42.
23 .Adoption of Children (Scotland) Act 1930 , s.2(3).
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dispense with such consent was made. Sheriff-substitute
Duncan took the view that the consent of a girl of twelve
2 <♦
years was necessary but could not be dispensed with; an
adoption order could not therefore be made. Reference was
made to the policy of the legislation but it failed to have
any effect. A literal approach was adopted
" the general purpose of the
statute is remedial and ... no
unnecessary barriers ought to be
erected to impede desirable
adoptions. One can well envisage
circumstances - and they may exist
here - in which possible adopters
would regard the price of revelation
to a child as too high a price to
pay for its adoption. However that
may be, the circumstance is irrelevant
if the statute makes no provision
for it."2 5
The dilemma facing the court may be appreciated. The
desirable purpose of not refusing beneficial adoptions is
in conflict with the equally reasonable requirement of the
consent of a minor. Where one item of policy is
unambiguously crystallised in statutory form, it is scarcely
practical, even if permissible, to rely upon a more general
policy not couched in specific terms which is in conflict
with the former policy. In such a situation the normal rule
of interpretation of giving effect to the- literal meaning
24 A power of dispensation was subsequently conferred by
the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) (Scotland)
Act 1966 (1966 c.19), s.4: see also Children Act
1975 , s. 8 (6) .
25 (1948) 65 Sh. Ct. Rep. 42 at p.44.
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would apply to exclude matters of broad policy. Hence the
use of policy as an aid to interpretation remains an
exception justified ultimately by the significance
attributed to the welfare of the child.
Section 5 - Conclusion.
8.31 This analysis suggests that, when faced with
interpreting a statute regulating the position of children,
the courts, both in England and Scotland, have regard to
the policy of the legislation in certain circumstances. The
use of policy in this way is fundamentally an exception to
the general rule which applies to children's as to other
legislation-, namely, that the words used by the legislature
are prima facie indicative of.Parliamentary intention.
Policy, however, would appear to be of potentially wider
scope in this context than in others, for the courts have
2 6
not limited the relevance of policy to cases of ambiguity.
This is not to say that an interpretation founded upon
policy considerations is permissible when it is contrary to
the meaning of the statute. Nevertheless the circumstances
in which the aid of policy may be invoked have not been
precisely formulated. To that extent the position is
unsatisfactory.
8.32 The question may be posed why is it desirable
or even necessary to have regard to legislative policy in
26 Para. 8.29.
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this type of legislation. There is no judicial answer.
The courts have merely made assertions about policy and
used policy in aid of statutory interpretation. They have
not sought to justify it. The answer however is perhaps
implied in the several judicial pronouncements. Tie: nature
of children's legislation and the precarious position of
children within the lav; generally indicate and require
privileged treatment. The courts have accepted, without
question or justification, this exceptional privilege
conferred upon children as a type of grundnorm. If this
is the correct view, rationalisation lies in the area of
policy, not a matter for discussion by the courts. It is
not therefore surprising that the courts take this policy
of privilege for granted. It is merely a practical
demonstration of the fulfilment of legislative policy that
it should play an important role in such a mundane but vital
area as interpretation.
8.33 It could be suggested that sucli a policy-inspired
view of interpretation might create an opportunity for
judicial legislation. Parliament,■ allegedly , might be
practically impotent in the face of such a discretionary
27
approach. It Is however suggested that there is no
evidence of any judicial abuse of the procedure. The courts
tend to be somewhat conservative and normally apply the
27 Parliament has conferred wide discretionary powers
upon the courts in many different contexts. The
"restrictive" factor is often welfare.
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strict rules of interpretation. Policy would appear to
be invoked only when the court is satisfied what is the
content of the relevant policy. It must be emphasised that
the courts do not apply legislative policy; they merely
have regard to such policy in the interpretation of the
relevant Act. Their difficulties lie less in handling
policy and more in ascertaining the content of the policy.
Notoriously statutes implement but do not state policy,
except in the most general and normally unhelpful fashion.
If legislation is to continue to be drafted in current form
and if policy is to remain as a catalyst to interpretation,
it would be helpful if the purpose and objective of the
legislation were to be disclosed on the face of the legislation
so as to be openly available for interpretational purposes.
This may be tantamount to suggesting a new form of legislation.
But it would do little more than acknowledge a current and
apparently acceptable judicial practice and make interpretation
a little easier for the judges.
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CHAPTER 9
THE PROTECTION OF CHILDRET AC POLICY
Section 1 - Introduction
0.1 The preceding diopter established toe relevance
of policy to interpretation. Logically the next sta^e is
to ascertain the contents of the policies admitted as an
aid to judicial interpretation. Policy in relation to the
i
welfare of children is expressed in many 'ways. There are
many other more specific instances of judicial descriptions
of legislative policy affecting children. One such common
description of legislative policy refers to the protection
of children, to which passing reference has already been
made. Protection of children as such is an important policy
objective and deserves closer analysis. Protection of
children has a clear physical connotation. The concept of
protection also relates to the welfare and interests of the
child. In that context it must be distinguished from
promotion of the child's welfare. The former' is negative,
the latter positive: a distinction vital to this analysis.
Section 2 - England.
2
3.2 The decisions in three English cases, already noted
1 E.g. as legislative policy, intention, purpose, object,
objective, aim, etc.
2 Kirkwood v Kirkwood [1370] 2 A11E.R. 161; Snow v Snow
L13 71 ] 3 A11E.R. 83 3 ; W(RJ) v W(SJ) [1371] 3 A11E.R. 303 .
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in the general context of legislative policy, were founded
upon the view that, as certain English matrimonial statutes
were intended to protect children, they were required to be
construed accordingly. There was no suggestion in these
cases that the policy of child protection was relevant only
in the event of ambiguity. The policy operates therefore
not merely as an aid to interpretation in case of difficulty
but more importantly as the premise upon which the whole
interpretative approach to the statute is founded.
9.3 This philosophy is not restricted to matrimonial
5
legislation. The preamble to the Children Act 1958, the
6
significance of which has already been considered, refers
to the "protection of children living away from their parents."
7
This was used in Surrey County Council v Dattersby in
considering whether the statutory criteria of a "foster
parent" were satisfied. The policy of the protection of the
child was particularised by Sachs J. in the following words:-
"The main mischief aimed at was to avoid
such children being for long periods in
charge of persons who might be unsuitable
to have their care or being in accommodation
that was unsuitable."8
In this case the policy of protection was, used to justify one
3 Paras. 8.11 and 8.12.
4 Matrimonial Proceedings (Magistrates' Courts) Act 1960
(8 S 9 Eli-z. 2, c.48); Matrimonial Proceedings and
Property Act 1970 (1970 c.45).
5 6 S 7 Eliz. 2, c.65. 6 Para. 7.11.
7 [1965] 1 A11E.R. 273 . 8 Ibid, at p.277 .
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of two constructions attributable to the word "undertaken"
in section 2(1) of the Act. There was no suggestion that
such an approach would necessarily be restricted to resolving
an ambiguity, although it cannot be denied that that is what
happened in that case.
9.4 The solution may not always be so simple. How,
for example, do provisions in a statute which are intended
to protect children relate to other statutory provisions
which indicate an alternative but not necessarily inconsistent
objective? In R. v Coleshill Justices: ex parte Davies and
9
another two "young persons" were committed for trial along
with five adults under the procedure prescribed by section 1
1 o
of the Criminal Justice Act 1967. That provision permits
in certain circumstances committal for trial without
consideration of the evidence. Section 6(1) of the Children
i l
and Young Persons Act 1969 requires a "young person" to be
committed for trial in certain prescribed circumstances but
only if the magistrates' court is satisfied that there is
sufficient evidence to do so. The provisions of the 1969
Act are undoubtedly protective in character and the* Queer's
Bench Divisional Court concluded that the 1967'Act could not
apply "to the committal for trial of a young person to whom
1 2
section 6(1) of the 19G9 Act applies." This reasoning is
9 [1971] 3 A11Z.R. 929. 10 1967 c.30.
11 1963 c.54.
12 [1971] 3 A11E.R. 929 at p.331 per Bridge J.
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1 3
analogous to the maxim generalia specialibus non dcrogant.
This case may reasonably be regarded as a special instance of
the approach indicated by that maxim with particular reference
to the policy of child protection. That policy will thus
take precedence over any other more general policy which
may be relevant.
Section 3 - Scotland.
9.5 These English cases illustrate protection of
children as a policy factor in interpretation. There are
fewer Scottish examples, but the Scottish courts in two
l <*
cases have analysed protection as legislative policy in
considerable depth. In EO15 a widowed father of two small
girls and his sister were living together in "family" with
the children. The father proposed to remarry and his sister
applied to adopt the two girls. An adoption was regarded as
1 6
"consistent with their best welfare." The problem centred
round the requirement in section 2(6)(a) of the Adoption Act
17
1950 that, unless the infant had been continuously in the
care and possession of the applicant for at least three
13 Maxwell, p.196. The maxim does not apply strictly in
this case, since the general provision precedes the
special provision.
14 E.O. - Petitioner 1951 S.L.T. (Sh. Ct.) 11; A. ,
Petitioners 1958 S.L.T. (Sh. Ct.) 61.
15 1951 S.L.T. (Sh. Ct.) 11.
16 1951 S.L.T. (Sh. Ct.) 11 at p.11 per Sheriff-substitute
Hamilton.
17 14 Geo. 6 , c.26 .
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2 8
consecutive months, an adoption order1 could not be nude.
It was conceded that the sister had been looking after the
children since the mother's death and that she was living
19 2 0
with the children and their father. The judge did not
think that these circumstances justified the proposition
that the children were living with their aunt. There is
thus a significant distinction between "living with" and
2 1
"being in the care and possession of." He concluded that
the children were in the possession and control of the
father; the statutory requirement in section 2(5)(a) had
not been met. Thus an adoption order could not be made,
however much it may have been beneficial to the children.
9.G The justification for this interpretation of
section 2(6)(a) of the 195C Act lies in the judge's view
of the policy of child protection. It is worthwhile
quoting him in full:-
18 This requirement and its recent substitute are
analysed in chapter 24.
19 1951 S.L.T. (Sh. Ct.) 11 at p.12.
20 Sheriff-substitute Hamilton.
21 Which may be similar to the distinction between
that requirement and the recently substituted
requirement of "having his home with:" Children
Act 1375 (1375c. 72), s.9(l).
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"In my view it is a peremptory
provision and a condition
precedent to an order being
made. The agent for the
petitioner submitted that the
provision went no further than
meaning that the children had
been living with the proposed
adopter, and that if the Court
was satisfied the adopter was
suitable that was enough. I
think not. The whole Act is
for the protection of children
and this provision very much
so. V'hile the children may
be - and I think are - perfectly
happy living as they are, it
does not follow they would
necessarily be so if removed
from their father and living
with their aunt alone. This
provision in my view would
protect a child who was not
contented and progressing
with the adopter. " 2 2
That leaves no doubt why the judge reached his decision.
Nevertheless it nay be possible to question the sweeping
generality of the remark that "the whole Act is for the
protection of children" on the ground that adoption
legislation nay also be intended to promote, not merely to
2 3
protect, the welfare of children and to safeguard certain
2
parental rights and interests. It would however be
difficult to deny that the provision in question 'was
designed to protect the child from an adverse adoption.
22 1951 S.L.T. (Sh. Ct.) 11 at p. 12 per Sheriff-
substitute Hamilton.
2 3 Para. 7.9.
29 Idem.
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Q *7 V> r-s T-N h , •
i •'•icy of protection was used in that sense
by the judge to Inject one interpretation of the provision
in preference to another, so as to prevent an unfortunate
.
i 7 5adoption .rori ta^j_nfr p]ace< The result is a rather narrow
and restrictive vj_ew 0f section 2(6) (a) of the 16 50 Act.
If a wider view of -that provision had been taken, for
example, to promote welfare generally rather than to nrotect
the cnild, a diffGren^. interpretation may well have resulted.
Thus the kernel of this aspect of the decision, the judicial
formulation of locr-j g] ativo no] icy, reflects essentially one
person's view of what Parliament was in a very broad sense
trying to do when the Act was passed. The judge nave no
reason for his view Gf the policy of the Act; indeed to do
2 6
so would be a r.ajor aruj detailed exercise. The refusal to
grant an adoption order therefore turned on an unsupported
statement of extremely subjective quality. This is not to
say that the statement or the decision was wrong;; it is in
the present context an acknowledgement of its nature.
2 7 2 8
• s - ae issue in was tiie same as in n0 , namely
whether the requirements of section 2(C)(a) of the 1330 Act
were satisfies. One facts were somewhat different. t\
husband and wife applied to adopt the illegitimate child of
the 'wife born to her before the marriage to the other
applicant. It appeared that the husband was, and had for
25 This is an example of the distinction between the
protection and promotion of welfare. Protection is
negative in that an adoption nay be prevented;
promotion is positive in that an adoption may be
brought about.
26 One, given current rules, likely to be beyond the
technical competence of a court. 27 1353 S.L.T.(Sh.Ct.) 61.
28 1951 S.L.T. (Sh. Ct.) 11.
2 88
some time boon, serving .its a regular soldier, upending leaves
witn his wife and her child in her oaront' s horn*.-. ie iiuu
never, however, been able to live for three consecutive
2 9 3 0
months v/ith them. The judge conceded that an adoption order
could not be granted if section 2 ((!) (a) were to be applied
literally, for the child had clearly not been continuously
in the care and possession of the husband for three
3 1
consecutive months. The sheriff-substitute considered two
3 2
Scottish authorities on the effect on care and possession
of an interruption during the three month period. neither
proved directly helpful. He felt justified in adopting a
3 3
flexible attitude and granted the adoption order. In doing
so he made various observations on the policy of the
Adoption Act 1950 which repay analysis.
0.9 He argued that, the various reports being highly
favourable to the adoption, "the protective intention of
3 9
the section [had been] in fact fulfilled." It v/as "protective"
in the sense that "the three month period [was] a
probationary period to enable it to be seen whether the
child [would] settle down with, and be properly looked after
3 5
by, the adoptive parents." To this extent the judge's view
of the policy implicit in section 2(G)(a) of the 195(1 Act
29 1958 S.L.T. (Sh. Ct.) 61 at p.61.
30 Sheriff-substitute Prain. 31 1958 S.L.T. (Sh.Ct.) 61 at p.61.
32 S. Petitioner 1953 S.L.T. 220; Mr. and Mrs A., Petitioners
1353 S.L.T. (Sh. Ct.) 45.
33 1958 S.L.T. (Sh. Ct.) 61 at p.61. As to "flexibility,"
see chapter 10. 34 1958 S.L.T. (Sh. Ct.) 61 at p.62.
35 Ibid. at p.61. There a child and his mother were to
continue living together, as here, that according to the




is the same as that of Sheriff-substitute Hamilton in EO,
but Sheriff-substitute Prain added a further comment which
went far beyond anything said by Sheriff-substitute Hamilton
'The disturbing feature of this case
is that the statutory provisions
should cause doubt and hesitation
in the granting of an order which ii
so manifestly for the benefit and
welfare of this child At the
moment there seems to be some
confusion between the necessary
legislation for the protection of
children generally and the aims of
the restrictions placed on the
granting of adoption orders. The
latter are presumably intended as
protective provisions but, in
fact, they operate in the other
direction. To be protective those
restrictions would require to
apply to all actual adoptions and
not only to the granting of
adoption orders. At present the
restrictions do nothing to prevent
actual adoptions, they do nothing
to protect children from
unsuitable adoptions; all that
they do is to restrict the number
of children eligible for the
benefits of an adoption order and
to serve to deprive children of
important and valuable rights."37
9.10 The problem clearly is what purpose certain
provisions of the Act are intended to achieve. The judge's
comments indicate how difficult it nay be to identify
legislative policy and perhaps even how dangerous it may be
to use policy in construing Acts of Parliament. but the
(Sh. Ct.) 11.
(Eli. Ct.) G1 at p . G 2 .
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overall policy 01 tie legijiatiuii almost forotJ tne aib
of that very policy to assist intei rrut a Limn. 1L la not
moreover absolutely cleai' what Sheriff-substitute brain's
comments mean. He talked in terms of "protection"'.
"Protection of children" involves safeguarding or securing
the welfare of children: it does not normally moan the
promotion of the welfare of children. In that sense it is
a static rather than a dynamic concept.
3.11 Section 2(6)(a) of the 1350 Act was probably
intended to ensure that an adoption order undesirable from
the child's point cf view could not be made. This is very
different from arguing that a desirable adoption order
should be made so as to benefit the child. The questional:!
element in Sheriff-substitute Prain's opinion is the common
that the restrictions placed upon the granting: of adoption
orders do not operate to protect the child. In his view
3 8
"in fact they operate in the other direction." These are
puzzling comments. It is not clear against what the childr
are to be protected. The general legislation to which he
referred may include the provisions which protect children
3 9
from physical abuse. The restrictions on the granting of
adoption orders are probably concerned to.protect the child
from undesirable adoption orders. Sheriff-substitute Prain
seems to have treated in the same way these distinctive
aspects of protection.
3 8 Para. 9.9, n.'lO.
39 E.g. Adoption Act 1958 (7 £ 8 Eliz., 2, c.5) s.43 as
amended by Children Act 1975, s.103 and Sched. 4,
Part XI; Adoption Act 1375 (1976 c.36), s.34.
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9.12 This criticism may be further justified by
reference to the last two sentences of the extract of the
judge's opinion. lie suggested that the statutory restrictions
should apply to "all actual adoptions." The reference in
his judgment to the restrictions doing nothing "to prevent
actual adoptions" is also puzzling. If section 2(G)(a)
were to be interpreted .literally, it would, as Sheriff-
substitute Prain suggested, almost certainly limit the number
of adoption orders made, by "protecting" children from
"suitable" adoptions without assisting the granting of orders
in cases where an order would be beneficial. That would no
doubt be undesirable as a matter of policy. By "actual
adoption" he probably meant the de facto assumption of a
parental relationship by non-parents. The restrictions in
the legislation were directed only to the situation where
it was proposed to apply for an adoption order. They had
no relevance to "actual adoptions" in that sense. The
judge appears to have misled himself about the policy of
protection contemplated by the legislation. His dicta were
probably not necessary for his actual decision. The case
demonstrates the problems which may arise if the policy of
the legislation is misconceived.
Section 'I - Conclusion.
9.13 The general position, however, seems clear. The
courts in Scotland and England have evolved the concept of
the protection of children as an item of policy propounded
by Parliament and have vised it as an aid to interpretation.
The concept has been neither fully described nor analysed
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by the courts. It is an idea sufficiently wide and imprecise
to be susceptible of various meanings, thus enabling it to be
used by the courts to justify several different lines of
approach to interpretation. Perhaps the legislation
affecting children requires such flexibility or perhaps, as
<♦ o
Sheriff-substitute Prain hinted, even more freedom of
manoeuvre. The courts are afforded considerable discretion
in terns of current legislation: an additional discretion
at the point of interpretation may arguably complement that
type of Parliamentary mandate.
9.1'l Reliance upon protection as a policy is not a new
phenomenon: it would appear nevertheless to be finding
increasing judicial support. Perhaps the moment is coming
when it should be more fully analysed " y the courts to
enable its use to be more easily predicted. Per]imps it
should also be more carefully distinguished from other equally
•» i
valid policies pursued by the legislation. Tor it seems
clear that it is not impossible for judges to become slightly
•» 2
confused when attempting to identify the relevant policy
objectives. Current practice suggests that trie search for
the correct policy is too subjective. The use of policy
should therefore be clarified by some new, mechanism or
abandoned as a device to construe children's legislation.
40 A., Petitioners 1358 S.L.T. (Sh. Ct.) 61 at p.62:
para. 9.9.
41 The distinction between protection and promotion has
already been suggested.
42 L.g. Sheriff-substitute Prain in A., Petitioners 1353
Q 7 T / Oh p-f- "S r lO • Lj . 1 . ( Oil , L . J O ± .
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CHAPTER 10
WELFARE AND THE TECHNIQUES OF INTERPRETATION.
Section 1 - Introduction.
10.1 The consequence of admitting policy, particularly
the policy of protection, as an aid to statutory
interpretation is simply the avoidance of absolute reliance
upon the literal approach. There are many, well-established
l
ways of achieving that result. This analysis is concerned
particularly with those relevant to children's legislation
and founded ultimately upon the welfare of children as their
justification. The final technique for consideration may
be found in conjunction with the use of policy or independently
of it. There is no single established name for this technique;
it appears under differing descriptions; its fundamental
quality is flexibility. It is thus less an aid to interpretation
and more a state of mind in which a judge comes to interpret
the relevant statute. In that sense it is to a very large
degree dynamic. Its subjectivity places it almost beyond
2
legal justification; as in the case of policy, it operates
as a type of grundnorm acceptable to the judge.
Section The liberal approach : England .
10.2 This significant and well-precedented technique of
interpretation in relation to children's legislation amounts
in practice to inherent flexibility. Emphasis is placed not
on the object of the legislation, as in the case of the
1 Maxwell, particularly chapters 2, 4 and 11. 2 Chapter 9.
29^
policy of protection of children, but on the way in whicn
the fabric of the statute has boon woven. In Ridley v
3
Ridley, for example, the court was asked to exercise its
powers under section 23 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1950
to make an order for periodical payments in respect of both
the wife and the children. The husband had been proved to
have been guilty of wilful neglect to provide reasonable
maintenance for his wife but not for the children. Barnard
J. felt convinced that lie had to regard section 2 3 "broadly"
5
as it would be "more convenient" to provide for payments
for the wife and for the children together. be did not
explain his reasoning; he readied his decision by instinct,
be adopted a broad rather than a narrow interpretation and
thereby gave effect to his feeling for what Parliament
intended.
10.3 A similar preference for a "wide" interpretation
6
was exhibited by the House of Lords in Galloway v Galloway
for the purposes of section 26(1) of the same 1950 Act and
7
by Lane J. in dewman v Hewr.an in construing "relevant child"
within the meaning of section 46(2) of the Matrimonial Causes
8
Act 13G5. In concluding that a child may be a "relevant
child" in a second divorce suit to which .only one of the
parents is a party, Lane J. regarded it as important "that
the court should be able to exercise its powers not only
under sections 33 and 34, but also under sections 36 and
3 [1953] P.150. 4 14 Geo. 6, c.25.
5 [1353] P.15U at p.152. 6 [1955] 3 A11L.R. 423.
7 [1970] 3 A11E.R. 529. 8 1965 c.72.
29 5
9
and 37 This certainly indicates a wide or liberal
approach to interpretation.
10.4 There are examples also in the contexts of custody
1 o
and adoption. In Re VKJC) (An infant) the Court of Appeal
interpreted the Guardianship of Infants Acts fairly broadly
in holding that custody was a "divisible" concept in the
sense that custody could be awarded to one parent and care
i I
and control to the other. When construing section 3(1)
1 2
of the Adoption Act 1958 Buckley J. in Re B(GA) (an Infant)
1 3
followed earlier Scottish authorities and acknowledged that
"the section cannot reasonably be construed in its most
1 9
strictly literal terms."
10.5 Examples of similar interpretative techniques may
be found in relation to the Children and Young Persons Acts.
1 5
The circumstances in R. v Whilbey were somewhat unusual. A
father present in court to seek the custody of three of his
children walked out of the building, leaving his other five
children behind, when he was informed that the application
for custody could not be heard on' that day. He was charged
with abandoning them and causing them unnecessary suffering
contrary to section 1 of the Children and Young Persons Act
9 [1970] 3 A11E.R. 529 at p.533. 10 [1963) 3 A11E.R. 459.
11 See also ReN (Minors) (1973) 4 Family Lav; 93.
12 [1963] 3 A11E.R. 125.
13 Including A, Petitioners 1958 S.L.T. (Sh. Ct.) 61 discussed
in paras. 9.8 to 9.12.
14 [1963] 3 AllE.R. 125 at p.127. 15 [1938] 3 A11E.R. 777.
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1 6
1933. The heading of Part I of that Act indicated the
nature of the suffering contemplated by the legislature,
namely "prevention of cruelty and exposure to ncml and
Physical danger." Branson J.'s approach was not "to limit
17
the ambit of that language in a proper case." This clearly
was an exhortation to himself of flexibility. It was not
however necessary, for he did not accept that in the unusual
circumstances of that case even the most literal view of
section 1 of the 1933 Act could sustain a conviction. The
finding of guilty by the court of first instance was thus
reversed on anpeal.
1 8
19.6 In R. v Hay]es the accused was also charged with
a breach of section 1 of the Children and Young Persons Act
1933. His young son died after falling down the stairs and
having been put to Led without medical attention. The charge
under section 1 specified "wilful ill-treatment" of the child
and the presiding judge directed the jury that the father's
"neglect" to give medical attention was sufficient to sustain
the charge. Section 1, of course, prescribes different
1 9
examples of behaviour as amounting to the criminal offence
in question. Tito appellant: argued that the judicial reference
to "neglect" was not consistent with the charge of "ill-
treatment." This was however rejected. The various elements
of section 1 were not separate offences and the 'whole provision
was to be regarded as descriptive of one general offence against
16 22 S 23 Geo. 5, c.46. 17 [1933] 3 A11E.R. 777 at p.773.
13 [1969] i A11E.R. 34. IS I.e. assault, ill-treatment,
neglect, abandonment or exposure.
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children. Uidgery L.J. summed up the approach of the Court
of Appeal thus:-
"That [to create separate offences under
section 1] would be a technical
complication which would be highly
undesirable, and one from which this 20
court finds it possible to escape "
He did not explain why such a "technical complication" would
be "highly undesirable". The reason could be inconsistency
with the object of the provision, namely the protection of
the welfare of the child. This case may be a further
example, actually comprising the ratio decidendi of the
decision, of a "non-technical" approach to the interpretation
of the legislation.
Section 3 - The liberal approach: Scotland.
10.8 The oldest Scottish case of present concern does
not apply to children. It deals with the liability to care
for an adult mental defective under the Mental Deficiency
2 1
and Lunacy (Scotland) Act 1913. This does not matter, for
the issue is the same, provided the provision aims to
protect or promote the welfare of a person legally incapax.
A statutory duty was placed upon a parish council to care
for a mental defective "abandoned" within the meaning of the
2 2
1913 Act. The issue in New Monkland Parish Council v Lrskine
20 [1969] 1 A11E.R. 34 at p.37. 21 384 Geo. 5, c.33.
22 1926 S.C. 835.
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was whether a mental defective had been so abandoned. Lord
Sands in the Inner house of the Court of Session crystallised
the question concisely
"She is a defective, her father declines
to receive her into his house, the
persons who at present have the care of
her decline to keep her longer unless
compelled to do so. In these circumstances,
having in mind the humane objects of
the Act, which point to a liberal and not
to a Jesuitical construction, I am of
opinion that this defective answers the
description of a defective who is
'abandoned'. I am not disposed, in
construing this statute, to be troubled
by niceties or subtleties, such as the
contention that the woman cannot be
said to be abandoned because at the
moment she is not actually turned out
of doors."2 3
There can be little doubt therefore that, given the
appropriate statutory objective, the Court of Session is
prepared, if indeed not bound, to disregard the strict rules
of interpretation in order to give effect to that objective.
There would appear to be no need to indicate any ambiguity
in the phraseology to Introduce the liberal approach. The
identification of the appropriate objective is the justification
for the approach. There would in this sense seem to be
complete consistency between the approaches of the English
and Scottish courts.
10.9 There are Scottish examples derived from the parent
2 <t 2 5
and child relationship. Stokes v Stokes, it will be recalled,
dealt with the question whether in a consistorial context
access to a chi'ld could be awarded to persons other than the
2 3 Ibid. at p. 841 2 4 1965 S.C. 246. 2 5 Para. 8.26.
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parents of the child. Although the case wen L to the ..ousc
2 6
of Lords, where the decision of the Inner house wee confirmed
for reasons other than those given by the judges in the lower1
court, Lord Guthrie clearly and Lord Clyde L.P. by implication
27 2 8
considered it competent to adopt a wide view of the legislation
2 9
if it would give effect to the statutory objective.
3 o
10.10 In huddart v liuddart the court was also invited to
interpret section 19(2) of the Matrimonial Proceedings
(Children) Act 1958. The issue was different from that in
3 1
Stokes v Stokes : namely, was it competent for the court to
regulate access to a child in a consistorial context without-
dealing with custody? In an undefended divorce action the
pursuer husband averred that the best interests of the
children required that they should remain with their mother
who did not however ask formally for custody. The husband
nevertheless asked for access. Lord l/heatley accepted that
3 2
it was competent to award access without regulating custody.
In his view the question turned upon the meaning of "legal
custody" in section 14(2) of the 1958 Act. There were two
possible constructions. An element of ambiguity was thus
26 1967 S.C. (II. L.) 46.
27 1365 S.C. 246 at pp. 250 to 252 per Lord Clyde L.P. and
Lords Carmont and Guthrie.
28 Matrimonial Proceedings (Children) Act 1958 (6 8 7
Eliz. 2, c.40), s. 14(2).
29 To secure the welfare of the child: see 1365 S.C. 246
at p. 252 per Lord Guthrie.
30 1960 S.C. 300. 31 1965 S.C. 246.
32 1960 S.C. 390 at pp. 300 and 301.
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3 3
introduced. Lord Wheatley preferred the "wider" sense,
simply because "it was the expressed intention of Parliament
3 »t
in this Act , benevolently framed in the interests of children".
A liberal approach therefore is quite within the competence
of the Court of Session in modern circumstances if it is in
line with the object of the Act.
3 5
10.11 Reference should be made to H and H, Pet itionex''S .
The judgment of Sheriff-substitute Kermack is typical of that
judge as a penetrating analysis of a legal concept, here
adoption, as a social institution. Such an approach is
rare. lie was faced with an application by members of the
Jewish community for adoption of a child who was the
illegitimate child of a Christian. The difficulties facing
a non-Jewish child growing up in a Jewish community were
3 6
sharply drawn to the attention of the court but the Sheriff-
substitute approached the question from the point of view
37
of the best interests of the child. The broad background
was sketched in with the following-words:-
"It is perhaps necessary to keep in
view that adoption, although first
legalised by the Act of 1930, was
a social institution in Britain of
possibly immemorial origin, a fact
of which, I think, the legislation
enacted shews cognisance. It is
therefore advisable to tread warily
in imposing too strict limitations
on it by judicial action."38
Not, as already established, a precondition of a
flexible approach. 34 1960 S.C. 300 at p.301.
1949 S.L.T. (Sh. Ct.) 68.
Information provided by the Director of Welfare, Glasgow,
who was the curator ad litem and also by a leading rabbi:
see 1949 S.L.T. (Sh. Ct7~5 68" at p. 68.






The social implications of a decision on an adoption
application were thus recognised together with the corollary
that a strict judicial approach is hardly desirable. The
judgment therefore exhibits the flexibility of approach
appropriate in dealing with such legislation.
Section 4 - Conclusion.
10.12 These various instances, both English and Scottish,
demonstrate that legislation affecting children, whatever its
objective, attracts an approach which is essentially at
variance with the basic norm of statutory interpretation that
words are to receive their literal meaning except in
circumstances carefully circumscribed by law. It is probably
sufficient to describe this approach simply as one of
flexibility. It reveals itself in several different ways:
the interpretation may be "not technical"; the court may
wish to be unrestricted or not limited in its approach; a
"wide" view may be taken of the legislation; even a particularly
narrow view may conduce to the object of the legislation.
This approach has not been subject to close judicial scrutiny
nor have the courts postulated any conditions for its exercise.
Discretion is its fundamental quality. Whatever its
classification, this flexibility is exceptional but significant
within the context of legislation affecting children.
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CHAPTER 11
THE 1933 AND 1937 ACTS OFFENCES
Section 1 - Introduction
11.1 The ways in which the legislature has intervened
directly to protect the welfare of children by prescribing
objective standards have been considered in general static
i
terms. Some are enforceable by civil proceedings; most
are straightforward criminal prohibitions. The common
element is simply that a certain standard of behaviour is
set for certain persons in their relationshp with children.
This standard is prescribed objectively so that the welfare
of the child in the widest sense may be protected. The
criminal sanction operates retrospectively in the individual
case; the civil sanctions also operate retrospectively but
with different consequences. Thus the welfare of the
individual child may have already been prejudiced by the
time that a successful, or for that matter an unsuccessful,
criminal prosecution has been brought. The criminal
sanction will effectively protect the welfare of children
and of the individual child only if it succeeds in its
objective of deterrence. Other approaches, on the other
hand, operate prospectively not only in protecting but also




11.2 In the ease of criminal sanctions, where the
legislation succintly and unambiguously describes the conduct
which forms the foundation of the offence, the aspect of
welfare protected by the offence will be clear. Legal
2
difficulties will relate to establishing the facts or concern
the application of the law to the established facts. The
dearth of cases decided in the higher courts in England and
I
Scotland suggests that this is so. In any case the solution
of any problems of interpretation which arise may be assisted
by the special rules of interpretation applicable to
legislation affecting children. Some of the provisions are
couched in fairly general terms which by their nature are
open to differing interpretations. Moreover the ordinary
rules of law apply to these statutory offences except in
relation to the substance of the offence; for example, the
time limit of six months within which a summary complaint
3
must be brought in Scotland.
2 Oakey v Jackson [1914] .1 K.B. 216 at p. 220 per Darling J.
who said: "The question [of wilful neglect] is one of
fact to be decided in each case on the evidence;" Liverpool
Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children v Jones
[1914] 3 K.B. 813 at p.816 per Lord Coleridge J. on the
question of custody; Motion v McFall (1899) 1 Fraser (J)
85 at p.86 per Sir J.H.A. Macdonald L.J.-C. who held that
desertion for the purposes of the Poor Law Amendment
(Scotland) Act 1845 (869 Vict., c.83), s.80 was a
question of fact.
3 E.g. Farquharson v Gordon (1894) 2 S.L.T. 63 applying the
Summary Procedure (Scotland) Act 1864 (27 6 28 Vict.,
c.53), s.24 to a charge under the Prevention of Cruelty
to Children Act 1889 (52 6 53 Vict., c.44), s.l.
Section 2 - The general approach.
(a) The historical background.
11.3 One of the most important offences designed to
protect children is created by section 1(1) of the Children
k
and Young Persons Act 1933 for England and section 12(1) of
5
the Children and Young Persons (Scotland) Act 1937 for
Scotland. It is so important that quotation in full is
j ustified:-
"If any person who has attained
the age of sixteen years and
has custody, charge, or care of
any child or young person under
that age, wilfully assaults,
ill-treats, neglects, abandons
or exposes him, or causes or
procures him to be assaulted,
ill-treated, neglected, abandoned,
or exposed, in a manner likely
to cause him unnecessary
suffering or injury to health
(including injury to or loss
of sight, or hearing, or limb,
or organ of the body, and any
mental derangement), that
person shall be guilty of a
misdemeanour [in Scotland
"offence"]..."
Subsection 2(a) treats certain behaviour as neglect; for
example, by failing "to provide adequate food, clothing,
medical aid or lodging." Subsection 2(b) equates suffocation
by overlying in bed under the influence of drink with
statutory neglect. The types of conduct forming the basis
of a prosecution under these provisions cover a wide range
of imaginable human behaviour; indeed the circumstances of
9- 23 S 24 Geo. 5, c.12. 5 1 Edw. 8 S 1 Geo. 6, c.37.
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some cases are quite horrific. In general, two issues have
arisen for determination by the courts. To what persons do
the provisions apply? What precise conduct is regarded as
criminal? On the face of it the enactments contain a series
of conceptually unrelated offences. Some involve acts of
commission, others acts of omission. The common factor is
the effect on welfare of the child. The courts have on the
whole adopted a cohesive rather than a fragmented approach.
11.4 Similar provisions were in force long before the 1930s.
6
They were introduced in England in order to overcome
the deficiencies of the common law offence of neglect; they
seem to have been enacted for Scotland without a full
examination of any need for their introduction. The
criminal law of Scotland had the benefit of a much wider
7
range of common law offences. It may be that Scots law
would have been flexible enough to have adapted without
statutory intervention. In any event the legislation of
the 1930s had an undoubted Victorian foundation. Section
8
37 of the Poor Law Amendment Act 1868 made it an offence
for a parent wilfully to neglect to provide adequate food,
clothing, medical aid or lodging for his children, being
under fourteen and in his custody, so that their health
should have been likely to be seriously injured. The current
6 Bevan, pp. 175 and 176.
7 Para. 13.6.
8 31 and 32 Vict, c. 122.
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provisions may be traced through section 1 of the Prevention
of Cruelty and Protection of Children Act 1889, section 1 of
i o
the Prevention of Cruelty to Children Act 1894, section 1 of
i I
the Prevention of Cruelty Act to Children Act 1904 and
x 2
section 12 of the Children Act 1908. Although several of
the authorities relate to the earlier legislation, they
1 3
undoubtedly remain valid.
(b) The structure of the provisions.
11.5 The conduct comprehensively proscribed by these
provisions clearly includes behaviour prejudicial to the
i 4
physical welfare of the child. It requires little
imagination to forsee that assault, ill-treatment, neglect,
abandonment or exposure will sooner or later affect the
physical integrity of the child. This conclusion is
supported by the second limb of the provision, "in a manner
likely to cause him [the child] unnecessary suffering or
1 s
injury to health." The inclusion of the likelihood of
suffering or injury indicates that Parliament intended the
criminal law to intervene sooner rather than later, certainly
without having to wait for the actual, suffering or injury to
13 The history of the legislation was noted by Lord
Alverstone C.J. in R. v Connor [1908] 2 K.B. 26.
14 Mental well-being is also covered; the provisions refer
to "mental derangement."
15 In Brooks v Blount [1923] 1 K.B. 257 it was held that
proof of actual suffering was unnecessary; proof of
likelihood was sufficient.
9
9 52 8 53 Vict, c.44.
11 4 Edw.7, c.15.
10 57 S 58 Vict, c.41.
12 8 Edw.7, c.67.
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materialise. Where a third person has intervened to obviate
actual suffering or injury or the likelihood of such
suffering or injury, section 1(3)(a) of the 1933 Act provides
that a conviction shall not thereby be prejudiced. The first
requirement however remains to be satisfied, namely assault,
ill-treatment or any of the others. This may mean that the
suffering or injury has actually come about before the
prosecution is brought.
11.6 On a question of technical interpretation, it
may be asked whether the second limb of the provision
qualifies the act of assault as well as the causing or
procuring of the assault. Textually that clause is somewhat
removed from the requirement of assault. But there is
probably no reason to suppose that the clause does not apply
1 6
to all the preceding verbs in the subsection. The section
would otherwise be illogical and unbalanced. In any event
an interpretation sympathetic to the child would be
appropriate. The existence of the clause is in effect an
additional limitation upon the application of the section,
even although it may have been intended by its inclusion
to extend the range of its effectiveness. What, for example,
amounts to unnecessary suffering or injury to health?
Injury to health includes mental derangement, but "unnecessary"
is a requirement difficult to apply. For example, if a
father were to go away permanently and leave his son
unsupervised, it could amount to abandonment in a manner
"likely to cause him unnecessary suffering." But is the
16 Clarte Hall 6 Morrison, p.18 quoting R. v Hatton [1925]
2 K.B. 322.
3oa
suffering "unnecessary" where the child is on the one hand
old enough in a physical sense to look after himself but on
the other hand may be emotionally disturbed by his parent's
absence? Such questions probably cannot be answered except
in the circumstances of a specific case. It has however
17
been suggested that the second limb of the subsection is
insignificant in practice. Where a child is "neglected",
for example, the almost inevitable consequence of the neglect
would be unnecessary suffering or injury to health. This may
be true as a matter of fact in most cases, but it cannot be
true as a proposition of logic. Proof of the .likelihood of
such suffering or injury remains a prerequisite of a
conviction, however technical it may be.
(c) The meaning of wilful.
11.7 Just as the likely consequence of the conduct
contemplated by the subsection is an integral part of the
statutory offences, so the conduct of the parent or other
alleged offender must be "wilful." This requirement applies
1 8
to all the elements in section 1(1) of the 1933 Act,
although it was in the context of "wilful neglect" that
the courts have analysed the meaning of "wilful". One of
1 9
the earlier cases, R. v Senior, concerned a father of
17 Ibid., p.18, where it is suggested that direct proof that
the neglect etc. did or was likely to cause unnecessary
suffering or injury to health is not required, as it is
likely to be inferred from the evidence of neglect
itself (founding upon R. v Brenton (1904) 111 C.C.C.
Sessions Pap. 309 ); Bevan, p.190, where it is stated
that proof will not be "difficult".
18 As in the case of the likelihood of suffering or injury:
Clark Hall and Morrison, p.13.
19 [1899] 1 Q.B. 283.
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excellent character who had failed to provide medical aid
or medicine for his child, aged eight or nine months and
suffering from pneumonia. The father's excuse was that
medical treatment was sinful. The charge was brought under
section 1 of the Prevention of Cruelty to Children Act
1894-. All the statutory requirements were satisfied except
for "wilful." Clearly "evil intent" could not be attributed
to the father. Equally clearly the father intended to do
what he did by omitting to provide medical aid. This aspect
of the case turned on the meaning of "wilful". As Lord
Russell C.J. explained:-
"'Wilfully' means that the act is
done deliberately and intentionally,
not by accident or inadvertence, but
so that the mind of the person who
does the act goes with it. Neglect
is the want of reasonable care - that
is, the omission of such steps as a
reasonable parent would take, such
as are usually taken in the ordinary
experience of mankind."20
This test may be applied to the circumstances of the case
in this way. The father deliberately, but clearly not
inadvertently, omitted to provide medical aid for the
child. The issue was whether a reasonable parent would
provide medical aid, presumably for the benefit of the child.
20 Ibid, at pp. 290 and 291.
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A significant gap in the judicial reasoning lies in the
almost automatic acceptance on all sides that the provision
of medical aid would be for the child's benefit. The only
rationalisation is that the need of the child for medical
2 1
aid was too obvious for proof or argument.
11.8 It may be that the child in question was in
urgent need of medical aid. The gap is that no evidence
seems to have been adduced on this point. The last phrase
in the quotation from the judgment of the Chief Justice
indicates that the benefit of the child was a matter for
judicial knowledge and not an issue for proof. This approach
may effectively deny to a parent the chance of explaining
his attitude. It also gives to the judge an apparently
limitless power to determine ex proprio motu, as it were,
the question of "benefit." Since "neglect" has been treated
as the omission to do something for the benefit of the child,
the basic issue depends upon the judge's view of "benefit".
If the method of trial is by jury, neglect becomes a matter
of discretion for them. What is important is that the
accused's views of "benefit" are ignored; his self-imposed
21 Lord Russell C.J.'s reference to the "experience of
mankind": idem. A similar attitude prevailed in
Oakey v Jackson [1914] 1 K.B. 216 at p.220 per Darling
J. who said:- "... it is not necessary to know much
about surgery to know that the operation for the removal
of adenoids is very common in the case of children and
that a failure to perform the operation may result in
danger to the child's life if the child should ever
happen to be attacked with illness."
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2 2
standard is irrelevant. This approach is perfectly
intelligible if it is assumed that the legislation is
designed to protect children in as flexible a manner as
possible. The issue for determination has become whether
the accused has fallen short of the standard required by
the judge or jury, not whether the accused has "neglected"
this child. The criminality of the accused thus turns not
so much upon a consideration of the welfare of the
individual child, but upon the judge's or jury's view of
the accused's behaviour in the light of the standard set by
the tribunal. The attitude of the Chief Justice is founded
upon the techniques of interpretation already discussed;
namely, to have regard to the underlying policy of the
2 3
legislation to protect the welfare of children. This
contrasts markedly with the individualisation of approach
in other contexts.
11.9 A similar conclusion may be reached after
2 ^
studying H.M. Advocate v Clark and Clark. A husband and wife
were indicted under section 12(1) of the Children and Young
Persons (Scotland) Act 1937 for wilfully neglecting their
22 R. v Lowe [1973] 1 A11E.R. 805 at p.807 per Phillimore
L.J. who stated: "It did not matter what he ought to
have realised as the possible consequence of his
failure to call a doctor - the sole question was
whether his failure to do so was deliberate and thereby
occasioned the results referred to in the section."
23 [1899] 1 Q.B. 283 at p.290 per Lord Russell of Killowen
C.J. who said: "... [the statute shows] an increased
anxiety .... to provide for the protection of infants."
24 1969 S.L.T. 161.
312
child. The alleged neglect comprised failure to provide
adequate food and medical aid. The defence suggested that
the accused had not acted "wilfully" as they were only
partially responsible for their behaviour by virtue of a
mental or pathological condition short of insanity. The
evidence of the psychiatrist would have been to the effect
that the accused were unable, by reason of their impaired
ability, to perceive and appreciate the emerging circumstances
2 5
leading to the deterioration in health of their daughter.
The High Court of Justiciary upheld the decision of the
2 6
Sheriff-substitute not to admit that evidence.
11.10 It was stated by the High Court firstly that a
27
plea of diminished responsibility was not available except
in relation to murder. More importantly, the argument also
considered section 12(1) of the 1937 Act. Lord Grant L.J.-C.
said:-
"The argument for the applicants
[accused] seems to me to proceed
on a confusion between the two
ingredients of such an offence
(a) That there should be neglect
(or ill-treatment, abandonment,
assault, etc.) which is wilful -
though it is difficult to
conceive of conduct which is not
wilful constituting assault;
and (b) that this should be in
a manner likely to cause the
child unnecessary suffering or
injury to health [after
25 Ibid, at p.162: see the reason given by the husband
for the application.
26 Idem. 27 Idem, per Lord Grant L.J.-C.
313
quoting the sheriff-substitute].
In other words, while proof of
wilfulness is essential to
establish head(a), the test
under head(b) is an objective
one. That test is whether
the neglect was 'in a manner
likely to cause ' and
not whether it was 'in a
manner intended to cause....'
It is not suggested here that
the applicants did not
appreciate the nature of their
acts or omissions or that these
were not deliberate and
intentional. The argument is,
and the evidence proposed to
be led was, to the effect that
the consequences were not
intended or foreseen."28
The Lord Justice-Clerk thus impliedly applied the reasoning
2 9
here attributed to the court in R. v Senior. It must be
conceded, of course, that, although the two courts adopted
similar approaches to the matters before them, they
postulated different justifications for doing so. In the
English case the parent had neither wished nor intended to
harm the child; he had acted in the way he did because of
his unusual religious convictions. The Scottish parents,
on the other hand, were allegedly behaving as they did
because of fecklessness or incompetence. They were nevertheless
acting intentionally or deliberately. In each case the
28 Ibid, at p.163. This analysis rejected the view
expressed by Gordon?p.208 that "neglect may be
negligent or intentional," thus distinguishing between
wilful neglect and negligent neglect. This distinction
would not now appear to be justified in terms of the
statutory provision.
29 [1899] 1 Q.B. 283: para. 11.7 and 11.8.
3lU
accused parent's personal or individual wishes or
circumstances were ignored. An external standard was
imposed. In each case "wilful neglect" was established.
3 o
11.11 It will be recalled that in R. v Senior the
eourt based its conclusion upon the meaning of "neglect";
3 1
in H.M. Advocate v Clark and Clark, great weight was placed
upon what has been described as the second limb of the
subsection creating the offence. But the approach to
"neglect" was essentially the same, certainly from the
ultimate point of view of the child. There can therefore
be little doubt that the test of "likelihood of suffering
or injury" is objective and the mental or emotional state
3 2
of the alleged offender irrelevant. The use of the word
"wilful", therefore, in the offence of "wilful neglect"
adds little if anything to what is needed to constitute
3 3
child neglect beyond the usual requirements of mens rea.
The interpretation thus placed upon the statutory provisions in
31 3 5
R. v Senior and H.M. Advocate v Clark and Clark is not
restrictive and it remains fully consistent with the policy
of protecting the physical and emotional well-being of the
child.
30 Idem. 31 1969 S.L.T. 161-
32 It could however be relevant in the event of.sentence
being imposed: ibid. at p.163 per Lord Walker.
33 Cf. R. v Hatton [1925] 2 K.B. 322 at p. 324 where it
was somewhat obliquely suggested by Lord Hewart C.J.
that something more than ordinary assault was
contemplated by section 12(1) of the Children Act 1908
in the context of wilful assault likely to cause
unnecessary suffering.
34 [1899] 1 Q.B. 283. 35 1969 S.L.T. 161.
315
(d) Is the legislation a restrictive code?
11.12 The interpretation so placed upon the statutes
of 1933 and 1937 in these two cases, although not restrictive,
was not specifically founded upon the policy of the
legislation, although it was clearly sympathetic to it.
The cases are not examples of the liberal approach; they
exemplify the literal approach. In a sense this is a
tribute to the quality of the legislation. The provision
may thus be regarded as framed properly so as to achieve
its policy objective. It has not been impeded by legalistic
technicalities.
11.13 The same is true of two further cases which
demonstrate judicial common sense to criminal child neglect.
It would however be too extreme to suggest that these two
cases exhibited judicial disregard for legal technicalities.
3 6
In R. v Hayles a father was charged with ill-treating his
child contrary to section 1 of the 1933 Act. The jury was
directed that evidence of the parent's neglect to give the
child medical attention was sufficient to sustain the
charge of ill-treatment. The appeal against conviction was
based on the ground that the judge had wrongly equated
neglect and ill-treatment. Widgery L.J. did not accept
that contention
"That [the creation of separate
offences under section 1] would
be a technical complication which
would be highly undesirable, and
one from which this court finds
it possible to escape, because
this court accepts the alternative
36 [1969] 1 A11E.R. 34.
contention of counsel for the
Crown, that these words do not
create separate and watertight
offences. " 37
Section 1 of the 1933 Act was in this sense regarded as a
unitary provision. Thus, provided the conduct in question
falls within the description of one or other of the "offence
in section 1, it does not matter whether the description
of the conduct fits precisely the specific "offence" charged
s 8
In R. v Hayles, the accused had been charged only with ill-
treatment; and the court suggested that section 1(1) of the
1933 Act was what could be called a composite offence. On
this basis there would be no objection to charging the
accused with more than one of the constituent offences in
3 9
section 1(1). These considerations indicate therefore a
liberal and non-technical approach to the interpretation of
the legislation and hence by implication of the welfare
of the child protected by these provisions.
o
11.19 In R. v Roe the problem was not the internal
relationship of the "offences" in section 1(1) of the 1.933
Act but the relationship between the offences in section 1
and other offences. The indictment of a father and mother
37 Ibid, at p. 37 per Widgery L.J. 38 Ibid.
39 This had happened in Williams (1910) 9 Cr. App. Rep.
89 where the accused was charged with neglect and
exposure under the Children Act 1908, s.12(1) and in
Boulden (1957) 91 Cr. App. Rep. 105 where the accused
was charged with abandonment and neglect contrary to
the Children and Young Persons Act 1933, s.l(l).
90 [1967] 1 W.L.R. 639.
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for ill-treatment contrary to that section included other
charges, namely causing grievous bodily harm with intent
or inflicting grievous bodily harm. The father was found
guilty on two charges, the mother on one. They appealed
on the ground that further charges could not be added to
the indictment, as section 1(1) was a completely self-
4 I
contained code. Lord Parker C.J. rejected that contention;
the indictment was held to be valid. There is no legal
impediment, therefore, to charging parents with whatever
offences may seem justified, in conjunction or alternatively,
under statute or common law.
11.15 Although this happens frequently, there is no
doubt that the charges are separate and must be proved
independently. The requirements of the various offences
are different and not interdependent. The death of a child,
for example, as a result of circumstances amounting to
wilful neglect under the 1933 Act does not necessarily
4 2
constitute manslaughter. There is however a relationship
4 3
between these offences. In R. v Watson and Watson a husband
and wife were charged with the manslaughter of their three
year old child. Elwes J. circumvented some old and
4 4
restrictive authorities by regarding manslaughter as
currently founded upon the statutory misdemeanour contained
41 [1967] 1 W.L.R. 634 at p.640.
42 R. v Lowe [1973] 1 A11E.R. 805. Cf. 1933 Act, s.l(3)(b)
which enables a conviction under s. 1 (1) to be sustained
where the child or young person has dies, a not
infrequent consequence.
43 (1959) 43 Cr. App. Rep. 111. 44 Two cases decided in
1799 and 1836.
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in section 1(1) of the 1933 Act. The authorities
interpreting the 1933 Act become relevant to a charge of
manslaughter. It is clear that legal technicalities are
not to be allowed, so far as possible, to restrict
legislation designed to protect children. The prosecutor
thus has a fairly wide discretion in selecting how the
statutory criminal law may be used to protect the welfare
of children.
Section 3 - Neglect.
(a) Deficient care.
11.16 Most of the reported cases under section 1(1)
of the 1933 Act deal with neglect. These cases illustrate
a remarkable variety of examples of parental indifference
to children under their care. A number result in death.
Neglect is also the most general and least specific ground
in section 1(1) of the 1933 Act. This may be the reason
k 5
for its apparent relative popularity with prosecutors.
11.17 The offence of neglect has been judicially
described as "the omission of such steps as a reasonable
1* 6
parent would take." It is a concept lacking definitive
precision and is thus liable to a degree of ambiguity.
45 See the table ,p.378 It should be recalled that persistent
refusal or neglect to maintain certain persons is a
contravention of the National Assistance Act 1948 (11 S
12 Geo. 6, c.29), s.5 1(1) and of the Ministry of Social
Security Act 1966 (1966 c.20) ,s.30(1). There were
similar provisions in the earlier Poor Law legislation
(e.g. Poor Law Amendment (Scotland) Act 1845)
which were however somewhat narrower than the present
legislation. For the 1845 Act see Bryden v Wilson (1914)
30 Sh. Ct. Rep. 306, Wilson v Mannarn 1934 S.L.T. 353;
for the 1948 Act see Corcoran v Muir 1954 J.C. 46.
46 R. v Senior [1899] 1 Q.B. 283 at p.291 per Lord Russell
of Killowen C.J.
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Section 1(2)(a) of the 1933 Act however assists by providing
"a parent or other person legally
liable to maintain a child or
young person shall be deemed to
have neglected him in a manner
likely to cause injury to his
health if he has failed to
provide adequate food, clothing,
medical aid or lodging for him,
or if, having been unable
otherwise to provide such food,
clothing, medical aid or lodging,
he has failed to take steps to
procure it to be provided under
the enactments applicable in
that behalf."
The device of "deeming" as used in section l(2)(a) does
not exhaust the possible circumstances of neglect. There
seems to be no reason why conduct constituting "wilful
neglect in a manner likely to cause unnecessary suffering
or injury to health" other than within the description in
section 1(2)(a) should not form the foundation of a
competent charge; for example, leaving the child unattended
e
permitting him to fall out of a window or using drugs
9 9
unsuitable in relation to children.
11.18 Section 1(2)(a) is comprehensively framed and
relatively specific; and it sets an objectively
ascertainable standard. Failure to provide medical aid,
one of the more common instances of neglect, may comprise
various types of conduct: for example, refusal to provide
47 MacAulay [1971] The Times, 2 June; Barrie [1971] The
Times, 30 June.




aid or medicine for religious reasons; refusal to permit
5 1
an operation for adenoids; complete failure to provide
5 2
medical attention after the child had fallen downstairs;
"feckless and incompetent" parental care by failing to
5 3
provide adequate medical aid; failure, by a parent of low
s 9
intelligence, to call a doctor when the child became ill.
The "neglect" element is thus probably a matter of fact
5 5
determinable in the circumstances of the individual case.
The motive of the alleged offender, whether good or bad,
is irrelevant; the neglectful act however must be "done
5 6
deliberately and intentionally."
11.19 These general comments apply mutatis mutandis
to failure to provide adequate food, clothing or lodging.
Often it may be merely parental inability to provide rather
57
than unwillingness to do so. In Napier the children were
exhausted, grossly under-nourished and in a verminous
5 8
condition. A poorly furnished and dirty house, deficient
59 60 61
clothing, no heating or absence of food are not uncommon
50 R. v Senior [1899] 1 Q.B. 283.
51 Oakey v Jackson [1914] 1 K.B. 216.
52 R. v Hayles [1969] 1 A11E.R. 34.
53 H.M. Advocate v Clark and Clark 1.969 S.L.T. 161.
54 R. v Lowe Tl973] 1 A11E.R. 805.
55 Oakey v Jackson [1914] 1 K.B. 216 at p.220.
56 R. v Senior [1899] 1 Q.B. 283 at p.291.
57 ri971] The Scotsman, 10 November.
58 Thomson [1972] The Scotsman, 5 October; Bowman [1974]
The Scotsman, 27 July and 13 August.
59 Thomson [1972] The Scotsman, 5 October; Bowman [1974]
The Scotsman, 27 July and 13 August; Dawson [1974] The
Scotsman, 7 August.
60 Bowman [1974] The Scotsman, 27 July and 13 August.
61 Bowman [1974] The Scotsman, 27 July and 13 August; Daws
[1974] The Scotsman, 7 August.
321
features of neglect. In such cases the court may be more
concerned with the immediate future of the children than
with the imposition of a severe penalty; but the deterrent
sentence is not unknown. In any event neglect by failing
to provide adequate food, clothing or lodging attracts no
conceptual problems.
(b) Failure to provide money.
11.20 Neglect in this sense has a close affinity with
failure to maintain the child in terms of the Scottish
common law obligation to aliment supported by the offences
created by section 51(1) of the National Assistance Act
1948 and section 39(1) of the Ministry of Social Security
Act 1966. These offences were created largely to fill the
62
gaps in the common law of England. The obligations underlying
these civil and criminal liabilities are in practice
enforceable only in monetary terms. What then is the
relationship between neglect in this sense and failure to
provide money for maintenance purposes?
63
11.21 In R. v Connor the foundation of the charge was
that the father had given the mother insufficient money to
feed the children. He left. Only the aid of a relative
kept the family from the workhouse. The evidence was to
the effect that the children were clean but poorly clad
and fed. The father was found guilty of wilful neglect
under section 1(1) of the Prevention of Cruelty to Children
Act 1904. His defence was also rejected on appeal:-
62 Paras. 44. 60 to 44.66.63 [1908] 2 K.B. 26.
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"But in the present case the
fact was that the children
were half starved, although
not wholly starved. It is
no answer to the charge to
say that some person
prevented them from being
wholly starved."61*
It should be recalled that the 1904 Act did not contain
a provision similar to section 1(2)(a) of the 1933 Act
which sets out certain circumstances deemed to constitute
neglect for the purposes of section 1(1) of that Act. The
Court of Criminal Appeal thus considered neglect in the
wider context. Ridley J., the trial judge, had appeared
to accept the proposition that the mere omission to pay
part of his earnings to his wife constituted wilful neglect
65
on the part of the father. Two members of the Court of
Criminal Appeal agreed but Grantham J. had reservations.
Failure to provide food or the money with which to buy food
thus probably amounts to a breach of the duty to maintain
6 6
or aliment the child. Neglect in this sense may probably
be equated with failure to maintain. This represents a
broad but nevertheless literal interpretation of neglect.
11.22 The decision of the High Court of Justiciary
67
in Henderson v Stewart, on the other hand, is clear but the
64 [1908] 2 K.B. 26 at p.31 per Lord Alverstone C.J. In a
sense this view anticipated section 1(3)(a) of the 1933
Act.
65 Ibid, at p.32.
66 Failure to make payments under a separation agreement
plus actual or likely suffering or injury to health
may also constitute neglect: Brooks v Blount [1923]
1 K.B. 257.
67 1954 J.C. 94.
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reasoning unhelpful in this context. The father had failed
to make any payment towards the maintenance of his child,
although he had the means to do so. The child was maintained
out of funds from the National Assistance Board and gifts
from his grandmother; there was never any danger of injury
to the health of the child. The father was charged with
wilful neglect under section 12(1) of the Children and
Young Persons (Scotland) Act 1937. He was acquitted by the
6 8
trial judge who was not satisfied "that the effect of
section 12(2)(a) of the 1937 Act was to make a mere failure
69
to maintain an offence under section 12(1)." According to
his analysis the "deeming" provision, section 12(2)(a),
was intended to "remove the necessity for proof that the
neglect alleged was of the character likely to cause injury,
still leaving it to the Crown to prove that there was
7 0
wilful neglect within the meaning of section 12." On the
other hand Lord Cooper L.J.G. on appeal in the High Court
concluded that the trial judge ought to have convicted the
7 1
accused. He pointed out that the sheriff-substitute had
7 2
ignored relevant English authorities which should have been
followed for they dealt with legislation largely uniform
throughout the United Kingdom. The difficulty of that
comment is that the authorities to which he referred do not
specifically relate to this aspect of the case. The decision
68 Sheriff-substitute Middleton. 69 1954 J.C. 94 at p.96.
70 Idem. 71 Ibid. at p.98.
72 Liverpool Society v Jones [1914] 3 K.B. 813; Brooks v
Blount L1923J 1 K.B. 257.
of the High Court may thus lack cogency. It is nevertheles
suggested that the sheriff-substitute was wrong in holding
that failure to maintain was not neglect; the relevant
English view seems preferable. The practical solution may
be for failure to maintain to be prosecuted under the
social security legislation. An example may be the case of
7 3
Wimbury. The newspaper report of that case does not
disclose under which statute the charge was brought but the
reference to "persistent failure to maintain" and the
receipt of a large sum in name of social security indicate
that the prosecutor was relying upon the social security
legislation. The facts of that case seem peculiarly
appropriate to such a charge.
7 4
11.23 There is another aspect of Henderson v Stewart.
The offence in section 12(1) of the 1937 Act comprises two
elements: wilful neglect and the likelihood of suffering or
injury. The sheriff-substitute, it is suggested, erred in
ignoring the likelihood of suffering, particularly for the
reason given by him. To substantiate this point, it should
be recalled that neglect implies an omission to do something
The statutory offence requires proof of the likelihood of
unnecessary suffering or injury to health. This element
comprises the consequences of the omission. So a mere
omission is clearly not enough. In this sense the need to
prove the likelihood of suffering or injury is a limiting
73 C1974] The Scotsman, 19 June.
74 1954 J.C. 94.
J y 6
7 5
factor. In Henderson v Stewart the sheriff-substitute
apparently regarded the "deeming" provision in section 12(2)(a)
of the 1937 Act as eliminating the need for proof of that
7 6
second requirement. That, it is suggested, is not so.
Section 12(2)(a) enacts that failure to provide adequate
food, clothing or lodging, in effect failure to maintain,
shall be equivalent to neglect in a manner likely to cause
injury to health. It should be emphasised that it is deemed
equivalent to neglect not to wilful neglect. It is the total
offence, less "wilful", which is equated with failure to
provide the necessaries. The issue in that case, it is
suggested, was not whether failure to make payments to the
wife amounted to the offence of neglect but whether failure
to make payments amounted to failure to provide food. Wilful
failure to provide food would constitute the offence of
7 7 7 8
neglect. The reports of _R. v Connor and _R. v Senior should
have been drawn to the attention of the sheriff-substitute.
7 9
R. v Senior was certainly mentioned by the members of the
e o
High Court. It is odd that R. v Connor did not form part
of their deliberations. It is also regrettable that the
succinct phraseology of the legislation seems to have
escaped the attention of the court. A closer scrutiny of
the provisions would probably have avoided some of these
difficulties and contributed more to achieving the object
of the legislation.
75 Idem. 76 Ibid, at p.96. 77 [1908] 2 K.B. 26.
78 [1899] 1 Q.B. 283.
79 Idem.
80 [1908] 2 K.B. 26.
326
Section 4 - Qther grounds for conviction.
11.24 Although section 1(1) of the 1933 Act has been
ei
regarded comprehensively, neglect has not in practice been
complicated or prejudiced by reference to other types of
62
criminal conduct under that section. In Williams a father
was charged with neglecting and exposing his children under
section 12 of the Children Act 1908. The charge of neglect
was discontinued, as there was sufficient evidence of
exposure. The father had taken his children out of a
workhouse and set off in bad weather on a journey of thirty
miles. He declined minimal lodging. There seems little
doubt that this was exposure. His contention in an
unsuccessful appeal from conviction was that there could be
63
no exposure without abandonment. This point was not fully
dealt with in the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeal.
The implication however was that exposure did not necessarily
imply abandonment. Darling J. relied partly upon the view
of the policy of the Act favoured by him, namely, "to
prevent unnecessary suffering." Unfortunately the concept
of exposure was not analysed by the court in depth. It is
however suggested that exposure and abandonment are distinct
concepts. They are not in any sense mutually interdependent.
81 R. v Hayles [1969] 1 A11E.R. 34: para. 11.13.
82 (1910) 4 Cr. App. Rep. 89.
83 (1910) 4 Cr. App. Rep. 89 at p.93 per Darling J.
84 Idem.
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A child probably can be exposed without being abandoned;
for example, by being left unattended for a relatively
short period. In any event there must be a presumption at
least in favour of two distinct concepts where Parliament
uses the words in close proximity. Otherwise the provision
would be partially otiose.
11.25 On the other hand there is no reason to suppose
that the same conduct could not constitute both exposure
and abandonment within the meaning of the 1933 Act. For
85
example, in Prowse the mother of an illegitimate girl aged
ten months was convicted for abandoning the child by leaving
her "in near freezing conditions in a disused chalk pit
after an evening's drinking." This probably also amounted
8 6
to exposure. The ordinary meaning of the word "exposure"
involves a negative aspect, leaving unprotected, particularly
from the weather; and a positive aspect, turning a person
out of doors. "Abandonment" involves the surrender or
relinquishment of the child. There are probably positive
and negative elements of that word just as in the meaning
of "exposure". For these reasons there are probably grounds
for concluding that there can be exposure without
abandonment and vice versa..
11.26 To secure a conviction under section 1(1) of
the 1933 Act it is essential to prove likelihood of
85 [1974] The Scotsman, 25 May.
86 O.E.D.
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unnecessary suffering or injury to health in addition to
proof of exposure or abandonment. This point attracted
the attention of the Court of Criminal Appeal in R. v
87
Whibley. The circumstances were odd. The accused appeared
in court with his five children in order to assist his
sister-in-law in the recovery of the care of her children.
The case was not heard and he walked out of the court,
leaving his children. The charge of abandonment under
section 1(1) of the 1933 Act succeeded in the trial court
but on appeal the conviction was quashed. The reason of
Branson J. was rather negative:-
"... it does appear to me that
it is wrong to say that, if
the circumstances are such that
a child is a little frightened,
or that there may be some
mental suffering caused by its
being left in such circumstances,
it is a case which can be
brought within this section
of the Act." 8 8
The essence of the decision seems to have been the absence
of any suffering or injury to health. A different decision
89
was reached in equally odd circumstances in Moffat. The
mother of two young children appearing at Glasgow Sheriff
Court admitted having abandoning them at a city social work
department office about one month earlier. Such a decision
lacks authority and it cannot be assumed from the newspaper
87 [1938] 3 A11E.R. 777.
88 Ibid, at p.778.
89 [1974] The Scotsman, 19 September.
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report that the charge was brought under the 1937 Act.
If it was a statutory offence, the decision must be regarded
at best as doubtful. There is thus no authoritative
pronouncement on what constitutes either abandonment or
9 o
exposure in this context.
11.27 There is nothing to take the analysis much further
even in the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeal in
9 1
Boulden. A mother left her family, telling her husband that
she was going to Scotland. Later the father telephoned the
N.S.P.C.C. to tell them that the five children were alone in
the house. It was afterwards discovered that the children
were alone in the house in darkness with only a small
quantity of food. The father had left. His conviction of
abandonment under section 1(1) of the 1933 Act was upheld
by the Court of Criminal Appeal. According to Gorman J.
the accused's intention was probably "to clear out, to
leave their children to their fate and to wipe his hands
9 2
clean of them." Abandonment was treated as leaving a child
90 The concept of neglect to maintain appears in social
security, formerly poor law, legislation. Although
abandonment did not appear in the poor law legislation,
the related concept of desertion was part of one of the
offences created by the Poor Law Amendment (Scotland) Act
1845, s.80: see Motion v McFa.ll (1899) 1 Fraser (J) 85,
Inspector of the Poor for Glasgow Parish v Reid (1909)
25 Sh. Ct. Rep. 217 and Wilson v Mannarn 1934 S.L.T. 353.
These cases did not examine "the concept of desertion;
they were concerned with technical matters of procedure
and the relationship between the obligation and the use
of public funds.
91 (1957) 41 Cr. App. Rep. 105.
92 Ibid, at p.110.
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to his fate. This would seem to be in accord with the
ordinary meaning of the word. It is similar in some respects
9 3
to the positive aspect of exposure. As with neglect, so
with exposure and abandonment the courts have complicated
what are probably reasonably straightforward issues. Closer
attention to the detailed statutory requirements would have
given greater effect to the policy of the legislation in
protecting children and at the same time simplified the law.
Section 5 - The persons liable to be affected by the legislation.
(a) The background.
11.28 So far this chapter has looked at the conduct
necessary to create criminal liability under the legislation.
The Act also identifies the range of persons to whom it
9 *4
applies. The welfare of the child is affected only indirectly
by this provision. The general principle is that criminal
liability under the Acts may relate to any one with actual
or potential parental responsibilities towards the child.
Statutory liability was created, of course, to overcome some
of the problems of the common law offences in relation to
9 5
children. The significance in appropriate circumstances
9 6
of such offences, particularly in Scotland, is in no way
abated by the enactment of these statutory liabilities.
9 3 Para. 11.25.
94 Children and Young Persons Act 1933, s.17; Children and




The interests of the child are thus protectable by statute
in proportion to the number of persons deemed to have
custody for the purposes of these provisions. This statutory
protection comprises a quantitative extension of parental and
quasi-parental duties and a corresponding limitation of
parental and quasi-parental rights.
11.29 Section 1(1) of the 1933 Act applies to "any
person who has attained the age of sixteen years and has
the custody, charge, or care of any child or young person
97
under that age." Custody is a concept which has an undoubted
9 8
but sometimes ambiguous and vague juridical connotation.
On the other hand charge or care are largely matters of fact
determinable in the circumstances of each case. Until 1973
9 9
custody would normally have been vested in the father of
the child or, where the father was dead or the child
illegitimate, in the mother. Such persons were clearly
among those to whom the provisions of section 1(1) of the
1933 Act applied. It would be important in practice to
ensure that such a person charged with a breach of section
1(1) was a person with custody. If the matter of custody
had been regulated judicially, ascertaining the custodial
party would not be a problem. But in either case it could
remain an important matter to identify who had charge or
97 Likewise 1937 Act, s.l2(l).
98 Despite the statutory explanation of concepts in the
Children Act 1975 (1975 c.72), ss.86, 87 and 107(2).
99 I.e. according to the "static" rules of custody.
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care of the child if it happened to be someone other than
the custodial parent. This has been no longer a real
problem, as between mother and father at least, since the
1
enactment of the Guardianship Act 1973 which has conferred
equal rights of custody upon each parent. There remains
the question of deciding who has charge or care of the child;
the Act provides minimal assistance in deciding this point.
11.30 These problems do not appear to be statistically
important in practice. Although no scientifically based
investigation has been done, a clear impression emerges from
an examination of a number of offences against children
reported in the newspapers over a period of two or three
years. The offences in question are set out in the Table,u378.
Not all the offences therein are statutory but the overall
pattern is clear. Almost all the offences were committed
by either the mother or father or both acting together. To
some extent the party charged is a reflection of the nature
of the offence. But that conclusion cannot be pressed too
far, for either the mother or father is capable of committing
any offence against their child. It must be emphasised that
these are mere random examples. They are claimed to establish
nothing except the indication that most offences against
children are committed by parents.
11.31 This conclusion probably causes no surprise. Few
people other than parents are caught by the Act, although
the small number of non-parents convicted under the Act
1 1973 c.29.
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probably justifies their inclusion. It would nevertheless
appear to be the intention of the legislature to make it
particularly difficult for parents to escape liability by
arguing that it does not apply to them. Such a view would
be entirely consistent with the policy of protecting the
welfare of children, particularly against their parents.
It would no doubt have been possible for these provisions
to have applied to anyone at all. That makes sense in the
case of assault, but not in relation to neglect. Neglect,
and possibly also abandonment and exposure, imply an existing
relationship between the child and the allegedly negligent
party. Unless every person is to come under a general
responsibility to each and every child in the community, a
proposition going beyond currently accepted concepts of
jurisprudence, the limits of responsibility must be defined.
The legislation purports to do precisely that. This is also
one of the areas of complexity for the common law. It
cannot be said therefore that the law in this area protects
children generally; it protects them only from certain
stated sources of identifiable risk and responsibility.
(b) The legislation.
11.32 Section 17 of the 1933 Act gives some assistance
in interpreting the words "custody, charge or care." It
would seem that that provision merely operates as a presumption;
2
nor is it exhaustive; in effect it is an amplification of
2 Liverpool Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to
Children v Jones L1914 J 3 K.B. 813.
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3
section 1(1). There is thus room for the normal meanings
of "custody, charge or care" to apply. The more important
part of the provision relates to custody
"Any person who is the parent or
legal guardian of a child or
young person or who is legally
liable to maintain him shall
be presumed to have the custody
of him, and as between father
and mother the father shall
not be deemed to have ceased
to have custody of him by
reason only that he has
deserted, or otherwise does
not reside with the mother and
child or young person."
The policy of this provision is clearly to ensure a static
and inalienable concept of custody by excluding a
consideration of the merits of the parental conduct. A
parent thus probably cannot be deprived of or forfeit his
right to custody for the purposes of section 1(1) of the
5
1933 Act. The concepts of "charge" and "care" are similarly
defined.
11.33 Section 17 of the 1933 Act was analysed by
6
Lord Hewart C.J. in Brooks v Blount
3 Ibid, at p. 816 per Lord Coleridge J.; Brooks v Blount
ri923] 1 K.B. 257 at p. 263 per Lord Hewart C.J.
4 Children and Young Persons Act 1933, s.17; Children and
Young Persons (Scotland) Act 1937, s.27.
5 Cf. judicial deprivation of custody.
6 [1923] 1 K.B. 257.
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"... there is ... a scale of persons
in a descending degree of importance,
and there is a presumption with
regard to each of them. There are
persons who because of their blood
relationship or legal positions are
presumed to have the custody of a
child. There are persons who have
the charge of a child and are
presumed to have the charge because
the child has been committed to
them by the person having the
custody of the child. Finally
there are the persons who de
facto have the care of the child.
Before a person can be convicted
under s.12 of the wilful neglect
of a child it is necessary to
show that he is a person of the
kind against which s.12 is directed
and that he has committed an
act to which s.12 refers."7
The presumption is thus founded upon an actual relationship,
parentage, or upon a legal relationship, guardianship or
liability to maintain. The traditional and statutory
concepts of custody are thus cast aside by this provision.
It would seem that parents are most likely to commit offences
against their children and by providing in effect an
inalienable concept of custody section 17 directs the
attention of section 1(1) against those most dangerous
to children. The welfare of children is to that extent
more likely to be protected. A straightforward construction
of the provisions of section 17 in relation to section 1(1)
achieves this effect.
11.34 The achievement of that objective depends upon
two propositions of fundamental significance. Custody
7 Ibid. at pp. 263 and 264.
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"imposed" by the presumption in section 17 cannot be
avoided. Normally custody is now regarded as a "right"
inhering in a parent. The second is that, far from simply
being a right, custody in terms of sections 1 and 17
acquires the nature of a "duty". This is a particularly
interesting development of the law. Custody emerged as a
right from the early duty of a parent as guardian to "care"
for the child. The ensuing emphasis on "right" is now
8
giving way again to statutory notions of "duty".
9
11.35 In R. v Connor, a case under the Prevention of
Cruelty to Children Act 1904 which did not contain a
provision like section 17, the means provided by a father
for his children were inadequate. He left and the family
survived only by virtue of the benevolence of an aunt.
Lord Alverstone C.J. rejected the argument that the father
did not have custody of the children for the purposes of
the Act:-
"Can it be seriously contended that
the parent in the present case had
not the custody of the children?
If the contention were upheld,
it would follow that the prisoner,
by living where he ought not to
live, could get rid of the
custody of his child."10
Thus a parent by living apart could not thereby divest
himself of the custody of his child so as to free himself
8 Chapter 2. 9 [1908] 2 K.B. 26.
10 Ibid, at p.31.
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from criminal liability under section 1(1) of the 1933
Act. If, while apart, he wilfully neglected his child as
contemplated by section 1(1), he would be guilty of an
offence.
11.36 The father in that case was the person actually
responsible for the neglect of the child. In Poole v
i I
Stokes the father, who was not in that sense culpable, was
also guilty of the offence of wilful neglect. The parents
had agreed to live apart; the wife had charge of the
children. A sum was paid by the father to his wife regularly.
This was sufficient for the maintenance of herself and the
children. The mother however failed to provide proper food
and clothing for them. The father knew of the wife's neglect
and several times had complained to the N.S.P.C.C. Both were
charged but only the mother was convicted by the justices.
The Divisional Court on appeal held that the father also
I 2
should have been convicted. Channell J. argued that paternal
delegation of the parental functions to the mother did not
allow the father to escape from his responsibilities breach
of which amounted to an offence under section 1(1) of the
1933 Act. Intimating his wife's deficiencies to the N.S.P.C.C.
similarly failed to exempt him from liability. Nothing
therefore enabled him to avoid his ultimate responsibility.
This conclusion was based firmly upon a literal interpretation
of the statutory presumption:-
11 [1914-15]A11E.R. Rep. 1083.
12 Ibid, at p. 1085.
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"There was nothing, so far as we
can see, to prevent him from
taking his children away from
his wife. Section 12(1) of
the Act says that a parent
who is legally liable to
maintain a child shall be
deemed to have neglected him
if he fails to provide
adequate food, clothing and
so forth. I understand that
to mean that he is to be
punished as if he were guilty,
although there may be no
moral blame attaching to him."13
i k
A similar approach was adopted in Brooks v Blount. Salter
J. went further than was probably necessary for his decision.
He took the doctrine of the inalienability of custody to
its extreme limit by asking the question when may a parent
not be regarded as having custody. Referring to section 38(2)
1 5
of the 1908 Act, he argued:-
"These are presumptions of law.
I think that the person who
has the custody of a child
cannot be heard to say that
he has not the custody of
the child unless he is
deprived of the custody by
the order of a competent
court. A person to whom
has been committed the charge
of a child by the person
having the custody of the
child cannot be heard to
deny that he has the charge
of the child, and a person
who has actual possession or
control of a child cannot
be heard to say that he has
not the care of the child."1 6
13 Ibid, at pp. 1085 and 1086.
14 [1923] 1 K.B. 257.
15 The equivalent of the 1933 Act, s.17.
16 [1923] 1 K.B. 257 at p.267.
3 39
11.37 This concept of the inalienability of custody
17
has also been accepted by the Scottish courts in relation
to the identical legislation which applies in Scotland. The
1 8
same approach has been adopted in England in relation to the
common law offences analogous to wilful neglect and the
other grounds in section 1(1) of the 1933 Act. This has
been achieved largely by applying to the common law offences,
often manslaughter, the same presumptions which apply to
the statutory offences, although technically, it must be
conceded, the statutory provisions do not apply. There is
therefore something in the nature of a technical hiatus in
relation to the non-statutory offences.
Section 6 - Conclusion.
11.38 This analysis shows clearly two important aspects
of the statutory protection of the objective welfare of the
child. A concise and literal interpretation of section 1(1)
of the 1933 Act and its antecedents and equivalents directly
protects the welfare of children and such welfare is protected
by an objectively prescribed standard of behaviour on the
part of those most likely to damage or injure the integrity
of the children. There are certain qualifications. From
time to time, for example, the courts have regard to
legislative policy in solving certain interpretational
difficulties. Moreover the sanction imposed by the statutes
analysed is criminal. It thus operates retrospectively in
17 Henderson v Stewart 1954 J.C. 94.
18 R. v Watson and Watson (1959) 43 Cr. App. Rep. 111.
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the individual case by imposing a penalty upon defaulting
parents. By then it may be too late to save the child from
injury. In the general case it operates prospectively as a
preventive measure only as a deterrent. It has not been
effective in preventing all criminal abuse of children.
Hence Parliament has increasingly intervened with other
1 9
solutions. The statute does not apply to every species
of conduct likely to affect children or to every person
2 o
likely to behave detrimentally towards children. Nor is it
likely that such all-embracing legislation could, and
perhaps even should, be enacted. The common law fills some
2 1
of these gaps. It would nevertheless be unwise to claim
that the common law and statute law between them cover every
eventuality. These rules go some way to protecting the
welfare of children. Without them the law would be less
effective.
19 Part 5.
20 This is an example of the proposition that statutory






Section 1 - Introduction
12.1 Although section 1(1) of the Children and Young
Persons Act 1933 and its equivalents and antecedents are
probably the nost important provisions protecting the welfare
of children through the medium of the criminal law, there are
a number of other relevant criminal provisions. Several are
set out in Part 1 of Table I. Many statutory offences of
general application also protect the welfare of children just
i
as they safeguard the interests of the population generally.
This analysis is not concerned with then.
12.2 Most of the examples in Part 1 of Table I have
an immediate impact upon the welfare of the child. Others
on the other hand affect the children in a more oblique
manner. Some rest upon the assumption that the welfare of
the child is best protected by contact with the child's
parents. It would therefore follow that protection of the
parents' rights automatically safeguards the welfare of
their children. Most static rules of law governing the
parent-child relationship are probably an exegesis of that
presumption, but when the law operates dynamically, some of
these presumptions and concepts become arguably irrelevant,
1 E.g. Race Relations Act 1005 (10 5 5 c.73) ; Firearms Act
19 6 5 (19 6 5 c.44) ; Dangerous Drugs Act 196 5 (15 6 5 c.15);
Heights and Measures Act 1963 (1563 c.31).
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certainly less significant. Sectiois 55 and 5 0 of the
2
Offences against the Person Act 1801 and sections 10(1) and
3
20(1) of the Sexual Offences Act 1C5C , for example, enforce
parental rights, thereby obliquely protecting the welfare of
the child. They' proscribe the removal of the child from her
<♦
parents for non-sexual as well as sexual purposes.
12.3 The criminal offences set out in Part 1 of
Table I affect differing aspects of the welfare of the
child. Sevan classifies these provisions as protecting the
physical well-being of the child, the child's moral welfare
5
and both. Such a classification discounts the emotional and
psychological integrity of the child. This may be a factor
too 'tenuous to isolate easily but it is one of increasing
6
significance where there is an element of discretion. This
conclusion is nevertheless probably inevitable in view of the
conciseness of the criminal legislation compared with the
greater flexibility of the functional approach where it is
open to exercise a statutory discretion.
12.4 Many of the provisions creating criminal offences
are couched in fairly complex, although concise, terms. Most
of the issues likely to arise in connection with such offences
will probably be questions of fact. Legal problems admittedly
may arise, particularly in determining the extent and
application of the legislation: in other words, problems of
interpretation. They will of course affect the welfare of the
2 This applies only in England. 3 T^is^algo applies only in
4 This protection is normally afforded only to the girl:
Bevan , p. 2 3 2 .
5 Sevan, p. 175, 6 b-C- i-n custodial disputes.
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child, simply because the statute affects children. But
these legal problems v/ill not involve the role or substance
of welfare as such. The most likely candidates for legal
problems of this type are the Offences against the Person
7 8
Act 1361 and the Sexual Offences Act 1356, for example,
9
questions of age, the legal quality of the sexual intercourse
l o
in connection with certain offences, questions of possession
i l
and cnarge or care of the child.
Section 2 - Abandonment and Exposure.
.. - —— .... ... -
12.5 Most of the offences in Part 1 of Table I have
been subjected to relatively less judicial scrutiny than
section 1(1) of the Children and Young Persons Act 1033.
An examination of the authorities nevertheless indicates how
they operate in practice. Section 27 of the Offences against
the Person Act 1361 prohibits unlawfully abandoning or
exposing any child, being under the age of two years, whereby
the life of such child shall be endangered, or the health of
such child shall have been or shall be likely to be permanent1
injured. Although these requirements are more onerous than
those of section 1 of the 1933 Act, there is a clear affinity
between this provision and the grounds of abandonment and
i 3
exposure m section 1 of the 1933 Act. In R. v FaIkIngham,
7 24 8 25 Vict., c.100. 8 14 5 5, Eliz. 2, c.69.
9 Sevan, p.223; he points out that the defendant's belief
about the girl's age being no defence is consistent with
the policy of protection underlying the Act. The rule
that the girl's consent is no defence is also consistent
with that policy.
10 R. v Chapman [1959] 1 Q.B. 100 where it was held that
'""unlawful" Tn the Sexual Offences Act 1956, s.19 amounted
to "extra-marital" intercourse; see also Watson (1885)
5 Couper 6 37. """"""
11 Sevan, pp.223 to 230. 12 (1870) L.R. 1 C.C.R. 222.
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for example, it way held that the action of a mother- and
another who as sir. ted her amounted to abandonment under
section 27 of the 1861 Act. A very young child had been
placed in a hamper and sent by train to the residence of
the putative father. The child was found to be alive and
unharmed on delivery to the father's address twenty-five
minutes after the half-hour train journey.
1 3
12.6 The issue in R. v White was even clearer. The
mother brought her child and left him outside the house of
the father from whom sine was separated. She called out:
"Bill, here's your child; I can't keep it. I am gone."
The father later came out, stepped over the child and went
away. His attention was again drawn twice to the presence
of the child: he ignored him. The' police later found the
boy, cold and stiff; he was later revived. The Court of
Criminal Appeal confirmed that the father was guilty of
both abandonment and exposure contrary to section 27 of the
1861 Act. Little attention was paid to the concept of
abandonment or exposure. Presumably it was clear beyond
argument that the conduct could be so described.
i i.
12.7 In any event the decisions in R. v Falkingham
1 5
and R. v White are conceptually consistent with the criteria
discussed in relation to abandonment and exposure under
16 17
section 1(1) of the 1933 Act. In R. v White the court was
13 (1871) L.R. 1 C.C.R. 311. 14 (1870) L.R. 1 C.C.R. 222.
15 (1071) L.R. 1 C.C.R. 311. 16 Paras. 11.24 to 11.27.
17 (1871) L.R. 1 C.C.R. 311.
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concerned with the proximity of the relationship between the
father and the child. Section 27 of pbc 10R1 Act does riot-
stipulate who nay be liable: it therefore applies
indiscriminately. Nevertheless the judicial view on the
application of the provision is consistent with what later
became the presumption contained in section 17 of the 1933
l e
Act. Martin 3. at first thought the statute could only
apply to persons who had had the "actual custody and
possession"of the child. But he went on:-
"But the prisoner here was the
father of the child, entitled to
its custody and loyally bound
to its protection. I do not
differ "from the rest of the
Court."
The link between child and offender is thus liability to
protect. Blackburn J. however seemed to rely also on the
parent-child relationship as such:-
"brnen the child is left in a
position of danger of which
he [the father] knows, and
from which lie lias full power
to remove it, and lie neglects
.lis duty of protection, and
lets the child remain in danger,
I think this is an exposure and
abandonment by him."
Knowledge of danger was a factor, but it was relevant for
Blackburn J. only in the parent-child relationship. The
significant aspect, positively adverted to by Martin B., is
13 Paras. 11.32 to 11.37.
19 (1871) L.R. 1 C.C.R. 311 at p.314.
20 Ibid, at p.314.
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that these interpretation:.; give effect to the natural meaning
of the relevant words. There was no reliance- upon aids to
interpretation. The legislation was appropriate in the norma
way to achieve the protection, albeit retrospectively, of the
child.
Section 3 - Children in licensed nremises.
- i . ■ .r . . , ■ —— i ..
12.8 An even stronger instance of an effective and
2 1
literal interpretation may be found in Donaghue v Hclntyre.
The holder of a licence for the sale of liquor was charged
under section 120(1) of the Children Act 1908 with permitting
a child to be in the bar of the licensed premises. It was
held that the partitioned box in which the children were
situated did not form part of the licensed premises. So
far as Sir J.II.A. Macdonald L.J.-C. was concerned, the purpos
of the Act was perfectly synonymous with the language used:-
"I need hardly say that a judge has
no power to extend the application
of an Act of Parliament, even if he
thinks it is unsuccessful as it
stands ; but in the present case
I do not think the judge's opinion
is well founded. The purpose of
the Act is to prevent children
being brought into contact with
people who frequent the bar and with
what is called the atmosphere of
the bar of the premises, and
here that purpose was effected,
for the children were not",
in my opinion, taken into a.
place which was within the
atmosphere of the bar, and were
not taken to a place which was
in any true sense the bar at all."22
21 1911 S.C. (J.) 61.
22 1911 S.C. (J.) 61 at p.66.
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If, arguably, the purpose of the provision had been to avoid
the presence of children in such premises not only within but
also adjacent to the bar, then a strict interpretation would
not have achieved such a purpose. Probably the provision
in question was intended to protect the moral rather than the
physical welfare of the child. Moral welfare is rather
flexible in cr itent; perhaps the provision should be
interpreted in a similarly flexible manner. Much thus
depends upon the policy of the Act and how it may be
identified and defined; a problem already discussed in
2 3
relation to this case.
Section 4 - Death of the child.
12.9 One of the more difficult branches of law
affecting children and thus the welfare of children is
homicide or more correctly the deliberate or reckless
2 »•
killing of a child. It seems to be true for both England
2 5
and Scotland that the prosecution in the past was faced
with considerable difficulties in proving for common law
purposes what happened at and around the time of birth,
2 6
including proof of the child's independent existence. The
deaths of older children attracted somewhat different
23 Para. 8.22.
2 4 Bevan, pp.176 to 179 and 18 5 to 18 8.
25 Gordon, p.753; Hume, Commentaries, 1.291.
26 H.M.A. v McAllum (1858) 3 Irvine 187.
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problems. Statute has thus intervened in both jurisdictions
to simplify the issues triable in relation to the peri—natal
death of children. The offence of concealment of birth was
2 P
created for England in 1623 and is now to be found in section
60 of the Offences against the Person Act 1861. Concealment
2 9
of pregnancy in Scotland originated in the Act of 1690 and




12.10 According to Cordon, the essence of the Scottish
offence comprises a failure to reveal the birth. The practice
apparently is to treat anv potential offender sympathetically
This
represents a narrowly strict, if not a restrictive,
.g. an allegation oi nurucr nrougnt auout by oxuosu
as irrelevant: "I.E. A. v Kerr (1869 ) 3 Irvine 6 27 a
9 j : nut aii allegation of murder tnriu'~n stnhm^ 6
niid' s head Oil t.ie wall or floor was competent :
•■j J.
o o
v Craig ( 136 2 ) 9 Irvine 139. The creation of statu"!
offences by virtue of the Children and Young Persons Act
1033 s.l and the Children and Young Persons (Scotland)
Act 1937 s.12 has made homicide by omission easier to
sustain: see Bevan, pp.185 to 188; Kennv, p.17: P. v
Church [1966] 1 Q.B. 59. Cf. R. v Lowe [1973] i'aiIE.R.
o g c
21 Jac. 1, c.27.
28 Act anent murdering of children passed in the second
session of the first Parliament of Mary and Lillian, c.50.
33 43 Geo. 3, c.14.Hume, Commentaries, 1.293 regarded the
1309 Act as substituting a presumption of culpable
homicide for the presumption of murder contained in
the 1690 Act.
31 Gordon, p.753.
32 E.g. a letter subsequently destroyed: H.M.A.v Gall (1356)
2 Irvine 366.
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interpretation of the Act, in accordance v.ith the doctrine
3 3
of strict interpretation op pencil otutuLo:. it -J an
interpretation not wholly consistent with the doctrine of
the welfare of the child.
12.11 Aiie offence of cpjiceali.ient of birth in- England
3 4
has since its enactment heon suyportcu ny lurtutr i.cpxslatcon 3
3 5
namely the Infant Life (Preservation) Act 1322 and the
3 6
Infanticide .let ln33. Concealment of birth is concerned
with peri-natal death. On the other hand, infant life
Jy1'0 3 G jT* V ci L lOi i (or child destruction), which has an affinity
with abortion, is concerned with ante-natal "death"; and
infanticide .vita post-natal death. In England therefore all
three possible sets of circumstances are covered by legislation.
The various Acts define the offences fairly comprehensively;
any problems arising .are likely to be factual. The courts
have rarely had an opportunity to analyse the legal
intricacies of these statutory provisions.
12.12 Once the birth of the child and thus his existence
have been established, the way may be open to apply the
33 Gordon, pp. 753 to 7 5Gh
34 Partly because of the narrow nature of the statutory
provisions; Bevan, p.185; Kenny, pp. 133 and 139.
35 19 8 20 Geo. 5, c.34. Generally, see Bevan, pp. 133
and 134 and Kenny, p. 183.
36 152 Geo. 6, c.36. Generally, see Bevan, pp. 184
and 185 and Kenny, pp. 187 and 188.
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3 7
nor.ua 1 law of homicide. On the other hand, there may be
considerable argument about 'whether and to what extent a child
may be said to exist before birth for the purpose of the
legal protection of his welfare, assuming always that there
is a relevant aspect of 'welfare to be protected. Child
destruction, which should be considered along with abortion,
may be legitimate if the act causing death was done in good
faith for tlic purpose only of preserving the life of the
mother. Assuming that an embryo has an existence whose
welfare may be protected, such a provision introduces a
second interest which must be taken into account. The same
is true of abortion.
Section 5 - Abortion.
3 8
12.13 The Abortion Act 1967 has been superimposed upon
3 9
the common law offence of abortion in Scotland and upon
9 o
section 58 of the Offences against the Person Act 18G1 in
England. These offences protect the embryo only, subject
9 1
to the doctrine of necessity postulated in R. v Bourne, at
least for England. The 136 7 Act lias forced the recognition
of further interests. The existence of the crime of abortion
37 E.g. T*. M.A. v Scott (1392 ) 19 Rettie' (j.) 63 where a woman
was charged witn culpable homicide of the child soon after
delivery. Alternatively, she was charged with refraining
"from calling for assistance when the time of her being
delivered had arrived, in consequence whereof the child
died." Lord Young at pp.64 and 65 declined to hold that
the alternative charge was recognised by the common law
although such circumstances could if proved amount to
culpable homicide.
38 1967 c.87. 39 Gordon pp. 757 to 758.
40 As amended by the Criminal Justice Act 1943 (11 £ 12, Geo 6,
s.l. for the history of abortion lav; in England, see c. 58)
Sevan, pp. 179 and 180: see also Kenny, pp. 189 and 190.
41 [1939] 1 K.B. 637.
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itself would seen to project the mental and physical integrity
of the unborn child so that eventually that child will have
the benefit of all the other legal advantages conferred upon
children and ultimately adults. The introduction of lawful
termination of pregnancy would seem to some extent to cut
across that principle. By doing so, the legislature has
probably reached a social judgment which attributes ^reat^r
weight to the protection of interests other than those of
the unborn child. On the other hand, an unwanted child, a
potential candidate for abortion, may be at an extreme
<♦ 2
disadvantage after he has been born. In a sense therefore
it may be of advantage to an unwanted child not to be born at
all. Tills is an extreme hypothesis which is probably beyond
proof or disproof. It indicates, however, even on a purely
hypothetical plane, that there may be a variety of interests
relevant to the question of abortion.
12.14 Of the two relevant statutory grounds of lawful
termination, one permits abortion if there is a substantial
risl: that if tine child were born it would suffer from
such physical or mental abnormalities as to be seriously
4 3
handicapped. This is an application to abortion of the
welfare principle in the following sense. The original
offence of abortion probably amounted to no more than
conferring upon the unborn child a right to life of
42 See a letter to the Times dated 23 March 1972 from
Professor f-lanville u'illiams citing the study of
Forssaan and Thuwe in 196G.
4 3 Abortion Act 13 6 7 , s.1(1)(b).
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unprescribed quality; or, in welfare terms, it merely
recognised that the welfare of the child favoured life
rather than the absence of life. Section 1(1)(b) of the
1967 Act introduced a qualitative dimension to this principle.
It is better for the unborn child to be born alive: but if
the child were to suffer from serious physical or mental
handicaps, the welfare test would point to the alternative
conclusion that it would be better for the child not to
survive. There are thus two dimensions of welfare for
consideration: one largely a matter of principle; the other
essentially a matter of fact. Prognosis of the likely
condition of a child after birth is unquestionably a difficult
matter. The decision is conferred by the Act upon two
4 4
registered medical practitioners; it is difficult to see
how the courts could become substantially involved in sucii
4 5
a matter.
12.15 The other ground of lawful termination of pregnancy,
set out in section 1(1)(a) of the 1967 Act, introduced not
an extended notion of welfare but rather a new welfare-interest
protected by the offence of abortion. Paragraph (a) allows
abortion if the continuance of the pregnancy would involve
risk of injury to the physical or mental health of any
existing children of the family of the pregnant woman greater
than if the pregnancy were not terminated. The child whose
44 Abortion Act 1967, s.l(l).
45 See also Bevan, p. 132.
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health is thus protected is not the unborn child in utero
but any other existing child of the mother. The welfare
of the unborn child, including its life, thus depends to
some extent upon the welfare of another child, normally a
4 6
sibling. As in the case of the other ground, the substantive
47
decision is effectively given to two medical practitioners.
No doubt it would be a medical decision of extreme delicacy
with which the courts are again unlikely to interfere on
the merits.
12.16 The scope of that ground of termination of pregnancy
is determined to some extent by the meaning of "any existing
4 8
children of her family." Bevan has drawn attention to the
problems of interpreting that phrase. It is probably a
mixed issue of fact and law. He has called for a wide
construction of the provision. In the event of ambiguity,
there are, of course, strong arguments favouring such a
construction and Sevan has put forward the novel suggestion
that the test of the relationship should be the child's
4 9
dependence on the woman, not the age of the child. This
stresses the "family" aspect of the relationship, which is
not one normally afforded much weight by the courts in this
context. The 1967 Act thus illustrates in an unusual way
how the interests of children may be recognised and
protected by statute.
46 But probably not necessarily so.
47 Abortion Act 1967, s. 1(1).
48 Bevan, n. 182.
49 Bevan, p. 183.
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CHAPTER 13
THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE COMMON LAW
Section 1 - Introduction
13.1 Section 1 of the Children and Young Persons Act
19331 was introduced to overcome some of the problems of the
common law. To some extent the statutory provisions complement
the common law2. The 1933 Act does not, however, replace the
common law offences and there is no doubt that the common law
has a role to play in the protection of the well-being,
particularly in the physical sense, of children in a way very
similar to the criminal offences created by statute. This
part3 as a whole deals especially with the way in which Acts of
Parliament protect and promote welfare. This chapter in
particular deals with analogous common law approaches. No
apology is made for switching the emphasis away from enacted
law, for to ignore the common law aspect would be a serious
defect in the overall analysis. It is convenient to look at
the common law now.
13.2 The Table on page 378 was designed to illustrate the
rather narrow range of persons guilty of, or at least charged
with, offences against children. It also demonstrates a number
of other points. Part B of that Table, for example, shows
that culpable homicide and manslaughter are not uncommon.
1 23 £ 24 Geo. 5, c.12. More correctly, the changes were
made by the provisions from which section 1 was derived.
2 Bevan, p.186; Kenny, p.17.
3 I.e. chapters 11 to 13.
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They probably attract rio special difficulty when the victim
is clearly beyond the stage of newly-born. Death of the
child may, of course, occur even where the charge is a non-
homicidal offence. Moreover Part A of the Table clearly
5
suggests that non-statutory offences, particularly assault
6
and causing grievous bodily harm, are often committed against
children. The unsubstantiated impression is that the prosecutors
in England rely on the common law more than their Scottish
counterparts. This is perhaps surprising in view of the more
imaginative approach of the Scottish judiciary during the
7
nineteenth century. An analysis of the Scottish common law
is not merely of antiquarian interest, for it demonstrates the
fundamental similarity of approach of both common law and
statute law in Scotland.
13.3 Even before the intervention of statute the law
was able in certain circumstances to protect the interests of
children; admittedly the circumstances were probably more
restricted than those contemplated by statute, especially in
England. In the case of acts of commission there could be
little difficulty in relation to children whose formal existence
was not in doubt. Allegations founded upon acts of omission
i+ E.g. R. v Watson and Watson (1959) 43 Cr. App. Rep. Ill;
R. v Lowe [19 7 3 J 1 A11E.R. 805 ; Horwood [19 71] The
Scotsman, 19 March and 6 April; Macaulay [1971] The Times,
2 June. There are many other examples.
5 E.g. Murray [1972] Edinburgh Evening News, 30 March;
Simpson L1974] The Scotsman, 21 August.
6 E.g. Drewery [1974] The Times, 25 April; Chand [1974]




could cause problems. But even the common law of England
recognised the offence of parental failure to provide for
his child. For example, any person failing to implement the
duty resting upon him to supply the child with food and
clothing so that the child died could well be guilty of murder
8
or manslaughter. Current practice on the other hand would
seem to suggest charging such offences as neglect or some
other ground under the 1933 Act, even where death of the child
results. Breach of the statutory duty may equally be an
element in the foundation of a possible charge of homicide
9
in the event of death. The validity of these common law
procedures cannot be questioned.
13.4 Common law assault was also a weapon in the armoury
of the nineteenth century English prosecutors. Thus putting a
1 o
child in a bag and leaving it hanging on palings or exposing a
i i
child to the inclemency of the weather were treated as assault.
But the absence of inconvenience or injury would probably avoid
1 2
that consequence. Leaving a child in a dark room but without
1 3
shutting him in would not be assault, although the view has
l ^
been expressed that it might be neglect or ill-treatment.
Most modern examples of assault or causing bodily harm do not
attract these difficulties; they are usually cases of
i s
fractured limbs or skulls, broken ribs, bruises or burns. In
8 R. v Bubb; R. v Hook (1850) 4 Cox C.C. 4 55; Bevan, pp.
175 and 176; Kenny, p.132.
9 Bevan , p.186.
10 R. v March (1844) 1 Carrington £ Kirwan 496.
11 R. v Ridley (1811) 2 Campbell 650.
12 R- v Kershaw (1847) 2 Cox C.C. 285.
13 K. v Smith Tl826) 2 Carrington £ Payne 449.
14 (Tlark Hall S Morrison, p. 14.
15 E.g. Cooke [1974] Daily Telegraph, 12 July; Chand [1974]
The Times, 13 June; Smith [1974] The Times, lT~Tune;
Panchkowre_e [1974] Thi-Times, 20 July; Johnson [1974]
The Times, 8 November.
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such cases the problems are not legal, rather factual; not
1 6
interpretation, rather causation. Bevan, nevertheless, takes
17
the view that the common law authorities are now weak. That
may be so, but they have a part to play particularly in the
more straightforward acts of commission. The more problematical
cases, including neglect, are thus more likely to be dealt
with under the legislation.
13.5 The pattern for Scotland is fundamentally similar.
The information in the Table suggests that murder is very
1 8
rare, but culpable homicide not uncommon. On two occasions
where death resulted, the conduct, although charged as murder
and culpable homicide, was founded upon neglect through failure
to provide medical aid and the other necessaries of life. On
1 9
the other hand there are some instances of statutory neglect
causing death where the prosecutor was content to allege a
breach of section 12 of the Children and Young Persons (Scotland)
2 0
Act 1937. As in England, so in Scotland ordinary assault
2 1
involves simply physical violence. There is therefore no
reason to suggest that the general criminal law plays no part
in protecting the welfare of children.
16 E.g. Marsh and another v Hodgson [1974] Crim. L.R. 35.
17 Bevan, p.176. See also Gordon, p.813.
18 Findlay [1971] The Scotsman, 3 April; Lockhart [1974] The
Scotsman, 9 May.
Macaulay [1971] The Times, 2 June; Barrie [1971] The Times
30 June. Cf. the nineteenth century approach when culpable
homicide would also be charged if death ensued from
statutory neglect; see H.M.A. v Kemp and Kemp (1891) 3
White 17 and H.M.A. v Fraser (190H 8 S.L.T. 416.
20 1 Edw.8 g 1 Geo. 6, c.36.
21 Murray [1972] Edinburgh Evening News, 30 March; Jackson
L1974J The Scotsman, 8 March; Hislop [1974] The Scotsman,
24 September.
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13.6 Section 1 of the 1933 Act and section 12 of the
1937 Act apply to children under sixteen years of age who are
the objects or victims of the offence. The general criminal
law necessarily applies to anyone the object of the offence.
The statutory offences are thus limited by the terms of the
enacting provisions, whereas the approach of the common law
in that respect is more flexible. One of the problems is
that while statute has defined what groups or classes of
persons may be subject to the offence, the common law tends
to apply more restrictively to any responsible person who
2 2
has assumed the care of an incapax. The common law of
England does not seem to have evolved many offences peculiarly
related to children and their parents. The Scottish system on
the other hand contains evidence of an imaginative approach,
at least during the nineteenth century. It shows, at that
2 3
stage, little of the paralysis which seems to have overcome
the law of England. This may be one reason why Parliament has
intervened less in the criminal law of Scotland than in that
of England. Too much however should not be claimed for the
law of Scotland. There is plenty evidence of its difficulties.
22 Bevan, p. 175.
23 Bevan, pp. 176 and 177, where the original difficulties
of providing that the neglect caused the death of the
child or that the injury suffered was serious are
canvassed.
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13.7 The distinctive feature of the Scottish system
is that the fundamental criminality of the conduct is of more
importance than the nomen criminis. Whether the conduct is
described as cruel and unnatural treatment, wilful neglect,
confinement and imprisonment, exposure, desertion or
endangering life, it operates to protect the child's well-being.
It does so directly. But, just as in the case of the statutory
protection of welfare, so the common law in Scotland protects
the welfare of children by relying partially on the assumption
that the exercise of parental rights by parents normally
operates for the benefit of the children. This is tantamount
to implying that the protection of parental rights equates
with the protection of welfare of the children; consider,
2 '»
for example, abduction or plagium. In this case welfare is
protected obliquely rather than directly.
Section 2 - Cruel and unnatural treatment.
13.8 A broad approach to the criminality of conduct
towards children may be demonstrated by reference to several
2 5
cases. In H.M.A. v McGavin a stepmother was charged with
murder, culpable homicide, and cruel and unnatural treatment
of a young child in her lawful custody. The conduct libelled
habitual exposure to the cold and withholding food and clothing.
The quality of such conduct as amounting to cruel and
unnatural treatment was questioned. The High Court of
24 Paras. 13.21 S 13.22.
25 (1846) Arkley 67.
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of Justiciary looked broadly at the issue, regarded the crime
as "barbarous" and sentenced the offender to transportation for
2 6
seven years. The issue in H.M.A. v Mcintosh was much the same.
The child's paid foster mother was charged with culpable
homicide, culpable wilful neglect and bad treatment. The element
of "bad treatment" was questioned. It was held that the
gravamen of the charge was neglect to supply wholesome and
sufficient food and clothing. There were sufficient facts
alleged to sustain the relevence of the charge. In H.M.A. v
27
Craw exception was taken to the relevance of the charge of
assault, cruel and unnatural treatment, and culpable and
wilful neglect, largely because "nothing could be more
dangerous than to violate the privacy of families, for the
purpose of enforcing by penal sanctions the performance of
parental duties." This attempt to keep the law out of the
domestic regime almost summarily failed.
13.9 One of the features of these cases is the
multiplicity of charges. If the child died, a charge of
culpable homicide or murder could be added. This could happen
2 e
even in the case of statutory neglect or ill-treatment. The
High Court of Justiciary avoided any involved analytical
consideration of the various offences. The nature of the
offences is thus deducible only from the facts of each case.
26 (1881) 8 Rettie (J.) 13.
27 (1839) 2 Swinton 449.
28 See H.M.A. v Kemp and Kemp (1891) 3 White 17; H.M.A. v
Fraser (1901) 8 S.L.T. 416. *
db±
2 9
In H. M. A. v Craw the cruel and unnatural treatment alleged
by the prosecution comprised beating the child with a stick
or fist and plunging the child into a barrel of cold water in
cold weather. The child's arm was broken; two teeth stuck
out; the body was covered with ulcers and sores. The treatment
meted out to the child is probably required to be unnatural
3 o
as well as cruel. In these circumstances it would be difficult
3 1
to deny that such conduct amounted to cruelty.
13.10 The meaning of "unnatural", on the other hand,
may create more difficulties. Probably it means conduct
3 2
which would not be expected of a normal person. In that
event "unnatural" and "cruel" are not synonymous but closely
3 3
related. In H.M.A. v Gemmell the conduct complained of
involved confining the child in a loft or closet, with the door
locked, for two months. Failure to provide clothing, food,
medical supplies and assault by beating with fists or sticks
were also charged; they were not, at least on the face of it,
related to cruel and unnatural treatment. The charge in H.M.A.
3 9
v McGavin included beating and striking the child with hands,
brooms and switches, habitually exposing her to cold and
withholding food and clothing. There was no allegation of
3 5
neglect in that case. But in H.M.A. v Mcintosh neglect was
included. The cruel and unnatural treatment probably comprised
29 (1839) 2 Swinton 449.
30 All the charges refer to "cruel and•unnatural treatment".
31 Applying the normal meaning of the word.
32 Paraphrasing the meaning in the O.E.D.
33 (1841) 2 Swinton 552. 34 (1846) Arkley 67.
35 (1881) 8 Rettie (J.) 13.
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feeding the child with improper and deleterious food and
keeping her dirty, damp and cold. The common factor in these
cases appears to be the fairly extreme character of the conduct
of the alleged offenders.
13.11 The court also tended to avoid any analytical
arguments about those owing a duty towards these children.
Probably any person in fact responsible for and having the
care of the child and so in practice answerable for what
happened would be held legally liable, however remote or
3 5
absent any relationship with the child. These cases tended
to emphasise positive misconduct on the part of the accused
rather than elements of neglect, thus reducing the importance
of the relationship between offender and victim. The Scottish
courts thus look to the conduct of the offender rather than
his affinity with the child. The overall impression is that
the conduct of the accused must be fairly "robust" to amount
to cruel and unnatural treatment and in turn the attitude of
the court towards the legal requirements of the offence is
37
founded largely upon judicial common sense. It is under¬
standable why contemporary prosecutors prefer to charge
offenders with precise statutory offences rather than grapple
with abstruse common law.
36 E.g. in H.M.A. v Kemp and Kemp (1891) 3 White 17 the
accused were the child's mother and father; in H.H.A.
v Fraser (1901) 8 S.L.T. 416 the child's father; in
H.M.A, v McGavin (1846) Arkley 67 the child's stepmother;
in H.M.A. v Mcintosh (1881) 8 Rettie (J) 13 the child's
foster mother] in H.M.A. v Craw (1839) 2 Swinton 449
the child's mother and father; and in H.M.A. v Gemmell
(1841) 2 Swinton 552 the child's father and stepmother.
37 See generally Gordon, p.780.
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13.12 An unusual case in this context is H.M.A. v Watt
and Kerr3 8. The accused were charged with cruel and barbarous
usage of several boys who had stowed away on board ship.
The conduct comprised withholding necessary food and
nourishment, striking and beating the boys with fists and
ropes, kicking, putting the boys in irons, stripping them
naked in cold weather and pouring cold water over them. It
may reasonably be asked how the offence of cruel and unnatural
treatment differs from cruel and barbarous usage. The latter
is presumably more reprehensible39. It is difficult to see how
the conduct alleged in H.M.A. v Watt and Kerr k0 would not amount
to cruel and barbarous usage. However, it was held irrelevant.
It should be recalled that the accused were master and mate
of the ship. The children were, of course, stowaways.
Perhaps it is questionable whether that gives to the master
and mate any greater rights, particularly in relation to
children.
13.13 The alternative charge of compelling the boys to
leave the ship was sustained and held proved. This is the
odd feature of the case. It could have been expected that
such a charge would constitute the facts of the offence, but
not the offence itself. But, without much discussion or
analysis, the High Court of Justiciary accepted the validity
of the offence of compelling persons to leave a ship. Lord
38 (1868) 1 Couper 123.
For a journalistic account of the case, see Roughead,
"The boys on the Ice" (1939) 51 Juridical Review 28.
39 Because the conduct would appear to be more extreme.
40 (1868) 1 Couper 123.
36U
Patton L.J.-C., on the other hand, attempted to justify the
decision holding the charge of cruel and barbarous usage
irrelevant:-
"There is not a sufficient affirmance
of a positive duty incumbent on the
accused, nor even of such relationship
between the parties as to rear up a
duty by implication. The fact of the
panel's having authority on board the
ship and of the other parties being on
board is not enough. There may be
persons on board over whom the master
and mate have no authority, and such
parties may have no special claim for
the performance of any duty on the
part of these officers. The casual
presence on board does not state such
a relationship as brings the case
within such cases, as that of husband
and wife, parent and child and others
that have been quoted to us; and cruel
and barbarous usage of itself does not
constitute a crime.,,,tl
The essence of that view is the lack of an appropriate
relationship between the alleged offender and the victim.
There is a suggestion that the presence of the boys as
stowaways made some sort of difference. It may be that the
master and mate did not want the responsibility of the boys.
But if anyone was responsible, they were. Even if there was
no relationship sufficient to sustain a charge of neglect,
the facts would appear to sustain a charge of assault. Judicial
reticence on this fundamental issue is regretted. The case
<♦ 2
of H.M.A. v Watt and Kerr is not free from difficulty. Its
41 Ibid, at pp. 133 and 134.
42 Ibid.
circumstances are patently exceptional; the legal position
rather obscure.
13.14 One of the interesting aspects of several of these
cases involving cruel and unnatural treatment is the alter-
4 3
native charge of neglect. Although in H.M.A. v Watt and Kerr
there was no charge of neglect, one of the facts alleged was
withholding necessary food and nourishment. This would on
the face of it amount to neglect, if the relationship were one
4 4
supporting a duty to maintain. The cases of H.M.A. v Craw
45 46 47
H.M.A. v Gemmell, H.M.A. v Mcintosh and H.M.A. v Kemp
included charges of neglect. In each of these cases there
were allegations of failure to supply adequate and sufficient
food; and in each case there was a sufficient relationship
between the children and the alleged offenders to create a
duty breach of which could constitute neglect.
13.15 There is in practice a fairly close affinity
between the common law offences of cruel and unnatural treat¬
ment and neglect. This is not surprising since there is a
clear substratum of substance between them. Neglect is a
fairly flexible and indeterminate offence. It can cover a
wide range of circumstances. Cruel and unnatural treatment
is a more definite concept, although it too is reasonably
comprehensive in nature. It may be that cruel and unnatural
treatment could be co-extensive with the circumstances of
neglect if neglect amounts to failure to implement a legal
obligation. The substance
43 Ibid. 44 (1839) 2 Swinton 449. 45 (1841) 2 Swinton 552
46 (1881) 8 Rettie (J) 13. 47 (1891) 3 White 17.
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of the obligation may differ, even if the analysis is the
same. In that event the obligation in relation to cruel and
unnatural treatment would be to protect and sustain the
physical, emotional and mental integrity of the child.
Section 3 - Endangering and imprisoning a child.
13.16 The same conclusion also applies to other common
law offences which have the effect of protecting the welfare
of the child. The protection may however be weaker and less
it &
obvious. In H.M.A. v Rachel Gibson the accused was charged
with wickedly and feloniously exposing and deserting her
small child only two weeks after being delivered of the infant.
She was also charged with wickedly, wilfully and feloniously
placing the infant child in a situation of danger to the child's
life. The offence comprised enclosing the child in a basket,
covering the basket with cotton wrap, addressing it and
conveying it from Glasgow to Ayr as a parcel without telling
anyone of its contents. The charges were held relevant. These
facts certainly seem to support the allegation of endangering
the child's life. It is perhaps less clear how they amount to
exposure and desertion. It may be asked - exposure to what?
If it were exposure to danger to life, there would be little
difference between that offence and actually endangering life.
It is equally questionable in what sense the circumstances
amount to desertion. The facts suggest that the parent sent
away rather than left the child; they may however be covered
by a flexible concept of desertion.
48 (1845) 2 Broun 366.
3 67
9 9
13.17 The decision in H.M.A. v Jane Thorn is more
straightforward. The mother allegedly threw the child from
a railway carriage in motion. The charge was endangering the
child's life and assault to the danger of life. The only
contention was whether there was danger to life in the absence
s o
of actual injury. The court decided that actual injury was
not necessary. In the event the charge was not proved but
its competency was not successfully challenged. There would
seem therefore to be little doubt that it is an offence at
common law for a child to be treated in such a way that his
life is endangered. Mere possibility of injury is sufficient.
Such an offence clearly has the effect of protecting the
physical welfare of the child.
13.18 The last common law offence which directly protects
welfare is confining and imprisoning the child. The classic
5 1
instance is H.M.A. v Fairweather. A child was apparently
kept in a cage or crib constructed for the purpose in a barn
or outhouse. It was four feet ten inches long, two feet nine
inches wide, four feet nine inches high, at the highest point,
and two feet six inches high at the lowest point. She was
there for some three weeks. There was neither fire nor
warmth. The child's life was endangered and she was reduced
to almost total idiocy. The validity of the charge was not
challenged. There would seem little doubt that these
circumstances constitute confinement or imprisonment. There
are obviously elements of cruel and unnatural treatment,
endangering life and neglect. The flexibility and inter-
49 (1876) 3 Couper 332. 50 Cf. the common law of England:
Bevan, p. 176.
51 (1842) 1 Broun 309.
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changeability of these several offences are thus emphasised.
S 2
13.19 The charges in H.M.A. v Gemmell, it will be
recalled, were culpable homicide, cruel and unnatural
treatment, and wilful and culpable neglect. One of the
allegations was that the child was confined in a loft or
closet, with the doors locked, for two months. The
technicalities of the indictment suggest that the allegation
of confinement formed the species facti of one of the charges,
probably cruel and unnatural treatment. This point was not
specifically raised or decided. The accused pleaded guilty
to the main charge but did not admit the allegation of
confinement. It is presumed that in these circumstances the
confinement issue was dropped and sentence passed in relation
to the charges to which the plea of guilty was made.
Section 4 - Parental rights approach.
(a) Scotland.
13.20 The offences of confinement and imprisonment, as
S3 s i>
in H.M.A. v Fairweather and in H.M.A. v Gemmell, in common
with most of the other common law offences, protect the child
from reprehensible parental conduct. The accused .in both
cases were husband and wife, of whom at least one enjoyed a
formal relationship with the child. The persons to whom these
these several offences apply have not been authoritatively
determined and it may be that they do not relate to a third
52 (1841) 2 Swinton 552. 53 (1842) 1 Broun 309.
54 (1841) 2 Swinton 552.
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5 5
party maltreating or otherwise detrimentally affecting the
child. The reason may be that the common law protects the
child from illegal conduct on the part of a parent or other
person either undertaking the duty of care or upon whom legal
obligations towards the child have been imposed. If the law
intervenes to protect a child from a third party, the
rationale is probably to enforce or sustain the parent-child
5 6
relationship rather than to protect the child directly. The
assumption underlying that rationalisation is that it is to
the child's advantage for the relationship between the child
and his parent to be preserved and continued. It reflects a
parental rights approach rather than a welfare approach.
13.21 So far as Scotland is concerned, parental rights
57
in the child are protected by the common law crime of plagium.
It is neither an obsolete nor even an obsolescent offence; in
1974 a grandmother admitted stealing her three year old
5 8 5 9
granddaughter from her son's home. In H.M.A. v Cook and Cairney
the accused were charged with "stealing" a girl aged eight in
the legal custody of her grandfather. One of the accused was
also charged with "detaining and secreting" the girl, knowing
her to have been stolen. Objection was taken to the competency
55 I.e. someone without a formal relationship with the child.
56 The position is similar in relation to some of the statutory
offences.
57 Generally see Hume, Commentaries, i.84; H.M.A. v Wade
(1844) 2 Brain 2 88 ; B.M.AI v Millar or Oates (.18 61) 4
Irvine 74; H. H. A. v Cook~"and Cairney (1897) 5 S.L.T. 2 54 ;
Gordon, p. 4 3 07 (Jf . Gordon, p. 7 81 ^
58 McHugh [1974] The Scotsman, 23 September.
59 (18977 5 S.L.T. 254.
of the second charge. The argument was that "the child being
over the age of seven, when in criminal law a child became
60
capable of exercising a will, the indictment should set forth
61
that the acts done were against her will." The court rejected
this argument, pointing out that plagium, may be
committed on any child under the age of puberty and that it
was not necessary to state that the taking was against the
62
child's will. For the purposes of plagium, therefore , the child
is regarded as a mere object, almost as a piece of property
belonging to the parent and liable to theft and reset.
13.22 Gordon takes the view that abduction for any
63
purpose is criminal. For this purpose he treats abduction
as the deprivation of the victim of his personal freedom.
This presumably includes the abduction of minors. Plagium,
on the other hand, applies only to the abduction of pupils in
the sense of their removal or theft. It was suggested in
6*»
Abinet v Fleck, an action of damages for wrongous apprehension
of a girl between seventeen and eighteen, that "the abduction
of a girl between seventeen and eighteen was not a crime at
common law, and was so under the seventh section of the
Criminal Law Amendment Act 1885, only if the intention was
65
that she should be unlawfully known." If this is so, then,
60 Hume, Commentaries, i.35. 61 (1897) 5 S.L.T. 254 at p.254.
62 Idem., at least according to the reporter's note. These
principles were also established in H.M.A. v Millar or Gates
(1861) 4 Irvine 74. Gordon, p. 430,~aTso points out tHat~TF
the child were removed by force, that would constitute a
further crime, in that case not against the parent but
against the child himself.
63 Gordon, p. 781. 64 (1894) 2 S.L.T. 30.
65 Idem., at least according to the reporter's note.
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unless some statutory provision is relied upon, abduction
of any person over puberty would not be an offence. Indeed
6 6
in H.M.A. v Millar or Oates a charge of "abduction" of a
pupil was withdrawn by the prosecution. Gordon's view is
thus perhaps questionable, but in practice, if attention is
paid not to abduction but to the effect of abduction, namely
the deprivation of liberty, the circumstances contemplated by
Gordon may constitute the common law offence of confinement
or imprisonment.
(b) England.
13.23 In England, by comparison, the common law is
probably much weaker than in Scotland and, consistently with
67
general trends, English law now relies heavily upon statute.
There is some doubt whether the common law offence of
kidnapping protects the child's interest or the parent's
right. According to East, kidnapping is "the stealing and
6 e
carrying away or secreting of some person." It cannot be
deduced from that proposition whose interest is being
69
infringed. The most recent decision is R. v Hale. One of the
allegations there was that the accused had "unlawfully
secreted .... a girl aged thirteen years, against the life
of her parents and lawful guardians." This is reminiscent
of the Scottish offence of confining and imprisoning a child.
66 (1861) 4 Irvine 74. 67 Bevan, p. 201.
68 Pleas of the Crown (1803), vol. 1, pp. 429 and 430.
69 L19 74 J 1 A11E.R. 1107.
Lawson J. held that the particulars of that allegation, in
the absence of any suggestion that the girl had been taken
or secreted by force or fraud or against her will, disclosed
7 o
no common law offence. The reasoning of Lawson J. appears
to suggest that kidnapping tended to protect the child's
interests rather than those of the parent. The charge of
7 1
kidnapping in R. v Hale was therefore quashed.
13.24 Earlier convictions in England for kidnapping were
explained by Lawson J. in these words
"It is, of course, true that there are
many old cases in which consenting minors
have been removed from their homes and
parents, in the context of subsequent
forced or fraudulent marriages, or
unlawful sexual intercourse, but these
cases all appear to have been dealt
with as offences of conspiring against
public morals, or in the case of females,
of abduction or conspiracies to abduct.
The present case has none of those
features There are also older
authorities which deal with offences of
'kidnapping', either as a common lav;
misdemeanour or as crimes against old
statutes, no longer in force. These
appear to present an elemen| of removing
a person from this country7 The
kidnapping cases to which I have
referred also present elements of force
or fraud, and, as far as I have been
able to discover, in the absence of one
or other of those elements the case of
a consenting victim does not seem to
have been adjudicated on by the English
courts. The vital point in the present
case is that count I does not allege
that the named girl was taken or secrete^
by force or fraud or against her will."7
70 In People (Attorney-General) v Edge [1943] I.R. 115 the
Supreme Court of Ireland had by a majority come to a
similar conclusion in relation to the kidnapping of a boy
aged fourteen and a half. 71 [1974] 1 A11E.R. 1107,
72 A raoant axample of this, not referred to by Lawson J.,
would seem to be Pinney [1970] Daily Telegraph, 9 September.
Dr. Pinney pleaded guilty to unlawfully keeping and
maintaining a boy of fourteen out of England against the
will of his mother.
73 [1974] 1 All E.R.1107 at pp.1108 and 1109. per Lawson J.
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The decision of Lawson J. thus considerably restricts the
nature of the offence of kidnapping. This means that
prosecutors will be even less inclined than previously to
7 4
rely on the common law. On the other hand in Scotland
plagium can be effective within its own context; it is
relatively simple and straightforward.
13.25 Against this background it is not surprising that
Parliament intervened. Child-stealing was first proscribed
7 5
in 1814. It is now dealt with by section 56 of the Offences
7 6
against the Person Act 1861. That section requires force or
7 7
fraud, an aspect to which Lawson J. drew comparative attention
7 6
in R. v Hale considering the common lav/ offence of kidnapping.
He stated:-
"But the use of force or fraud is a
necessary ingredient of this [statutory]
offence as well as the existence of one
of the specific intents which are
referred to in the section. Where a
child is harboured with its own consent
or at its own instigation, and the
statutory elements of the offence are
lacking, it is clear that the section
has no operation."79
Baby-snatching appears to be a not uncommon occurrence now
and section 56 will probably be the basis for any charge
so
against the alleged offenders. Since permanent removal from
81
the parent or other person iri loco parentis is not necessary
74 E.g. in Henry [1974] The Times, 19 March the judge
directed that a charge of kidnapping should be dropped and
the accused pleaded guilty to child-stealing.
75 54 Geo. 3, c.101.
76 As amended by section 83(2) and (3) and Schedule X, Part I
of the Criminal Justice Act 1948. 77 Bevan^ pp.201.to 203.
78 [1974] 1 A11E.R. 1107. 79 [1974] 1 A11E.R. 1107 at p. 1108
per Lawson J.
80 E.g. Whitfield [1974] The Scotsman, 23 August; probably
also A girl aged 11 [1974] The Times, 12 November.
81 R. v Powell nOTiT"24 Cox C.C. 229.
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and the force or fraud may be perpetrated against the parent
62
as well as against the child, the section has been fairly
liberally interpreted and is appropriate to cover a wide
variety of circumstances.
13.26 On this basis there is a great deal of common
ground between kidnapping and statutory abduction. The
Sexual Offences Act 1956 contains a number of provisions
83
intended to protect children in a purely sexual context.
As abduction may frequently be sexually motivated, the 1956
Act may be the appropriate legal machinery to prosecute
certain alleged abductors. Section 20, however, exceptionally
does not stipulate any purpose. Any person acting without
lawful authority or excuse who takes an unmarried girl under
sixteen out of the possession of her parent or guardian
against his will commits an offence. This probably constitutes
the simplest offence of abduction in English law. It is a
wide offence, but concisely drafted. Even so, it is
restricted by its own terminology. For instance, in R. v
8<»
Jones it was decided by Swanwick J. that the concept of taking
out of the possession and against the will of the parent
required conduct involving a "substantial interference with
S5
the possessory relationship of parent and child." Jones'
unsuccessful attempt to have two small girls to go for a walk
with him did not amount to an attempt to breach that possessory
relationship. Section 20 does not therefore comprehensively
cover all the circumstances in which a girl under sixteen may
leave or be removed from her parents.
82 R. v Bellis (1893) 17 Cox C.C. 660.
83 No detailed analysis is necessary here: the ground has
been concisely covered by Bevan, pp. 219 to 235.
84 [1973] Crim. L.R. 621. 85 Ibid., at p. 622.
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13.27 These various offences, plagium, confinement and
imprisonment in Scotland and kidnapping and the statutory
offences of abduction in England, have the effect of
protecting the child's physical integrity, albeit indirectly,
and his relationship with his parents or other custodians.
It is probably a matter of debate which objective inspires
each offence but the tendency in Scotland, particularly in
the context of plagium, and of the statutory offences in
England appears to be founded upon a parental rights approach.
This is entirely reasonable so far as the retention and
continuity of the parental relationship is in the child's
best interest. That may be so but it will depend very much
upon the circumstances. The feature of the provisions
considered in this section is that they ignore the quality
of the parental relationship; they seek merely to enforce it.
Section 5 - Conclusion.
13.28 There is no doubt that just as statutory offences
protect the child's welfare so do common law offences. The
legislation has been designed to apply specifically to children;
common law offences, on the whole, apply more generally.
Although the conduct proscribed by both statute and common law
tends to be similar, the common law labours under the peculiar
difficulty of needing to point to a sufficiently nexus
between victim and offender. Arguably such a duty is
unnecessary; the conduct, given its moral culpability, should
be sufficient. Thus any acts of cruelty or unnatural treatment
should per se be criminal. Such a view would have avoided the
37 6
8 6
difficulties in H.M.A. v Watt and Kerr. On the other hand
such a flexible attitude would amount almost to judicial
lawmaking which, in the context of criminal law in particular,
attracts a good deal of criticism.
13.29 It is unquestionably true that in practice statutory
offences predominate, particularly in England, but even in
Scotland much reliance is placed upon the legislation dealing
specifically with children. Common law offences suffer from
many of the same disadvantages as statutory offences,
particularly in the sense that the criminal law depends for
its contribution to the protection of children upon its
effectiveness as a deterrent. But given the nature and
function of criminal law, that is probably inevitable. This
is not to say that the criminal law has no part tc play in
protecting children. The role is a subsidiary one; it backs
up a whole series of other remedies and methods of regulation
87
and control.
13.30 Although the common law offences Ave probably less
precise than the statutory offences, each system approaches
the protection of children in terms of similar concepts; those
of neglect, abandonment, exposure, ill-treatment. The more
general concepts, homicide, assault, causing bodily harm,
apply more generally; yet they are relevant to the protection
of children in appropriate circumstances. The protection
86 (1868) 1 Couper 123.
87 They are dealt with in Part 5.
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afforded by the criminal law has been considered in some
detail. It operates in terms of specific offences; some
are wider or narrower in essence than others. The system
does not operate in terms of welfare itself, simply because
it is inconceivable that it should do so. Parliament would
never be expected to declare that any person acting contrary
to the best interests of a child shall be guilty of an offence.
Such a provision might be effective if very comprehensive and
efficient investigation, evaluation and prosecution services
were available; the whole range of professional expertise
from the police, social workers to doctors and lawyers would
be needed. Even so, the concept of "best interests" would be
so general and indeterminate that the scope for debate would
be infinite, apart from any allegations that such an approach
would be draconian. Such a system would be impracticable in
the foreseeable future. However, the stark comparison between
such an approach and the present protection of children
through the criminal law emphasises the nature of the present
system. The criminal law, statutory or common law, proscribes
conduct meted out to children in a fashion that is largely
both direct and objective. The degrees of directness and
objectivity vary according to the context. Discretion, except
interpretational discretion, is absent from the criminal law,
in relation to the courts, the children or the parents. The
only qualification is the power of the prosecutor to proceed
or not. That type of discretion is unrelated to the present
context which is concerned with the operation of the law within
e e
the judicial process.
88 The prosecutor's discretion is considered in paras.19.23 to
19.33.
TABLE
Offence Persons Charged Court Newspaper Date
Part A - Non-homicidal Offences:-
1 Abandonment Mother Ipswich Crown Scotsman 25.05.
2 Abandonment Mother Glasgow Sheriff Scotsman 19.09.




4 Assault Mother Glasgow Sheriff Scotsman 08.03.
5 Assault Mother Aberdeen Sheriff Scotsman 21.08.
6 Assault Father Glasgow Sheriff Scotsman 24.09.
7 Grievous
harm
bodily Mother Lincoln Crown The Times 25.04.
8 Grievous
harm




















St. Albans Crown The Times 23.05.
13 Ill-treatment
and cruelty
Matron of Home Lewes Crown The Times 24.07.
14 Cruelty and bodily Father
harm
Chichester Crown The Times 19.09.





16 Neglect Mother and
Father
Central Criminal Scotsman 19.03.
and
06.04.
17 Neglect Mother and
Father
Glasgow Sheriff The Times 02.06.



























































Mother and Father 6
Others 2
Total 24
Part B - Homicidal Offences
1 Culpable homicide Father High Scotsman
2 Culpable homicide Mother High The Times
3 Culpable homicide Mother High Scotsman
4 Culpable homicide Mother Edinburgh Scotsman
Sheriff
5 Manslaughter Third Party Reading Crown The Times












1 Of this total 13 were Scottish cases and 11 English.
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7 Manslaughter Third Party Stafford Crown The Times• 20.07.74
8 Manslaughter Mother Reading Crown The Times 26.10.74
9 Manslaughter Father Sheffield Crown Scotsman 30.11.74
10 Manslaughter Mother Central Criminal The Times 09.11.74
11 Manslaughter Mother1 Central Criminal Hie Times 09.11.74
12 Murder Father High Scotsman 03.04.71















2 Of this total 5 were Scottish cases and 8 English.
3 Of this total 18 were Scottish cases and 19 English.
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CHAPTER 14.
OFFICIAL CARE THRESHOLD REQUIREMENTS: THE ADMINISTRATIVE REGIME.
Section 1 - Introduction.
14.1 The principal disadvantage of the criminal law
in relation to the protection of children lies in its
retrospective quality. Unless it is going to be effective
as a deterrent, the criminal law is largely restricted to
imposing penalties on the offender after the offence has
taken place. The criminal law, in other words, contains
no mechanism for preventing the injury or harm against which
it is the policy of the legislation to protect the child.
Even if it were possible to seek an injunction or an
interdict from the court against the parent who is likely
to be guilty of criminal abuse towards the child, the
procedural and evidential problems would make that type of
remedy hopelessly impracticable. These difficulties
existed long before the emergence of the welfare doctrine
and Parliament has reacted from time to time by conferring
certain, at first very limited, functions upon identifiable
i
agencies within the state. This movement gathered
momentum during the second half of the nineteenth century
and, more particularly, since 1945. The tendency has been
to create increasingly sophisticated techniques for
protecting children from themselves and from their parents.
14.2 The legislation designed to achieve these broad
policies has always tended to fall into two parts, The
1 Paras. 14.11 to 14.16.
3«2
first describes or prescribes the situations of risk to
2
the children against which they need protection. It is no
accident that these circumstances have a close affinity
with the conceptual basis of the criminal offences created
by statute or recognised by the common law. They may be
justifiably regarded therefore as creating the threshold
to a system for preventing the abuse of children, thus
filling the gap left by the criminal law. The second part
of the legislation deals with the treatment of the children
after the risks of abuse or the actual circumstances of
abuse have been established. The function in the first part
is fundamentally adjudicative; in the second part,
discretionary. But the agencies upon which the&e functions
have been conferred do not fall into that classification.
Executive agencies, for example, may be required not only
to determine whether the threshold requirements have been
3
met but also to decide what should be done with the child
thereafter. That is true also of judicial agencies. There
5
are, of course, policy reasons underlying these differences.
This analysis is concerned more with the nature of the
function than with the agency upon which it has been conferred.
The evolution of the system, however, and the consequential
legislation have tended to place more emphasis upon the
agency rather than the function. For the sake of convenience,
2 E.g. parental inadequacy or incapacity.
3 Children Act 1948 (11 S 12 Geo. 6, c.43), ss.l and 2;
Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968 (1968 c.49), ss.15 and
16. In this chapter the former is referred to as the
"1948 Act", the latter as the "1968 Act."
4 Children and Young Persons Act 1969 (1969 c.54), s.l.
5 The functions in Part Illof the 1968 Act are conferred
differently.
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therefore, this analysis will follow the pattern of the
legislation. The threshold requirements for the admission
into official care will be considered first in terms of
the administrative regime and then under the judicial system.
It is nevertheless the same function which is being considered.
14.3 During the earlier discussion on the classification
of welfare it was noted that certain statutory provisions
appeared in more than one part of the Tables. For example,
section 1(1)(a) and (b) of the Children Act 1948 and
section 15(1)(a) and (b) of the Social Work (Scotland) Act
1968 appear in both Tables land 2; section 2(1)(b) of the
1948 Act and section 16(1)(b) of the 1968 Act in Tables 1
6
and 4; section 3 of the Custody of Children Act 1891 in
Tables land 3; section 1 of the Custody of Children Act
1891 in Tables land 4; section 12(2) of the Children Act
7 8
1975 and section 16(2) of the Adoption Act 1976 in Tables 1
and 4. Compulsory measures of care under the Social Work
(Scotland) Act 1968 and care proceedings under the Children
and Young Persons Act 1969 also attract double classification.
All of these examples prescribe the threshold requirements to
be met prior to the exercise of the statutory function
conferred upon the agency in question. They concern the




criteria necessary to disqualify a parent from custody, to
dispense with a parent's agreement to adoption or to deprive
a parent of his parental rights. It is no coincidence that
they regulate the circumstances in which a parent's rights
and interest in his child may be destroyed or restricted.•
Whether the function is conferred upon a judicial or an
administrative body, Parliament has used a similar formula.
The context of each function is admittedly different, the
approach, it is suggested, is for present purposes conceptually
the same. Of the examples in this paragraph, those from the
Children Act 1948, the Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968 and
the Children and Young Persons Act 1969 comprise the official
care code. In care proceedings and where compulsory measures
of care are needed, the adjudicative function is given to a
9
judicial body. On the other hand, reception into care and
assumption of parental rights are matters for the administrative
body and they will be considered in this chapter.
Section 2 - The formal structure of the provisions.
14.4 The formal structure of section 1(1) of the 1948 Act
and of section 15(1) of the 1968 Act is clear. A duty is
placed upon the local authority to receive into care a child
fulfilling the threshold requirements set out in paragraphs
1 o
(a) or (b) and (c). At the moment paragraphs (a) and (b) are
9 Chapter 15.
10 Paragraph (c) requires that intervention is necessary
in the interests of the welfare of the child.
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particularly relevant, for they set out requirements which
relate directly to the objective welfare of the child.
Paragraph (c) is different, as it contemplates welfare in
the general and unspecified sense. There can be no doubt
however that fulfilment of paragraph (c) is additional to
satisfying either paragraph (a) or paragraph (b). Fundamentally,
therefore, sections 1(1) and 15(1) comprise a duty exigible
only in certain circumstances. They compare with care
proceedings and the other examples in the preceding paragraph
in the sense that threshold requirements must be satisfied
but contrast with them for the latter confer a discretion
rather than impose a duty. Under section 1(1) of the 1948
Act and section 15(1) of the 1968 Act the responsibility rests
i i
with an administrative rather than a judicial body. There
are other restrictions circumscribing the function of the
local authority necessary to a complete understanding of the
scheme of the Acts but they are not germane to this aspect
of the analysis.
14.5 Paragraphs (a) and (b) of sections .1(1) and 15(1)
1 2
are directed to certain fairly clear sets of circumstances.
11 Lord Goddard C.J. in In re AB (An Infant) [1954] 2 Q.B.
385 at p.396 noted that the Act of 1948"not only enables,
but directs the local authority to act without an order
of the court."
12 Krishnan v London Borough of Sutton [1969] 3 A11E.R.
1367 would appear to be an example of a child whose
parents were prevented (for an undisclosed reason) from
providing for the child's proper accommodation,
maintenance and upbringing. The existence of the ground
was not questioned. In In re AB (An Infant) [1954] 2
Q.B. 385 at p.394 the reason supporting the same ground
was disclosed, accepted but not discussed: according to
Lord Goddard C.J. "because the mother had to earn her
own living as a domestic servant and there was nobody to
take over the child."
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The former comprehends the physical lack of a parent or
guardian; the latter rather implies parental inability to
provide properly for the child. What matters, of course,
is not this simplistic paraphrase of the provisions, but
the actual terminology of the paragraphs. There has been
1 3
little or no judicial or academic discussion of the paragraphs,
probably because the substantive decision remains with the
local authority, with little scope for intervention by the
courts. Thus most legal argument has probably been confined
within the offices of the local authority's legal advisers.
14.6 The nature of the function conferred upon the local
i t
authority by section 2(1) of the 1948 Act and section 16(1)
i s
of the 1968 Act is different. Parental rights and duties
may be assumed by resolution of the local authority, subject
1 6
to a form of judicial review. These sections are in several
respects different from sections 1 and 15. It is however
convenient for present purposes to consider them together.
17
Both contain administrative functions; one mandatory, the
1 8
other discretionary. Both are circumscribed by threshold
requirements. These requirements are in some respects similar.
13 Judicial decisions on the legislation tend to take for
granted the existence of the ground and thus the facts
of any reported case merely illustrate without defining
or analysing the legal concepts. This has inhibited
academic discussion of this aspect. What discussion
there is, however, is accounted for in the following
paragraphs.
14 As substituted by the Children Act 1975, s.57.
15 As substituted by the Children Act 1975, s.74.
16 1948 Act, s . 2 ( 5); 1968 Act, s.l6(8).
17 1948 Act, s.l; 1968 Act, s.15.
18 1948 Act, s.2; 1968 Act, s.16.
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1 9
Sections 2 and 16 apply only to a child who has been
received into care under sections 1 and 15 respectively.
The scope of the power to assume parental rights and duties
was widened in 1975 when voluntary associations were given
in certain circumstances a statutory status in relation to
children in their care similar to that of local authorities.
Voluntary associations are liable to be deprived of their
2 o
status at the instance of the local authority.
14.7 The English and Scottish versions of the provisions
remain largely identical; the differences tend to be matters
of drafting than of substance. The grounds of assumption of
2 1
parental rights were extended in 1963. The 1968 Act set out
all the grounds for Scotland; the 1975 Act does likewise for
both systems. It will be recalled that sections 1 and 15
contain two generic grounds: physical lack of a parent or
guardian and parental inability to provide properly for the
child. There are three generic grounds in sections 2 and 16:
physical lack of a parent or guardian, incapacity to care for
2 2 2 3
the child and unfitness to have the care of the child. A
19 1975 Act, s.60; 1968 Act, s.l6(l)(b) as substituted by
1975 Act, s.74.
20 1975 Act, s.61; 1968 Act, S.16A inserted by 1975 Act,
s. 75 .
21 Children and Young Person Act 1963 (1963 c.37), s.48.
22 Re MAC)(an Infant)[1971] 3 A11E.R. 743 and R. v Oxford
City Justices, ex parteHf1974] 2 A11E.R. 356 would
appear to be examples of parents suffering from
permanent disabilities.
23 Tn
^ Barker v Westmorland C.C. (1958) 56 L.G.R. 267
evidence of the parent's past life was admissible to
determine whether he was unfit to have the care of the
child.
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fourth and different ground has now been added: where the
child has been in the care of the local authority for the
2 <♦
preceding three years.
14.8 The absence of official reports of resolutions under
sections 2 and 16 and of judicial determinations under
subsections (5) and (8) of these sections makes discussion of
these grounds difficult in any authoritative way. However,
2 5
MacEwan in his article on this matter has described three
2 6
cases illustrating the approach of the relevant sheriff to
the establishment of these grounds. The cases dealt with
27
unfitness to have care of the child and persistent failure
without reasonable cause to discharge the obligations of a
2 8
parent. Only one parent was in fact relieved of his parental
rights in relation to the child. The indication is therefore
that the sheriffs take a fairly strict view of the circumstances
necessary to support the relevant ground. This is not
unexpected, despite the fairly wide language used in relation
to some of the grounds. MacEwan does not report the shrieval
reasoning; it is not therefore possible to analyse the cases
further.
24 1948 Act, s.2(l)(d); 1968 Act, s.l6(l)(iv): as
substituted by 1975 Act, ss.57 and 74 respectively.
See Houghton-Stockdale Report, para. 156. The principal
changes made by the 1975 Act in relation to Scotland have
been discussed by Wilkinson A.B., "Children Act 1975"
1976 S.L.T. (News) 237 at p.243.
25 MacEwan J.N.S. "Powers and Duties of Local Authorities
with regard to Children" 1971 S.L.T. (News) 89.
26 Ibid., pp.90 and 91.
27 1968 Act, s.16(1)(b)(iv) as unamended.
28 1968 Act, s.16(1)(b)(v) as unamended.
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14.9 There is similarly one publicised but unreported
2 9
English juvenile court judgment. In Anonymous Bradford
Juvenile Court upheld the council's decision to assume the
3 0
parental rights of a convicted murderer on the ground of his
unfitness. The court rejected the father's argument that
the council's decision to assume his parental rights was
"wholly unethical, immoral, inhuman, vindic tive, uncivilized
and untenable in lav;." As with the Scottish cases, the
reasoning of the court was not reported but in this case the
reasons seem clear even without detailed articulation.
14.10 Sections 1 and 15 merely require the local authority
to receive a child into their care in the relevant circumstances.
Sections 2 and 16 enable the authority to assume parental
31
rights and duties. It is probably because the latter
sections go much further than the former sections by depriving
or at least suspending parents of their otherwise enforceable
rights and interests in relation to their children that
3 2
ultimate judicial control has been built into the procedure.
But the common element of fundamental significance is that
both sets of provisions involve in effect administrative
intervention by the state in parent-child relationships
through the agency of the local authority. The courts have long
had similar powers of intervention, either as the delegate
of the Crown acting as parens patriae in England, in exercise
29 [1973] The Times, 19 October. 30 The victim was his wife.
31 The consequences of these decisions are examined in chapter 17.
32 1948 Act, s.2(5); 1968 Act, S.16(8).
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3 3
of the nobile officium in Scotland or alternatively under
3 <♦
statute. But the state in its administrative capacity has
had in many respects a surprisingly longer history of
intervention in these matters.
Section 3 - The historical background.
14.11 Although reception into care under section 1 of
the 1948 Act was an innovation of that year, assumption of
parental rights as a result of State intervention through
the agency of a local authority, parish or other municipal
3 5
council has had a long history. The threshold requirements
for the exercise of this power have not changed fundamentally
over the years, although the statutory language has probably
become less colourful. Early legislation gave to the agency
of the State a wide, if not absolute, discretion and it is
3 6
a feature of the 1948 Act, following upon the Curtis Report,
that the local authority's powers and duties are set out
more carefully. The objectives of care by the local authority
are thus more readily comprehensible. Earlier regimes were
37
probably very rigorous and excessively paternalistic.
14.12 Pinchbeck has traced the relationship between the
3 8
state and the child in England. By the sixteenth century
Parliament had established principles similar to those
currently applicable. In particular two identified by
33 Part 7. 34 Particularly chapter 15.
35 Generally see Heywood J., Children in Care (London, 1955)
and Clarke Hall, The State and the Child ("London, 1917).
36 Report of the Care of Children Committee (London, H.M.S.O.,
1946), Cmd. 6922.
37 Pinchbeck, "The State and the Child in Sixteenth-Century




"The children of vagrant and demoralised
parents were to be removed from parental
control and placed in a new environment
to secure their welfare. And finally,
the state accepted in principle the
responsibility for securing the proper
treatment and training of the children
thus brought into community care."39
The effectiveness of these principles and the way in which
they were implemented were clearly a separate issue and it
is unlikely that the standards applied then would meet with
approval now. The state, through the direct agency of the
Crown in its wardship jurisdiction, could act independently
of the legislation. Apparently the interests and welfare of
the children were not always foremost in the decision making
4 o
process of the Crown. These various ideals soon faded away,
but, according at least to Pinchbeck, "the twentieth-century
conception of the duty of the state towards the child has
its origins, not in the reforming movement of the nineteenth
it I
century, but in the paternalistic policy of the Tudor State."
14.13 These comments apply to England. They are of little
<t 2
relevance to Scotland which had its own poor law system.
Its origins are to be found in the church rather than in the
<t 3
state, although the legislature intervened as early as 1535 to
39 Ibid, at p.59. 40 Ibid, at p.70: see chapters 32 and 34.
41 Ibid, at p.72.
42 Smout T.C., A History of the Scottish People 1560-1830
(Fontana, 19 7 2 ) , p.84.
43 James V: 1535 c.29.
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4 4
establish the principle of parochial responsibility. The
system probably became rather ineffective as time went on,
partly because of the close control by the church, partly
as a result of local employment customs and partly also
because of the Scottish character which would hesitate to
4 5
go to the parish for charity. The system broke down in the
4 6
economic circumstances of the early nineteenth century and
47
in 1845 Parliament established central supervision and other
features closer to the English model.
14.14 Poor law legislation involved public interference
with parental rights. Even in the nineteenth century the
courts were faced with relating the legislation to the
underlying common law. For example, in Orr v Kirk-Session
4 6
of Glassford the public body had to undertake the responsibility
for the charge of a child left destitute; and in Weepers v
4 9
Heritors and Kirk-Session of Kennoway the court was required to
interpret the legislation against the common law position of
the mother of an illegitimate child and the power of the
putative father to offer to take charge of the child in
answer to a claim for aliment. The relationship between
public law codes and private law remedies is not a solely
contemporary phenomenon.
14.15 Thus by the twentieth century administrative
interference with parental rights was not new. Section 52
44 Smout, op.cit. , p.84. 4 5 Ibid. p.30 3
46 Ibid., p.376; Mackie, A History of Scotland (Penguin, 1966)
t>p. 3 34 and 335 .
47 Poor Law Amendment (Scotland) Act 1845 (8 8 9 Vict. , c.83).
48 (1831) 9 Shaw 928. 49 (1844) 6 Dunlop 1166.
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5 0
of the Poor Law Act 1930 was the immediate predecessor of
section 2 of the Children Act 1948 and it contains a similar
statutory scheme for the assumption of parental rights.
The Curtis Committee regarded it as a "very important
5 1
provision" and in 1945 about sixteen per cent of children
in the care of poor law authorities had been the subject of
5 2
a section 52 resolution. Later in 1972 the Houghton-
Stockdale Committee were also impressed by the power to
5 3
assume parental rights.
14.16 A resolution under section 52 of the 1930 Act
was subject to judicial confirmation, where necessary, in
the same way as under section 2 of the 1948 Act. The
normal principle is that a judicial ox^der is necessary
before parental rights can be taken away. But there have
been two examples when an administrative act was sufficient.
5 i*
The War Orphans Act 1942 placed a duty upon the Minister of
Pensions to provide for the care of children for whom
pensions or allowances were payable in respect of the death
of a parent in the war and who were suffering from neglect
or want of proper care. The Guardianship (Refugee Children)
5 5
Act 1944 enabled the Secretary of State to appoint a
guardian of any person in England or Scot-land who had
arrived there in consequence of war or persecution without
a parent. These were rather special functions and did not
50 20 £ 21 Geo. 5, c.17. The 1930 Act provision was itself
preceded by section 1(1) of the Poor Law Act 1889
and. section 1 of the Poor Law Act 18 99.
51 Report of the Care of Children Committee, op.cit., para. 19.
52 Ibid., para. 29; Table IV, p.27.
53 Houghton-Stockdale Report, para. 153.
54 5 £ 6 Geo. 6, c.8. 55 7 £ 8 Geo. 6, c.8.
necessarily involve taking away parental rights. But they
are instances of state involvement in the interests of
children. There can be no doubt, of course, that state
intervention, either judicially or administratively, has
increased conceptually and quantitatively since 1948.
5 6
Section 4 - The concepts underlying the administrative regime.
(a) Loss or abandonment.
14.17 Paragraph (a) of subsection (1) of section 1
contains three elements: having neither parent nor guardian;
abandonment; and being lost. Having neither parent nor
guardian or being lost seems to indicate an existing state
of affairs without regard to the circumstances giving rise
to that condition. It should not be difficult to establish
whether that state of affairs exists or not. The only problem
57
may be in construing when a child "is lost". Normally it
means the condition arising when a child is temporarily missing
and out of the immediate control of his parent or other
custodian. There is no necessary suggestion of parental
56 Any reference hereafter in this chapter to section 1 or 2
is a reference to section 1 or 2 of the Children Act 1948
and includes for the sake of convenience a reference to
section 15 or 16 of the 1968 Social Work (Scotland) Act
unless there is a specific reference to the contrary. Any
references are those sections as amended or substituted
by the Children Act 1975.
57 Barker v Westmorland C.C. (1958) 56 L.G.R. 267 is a case
either of abandonment or of being lost. There may be
elements of both. In any event, although there was no
discussion on the point, it was not questioned that the
threshold requirements had not been satisfied.
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fault or incapacity. There has been no analysis of these
provisions nor do the official statistics assist in solving
5 s
these problems of construction.
14.18 Abandonment, on the other hand, although statistically
s 9
insignificant, has attracted some consideration.. The expression
60
"abandon" appears in other contexts relating to children and
the general consensus seems to be that it has the same meaning
61
in each context. Bevan, however, suggests rather tentatively
that it has a "wider meaning for the purpose of s.l of the
62 63
1948 Act." This may well be consistent with the policy of
58 Each year there is an official report on Children in Care,
one for England and one for Scotland. The reports set out
the reasons why children came into care during the relevant
period and the relative statistics. The figures include
all children in care, incorporating those coming into care
under other legislation. The reports contain statements
of the circumstances supporting the grounds in the 1948
Act but do not give any indication of the problems of
interpretation. They do however illustrate the circumstances
comprised in certain of the grounds; e.g. death of mother,
desertion by mother, confinement of mother, illness of
parent, imprisonment of parent, homeless family etc. See
Leeding, p.16 and Eekelaar, p.160. For R.S.S.P.C.C.
statistics, see [1971] The Scotsman, 15 June.
59 Re M (An Infant) [1961] Ch. 81 is an example of abandonment
but there was no discussion of its circumstances.
60 E.g. Children and Young Persons Act 1933, s.l(i); Children
and Young Persons (Scotland) Act 1937, s.12(1); Custody of
Children Act 1891, ss.l and 3; Children Act 1975, s.12(2)
(d); Adoption Act 1976, s.l6(2)(d).
61 Clarke Hall & Morrison, p.882; Bevan, pp.144 and 145;
Leeding, p.59. 62 Bevan,' p.144.
63 There have been two publicised instances of what may have
constituted allegations of abandonment. In Salter [1971]
The Times, 17 June the local authority decided that there
were not sufficient grounds to receive children into care
when their mother went out leaving them with an eleven
year old girl; the home was also "undescribably filthy."
On the other hand in Watson [1974] The Times, 3 December,
two children were taken into care when their father left
them at the council offices in protest over conditions in
his council house.
396
of the legislation. The other contexts of the use of the
word involve the commission of an offence and the deprivation
C 4
of parents of their rights. Section 1 of the 1948 Act
involves neither. The precise nature of the function
65
contemplated by that section will be considered later but
it probably involves no more than an acceptance by the local
authority of the responsibility for the care and maintenance
maintenance of the child usually with parental consent but
exceptionally without consent. The section is designed to
protect the child and at the same time to assist the parent.66
There is much to be said, therefore, on policy grounds for
a wider rather than a narrower interpretation. In any event
there is no manifestly binding reason for giving "abandon"
the same meaning as in the other contexts. It may be that
the literal meaning of the word is satisfactory for most
purposes of section 1 of the 1948 Act. That however is not
conclusive; policy may justify a wider interpretation.
64 These are merely generic descriptions and do not reflect
the phraseology of the legislation.
65 Chapter 16.
66 Lord Goddard C.J. in In re AB (an Infant) [1954] 2 Q.B.
385 at p.397 described the purpose of section 1(1) as
follows:- "Section 1(1) is dealing with children who
have no one to look after them, either because their
parents are dead or unable to look after them. In other
words, its purpose is to provide for care to be taken of
a deserted or substantially deserted child, and to prevent
it from being an abandoned child."
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14.19 Abandonment is also a threshold requirement for the
local authority's power to assume parental rights under
section 2 of the 1948 Act. The conceptual approach of that
section is the same as that of section 1 but the purposes of
87
the provisions are different. Implementation of section 2
vests in the local authority "the relevant parental rights
6 8
and powers" in Scotland and "the parental rights and duties"
of the relevant persons in England.'59 The argument may be put,
therefore, that, since deprivation or suspension of parental
rights is involved, a wider interpretation in case of doubt
may not be justified, even on grounds of policy. This may have
been one reason why Parliament has provided some assistance in
construing "abandonment" for the purpose of section 2. Where the
whereabouts of any parent or guardian of a child received into
care have remained unknown for not less than twelve months, the
child shall be treated as abandoned.70 This does not necessarily
assist in construing "abandon" but the indication is rather that
a state of affairs is contemplated by the deeming provision rather
than deliberate misconduct by the parent or guardian. The implica¬
tion may be that otherwise "abandon" involves parental mis-conduct
directed towards the child. The official statistics are, of course
irrelevant to the construction of an Act of Parliament but it
is interesting that "abandoned" is linked with "lost" in the
statistics. The official tendency, therefore, as distinct
from interpretation, judicial or
67 In Re G (Infants) [1963] 3 All E.R. 370 at p.373 Ungoed-
Thomas J. remarked that "s.l deals with what might normally
be contemplated as an emergency or a temporary situation,
whereas s.2 contemplates an arrangement of a longer and more
stable duration.%i
68 1968 Act, s.16(1) and (3). 69 1948 Act, s.2(l).
70 1948 Act, s.2(9 ) ; 196 8 Act, s.16(12).
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otherwise, is to look at the situation from the child's
point of view. In any event it is suggested that there
are good reasons to adopt the same attitude in the context
of interpretation.
(b) Delegation of parental rights.
14.20 If "abandon" involves leaving a child to his fate7 1
rather than describes a state of affairs existing at any
moment of time, a parent may delegate his parental
obligations without leaving himself open to action under
the 1948 Act. This necessitates a further analysis of
"abandonment" from an entirely different aspect: from the
point of view, not of the parent, guardian or child but of
the foster parent caring for the child.
14.21 Normally a foster parent is any person, not being
the child's parent, who assumes responsibility for the
child.7 2 The simplicity of this description is destroyed
by the statutory powers of local authorities to care for
children and in so doing to board them out with individual
. . . 7 3
persons rather than accommodate them m institutions.
The control of foster children provided in Part I of the
Children Act 19587 4 is directed to children living with
"private" foster parents; this excludes children in the
care of a local authority, in the care of voluntary
organisations or in the care of bodies approved officially
71 The test normally applied: see e.g. Clarke Hall S
Morrison, pp.882 and 885; paras. 11.24, 11.25, 12.5, 12.6.
72 This is the ordinary meaning which is not necessarily the
same as the statutory meaning.
73 1948 Act, s.13; 1968 Act, s.21.
74 6 S 7 Eliz. 2, c.65.
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in terms of other legislation7.5 The definition of "foster
child" in the 1958 Act7 6 reflects these policies. The
fundamental idea in section 2(1) of the '1958 Act is more
precise than the formulation set out at the beginning of
this paragraph. The most significant element is a child
"whose care and maintenance are undertaken by a person
who is not a relative or guardian of his". The earlier
legislation had incorporated a further requirement, namely
"apart from his parents or having no parents"7.7 Although
this requirement of physical separation was omitted in the
1958 Act, Sachs J. in Surrey County Council v Battersby7 8
impliedly resurrected it for the purpose of the 1958 Act
when he said of that Act:
"By its preamble, it was an Act to make
provision for the protection of children
living away from their parents," 7 9
The distinctive current statutory definition of "foster
child" therefore is probably of greater technical than
substantive importance. The underlying concept is
delegation pro tanto of parental functions rather than
abandonment of parental powers and duties.
75 Ibid., s.2(2) ,(3) ,(4) and (HA).
76 Ibid., s.2(l) as amended by the Children and Young
Persons Act 1969, s.52(l) and by the Social Work
(Scotland) Act 1968, Sched.l, para.2.1. The current
definitions for England and Scotland are not the
same but for present purposes the differences are
immaterial. The text indicates the provision as
amended which applies in England. For Scotland it
reads "whose care is undertaken for a period of not
more than six days beginning with the day on which
the child is received into that care by a person who
is not a relative or guardian of his".
77 Section 206(3) of the Public Health Act 1936 (26 Geo.
5 g 1 E dw . 8 , c . H 9 ) .
78 [1965] 1 All E.R. 273.
79 Ibid. at p.276 per Sachs J. emphasis added.
U 00
14.22 This matter was given some consideration by
Lloyd-Jacobs J. in Wallbridge v Dorset County Council.80
The issue was whether the proprietors of a residential
school for backward or maladjusted children were subject
to the foster children provisions of the Public Health
Act 1936 in relation particularly to a small number of
children in the school who were in the care of the local
authority under the Children Act 1948.81 The allegation
that the Public Health Act applied to the proprietors of
the school was, it is suggested, totally misconceived.
But the court adopted a less rigorous approach than that.
Attention was directed rather to the relationship between
the local authority and the children than to that between
the school and the children. Lloyd-Jacobs J. in an important
passage described the difference between delegation and
abandonment in these words
"The nature of the separation so expressed
is wider than physical absence. Physical
absence, if sufficiently prolonged, might
well justify an inference of intention to
part, and equally occasional meetings
might not justify an inference of an
intention not to part, but an actual
or inferred intention to deny to the
child parental guidance and control,
or, what anounts to the same thing,
inability to provide it, must be associated
with physical separation before the apart¬
ness upon which the need for this type of
protection is based can be created.
80 [1954] 1 Ch.659.
81 Cf. Hill v Minister of Pensions and National Insurance
[19551 2 All E.R. 890 where the issue was whether the
mother of children in care under s.l of the 1948 Act
and living in a residential school was entitled to family
allowance for them under ss.3(2) and 21(7) of the Family
Allowance Act 1945. In holding the mother not so entitled
the court commented that the children ceased to live with
the mother not because they were at residential school
but because they were maintained by the local authority.
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Such parental guidance and control must of
necessity be in part susceptible of dele¬
gation. In this personal capacity the
parents cannot always be available to
provide it and may often be unable effect¬
ively to discharge its obligations. In
such cases, the employment or engagement
of nurses, tutors, doctors and surgeons,
or other skilled persons, although such
arrangement may involve the temporary
surrender of direct control, cannot fairly
be regarded as a denial of parental
obligations.
Here again, attention must be had to the
extent and duration of such delegation.
If in sum it can fairly be regarded as
tantamount to complete surrender of
authority, or if by reason of its
duration it results in the substitution
of a mind independent of the parent in
respect of material decisions for some
indefinite period, it may be that an
inference of an intention to part from
the child could be drawn. But mere
delegation of some part of the parental
duty for a limited period cannot of
itself provide a sufficient animus
which, combined with the fact of absence
from home, would constitute the status
of living apart." 82
No apology is made for this lengthy quotation. The concept
of delegation is an important one, particularly in contrast
with abandonment; a consideration of it will recur from
time to time.
14.23 The legislation with which Lloyd-Jacob J. was
concerned was designed to protect children in the "private"
foster care situation. Hence the position of the local
authority qua statutory caretaker of the child was really
8 3
irrelevant in Wallbridge v Dorset C.C., although
reference was made by the judge to the local authority
82 [1954] 1 Jh. 559 at pp.666 and 667 per Lloyd-Jacob J.
83 [1954] 1 Ch. 659.
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as "the alter ego of the parent".81* There can be no
doubt therefore that in that case the children, including
those in the care of the local authority, were not foster
children for the purposes of the legislation; they were
not "living apart" from their parents. The question of
who was exercising parental care and control, the parents
or the local authority, was not really in issue.
14.24 The views expressed by Lloyd-Jacob J. introduce
two issues of current significance. What is the "status"
of a child living apart from his parents, particularly
when he is in the care of a local authority?85 Secondly,
what is the importance, of the distinction between abandon¬
ment, or more generally, parental culpability and delegation,
especially for the purposes of sections 1 and 2 of the 1948
Act? Both questions require an examination of the general
scheme of those provisions and at their consequences for
the relationship not only between parent and child but also
between them and the local authority.86
( c) Incapacity and unfitness
14.25 Physical or mental incapacity on the part of the
parent or guardian is a threshold requirement for either
section 1 87 or section 2 8 8 of the 1948 Act. They are
likely to be issue of fact without significant conceptual
difficulty. When it comes to parental unfitness, section 2
84 Ibid. at p.670.
85 Chapter 17.
86 Chapter 16.
87 1948 Act, s.1(1)(b); 1968 Act, s,15(l)(b).
88 1948 Act, s.2(1) (b)(ii) and (iii); 1968 Act, s.l6(2)(b)
and (c).
is much more guarded than section 1. Section 1 talks
generally in terms of the parent or guardian being
prevented from providing for the child's "proper accom¬
modation, maintenance and upbringing".89 A child's proper
upbringing is a wide concept, giving the local authority
considerable scope and discretion in following the direction
in section 1. The question comes close to the issue before
the courts in custodial proceedings. Moreover it is a
matter exclusively reserved to the local authority.
Judicial interference is marginal.90 Even so, the question
places the parent not the child at the centre: the issue
is whether the parent is prevented from providing properly
for his child, rather than whether the child is being
properly brought up.91
14.26 The matter for- decision in section 2 is also
centred on the parent. The alternatives are whether
the parent's habits or mode of life or his consistent
or persistent parental failures render him unfit to have
the care of the child.92 The test is clearly parental
failings, not the benefit of the child. The interest
of the child is at best negatively relevant, as the
individual affected by the incompetence of the parent.
To what extent the criteria in sections 1 and 2 are
conceptually the same. There is, however, one fundamental
89 1948 Act, s.l(l)(b); 1968 Act, s.l5(l)(b).
90 Paras. 16.18 to 16.26.
91 1. e. negative not positive from the child's point
of view.
92 1948 Act, s.2(1)(b)(iv) and (v); 1968 Act, s.16(2)
(d) and (e).
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difference. Section 2 is concerned with the 'intrinsic
failings of the parent rendering him parentally unfit.
But for section 1 it may be circumstances external to
the parental qualities of the parent which prevent him
from providing for the child's proper upbringing. So
the grounds of intervention under section 1 are potentially
wider than those in section 2.
14.27 The power to assume parental rights is available
only in relation to a child in the care of the local
authority under section l.93The overriding requirement
in section 1 is that intervention is necessary "in the
interests of the welfare of the child".94 There is no
similar requirement in section 2 in relation to the
decision of the local authority to assume parental rights,
presumably because the child may remain in the care of the
local authority only if it continues to be in his interests
to do so.95 But the interests of the child are a requirement
if the matter comes before the sheriff or the juvenile
court in England under the review procedures in the Act.9 6
Ultimately therefore either under section 1 or section 2
a child cannot be received into care nor his parent's rights
assumed by the local authority unless it is in the interests
of the child to do so, even if one of the other requirements
has been satisfied. The scheme of the legislation thus
9 3 1948 Act, s . 2 (1) ; 1968 Act, s . 16 (1) (a) .
94 1948 Act, s.1(1)(c) ; 1968 Act, s.l5(l)(c).
9 5 Para. 16.3.
96 1948 Act, s.2(5)(c); 1968 Act, s.l6(8)(a).
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comprehends at the threshold stage the interests both of
the parent and of the child in distinct but related





OFFICIAL CARE THRESHOLD REQUIREMENTS: THE JUDICIAL REGIME
Section 1 - Introduction
15.1 There is no reason why the State should not select
which of its various institutions is most appropriate in
the individual context to protect the interests of children.
Nor is there any reason why new institutions should not be
set up for the purpose: for example, children's hearings
in Scotland. Chapter 14 dealt with the administrative
regime of intervention. This chapter deals with the
judicial regime. It is purely a division of convenience.
Indeed it is probably inaccurate to some extent to deal
with children's hearings as part of the judicial regime.
One of the features of the Scottish system is the clear
division between adjudicative and discretionary functions,
simply because they are conferred on different bodies. The
same division of function holds good in England although in
practice, as one body exercises both functions, they tend
to merge into each other.
15.2 The pattern of judicial intervention is much the
same as the pattern of administrative intervention: the
satisfaction of threshold requirements prior to the
exercise of a substantive discretion. This is true of
the earlier legislation as it is of current legislation.
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The origins of judicial intervention may be found in the
mid-Victorian Industrial Schools Act 1866 1 and the
Reformatory Schools Act 18662. These provisions were
subsequently consolidated in the Children Act 19083 and
thereafter amended and consolidated by the Children and
Young Persons Act 19 33l4and the Children and Young Persons
(Scotland) Act 19375. The most recent enactments are the
Children and Young Persons Acts 1963 and 1969, the Social
Work (Scotland) Act 1968 and the Children Act 19756. The
legislation has thus been under almost constant review and
presumably reflects current values and attitudes. The
amendments from time to time of the threshold requirements
indicate the Parliamentary response to changing ideas. What
is striking is that the fundamental concepts have changed
little. The main reforms have been the introduction of more
sophisticated and sensitive institutions and procedures.
15.3 It is difficult to generalise with any degree of
accuracy on this point but the overall tendency seems to be
towards less precise prescription of the indicia of parental
abuse or deficiency and an increasing confidence that a
discretionary system will bring about the best or at least
1 29 S 30 Vict., c.118. This was preceded by the Industrial
Schools Act 1861 (24 £ 25 Vict. , c.113) and the Industrial
Schools (Scotland) Act 1861 (24 & 25 Vict., c.132).
2 29 £ 30 Vict., c.117. This was preceded by the Youthful
Offenders Act 1854 (17 £ 18 Vict., c.86).
3 8 Edw. 7, c.67.
4 23 £ 24 Geo. 5, c.12.
5 1 Edw. 8 £ 1 Geo. 6, c.37.
6 Respectively 1963 c.37, 1969 c. 54, 1968 c.49 and 1975 c.12.
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a justifiable decision as regards the child. For example,
the 1866 Act 7 talked quite specifically of being found
begging, receiving alms, being found wandering and not
having any home, being found destitute and frequenting
the company of reputed thieves. The 1908 Act8 introduced,
for example, unfitness to have the care of the child.
There was greater generalisation and increasing sophistic¬
ation in the 1933 Act which referred to falling into bad
associations and exposure to moral danger9. The most up-
to-date terminology is avoidable prevention of proper
development and need of care and control.10 The Scottish
provisions disclose a similar trend, where there has been
separate Scottish legislation. These expressions may
indicate a preference for a more scientific and professional
approach to child care and parental assessment but they may
create problems of interpretation: in other words
interpretational discretion.11
Section 2 - Civil and criminal criteria in the early
Legislation
15.4 The earlier legislation attempted to treat differently
those children who were technically guilty of an offence12
and those who were merely the victims of parental inadequacy^ 3
Later enactments have as a matter of deliberate policy14
tended to assimilate these two categories1.5 This may be a
7 Industrial Schools Act 1866, s.14.
8 Children Act 1908, s.58(l)(d).
9 Children and Young Persons Act 1933, s.61(1)(a).
10 Children and Young Persons Act 1969, s.l(2)(a).
11 See generally the Kilbrandon Report, pp.22 and 23;
Ingleby Report, pp.21 to 23.
12 Reformatory Schools Act 1866, s.14.
13 Industrial Schools Act 1866, s.14.
14 E.g. Kilbrandon Report, p.12.
15 Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968, s.32(2); Children and
Young Persons Act 1969, s.l(2).
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reflection of the view that juvenile crime is partly
the outcome of parental inadequacies; such deficiencies,
of course, may well be brought about by environmental
disadvantages. Whatever the justification, offenders
and non-offenders alike are now liable to undergo similar
"treatment".
15.5 This contemporary view seems to have commended
itself several decades ago to some Scottish judges. Why
this happened is not disclosed from the reports. It is
unlikely to have been deliberate. Sentencing juvenile
offenders seems always to have been a matter of some
concern to judges and the High Court of Justiciary has
usually required a positive statutory warrant before
imposing specific penalties upon children. The availability
of reformatory and industrial schools would seem to have
affected judicial views. There is, consistently with this,
evidence of an intention to consult the interests of the
child.
15.6 There is generally no threshold requirement to be
satisfied before a juvenile offender is sentenced, apart,
of course, from the commission of an offence. In McQuire
v Fairbairn1 6 a boy of fifteen, who had pleaded guilty to
a charge of breach of the peace, was sentenced to impris¬
onment for ten days and thereafter under section 14 of the
Reformatory Schools Act 1866 to be sent to a reformatory
school for five years. The reformatory school detention
16 (1881) 9 Rettie (J.) 4.
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sentence, though clearly competent, was quashed by the
High Court of Justiciary largely because it was
inappropriate:-
"... I am of opinion that this part of
the sentence [reformatory school
detention] was not warranted by the
conviction and cannot be sustained.
The statute on which it proceeded
was never intended to give the
magistrate power to send children,
under 15 years of age, or beyond it,
to a reformatory school for such
offences as this. Quite another
and much more serious class of offence
is suggested by the words of the
statute ." 17
Although the Act was widely drafted, the restriction
imposed by the court upon itself operated not as a
threshold requirement but as part of the exercise of
the judicial discretion.18
15.7 A construction consistent with this view was
applied to section 15 of the Industrial Schools Act 1865
by Lord McLaren in Hunter v Waddell.19 That section
provided that where a child apparently under twelve was
charged with an offence punishable with imprisonment or
a less punishment but had not been convicted of theft,
if the magistrate decided that the child ought to be dealt
with under the Act, he could order him to be sent to a
certified industrial school. The first statutory require¬
ments antecedent to the exercise of the power "0 were more
17 Ibid. at p.5 per Lord Young.
18 See also Farquharson v Guthrie (1884) 5 Couper 454,
Taylor v Tarras Cl901) 3 Adam "2 9 8 , Rorrison v. McDonald
(1894) , mentioned in Dewar, The Children Act 1908 and
other Acts affecting children in the United Kingdom
(Edinburgh, 1910) pp.36 and 37.
19 (1905) 7 Fraser (J.) 61.
20 Age and the penalty for the offence.
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formal than substantive; they were not fundamentally
threshold requirements relating to welfare. The desir¬
ability of dealing with a juvenile under the Act raised
issues of greater substance. Lord McLaren however
described the conditions under which children could be
sent to industrial schools in these words:-
"There is the provision applicable to
children who may be found begging or
wandering about without any fixed
occupation or place of abode, there
is the provision applicable to destitute
children, and there is this provision
applicable to children who have not
been well brought up, and who have
fallen into the commission of petty
crimes." 21
15.8 This sentence is a judicial paraphrase of the
statutory provisions and there is some doubt about the
provisions referred to by Lord McLaren. The first two
circumstances identified by the judge seem to reflect
some of the provisions in section 14 of the 1866 Act.
The references to "children ... not ... well brought up"
and the "commission of petty crimes" in his third
illustration are warranted by neither section 14 nor
section 15 of the Act. He may, however, have been putting
a policy gloss upon the provisions of section 15, which may
arguably be sufficiently wide to justify this type of
approach. The decision in that case probably did not turn
on this precise point, although the court seemed to regard
the sentence of detention in an industrial school as both
21 (1905) 7 Fraser (J.) 61 at p.63.
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competent and appropriate. Lord McLaren could see no
reason why "this was not a suitable case for sending
the boy to a certified industrial school".22 He failed
to give any justification, either legal or substantive,
for his views. The whole matter was treated very much
as an issue for the exercise of the court's statutory
discretion.
15.9 The case of Hunter v Wade.II2 3 is clearly unsat¬
isfactory. Although this point was not noted by Lord
McLaren in his judgement, it seems that the young offender
2 ^
had pleaded guilty to a charge of theft. The prosecutor
then withdrew the charge and the magistrate purported to
send him to an industrial school under section 15 of the
1866 Act. That section applies inter alia where a child
is "charged" with a certain offence. It is questionable
if the section applies where the "charge" is withdrawn.
On the other hand the part of Lord McLaren's judgment
already quoted refers to children not well brought up and
who have committed petty crimes. This reflects the
philosophy but not the terminology of section 14 of the
1866 Act. But this provision was not apparently founded
upon. In fact the requirements of that section do not
appear to have been fulfilled, for there was no evidence
of inadequate parental upbringing. On close scrutiny
therefore the competency of the sentence may be questionable.
22 Ibid, at p.64.
2 3 Ibid■
24 Ibid. at p.62 .
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This point escaped the attention of the High Court and
it is a matter of some importance. For, although the
High Court directed its detailed attention to another
point, the order pronounced by the magistrate remained
effective and must therefore be presumed to have been
regarded by the members of the court as both competent
and appropriate.
15.10 That issue apart, that decision indicates the
perhaps questionable practice of slipping conveniently
from criminal to non-criminal criteria for admission to
industrial schools or, in modern terms, for deciding
whether care proceedings are warranted or whether the
child is in need of care and protection. This judicial
uncertainty in treating these proceedings as civil or
criminal is reflected in two other cases. In Dunn v
Mustard2 5 the order of the sheriff-substitute removing
a child from the custody of his father under section 6
of the Prevention of Cruelty to Children Act 18942 6
following upon his conviction for cruelty was fundamentally
null because it referred, presumably by mistake, to the
incorrect statute. On the petition for suspension before
the High Court of Justiciary, there was judicial comment
on the nature of the proceedings, particularly whether the
order was reviewable in that Court or in the Court of Session.
The Lord Justice-Clerk commented:-
"It seems to me that an order of this
kind [depriving a parent found guilty
of cruelty towards his child of custody
of that child] is a proceeding taken in
direct connection with what is essentially
25 (1899) 1 Fraser (J.) 81.
26 57 S 58 Vict. , c.41.
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a criminal proceeding, viz., a
prosecution for cruelty to children
The whole information on which
the order rests is derived from
criminal proceedings . "27
According to Lord Adam:-
"The proceedings in this case commenced
with an application for the removal of
a child from the custody of its parent.
Prima facie that appears to be a civil
and not a criminal matter, but when we
look further into it the matter bears
a criminal complexion ... And if that
is the nature of the proceeding, it makes
no difference that the order committing
for trial and the order for custody are
separate." 28
15.11 The issue in that case was not the nature of the
threshold requirements for admission to an industrial
school but those needed to deprive a parent of custody.
There is however a fundamental contextual similarity
between the two problems. To classify as criminal the
proceedings taken to remove a parent from the custody of
his child as a result of alleged or proved cruelty is not
to equate such proceedings with an order to send a juvenile
offender to an industrial or reformatory school; such
proceedings are more analagous to those founded upon civil
criteria for admission to an industrial school. The
common element is some form of parental inadequacy. The
unfortunate aspect of Dunn v Mustard2 9 was treating as
criminal proceedings designed solely to deprive a parent
of custody. It is suggested that the allegation or proof
27 (1899) 1 Fraser (J.) 81 at p.83 per Sir J.H.A. Macdonald.
28 Ibid, at p.84 per Lord Adam.
29 Ibid.
of an offence against the child as the threshold
requirement for the exercise of the power of deprivation
does not colour the proceedings as "criminal".
15.12 A clear-cut instance of manipulating the civil
and criminal grounds for admission to an industrial school
is White v Jeans. 30 A boy of thirteen pleaded guilty to
a charge of theft and sentence was deferred for three days.
The order then pronounced by the magistrates stated that
the boy "apparently under the age of 14 years ... has
been found wandering and having a parent who does not
exercise proper guardianship over him"31 and directed
him to be sent to a certified industrial school. That
statement clearly reflects the wording of the second
limb of section 58(1) (b) of the Children Act 1908 , the
statute relevant to the proceedings. The threshold
requirements specified in section 58(1) are entirely
civil in character and it would seem to be incompetent
to exercise the power in section 58(1) in response to a
plea of guilty to a charge of theft. Subsections (2) and
(3) of section 58 certainly enable an offender in certain
circumstances to be sent to an industrial school but they
do not, on the face of the report at least, seem to apply.
Section 57(1) would probably have enabled the magistrate
to send the offender to a reformatory school but there was
no suggestion of the exercise of that power.
30 1911 S.C. (J.) 88.
31 Ibid. at p.90.
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15.13 The justification of the magistrate's order put
forward on behalf of the prosecutor was that new
proceedings were initiated on the second day. There does
not seem to be any evidence supporting the statement that
the child was "found wandering and having a parent who
[did] not exercise proper guardianship". Such evidence
would constitute the basis for an industrial school order.
It was nevertheless suggested for the prosecutor that the
boy's father had asked for the boy to be sent to an
industrial school and that in any event the order was
in the boy's best interests. These comments may well
have been true but clearly they could not justify an
order under section 58(1)(b).
15.14 On the basis of this analysis there is considerable
doubt about the validity of the order sending the child to
an industrial school. The High Court of Justiciary refused
to suspend the order, thus confirming their view of its
competency, although they had commented very critically
upon the irregularities of the first interlocutor pronounced
by the magistrate. The Lord Justice-Clerk, having commented
upon these irregularities, stated as regards.the second
order:-
"... in the boy's case the facts supply
no good reason for altering the order
pronounced in the proceedings taken with
a view to sending him to an industrial
school. There were new proceedings
instituted on 22nd September in order
to avoid the necessity of convicting
him of a crime, and these are not
affected by any defects there may have
been in the prior proceedings, which
were abandoned. I see nothing irr|^ular
as regards these new proceedings." -
32 Ibid. at p.93 per Sir J.H.A. Macdonald L.J.-C.
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15.15 Nothing more was said on this point. The High
Court apparently failed on the face of the report to
consider the fundamental competency of the industrial
school order. It may have been done with the very best
intentions, as in the case of the magistrate's decision,
but that does not justify a potentially incompetent order.
But even if the industrial school order had been competent
- probably not a difficult task for the prosecutor in the
circumstances - White v Jeans33 demonstrates a tendency
to blur the earlier distinctions between the civil and
criminal theshold requirements for making industrial and
reformatory school orders. It must be emphasised that
the Industrial and Reformatory Schools Acts represented
the introduction of radical concepts into the very delicate
area of parental rights in mid-Victorian society. It is
perhaps not surprising that the judiciary failed to some
extent to comprehend the fundamental nature of the legis¬
lation and thus allowed itself to be misled on some matters.
Section 3 - The requirements in general
(a) Introduction
15.16 On the face of the earlier statutory provisions
the power to send a youthful offender to an industrial
or reformatory school should have caused little difficulty,
for the requirements were minimal and straightforward, while
the important decision whether to make an order was
33 Ibid.
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discretionary.34 On the other hand it is understandable
why to remove a child from his parents for reasons of
parental inadequacy should have raised several problems
of interpretation and application. The threshold require¬
ments were couched in language which, even in the earlier
legislation, could give rise to a variety of interpretations.35
The trend in the legislation is towards increasing gener¬
ality;3 6 this will cause more interpretational difficulties.
For example, avoidable prevention of a child's proper
development,37 especially when coupled with the need of
care or control, is a concept of greater inherent flexibility
and generality than a child found begging or receiving alms.
Admittedly the earlier legislation had enacted as a ground
the circumstance of a child found wandering and not having
proper guardianship. The latter requirement contains an
element of interpretational discretion. This does not
distort the overall movement towards greater generality.
These provisions have been only infrequently scrutinised
by the courts. The reason may be that the issue is rarely
34 The statutes did not confer an absolute discretion:
the test was "expediency": e.g. Children Act 1908,
s.58(l). It was not until the enactment of Children
and Young Persons Act 1933, s.44 and the Children and
Young Persons (Scotland) Act 1937, s.49 that Parliament
provided some sort of policy to guide the courts.
35 Indeed it may be that the vagueness of the requirements
is deliberate drafting policy.
36 The Kilbrandon Report, p.58 recommended that in the
Scottish context only one reason should justify
referral to a children's hearing, namely "that prima
facie the child is in need of special measures of
education and training". Something like the present
series of grounds would then exemplify such circumstances.
37 Children and Young Persons Act 1969, 3.1(2)(a).
contested, so that the juvenile court operates more
often administratively than judicially.38 The older
authorities tend to be Scottish and the more recent
reported cases are English. To examine the Scottish
cases first thus presents an almost exact chronological
sequence.
(b) The background to the Scottish approach
15.17 The judicial tendency in Scotland to move from
criminal to civilly based requirements has already been
noted.39 The intention, no doubt commendable, may have
been to avoid any future stigma of criminality. But the
characterisation of proceedings to deprive a parent of
custody, even where the ground was the offence of cruelty,
as criminal40 rather conflicts with that intention. That
may, however, have been a minor judicial aberration for
in Wilson v Stirling41 Lord Moncrieff clearly characterised
the object of the legislation as preventive
"There can be no question as to the
importance and beneficial character
of the Industrial Schools Act of 1866.
It was intended to provide for cases
in which the provisions of the existing
law were found to be inadequate. Its
38 Technically it has both an adjudicative and an
administrative function, depending upon which part
of the proceedings is relevant. In Scotland this
distinction of function has been deliberate: the
sheriff adjudicates, the children's hearing acts
administratively.
39 Paras. 15.10 to 15.15.
40 Dunn v Mustard (1899) 1 Fraser (J.) 81.
41 7T874) 1 Rettie (J.) 8.
object was to step in and rescue from
a downward course a class of children
but too common amongst us who, though
not yet answerable to the criminal law
of the country, are in a fair way to
become so. It gives power to remove
them from their vicious surroundings,
and to provide them with lodging, food,
and education during a certain period
of youth. I should be sorry to say
anything that might throw difficulty
in the way of working such an Act.
I concur with counsel for the
respondent in holding that the classes
of children who fall under the 14th
section of the Act are not dealt with
as in themselves criminals. The object
of that clause, and I may say of the
statute generally, is not to punish
but to prevent. But it is clear that
all four divisions of that section
apply to children having no proper,
home or domestic superintendence.1,14
This analysis suggests that the statutory function contained
in section 14 of the Industrial Schools Act 1866 and in its
statutory successors is fundamentally administrative rather
than judicial, particularly having regard to the discretionary
power given to the eourt. The nature of the power is however
governed to some extent by the requirements for its exercise,
to the extent that they disclose its purpose. The admin¬
istrative nature of the legislation is supported by the
existence of an additional and clearly administrative
remedy under section 43 of the Act. Th'e availability of
such a remedy did not, of course, oust the jurisdiction of
the court to suspend the magistrate's order.
42 Ibid. at pp. 9 and 10 per Lord Moncrieff L.J.-C.
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15.18 Each of the statutory provisions in question
contains two elements: the threshold requirement and
the discretion. Some of the earlier statutes also
contained a more general requirement which gave the court
something in the nature of a second discretion, exercisable
before the principal power. They required the court to be
satisfied that it was "expedient" for the child to be
dealt with under the Act in question. This was dropped
from the 1933 and 1937 Acts but it re-appeared later in
a different and more specific form. Under the 1963 Act
the new requirement was failure to receive "such care,
protection and guidance as a good parent may reasonably
be expected to give";43 and under the 1969 Act "need of
care or control which he is unlikely to receive unless
the court makes an order under this section in respect
of him"."44 This later requirement was probably designed
as a nexus between the circumstances giving rise to the
need of care and the parent's responsibility for those
circumstances. Otherwise, it could be argued, a parent
could be deprived of his child for reasons for which the
parent was not responsible. The earlier reference to
"expediency" exemplified a looser nexus; the later
references a more positive one. They acknowledge in an
oblique fashion a stronger parental rights approach to
deprivation circumstances rather than a child-orientated
approach.
43 Children and Young Persons Act 1963, s.2.
44 Children and Young Persons Act 1969, s.l(2).
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15.19 Many of the difficulties involved in administering
this type of legislation arise from problems of communication,
investigation and information-gathering. Perhaps the
official intermediary under the Social Work (Scotland) Act
1968, namely the reporter, will solve some of these problems.
It has however been one of the features of the earlier
examples of this legislation that the issue may be brought
before the relevant court by "any person".45 The 1933 Act
restricted the category of informant to a "local authority,
constable or authorised person"d 6 The 1963 Act made no
change in this regard and the position has been preserved
in the 1969 Act.1*7 On the other hand, under section 37(1)
of the Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968, any person who has
reasonable cause to believe that a child may be in need of
compulsory measures of care may pass to the reporter the
available information.
15.20 Statistics on informants do not seem to be available
but a glance at the earlier Scottish cases suggests that
the public at large was not inspired to exercise their
rights in relation to children whom they considered might
have required the protection afforded by the legislation.
An inspector of the Royal Scottish Society for the Prevention
of Cruelty to Children, the apparently only person "authorised"
for the purposes of the more recent legislation, has promoted
8
proceedings on a number of occasions. The police are
45 Industrial Schools Act 1866, s.14; Children Act 1908,
s . 58(1) .
46 Children and Young Persons Act 1933, s.62(l).
47 Children and Young Persons Act 1969, s.l(l).
48 E.g. Dunn v Mustard (1899) 1 Fraser (J.) 81; Gh_ v.
Minister of Pensions 1950 S.L.T. (Sh. Ct.) 79;
Gillespie, Petitioner 1964 S.L.T. (Sh. Ct.) 67.
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occasionally involved.49 Relatives seem to have little
interest in removing children from their parents but more
in securing the child's release from the care of the local
authority. It is probably too soon to ascertain whether
the current Scottish machinery, centred upon the reporter,
is an incentive to the public at large to commit themselves
to child protection.50
(c) The legislation in detail: England and Scotland
15.21 It has already been suggested that the legislation
demonstrates a trend towards greater generality in the
substance of the threshold requirements. Despite the
greater specificity of the earlier legislation, attempts
have been made judicially to produce a generic description
of some or all of the threshold requirements.5 1 The common
element of these requirements in the Industrial Schools
Act 1866 appeared to Lord Moncrieff to be "children
having no proper home or domestic superintendence".5 2
This comment may be helpful even today. It postulates
a value judgment upon the adequacy of the home and of
the parents. The early legislation assisted the judges
by providing greater specificity in the requirements.
The current rules 53 require a similar kind of value judgment
they are however more difficult to interpret and apply.
Wilson v Stirling (1874) 1 Rettie (J.) 8; Goodbrand,
Petitioner 1915, 1 S.L.T. 446.
50 See also Clive E.M., "Getting children out of dangerous
1976 S.L.T. (News) 201.
51 Rather like the recommendation of the Kilbrandon Report,
p.58; para.15.16, n.36.
52 Wilson v Stirling (1874) 1 Rettie (J.) 8 at p.10 per
Lord Moncrieff L.J.-C.
53 For general comments, see Bevan, pp.23 to 26; Watson
and Austin, pp. 33 to 36; Holden, p.107.
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Paragraph (a) of section 1(2) of the Children and Young
Persons Act 1969, for example, sets out criteria which
are to some extent quite challenging. The ground of ill-
treatment5 4 may be difficult to describe but to recognise
it in practice should be less difficult. It is the largely
physical consequence of certain instances of parental
inadequacy. Avoidable impairment or neglect of the child's
health, probably mental as well as physical,55 may also
be readily identifiable in practice; the effect on mental
health may be however more difficult to establish.
15.22 These grounds relate to the consequences of past
conduct. As such they are not too difficult to apply.
Avoidable prevention of the child's proper development
is a more challenging concept. It is probably necessary
at the outset in any individual case to establish what
is the particular child's proper development. That
involves an examination of what norms are appropriate
for the individual child. Then the question is whether
such development is being prevented or neglected; and
if so, whether it is avoidable. Compared with ill-treatment,
impairment or neglect of health, which may be established
largely if not wholly by reference to past events, proof
of this requirement involves an element' of prognosis
founded upon a valid diagnosis. Paragraphs (b) and (bb)
of subsection (2 )5 6 latch. on to the probability of these
requirements being met and thus enlarge the already
54 Holden, p.107, seems to equate ill-treatment in this
context with ill-treatment as an offence under the
Children and Young Persons Act 1933, s.l.
55 See Bevan, p.23; Holden, p.107. This was recommended
by the Ingleby Report, p.149, if that was not already
the position in relation to the 1933 Act.
56 1969 Act, s.l. Paragraph (.bb) was added in 1975:
Children Act 1975, s.108 and Sched.3, para.67.
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significant problems of establishing the ground. One
of the features of these paragraphs is the reference
to the "household" of which the child and a convicted
person are members. This is explicit recognition that
the legislation is not restricted to children of their
nuclear family and is available to protect children from
step-parents, as in the Maria Colwell case. On the
other hand, paragraphs (c) to (f) of the same subsection
relate to an existing state of affairs and are not per se
a projection into the future. But they too may involve
considerable problems of interpretation and application,
although the range of difficulty does not include prognosis.
15.23 All the criteria set out in subsection (2) attract
an additional requirement;57 namely, proof that the child
is in need of care or control which he is unlikely to
receive in the absence of an order made in these proceedings.
This introduces in all cases, therefore, both a diagnostic
and a prognostic element.5 8 Firstly, is the child in need
of care or control? 5 9 There is no statutory need for any
link to be established between the circumstances in
paragraphs (a) to (f) and the need of care or control.
57 According to Watson and Austin, p.33 "an over-riding
condition".
58 This is the wider approach claimed by the legislation's
sponsors: see Watson and Austin, p.35.
59 An integral part of this question is what is care or
control. S.70 of the 1969 Act provides inclusive
definitions of "care" and "control". S.32(3) of the
1968 Act provides an inclusive definition of "care".
The two are by no means identical. Generally see
Stevenson 0., "Care or control : a view of intermediate
treatment" (19 71) 2 Social Work Today No.4, p. 3 where
"control" is stated to view the problem from society's
point of view and "care" from the child's point of view.
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The need may therefore be by reason of some other
circumstances, although in practice this is probably
unlikely in view of the comprehensive nature of para¬
graphs (a) to (f). Secondly, if care or control is
needed, are the parents or other guardians unlikely to
provide it? This effectively introduces a causal nexus
between the need for care, founded upon the statutory
indicia, and parental or similar inadequacy or deficiency.
This clearly involves an element of speculation.60
15.24 The pattern in section 32(2) of the Social Work
(Scotland) Act 1968 is different. There is, for example,
no overall need of care or control from some source other
than the parent.61 Until the introduction of the Children
Act 1975 paragraphs (b) and (c) of section 32(2) of the
1968 Act set out a statutory connection between lack of
parental care and the indicia of need. This requirement
has now been dropped from paragraph (b)62 which means that
in Scotland a child who is inter alia exposed to moral
danger may be in need of compulsory measures of care.
In England on the other hand, exposure to moral danger is
not enough. The child must also be in need of care or
control which he is unlikely to receive unless an order
in care proceedings is made in respect of him.63 Thus
60 According to Clarke Hall £ Morrison, p.132, the test
is now clearly objective and not dependent upon what
would be reasonable for the individual parents in
question.
6.1 1. o.. no "care or control" requirement.
62 Children Act 1975, s.108 and Sched. 3, para. 54(a).
63 Children and Young Persons Act 1969, s.l(2)(c).
in Scotland the question of need arises at the dispositional
stage of the process;64 in England at the threshold stage.
Paragraph (c) of section 32(2) however has retained the
statutory link between the lack of parental care and the
likelihood of causing the child unnecessary suffering or
seriously impairing his health or development. Similarly
in England avoidable prevention or neglect of the child's
proper development is not enough; the "care or control"
requirement must also be satisfied.65 All the other
Scottish criteria stand alone. In practice the difference
between the two systems most likely to be important relates
to the "offence" requirement. In Scotland the commission
of an offence is enough to qualify for compulsory measures
of care. 66 In England a finding of guilty together with
satisfaction of the "care and control" requirement is
necessary. 67 The distinction, clearly drawn, is a matter
of policy; but each system must be looked at in its own
context, particularly, so far as Scotland is concerned,
with respect to the powers of the reporter. The Scottish
Act thus pays less attention overall to the interests of
the parent than the English legislation. But the difference
is marginal. The law of Scotland appears to presume some
element of parental failing for the purposes of all the
paragraphs of section 32(2) of the 1968 Act except paragraph
64 Para 18.27.
65 1969 Act, s.l(2)(a).
66 1968 Act, s.32(2)(g).
67 1969 Act, s.1(2)(f).
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without giving the parent any chance to deny his
inadequacy. In England it is always a matter of proof.
To that extent England places more weight upon the
integrity of parental rights and interests and Scotland
is more welfare-orientated.
(d) The approach to the threshold requirements: Scotland
15.25 Scottish judicial authorities on this legislation
are sparse and, such as they are, they regrettably throw
little light upon the legislation. It will be recalled
that in Wilson v Stirling6 8 LordAdescnbed the
threshold requirements in section 14 of the Industrial
Schools Act 1866 as applying to children "having no proper
home or domestic superintendence"69 That rather archaic
description is useful even today for it points to some
recognisable standards of parental adequacy. In that case
the ground of the petition to send the boy to an industrial
school was that he had been found begging or receiving alms.
The child had apparently called at a house, where he and
his mother were well-known, and begged "a piece". As the
decision of the High Court of Justiciary turned on a point
of procedure, it was not necessary to consider whether these
facts amounted to "begging" under the Act. Lord Young,
alone among his colleagues to comment, indicated that
this was "not clear".70 It does seem rather narrow to
68 (1874) 1 Rettie (J.) 8.
69 Ibid. at p.10.
70 Ibid. at p.13.
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to classify as "begging" one request for bread at a
private household. Given the context of the Act,
something much more significant was probably contemplated
by the legislature. But even if the conduct of the boy
amounted to "begging", it was open to the court to decline
to make an industrial school order if it was not expedient
to deal with the boy in that way. That might have been
the easier way of solving that problem.
15.26 In Goodbrand - Petitioner' 1 the decision turned
on the statutory procedure prior to the stage of deciding
whether the requirements for making an industrial school
order had been satisfied. The substantive allegation
was that the children were residing in a brothel with
their mother. On the face of it, this fact would seem
to have been covered by section 58(1)(g) of the Children
Act 1908. There are not enough facts available to decide
whether the proviso to paragraph (f), namely proof of
proper guardianship and due care, was satisfied. Sheriff-
substitute Lyell made some remarks highly critical of the
Act, particularly in its application to Scotland, although
they were not directed to the substantive sections:-
"I cannot say that I am surprised that
some difficulty is occasioned to public
officers and others in their endeavours
to enforce the provisions of the
Children Act 1908 in this country." 7 2
71 1915, 1 S.L.T. 446.
72 Ibid. at p.446 per Sheriff-substitute Lyell.
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Thus in this case also an opportunity to consider
the substantive provisions of the legislation was lost.
15.27 The same conclusion is true for most of the
other Scottish cases. For example, in Dunn v Mustard 7 3
and Gillespie, Petitioner 7 4 the ground was parental
cruelty, the offence under section 12 of the Children
and Young Persons (Scotland) Act 1937 and subsumed under
section 65(1)(b)(i) of that Act within the definition of
"in need of care or protection". In Franks v. Glasgow
Corporation ,7 5 G v Minister of Pensions7 8 and G_ v
Glasgow Corporation77 the ground was neglect. Thus
in all these cases the parental conduct was so extreme
as to constitute a criminal offence. In no case, perhaps
not surprisingly, was the issue analysed.
15.28 Penningham Parish Council v McAdam7 8 was an
odd case. A mother and her illegitimate child had become
chargeable to the Parish poor fund. The council was
liable under section 38 of the Industrial Schools Act 1866
to make certain repayments to the Treasury and attempted
to recover these from the child's putative father. When
the child was four and in receipt of a generous payment
of aliment from the putative father, she was committed
to a certified industrial home for eleven years; the ground
73 (1899) 1 Fraser (J.) 81.
74 1964 S.L.T. (Sh. Ct.) 67.
75 (1942 ) 59 Sh. Ct. Rep. .139.
76 1950 S.L.T. (Sh. Ct.) 79.
77 (1954) 70 Sh. Ct. Rep. 358.
78 (1896) 13 Sh. Ct. Rep. 126.
was that she had been ".found destitute and not under
proper guardianship". In the first place, that ground
does not accurately reflect the phraseology of the
statute; nor does it seem relevant in the circumstances
reported. Is a child in receipt of aliment destitute?
In any event, Sheriff-substitute Lyell decided that the
putative father could not be held responsible for the
circumstance that the child was found destitute and not
under proper guardianship. The council's claim was
therefore rejected.
15.29 Most of the issues discussed in these cases were
procedural. One point however has been recently established.
It in a sense is also procedural but it has more fundamental
implications. To mention it is not entirely out of place
here. The first appeal to the Court of Session under the
Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968 concerned a decision of
Sheriff Bell whether the grounds of referral had been
established.7 9 The stated ground was "lack of parental
care is likely to cause unnecessary suffering or serious
8 0
impairment of health or development!'. The sheriff's
decision on this ground was rejected by the mother;
it was held by the court on appeal that the decision
whether the ground had been established- should be
reached on the most up-to-date information that could
be laid before the court.81 According to Lord Grant L.J.-C.,
79 Kennedy v B_ 1973 S.L.T. 38.
80 Supported by allegations of overcrowded and inadequate
accommodation and of the verminous condition of the
child and his clothing.
81 On the assumption, presumably, that the child's future
was at stake, not merely past events.
it would be unfortunate if the sheriff had to hold as
established grounds of referral which were based on a
situation which, at the date of the hearing, had funda¬
mentally altered or ceased to exist. The submission of
current information on the threshold requirements is thus
important. 82 It reinforces the "welfare" approach to
compulsory admission into care.
15.30 Although some of the grounds constituting need
of compulsory measures of care83 reflect earlier legis¬
lation, both civil and criminal,84 there is no reason
to presume that they will be similarly interpreted.
There is no necessary correlation. 85 In Neep, 86 for
example, there was the possibility that the grounds for
compulsory measures of care might be established even
where charges of ill-treatment of the children had been
found not proven in earlier criminal proceedings.
15.31 It would have been simpler if medical operations
and blood transfusions without the consent of parents had
• • • 87
been treated uniformly under the legislation. Failure
82 See generally Grant J.P., "Bridging Gaps" 1973
S.L.T. (News) 190.
83 E.g. neglect, ill-treatment.
84 Especially the Children and Young Persons Act 1933,
s.l and the Children and Young Persons (Scotland)
Act 1937, s.12.
85 But in practice since the operation of the 1969 Act
it has been normal to assume that a verdict of guilty
in the criminal courts would sustain a finding of ill-
treatment for the purposes of s.l(2)(b) of the 1969
Act: Blake L.W., "Battered Babies and the powers of
the juvenile court - section 1(2)(b), Children and
Young Persons Act 1969" (1973) 137 J.P. 242.
86 [1972] The Scotsman, 20 April.
87 I.e. as an offence under the Children and Young Persons
Acts, as a threshold requirement for care proceedings
or the need of compulsory measures of care.
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to consent to an operation may, it will be recalled,
amount to neglect contrary to section 1 of the Children
and Young Persons Act 19 3 3 .8 8 The current issue, howevei1,
is whether failure to consent to an operation89 or to a
blood transfusion90 justifies compulsory measures of care.
The matter is not uncomplicated, having regard to public
health legislation and particularly to the legal protection
afforded to the religious predispositions of parents
vis-a-vis their children?1 Fundamentally there is a
conflict of policy which the courts are forced to resolve
by what amounts to a political decision in determining
which principle is given priority.
15.32 There is little doubt that the courts in several
states in the U.S.A. may competently order blood transfusions
for children contrary to their parents' wishes.92 Each
case depends, of course, upon its own circumstances and
88 Para.11.18; Oakey v Jackson [1914] 1 K.B. 215.
89 Recently in the American case of Houle [1974] The
Times, 19 February, a court in Maine ordered doctors
to operate on a deformed baby against the wishes of
the parents. The baby subsequently died [1974] The
Times, 26 February. For comment see [1974] The Times,
20 February.
90 Which is presumably a type of operation.
91 Paras. 44.16 to 44.21.
92 See generally Kitchen and Paulsen, Juvenile Courts:
Cases and Materials (Brooklyn, 1967T7 p.222 to 229
and (1966) 6 4 Michigan L.R. 554 at pp.555 and 5 56
where it is stated: "In compliance with the state's
duty as parens patriae to protect the welfare of minors,
the courts have consistently authorised the administration
of blood transfusions to children whose parents have
refused, on the basis of their religious beliefs as
Jehovah's Witnesses, to consent to such treatment.
The courts' parens patriae jurisdiction over minors
emanates from the statutory powers of juvenile courts
to provide for the protection and control of minors,
and allows the courts, under appropriate circumstances,
to substitute their authority for that of a child's
parents."
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the courts seem prepared to rely either upon their
neglect jurisdiction93 or their powers under the parens
patriae doctrine.99
15.33 The competency of using theChildren and Young
Persons Acts in England for the purpose of forcing a
child to have a blood transfusion against the parents'
wishes has never been judicially determined. If parental
failure to allow a child to undergo a medically desirable
operation can constitute a breach of section 1 of the 1933
Act,95 it would be difficult to argue that a similar
failure would not satisfy section 1(2)(a) of the 1969
Act that the child's health was being avoidably neglected9. 6
The success of the care proceedings would thus depend upon
proof of the second requirement, namely need of care or
control which he is otherwise unlikely to receive. The
parent will have stated97 his intention not to provide
this element of care. The issue will become whether the
transfusion is an element of care needed by the child.
Medical evidence, it is suggested, would effectively
determine that issue.
93 I.e. their statutory powers of intervention similar
to those in the Children and Young Persons Act 1969
in England and the Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968.
94 Which seems to be more widely available in U.S.A.
jurisdictions than in England.
95 Oakey v Jackson [1914] 1 K.B. 216; Clarke Hall S
Morrison, p.17, and Bevan pp.189 and 192.
96 There are differences between the statutes but the
underlying common element is "neglect". The 1969
Act does not require "wilful".
97 As a matter of hypothesis in these circumstances.
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15.34 Official advice in England, however, indicates
that the Children and Young Persons Acts should not be
used for this purpose.9 8 Their use attracts "a number
of legal and practical difficulties"9.9 The official
circular seems to be more concerned with protecting the
doctor against the parents rather than with the child's
interests. In most cases the clinical judgment of two
or more medical consultants will reduce or eliminate
the risk of civil proceedings by parents but this may
not always be so. The official view is, of course,
entirely understandable on a practical plane; and it
must be conceded that there was no suggestion that care
proceedings would be incompetent. It remains regrettable
nonetheless that the child's interests were given little
or no weight.
15.35 In Scotland, on the other hand, the courts on
at least two occasions have intervened in this matter.
In an anonymous case1 before Perth Children's Hearing
it was decided that a baby whose parents refused a blood
transfusion 2 was in need of compulsory measures-of care.
Sheriff Kermack had earlier opened the way for this
decision by determining that the parents' refusal
"constituted a lack of parental care which could cause
the child unnecessary suffering or impair his health and
development".3 It would seem difficult, in the light of
98 Ministry of Health Circular No. F/P9/1B dated 14 April
1967 and Home Office Circular No. 63/1968 dated 5 March
1968, both reproduced in Clarke Hall S Morrison, pp.
693 and 694. They do not relate to Scotland.
99 Ibid.
1 ri973] The Scotsman, 27 April.
2 Because of their religious beliefs as Jehovah's Witnesses.
3 [1973] The Scotsman, 27 April. The report does not
reflect the precise terminology of the Act but its
implied reference to the Act is clear.
4 3 6
the phraseology of section 32(2) Cc) of the Social Work
(Scotland) Act 1968, to question the sheriff's inter¬
pretation, particularly when it is recalled that section
32(3) of the Act includes "treatment" as part of "care".
There would seem little doubt that a blood transfusion
can constitute "treatment".
15.36 Different proceedings seem to have been used
in McManus1* where Sheriff Henderson granted a petition
allowing staff at Stirling Royal Infirmary to give a baby
a blood transfusion after his parents had refused permission.5
These could not have been proceedings under the Social Work
(Scotland) Act 1968 for at least two reasons. Firstly,
such proceedings do not proceed by petition. Secondly,
it would not be for the sheriff to determine the merits
of care under the Act. It must therefore have been a
petition to the sheriff in the exercise of his custodial
jurisdiction. There is probably no reason in principle
why the sheriff or indeed the Court of Session should not
deal with one aspect only of the child's relationship
with his parents 6 and in this sense these proceedings
would be similar to the prerogative wardship jurisdiction
of the High Court in England. It is difficult to comment
further, given the brief report in the-newspaper, and it
is unfortunate that the Sheriff's innovative judgment was
not fully reported.
4 [1973] The Scotsman, 13 September.
5 Again because of their religious beliefs as Jehovah's
Witnesses.
6 Para. 45.55 and 45.56.
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15.37 The Scottish attitude contrasts with the much
narrower views adopted, officially at least, in England
and it is much more consistent with the experience in the
U.S.A. Just as some American judges have relied upon both
traditional and statutory powers, so the Scottish sheriffs
have taken a wide view of their old and new functions which
is entirely consistent with proper attention being paid to
the child's interest in the matter. This does not mean that
the parents' position is ignored. But in the context of
blood transfusions at least, the parents' religious and
other predispositions are given less weight than the needs
of the child, once the threshold requirements, without
which there is no jurisdiction, have been satisfied.
(e) The approach to the threshold requirements: England
15.38 Although some of the more recent English cases
contribute more to an understanding of the civil threshold
requirements than the Scottish cases, it is nevertheless
significant that very few disputes have found their way
into the law reports. Earlier English cases determined
which institution was liable to receive the child or young
person7, or the appropriate punctum temporis for determining
residence for a similar purpose.8 Some discussion has
taken place on the status of the local authority exercising
statutory powers of care. But relatively few have dealt
7 Stoke-on-Trent Borough Council v Cheshire C.C. [1915]
3 K.B. 699.
8 South Shields Corporation v Liverpool Corporation [1943]
1 All E.R. 338.
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with the substance of the threshold requirements. This
is surprising in view of the large number of children in
care. Perhaps the allegations are admitted as matters
of fact; perhaps legal advice or representation is
unavailable for various reasons or not sought; perhaps
the parents are not concerned; perhaps the interest of
the child is simply ignored. The reasons are admittedly
not known. On the other hand the generality or lack of
specificity in the provisions may in the normal case make
an appeal too speculative.
15.39 The history of the legislative provisions has
already been considered. They represent an attempt to
achieve a balance between the interests of the parents
and of the children. The legislation thus contains an
inherent regard for the interests if not the rights of
parents9, despite the policy of protection of the child.
They do so indirectly rather than directly, for the
statutory provisions in both jurisdictions are framed
passively rather than actively; that is, by way of the
effect on the child rather than in terms of parental or
other responsibility. The courts, it will be seen, tend
to reflect this view of the legislation.
15.40 The Children and Young Persons Act 1969 does
not specifically attribute the responsibility for the
existing state of affairs to a parent or guardian; the
9 There is however only one reference to "parent" or
"parental" in s.l(l) of the 1969 Act and two in s.32
of the 1968 Act.
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"need of care or control" test is, no doubt deliberately,
left open. The 1963 Act applied the test of a "good
parent". The 1933 Act directly referred to the unfitness
of the parent or guardian of the child in question. The
same is true of Scotland; the 1968 Act refers generally
to "lack of parental care", thus distinguishing that
requirement from the lack or inadequacy of the care of
the particular parent or guardian in question. Thus in
both jurisdictions the test is objective. The consequence
is that anyone responsible for a child is amenable to
these statutory provisions. In In re B (a minor)1,0
for example, the ill-treatment meted out to the child11
seems to have been the foundation for the child's placement
in care of the local authority. This distinction is not
without significance. The question "does this child need
care?" is different from "is this parent providing
inadequate care". The approach of one question, it
is suggested, is quite the reverse of the approach of
the other. The current legislation thus indicates an
attitude more sympathetic to the child but it nevertheless
requires an assessment of the care handed out to the child
at the time of investigation.
15.41 While applying the 1963 Act definition in In re
An Infant (Care or Protection)1 2 Lord Parker C.J. drew
attention to the duality of the requirements to be proved.
10 (1974) 124 N.L.J. 620, [1974] The Times, 22 June.
11 Probably by the child's stepfather, for he was
convicted of causing actual bodily harm.
12 (1965) 63 L.G.R. 338.
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In that case they were firstly falling into bad
associations or being exposted to moral danger and
thereafter the non-receipt of such care, protection
and guidance as a good parent might reasonably be
expected to give. Such a view was implicit in the
view expressed by Lord Goddard C.J. in Bowers v Smith13
where the exposure of the young persons to moral danger
was their attempted sexual intercourse with a seventeen
year old girl in a makeshift structure at the end of a
football field. He argued:-
"It is a very serious thing to say ...
that because young adolescents commit
some sexual misbehaviour ... it is due
to neglect on the part of the parents."11*
It is thus not justifiable, in principle at least, to
assume parental inadequacy where a child or young person
is otherwise within the definition of "in need of care
or protection". The issues of child conduct and parental
responsibility are separate although, as it will be seen
later, they are linked. For the purposes of section 1
of the 1969 Act and section 32 of the 1968 Act there would
.appear to be no need to prove a causal nexus between the
delinquent behaviour and the inadequacy of parental care.
Section 4 - The individual grounds
(a) Exposure to moral danger
15.42 To turn now to consider the substance of some of
the requirements in turn: the ground most closely considered
13 [1953] 1 All E.R. 320.
14 Ibid. at p.323.
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by the courts is "exposure to moral danger". Some
attention has also been devoted to the analogous
provision "falling into bad associations". Both
appear in the Scottish Act of 1968; only the former
is included in the English legislation of 1969. The
pattern of the legislation has, of course, changed over
the years, but "exposure to moral danger" has remained a
relevant ground, although the 1933 Act included others
to exemplify the meaning of "exposure to moral danger".
That has always been one of the least precise grounds
in the legislation.
15,43 There seems little doubt that, whatever circum¬
stances are contemplated by "exposure to moral danger",
they need not amount to conduct which is criminal. The
circumstances of the cases considered by the English courts
suggest that the moral danger to which the children may be
exposed is normally sexual in origin. It nevertheless
seems clear that contact with drugs, drug pedlars or
criminals could amount to exposure to moral danger.15
The word "moral" is flexible enough to include widely
differing circumstances and to vary with changing mores.
Indeed the adoption of the appropriate moral context was
one of the difficulties in Mohamed v Knott1. 6
15 E.g. Holden, p.107.
16 [1969] 1 Q.B. 1.
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15.4U The earliest of three principal cases, Bowers
v Smith1,7 involved section 61(1) of the 19 3 3 Act.
Three boys under the age of seventeen had been sent to
play football in a field. There they had or attempted
to have sexual intercourse with a seventeen year old
girl in a makeshift structure at the edge of the field.
The justices considered that the requirements of the
Act had been satisfied and placed the boys under the
supervision of a probation officer. The Divisional
Court set aside these orders not because the boys had
not been exposed to moral danger but because the events
in themselves did not suggest any lack of proper parental
care. The decision thus turned upon the second of the
two requirements. There was nothing to indicate that
actual or attempted sexual intercourse did not amount
to exposure to moral danger1. 8
15.45 The allegation in In re An Infant (Care or
Protection)9 was that a girl of eleven was either falling
into bad association or was exposed to moral danger. She
had apparently been sexually assaulted at the age of eight
by her cousin's husband; he had also been sentenced to
thirty months' imprisonment in respect of unlawful sexual
intercourse with her when she was eleven; she had been
indecently assaulted by her brother on at least two
17 [1953] 1 All E.R. 320.
18 The unreality of this ground is clear if the question
is asked - was the girl in the case not also exposed to
moral danger? Indeed it could be argued that merely
being in existence involves exposure to moral danger.
To be in danger, it is suggested, is quite different.
The difficulty is brought about perhaps by the statutory
passivity of the child or young person allegedly in need
of care or control or protection. The child or young
person may or may not bring exposure to moral danger
upon himself. The possibilities seem almost endless.
19 (1965) 63 L.G.R. 338.
occasions and also by a cousin?0 As in Bowers v Smith21
there was no suggestion that these circumstances did not
amount to "falling into bad associations" or "exposure to
moral danger"; the decision again turned upon parental
responsibility.
15.4-6 The problem in Mohamed v Knott2 2 was different.
The wife, a partner to a Nigerian Moslem marriage, was just
over thirteen years of age. The husband had earlier
engaged in Nigeria in a sexual career which could be
described as promiscuous. After they had arrived in
England, the husband was treated for venereal disease
contracted as a result of intercourse with a prostitute
in Nigeria. After he was cured, he asked for his wife
to be fitted with a contraceptive device. These circum¬
stances were drawn to the attention of the authorities
by their medical adviser. The justices, applying the
definition in the 1963 Act and founding upon "exposure
to moral danger", made a fit person order in favour of
the London Borough of Southwark. In coming to this
conclusion they applied inter alia the standards of
• • 2 3
"any decent minded English man or woman".
20 She was probably not only exposed to but also
actually in moral danger.
21 [1953] 1 All E.R. 320.
22 [1969] 1 Q.B. 1.
23 Ibid. at p.l5per Lord Parker C.J. quoting the justices.
There was no indication how such a standard was to be
ascertained.
1+1+it
15.47 The Divisional Court on appeal revoked the fit
person order. The potentially polygamous marriage of the
parties was recognised and the status of wife thus
afforded to the girl. Her marriage did not disqualify
her from the protection afforded to any "child or young
person" .2 ^ Most importantly it was decided that the nature
and quality of the relationship of the parties was to be
judged not merely by English standards but by reference to
the background of the parties themselves?5 On that basis
there was nothing "inevitably repugnant" about the girl's
way of life; marriage at an early age was natural and
for a girl of thirteen to marry a man of twenty five was
not abhorrent.Lord Parker C.J. summed up his views
"Granted that the appellant [husband] may
be said to be a bad lot, that he has done
things in the past that nobody would
approve of, it does not follow from that
that the wife, happily married to the
appellant, is under any moral danger
by associating and living with him.
For my part, as it seems to me, it
could only be said that she was in
moral danger if one was considering
somebody brought up in and living in
our way of life, and to hold that she
is in moral danger in the circumstances
of this case can only be arrived at, as
it seems to me, by ignoring the way of
life in which she was brought up, and
the appellant was brought up."26
24 Ibid. at p. 14 per Lord Parker C.J. The applicability
of this legislation to a wife who is also a child or
young person and whose husband is the source of moral
danger, as here, suggests that these proceedings could
in effect bring about a judicial separation, a purpose
for which they were probably not intended. On the
general question whether care and protection are
relevant for infant husbands or wives, see "Care and
Protection: Infant Husband or Wife" (1940) 104 J.P. S
L.G.R. 35 and "Care or Protection: Infant Wife or Husband"
(1944) 108 J.P. S L.G.R. 14.
2 5 Ibid. at p. .15.
26 Ibid. at pp. 15 and 16.
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This emphasises the flexibility of the test of moral
danger. The way appears to be open to look not at the
standards of society at large but at the standards
relevant to the parties in question. Such standards
are not entirely self-imposed. Account must be taken
of the standards of the parties; but there is no
obligation for them to be decisive. This represents
a considerable modification. Mohamed v Knott27
however may be exceptional. It may represent an
attempt by an English court to avoid imposing purely
English moral standards upon persons for whom such
standards were clearly notappropriate.
15.4-8 The earlier cases turned, it has been seen, upon
factors other than exposure to moral danger? 8 In each
of these cases the standards of parents were available
as a basis for the assessment of parental care and
responsibility. In Mohamed v Knott2 9 on the other
hand the girl's parents found no place in the arguments
of the court. Their absence from England was sufficient,
apparently, to disqualify them. It is thus not surprising
that the matter of parental care, so vital in the other
cases, did not arise. The idea of a wife being exposed
to moral danger by associating with her husband, however
relevant in a matrimonial context, seems strange in the
27 Ibid.
28 Rather upon the quality of parental care and parental
responsibility for the events in question.
29 [1969] 1 Q.B. 1.
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context of children and young persons. The case may
therefore be regarded as special in the light of its
own circumstances. If the judicial dicta are extrapolated
to an English context, the decision is entirely consistent
pro tanto with earlier authority. For a young girl to
associate with a person of proved sexual promiscuity is
exposure to moral danger.
(b) The "sibling" effect
15.49 One of the grounds which has caused a certain
amount of difficulty of interpretation is section 1(2)(b)
of the 1969 Act; not, strangely, from the substantive
point of view but simply from an ambiguity of meaning.
The substance of the ground is the probability that the
child's proper development will be avoidably prevented
or neglected or his health will be avoidably impaired or
neglected or he will be ill-treated, "having regard to
the fact that the court or another court was found that
that condition is or was satisfied in the case of another
child or young person who is or was a member of the
household to which he belongs". The intention is clear:
to enable a court to take action before the child's
welfare is prejudiced by parents already found inadequate
with regard to a child of the same household. 30
30 See e.g. Surrey County Council v S_ [1973] 3 All E.R.
1074 at p.1076 per Lord Denning M.R. and at p.1078 per
Lawton L.J. See also Kepple [1974] The Times, 17
April; The Scotsman, 18 April, where the newly born
son of Mrs Pauline Kepple (Maria Colwell's mother) was
the subject of a place of safety order and potentially
a care order on the ground of the mother's neglect of
her other children.
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15.50 In Surrey County Council v S__3 1 an elder
daughter was allegedly ill-treated by her parents.
The girl subsequently died; her father was charged
with but acquitted of her murder. After the death of
the elder daughter the county council attempted to
bring the younger daughter into their care and control
in terms of proceedings under section 1(2)(b) of the
1969 Act; the ground being the probability of the
younger daughter being ill-treated, having regard to
what had allegedly happened to the elder daughter. It
was generally admitted that no court at any time had
found the requirements of section 1(2)(a) of the 1969
Act satisfied in relation to the elder daughter. The
justices largely for that reason32 decided that they
were not competent to make a finding in relation to the
younger daughter in the proceedings before them.
15.51 This conclusion seems prima facie reasonable3 3
but both the Divisional Court34 and the Court of Appeal35
thought differently. Paragraph (b) refers to "the fact
that the court or another court has found" that the
requirement in paragraph (a) "is or was satisfied" in
31 [1973] 1 All E.R. 1027 (Q.B.D.): [1973] 3 All E.R.
10 74, [1974] Q.B. 124 (C.A.).
32 See [1973] 1 All E.R. 1027 at p.1029.
33 It was conceded more or less all round that this
represented the strict and grammatical meaning of
the provision. This view is also shared by Blake
L.W., "Battered babies and the powers of the juvenile
court - section 1(2)(b), Children and Young Persons
Act 1969" (1973) 137 J.P. 242.
34 Eveleigh and May JJ.; Lord Widgery C.J. dissenting.
35 Lord Denning M.R., Buckley and Lawton L.JJ.
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the case of another child of the same household. A cursory
reading suggests that the required judicial finding will have
already taken place. A closer analysis indicates that this is
probably not so. The fourth line of paragraph (b) states "is
or was"; this appears to comprehend a finding in relation to the
other child by the court determining the requirements in
relation to the principal child, here the younger daughter. The
Court of Appeal decided that when section 1C 2)(b) referred to
"the court", it meant the court by which the application was
being heard and that "has found" meant not found by a previous
court but simply found as a fact.3 6 It follows therefore that
the court before which the case was being heard could receive
evidence about earlier incidents in relation to another child
and find that that child was or had been ill-treated or neglected.
In that event the court could oonsider, having regard to that
fact, whether the child in question was covered by section
l(2)(b) of the 1969 Act. This view is eminently sensible.37 It
does not, of course, exclude and clearly comprehends the pos¬
sibility of another court having come to a conclusion about the
"other"child. This interpretation gives the courts greater scope
for intervention in the parent-child relationship than an inter¬
pretation founded upon the earlier view, rejected by the Court of
Appeal. The authoritative interpretation gives the court greater
power to deal with the whole issue without necessarily relying
upon the decision of a prior court. It is an interpretation which
may favour the welfare of the child rather than the parents'
position.
36 [1974] Q.B. 124 at p.135 per Lord Denning M.R., supported
strongly by Buckley and Lawton L.JJ.
37 In the sense that it gives effect to the policy of the
legislation as conceived by the court. It has, of course,
been criticised as being grammatically unsupportable by Blake,
op. cit.
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Section 5 - The statutory balance between parent and child
15.52 That ground of intervention is relevant only in
England; the Scottish Act of 1968 contains no counter¬
part. Both jurisdictions, however, contain, as already
noticed, a double requirement in relation to exposure to
moral danger, impairment of health or development,
unnecessary suffering or ill-treatment. The statutory
phraseology in the two Acts is different; but the
additional requirement of lack of parental care or need
of care or control is clearly relevant. It has already
been tentatively suggested 3 8 that this additional
requirement to some extent swings the balance of the
legislation against the child in favour of the parent.
This aspect must now be considered in more detail.
15.53 The mere fact of exposure to moral danger or
the existence of one of the other grounds forming the
first part of the double requirement does not in itself
indicate inadequate parental care or the need of care
or control from some other source. The whole circumstances
must be viewed not just from the child's point of view but
also from the parents' point of view. For example,
Bowers v Smith 39 indicates that the commission of the
indecent act, giving rise to the exposure to moral danger
38 Para. 15.24.
39 [1953] 1 All E.R. 320.
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of which the parent had no knowledge, was not sufficient
to infer that the parent had failed to give his child
sexual instruction. Lord Goddard C.J. commented on the
"most reprehensible character" of the boys' conduct
"which was deserving of some condign punishment,h.°
But he added
"But it is quite another thing to say
that, because these boys committed a
grossly dirty act of this sort, they
did it because their parents had not
exercised proper care and control over
them. All that the parents had done
in this case was to send the boys to
play football."''1
15.54 The Chief Justice was concerned with the
definition of "in need of care or protection" in section
61 of the 1933 Act. An inadequate parent is clearly a
statutory requirement. But the nature of the requirement
calls for a value judgment on the part of the court. It
is not a simple issue of fact. 1,2 The critical circumstance
in Bowers v Smith43 is probably that the event in question
was apparently the first example of such conduct on the
part of the boys. In a sense a value judgment of this
type is a judgment inferred from the established facts.
But in that case the court was obviously disinclined to
read too much into the facts about the.parents' adequacy.
40 Ibid. at p.322.
41 Idem.
42 As already mentioned, there is an element of both
diagnosis and prognosis: para.15.22.
43 [1953] 1 All E.R. 320.
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15.55 Lord Goddard C.J., on the other hand, suggested
obiter that "if boys are found repeatedly committing
criminal or disgraceful acts, the court may be justified
in drawing the inference that parental discipline is
wanting" .14 His opinion clearly reflected a bias in
favour of parental adequacy, rebuttable perhaps by
evidence of repeated delinquency; "even if it happens
on two or three occasions with the same girl, the parents
knowing nothing about it, ... it is due to neglect on the
part of the parents".45 Such a view predicates an almost
wholly subjective test of parental adequacy which hinges
upon parental knowledge. It is tentatively suggested
that a subjective test is fundamentally inappropriate.
It is difficult to validate or challenge claims to
knowledge. There are problems of evidence. More
particularly, a subjective standard is heavily biased
in favour of parents, perhaps potentially or actually
inadequate parents, to such an extent that the purpose
of the legislation in protecting children from their own
inadequate parents is in danger of being thwarted.
15.56 Certain hypothetical circumstances allegedly
covered by the statutory definition were suggested by
Lord Goddard C.J.:-
44 Ibid. at p.323.
45 Idem.
"If a girl or boy is found being kept
in a house when the mother is permitting
prostitutes to assemble or to be housed,
or if the mother herself is a prostitute
or is carrying on a loose life, it is
very proper that the children should be
removed 6
It follows that a child in those circumstances would be
exposed to moral danger and at the same time the parent
would be either unfit to exercise care or not exercising
proper care. That would involve contemplating the same
circumstances from the point of view of both child and
parent, but independently so. There would have to be
direct evidence to satisfy each of the two requirements.
It could on the other hand be argued that the prostitution
of a mother is not necessarily evidence of inadequate
care; she may be a very capable, affectionate and
generous parent. But it is unlikely that Lord Goddard C.J.
would have shared such a view. Parental adequacy is in
any case a fairly flexible idea and differing opinions
are not uncommon in this context. So in this sense also
parental adequacy is a value judgment based upon specific
substantiated facts. This point apart, however, it is
possible to understand Lord Goddard C.J.'s approach,
without necessarily agreeing with its application, in
attempting to describe circumstances which could satisfy
both requirements. Even these hypothetical instances show
that the application by Lord Goddard C.J. of the approach
he postulated is biased in favour of the parents' view.
^6 Ibid. at p.323.
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15.57 This criticism cannot so easily be levelled
against Lord Parker C.J. in In re An Infant (Care or
Protection) . 1,7 In that case there was very little doubt
that the young girl was exposed to moral danger or falling
into bad association. The justices dismissed the
application because,no evidence having been received
from the girl's parents, a prima facie case had not been
established. The Divisional Court took the view that it
could not be suggested that there was no case to answer;
on the contrary, the facts suggested ex facie a lack of
care, protection or guidance. According to the Chief
Justice the question of the adequacy of parental care
could not be determined until the justices had heard
what the parents of the child had to say. The matter
was referred back to them.
15.58 In the course of his opinion Lord Parker C.J.
identified four issues in particular on which information
would be needed
(a) whether the events had occurred without
the parents' knowledge;
(b) whether they had occurred despite every
care taken by the parents;
(c) whether the facts "spoke for themselves";
(d) whether what had happened could not have
happened if proper care had been given.
m (1965) 63 L.G.R. 338.
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On the basis of these issues, Lord Parker C.J.'s approach
had progressed considerably beyond that of Lord Goddard
C.J. Clearly parental knowledge was not the only test,
nor even a sufficient test. Lord Parker C.J.'s approach
seemed to be designed to answer specifically the question
whether the child "is not receiving such care, protection
and guidance as a good parent may reasonably be expected
to give". That, of course, is the question posed by
section 2(1)(a) of the 1963 Act enacted in place of
section 61(1)(a) of the 1933 Act. It is suggested that
the test envisaged by the 1963 Act is not subjective but
obj ective 8 The court must presumably decide upon the
standard of care, protection and guidance which a good
parent may reasonably be expected to satisfy. Admittedly
that would be difficult to formulate and a court might
decline to do so while at the same time proceeding to
decide whether the care, protection and guidance given
by the parent in question fell below that standard.
Courts often adjudicate upon flexible standards without
defining them. To do so, however, the court would need
to investigate what care, protection and guidance was
given to the child in question. The ultimate situation
contemplated by Lord Parker C.J. was a set of circumstances
so blatant that lack of the necessary care could be inferred
without any evidence, or perhaps even in the face of the
48 Bevan, p.25; Watson and Austin, pp.35 to 36.
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evidence, from the parents. This approach seems
entirely in accord with the statutory function. It
also rids itself of the subjective test postulated or
inferred by Lord Goddard C.J. and, most importantly, it
looks at the circumstances from the child's point of
view rather than from that of the parents. The parents'
conduct and attitudes cannot, of course, be ignored;
they are balanced, if need be, against the circumstances
in which the child has found himself; they do not form
the centrepiece of the exercise.
15.59 An incidental but not insignificant question is
whether the parents can be compelled to account for their
parental care. If not, Lord Parker C.J.'s approach would
be undermined. The alternative would be to make an
inference prejudicial to the parents if they did not
co-operate. But in this area of the law judges on the
whole prefer actual information rather than to proceed
by inference or assumption. Section 34(1) of the 1933
Act places an obligation upon the parent or guardian
to attend at the court when required to do so.1+9 There
does not appear to be any requirement in terms obliging
the parent to answer questions put to him. It may be
difficult to infer such a duty, for by so doing a parent
may be giving evidence of a crime or offence which he has
49 S.41(2) of the Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968 makes
similar provision for a children's hearing.
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committed against his child. But the practical answer
may be that, once a parent is in court, he would probably
co-operate by providing any information the court wishes?0
This, however, raises fundamental issues about how the
court is to obtain the information it needs to carry out
its function under this type of legislation.
15.60 These procedural aspects apart, the existence
of the double requirement and the way in which the courts
have dealt with these issues indicate that, at the
threshold stage of the proceedings, neither the welfare
of the child nor the position of the parents dominates.
Parliament has created a rather complex relationship
between these two aspects and in a sense the court is
faced with an ad hoc decision to be made in the circum¬
stances of each case. That was probably intended. If
the additional requirement relating to the need of care
and control had been omitted, the courts would have been
concerned to examine only the consequences of the parent-
child relationship, thereby disregarding parental
responsibility for such consequences and the adequacy
of parental care. Clearly Parliament as a matter of




THE STATUS OF CHILDREN RECEIVED INTO CARE
Section 1 - Introduction
16.1 Chapter 14 analysed inter alia the threshold
requirements to be satisfied under section 1 of the
i
Children Act 1948 and section 15 of the Social Work
2
(Scotland) Act 1968 before the duty cast upon the
local authority to receive children into their care
3
became enforceable. The system of receiving children
into care can be fully understood only when the
relationship between the local authority, the parents
and the child after actual receipt into care is taken
into account. The welfare of the child is an integral
part of that relationship. It is the purpose of this
chapter to examine the relationship so arising and the
part played by the welfare doctrine. The synthesis so
created by adding to the threshold requirements the
consequences of their satisfaction presents a view of
the provisions as a whole and in particular the status
of children received into care.
1 11 S 12 Geo.6, c.43.
2 1968 c.49.
3 In this chapter any reference to s.l is a reference
to s.l of the Children Act 1948 and includes a
reference to s.15 of the Social Work (Scotland)
Act 1968 unless otherwise indicated.
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Section 2 - Abandonment and delegation
16.2 The importance of the distinction between
parental abandonment of the child and parental delegation
of his functions is vital to the scheme of section 1.
This argument should new be taken further. One of the
grounds for the exercise by the local authority of their
5
functions under section 1 is parental abandonment. That
section, which has so far been considered analytically
6 . , .
but not dynamically, contains certain provisions which
seem PPima facie at least to contain possible inconsis-
7 . .
tencies. This probably arises because of the introduction
of some more elastic concepts into the section.
16.3 There are five crucial elements in section 1:-
(a) The statutory duty of the local authority is to
8
"receive" the child into their care. It has been often
emphasised that the authority cannot "take" a child into
their care. In practice most children come into care
i o
at the request of one or both parents.
4 Para. 14.24.
5 The exact phraseology of s.l(l)(a), which is significant,
is that the child "has been and remains abandoned" by
his parents: c f. s.2(l)(b) which applies where "a
parent or guardian has abandoned" the child.
6 Paras. 14.4 and 14.5
7 Clive E.M., "Refusing to return children to dangerous
homes" 1976 S.L.T. (News) 265.
8 S.l(l).
9 E.g. Clarke Hall S Morrison, p.882; Eekelaar, p.159;
Leeding, p.58; Levin, "The Control of Local Authority
Powers over Children" (1971) 4 Eamily Law 101. Cf.
Cavanagh, p.135 where reference is made to the "duty
to assume the care" of certain juveniles. This is not
what the Act says and, it is suggested, is misleading.
10 Leeding, p.59; Eekelaar, p.159. It is important that
it is voluntary; coercion would invalidate the parental
decision: see Anonymous [1970] The Scotsman, 11 July
per Sheriff-substitute Byrne.
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(b) Once a child is in care, the local authority's duty
is "to keep the child in their care so long as the welfare
of the child appears to them to require it"1.1 This is
entirely consistent with subsection (l)(c) which provides
that a child cannot in effect be received into care unless
that course is "necessary in the interests of the welfare
of the child".
(c) Subsection (3) disables the authority from keeping a
child in their care "if any parent or guardian desires to
take over the care of the child". This would appear to
confer a right on the parent or guardian to have the
child returned at his request. Does it confer on the
parent the privilege of changing his mind or does the
local authority retain some power of control?
(d) Subsection (3) concludes by placing a duty on the
local authority to endeavour to secure that the care of
the child is taken over by a parent, guardian, relative
or friend when to do so is "consistent with the welfare
of the child". It is interesting that subsection (3)
of the Scottish enactment is, probably for practical
reasons, preceded by a duty placed on the local authority
to take all reasonable steps to discover the whereabouts
of the child's parent or guardian. This gives the ensuing
obligation a greater chance of fulfilment.
1 2
(e) Subsection (3A), inserted in 1975, effectively
restricts the right of a parent or guardian to remove
11 S.1(2 ) .
12 Children Act 1975 (1975 c.72), ss.56(l), 73.
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the child from the care of the local authority either
without the consent of the local authority or without
giving not less than twenty eight days' notice of his
intention to do so. This provision supports the view
that the local authority retains a certain power of
control over the child while he is in care under section
1. The parent does not therefore appear to have an
unrestricted privilege of changing his mind.
16.4 There are three points of general concern in
relation to section 1. The functions conferred upon the
local authority are exercisable by them only where "it
appears to them" that the relevant requirement has been
fulfilled. A considerable substantive discretion, both
on the merits and as a matter of interpretation, has thus
1 3
been conferred upon the administrative body; there is
1 <t
little scope for judicial intervention. The potentially
conflicting duties of the local authority and the appar-
1 5
ently overriding place given to parental wishes would
indicate that the section must be construed as a whole
of which each provision must be treated as an integral
part and not an independent enactment. Finally the
concept of the welfare of the child, whether specific
or general, plays a number of differing roles. It is
13 In Re M (an infant) [1961] 1 All E.R. 788 at p.793
Lord Evershed H.R. argued that this statutory formula
"must be taken to confer an absolute discretion on
the person or authority concerned provided it is
exercised bona fide".
14 Para. 16.29.
15 Paras. 16.5 to 16.7.
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thus not surprising that the courts have paid considerable
attention to their view of the "scheme" of the provisions.
16.5 The broad philosophy of section 1 would appear to
suggest a considerable if not paramount regard for
parental wishes. Is section 1, then, merely a device for
enabling parents to delegate their duty of care to the
local authority in certain prescribed circumstances? If
so, then all the grounds in subsection (1) are intelligible
except "abandonment" in the sense of parental culpability.
It would be odd for a parent to rely upon his own
reprehensible action as a reason for asking the local
1 6
authority to receive his child into care. The answer
probably is that persons other than parents may ask (in
the unofficial sense) for a child to be received into
care. If so, reliance upon parental culpability, even
to some extent, seems reasonable.
16.6 Such a view may find support in the argument
that the provisions apparently giving effect to parental
wishes apply only after a child has been received into
care; they can technically at least have no bearing upon
the threshold requirements enabling a child to be
received into care. The final argument is that "abandoned"
in paragraph (a) probably does not mean the same as in the
other statutory contexts. The phrase is "has been and
remains abandoned". This may indicate a state of abandonment
16 The judicial power to make an order under s.l(3) of the
Children and Young Persons Act 1969 (1969 c.54) when
the child is "beyond the control of his parent or
guardian" under s.l(2)(d) of that Act is, it is suggested,
quite different: similarly s.32 (2)(a) of the Social
Work (Scotland) Act 1968.
4 6 2
rather than the act giving rise to that state. If
these various arguments are correct, section 1 is
probably no more than a power given to parents or
guardians to delegate the care of the child to the
local authority. It is not a duty of positive inter¬
vention conferred upon an administrative body. It is
a duty to receive into care, as the Act says, when
certain facts have been established, but largely on
the initiative of the parent or some other person.
This conclusion would be consistent with the underlying
doctrine that only a court can ultimately deprive or
suspend a person of parental rights. Have the courts
conceived the scheme of the section in this way?
Section 3 - The judicial view of the scheme of section 1
Ca) The earlier cases
16,7 The cases, mostly English, which use the scheme
of the legislation to support the conclusions of the
various courts tend to be rather complicated and the
issues with which this chapter is concerned are not
normally given a prominent place in the judicial
argument. The problems usually arise out of a tripartite
relationship; that is, natural parents, foster parents
1 7
appointed by the local authority and the local authority
17 1948 Act, s.l3(l)(a); 1968 Act, s.21(l)(a). Cf. the




itself. Complexities also occur, in England at least,
as a result of the competition for jurisdiction between
the local authority acting administratively under the Act
and the High Court exercising its prerogative jurisdiction
1 9
as parens patriae.
16.8 The English authorities demonstrate changing attitudes
to the scheme of the legislation over the years. The
possibility of inconsistency or at least administrative
conflict between subsections (1) and (3) of section 1 of
2 o
the 1948 Act has already been formally acknowledged.
Subsection (1) appears to require the local authority
to receive a child into care if the threshold requirements
have been satisfied, including the welfare test.
Subsection (3), on the other hand, may confer a right
upon parents to have their child returned to them. Even
if that were the correct interpretation of these
provisions, the local authority could give effect to
subsection (3) and then immediately be invited to invoke
subsection (1) again. But that could be a course potentially
18 Others may be involved less frequently: e.g. guardians
or step-parents. See Levin J. "Step-parents and
Guardians" (1974) 124 N.L.J. 507.
19 Generally see Bevan, pp.411 to 416. This problem is
wider than the relationship between sections 1 and 2
of the 1948 Act and the prerogative jurisdiction: it
is relevant not only where a child is in the statutory
care of a local authority under whatever Act but also
when there is a statute relevant to a dispute affecting
the child. It has however been suggested that the
relevant principles "are not affected by the method of
origin or of termination of the local authority's duties
and discretions with regard to children in their care":




detrimental to the child, even assuming that it is
2 1
technically competent.
16.9 The English Court of Appeal exhibited one inter-
2 2
pretation of section 1(3) in 1954 and a different view
2 3
in 1969. The progression of the Chancery Division in
the intervening period from one view to the other
demonstrates what in summary may amount to a changing
2 if
judicial attitude to child protection in the context
of local authority fostering arrangements. The approach
2 5
adopted by Lord Goddard C.J. in In re AB (An Infant)
may be summed up in four simple propositions:-
(a) section 1 imposes a positive duty to
2 6
assume care under certain circumstances;
(b) section 13 explains how this duty should
27
be carried out;
(c) section 1(3) preserves the rights of
2 8
parents; while
21 There is no reason to suggest that it would not be
competent. Indeed in In re AB (An Infant) [1954] 2
Q.B. 385 Lord Goddard C.J. at p.399 implied that this
could be done. See also Re S (An Infant) [1965] 1 All
E.R. 865 at p.870 per Danckwerts L.J. and at p.871
per Pearson L.J.
22 In re AB (An Infant) [1954] 2 Q.B. 385.
23 Krxshnan v London Borough of Sutton [1970] 1 Ch.181.
24 From one giving affect to parental wishes to one
acknowledging a substantial administrative discretion.
25 [1954] 2 Q.B. 385.
26 Ibid. at p.394.
27 Ibid, at pp.394 and 395.
28 Ibid. at pp.397 and 398.
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(d) section 2 alone enables the local authority
to obtain full rights over the child to the
2 9
exclusion of the parents.
These propositions were probably not essential to the
decision of the court; the conclusion turned more on
the relationship between the administrative and prerogative
3 0
jurisdictions. Similar views were expressed in Barker
3 1 3 2
v Westmorland C.C. and Re M (An Infant). The most
explicit comment however came from Ungoed-Thomas J. in
3 3
Re G (Infants):-
"Here L.C.C. [London County Council], as the
local authority, received the children into
their care under subsection (l)(b) and (c);
and under subsection (2) they have continued
to keep these children in their care as I have
stated. Subsection (3), however, makes it
clear that, if either parent desires to take
over the care of the children, the L.C.C.
cannot retain them against the parent's desire,
29 Ibid. at p.398: at pp.397 and 398 Lord Goddard C.J.
said:- "... the local authority take the child into
their care. Having done that, they board it out as
the statute directs, but the next thing they have to
do is to give the child back to the parent's care if
he can look after the child and wants to do so, or
endeavour to get the parent to perform his parental
duties or find a friend or relative who will do that.
If the local authority think that the parent is a
person who cannot be trusted to look after the child,
then section 2 comes into play." The words emphasised
are an addition to the statutory scheme and represent
a modification of the duty to give effect to parental
wishes. They are inconsistent with Lord Goddard C.J.'s
general view of the legislation: cf. para. 14.18.
30 Ibid■ at p.396 per Lord Goddard C.J. and at p.401 per
Donovan J. Generally see Levin J, "The Control of
Local Authority Powers over Children" (1971) 1 Family
Law 101.
31 (1958) 56 L.G.R. 267.
32 [1961] Ch.81; [1961] Ch. 328 (C.A.).
33 [1963] 3 All E.R. 370.
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and further provides that the local
authority have a duty, where it appears
to them consistent with the welfare of
the children, to endeavour to secure
that the care of the children is taken 3^
over by, among other people, a parent."
Clearly, therefore, parental wishes could override the
local authority's view of what was best for the child
and parental care as a matter of general policy was
preferred to any other form of care, subject only to
consistency with the welfare of the individual child.
16.10 Finally in 1965 Lord Denning M.R. in Re S (An
3 5
Infant) adopted a position entirely consistent with
3 6 37
that of Lord Goddard C.J. and Ungoed-Thomas J. The
Master of the Rolls pointed out that the case before him
was "a s.l case, in which the local authority have only
a transient care of the child, in this sense, that if the
natural parents desire to take over the care of the child,
3 8
the local authority have to give him up". He went on to
stress the importance of the prerogative wardship juris-
3 9
diction, particularly where the parental removal of the
child from the care of the local authority could be
detrimental to the child, by indicating that "in order to
avoid this peril and secure the welfare of the child, the
9 o
jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery must be maintained".
34 Ibid. at p.372 per Ungoed-Thomas J. C.f. the views of
Lord Goddard C.J. in In re AB (An Infant) [1954] 2 Q.B.
385 at pp.398 and 399 where the local authority's
decision, albeit following the parent's wishes, was
the fundamental factor. In practice, however, there
would be no distinction between the two.
35 [1965] 1 All E.R. 865.
36 In re AB (An Infant) [1954] 2 Q.B. 385.
37 Re G (Infants) [1963] 3 All E.R. 370.
38 [1965] 1 All E.R. 865 at p.867.
39 Ibid. at p.868.
40 Idem.
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The technique of Lord Denning M.R. was thus to use every
available remedy to secure the welfare of the child, singly
or together, particularly where, as here, statute in his
view favoured parental rights to the possible detriment
of the child. If his view of section 1(3) were correct,
4 1
he was prepared to use on strictly technical grounds
the powers of the Court of Chancery almost in the face
4 2
of Parliamentary policy.
16.11 Most of the decisions concerned children received
into care by the local authority and subsequently boarded
out with foster parents under section 13(1)(a) of the
4 3
194-8 Act. Sometimes the mother would want to resume
4 4
the care of her child. Access could be her sole
4 5
objective. She might want to give the child to a third
4 6
party. Sometimes a third party, perhaps the putative
47
father, might seek the care of the child. The local
authority might even change its view of what was best
41 That statutes do not bind the Crown, acting here as
parens patriae through the Court, unless there are
express words to that effect.
42 Assuming for the moment that that was to protect
parental wishes.
43 1968 Act, s.21(l)(a).
44 Re S (An Infant) [1965] 1 All E.R. 33; Re R (K) (An
Infant5 [1964] Ch.455.
45 Re G (Infants) [1963] 3 All E.R. 370.
46 In re AB (An Infant) [1954] 2 Q.B. 385.
47 Re C (A) (An Infant) [1966] 1 All E.R. 560.
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for the child. The overall impression is that where
the natural parents and the local authority shared the
same view on what was best for the child, there were
few problems. In the event of conflict between the
natural parents and the local authority, problems
could arise on the legislation and the relationship
between it and the prerogative jurisdiction of the
court. This will be considered later but generally
the courts will sustain the administrative decision
within its statutory limitations. Indeed they may
also use their prerogative jurisdiction to support
the local authority's decision, sometimes even without-
considering the merits of that decision. In either
case the foster parents would be unprotected. The
natural parents' wishes would also be at risk if they
conflicted with those of the local authority.
(b) The more recent cases
16.12 Some of the later judicial statements illustrate
a different view of the scheme of these statutory
provisions. The later view does not benefit either
foster parents or natural parents but it more realistically
recognises in practice the substantive discretion conferred
upon the local authority by modifying the role of the
parental wishes in the exercise of that discretion. The
issue is again related technically to the extent of the
prerogative jurisdiction of the court. The source of the
48 Re M (An Infant) [1961] 1 All E.R. 201 and 788.
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current approach may be found in Re R (K) (An Infant)
where the child's mother expressed a desire to assume
5 o
the care of her child under section 1(3). The foster
parents and the local authority applied to have the
child made a ward of court and for care and control to
be committed to the foster parents. The mother responded
by asking for the child to cease to be a ward of court.
Pennycuick J. said:-
"Once the notice [to a county council by a
parent under section 1(3) to resume care]
has been given, it is I think clear not
only that the common law rights of the
mother revive, but also that the juris¬
diction of this court in relatior^ to the
infant becomes fully effective."
Wardship was not terminated. The child was left in the
care and control of the foster parents pending final
determination. The wishes of the child's mother were
thus effectively ignored. Under the wardship jurisdiction
the court would presumably go on to decide the issue on
the paramountcy of welfare principle under what was then
in England section 1 of the Guardianship of Infants Act
5 2
1925. The interest of the foster parents would no doubt
be relevant at that stage.
16.13 Pennycuick J. reached his decision to some extent
on the scope of the court's prerogative jurisdiction in
relation to the local authority's administrative powers.
49 [1964] Ch.455.
50 Referred to by Pennycuick J. as "the mother's notice":
ibid. at p.461.
51 Ibid, at p.461 and 462. Cf. Lord Denning M.R. in
Re S (An Infant) [1965] 1 All E.R. 865 : he would
probably have taken the view that the prerogative
jurisdiction was never ineffective.
52 15 S 16 Geo. 5, c.45.
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What is particularly significant, however, is that
the judge went on to consider the policy of the
legislation with regard to parents' rights. This
included section 1(3). He argued:-
"It would, of course, be right to accept
the contention of counsel for the
mother [i.e. that she, as the natural
parent of the infant, had an unchalleng¬
eable right to possession of the infant]
if it were clear beyond doubt that this
was indeed the intention underlying the
Act of 1948. Section 1(3), however,
imposes no mandatory obligation to return
the infant to the infant's parent. The
first limb of subsection (3) merely puts
an end to the right of the local authority
to keep the child and the second limb of
the subsection is applicable only where
it appears to the local authority
consistent with the welfare of the child
to secure that the child's care is taken
over by others." 53
He reached this conclusion "with much diffidence" having
regard to the extensive quotations in his judgment from
s %
In re AB (An Infant). The crux of the proposition
that section 1(3) is not mandatory appears to be founded
upon Pennycuick J.'s view of the first limb of subsection
(3). There can be no doubt that it puts an end to the
local authority's right to keep the child. It takes away
the local authority's powers under section 1 only.55
This may be a further reason why the prerogative juris¬
diction otherwise remains available. Pennycuick J.
53 [1964] Ch.455 at pp.462 and 463.
54 [1954] 2 Q.B. 385.
55 By virtue of the words "nothing in this section".
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however gave no substantial justification for his view.
It may be that the grammar of subsection (3) is that
the local authority's statutory function is taken away
(the principal clause) only if a parent desires to take
over the care of the child (the subordinate clause).
Thus, perhaps, the thrust of the provision is not to
give effect to parental wishes but to disable the
authority from using section 1. On that basis the
non-mandatory nature of subsection (3) becomes more
intelligible.
16.14 The issue before Buckley J. in Re C(A) (An Infant/ 6
was similar but the circumstances were different. The
putative father of a child in the care of Essex County
Council and boarded out by them with foster parents
sought to have the child made a ward of court and for
leave to take him to South Africa. The mother opposed
the application and the local authority asked for him
to cease to be a ward of court. The local authority's
evidence was that they were satisfied that the welfare
of the child required that he should remain where he was
and in the care of the council. The putative father
5 7
argued partly on the basis of the second limb of
subsection (3), particularly paragraph (b) which requires
the local authority to endeavour to secure that care
shall be taken over by a relative (which here would
56 [1966] 1 All E.R. 560.
5 7 Ibid. at p.56 4.
bj2
5 8
include the putative father) or a friend. The
second limb is much more discretionary than the first
limb, for it requires the local authority to be so
satisfied in terms of the welfare test. . This enabled
Buckley J. to decide in favour of the local authority
almost entirely on the basis of their view of the child's
5 9
welfare.
16.15 Buckley J. took the same view of the scope of
the prerogative jurisdiction as Pennycuick J. in
60
Re R (K) (An Infant). The former judge accepted that:-
"the court could accept the guardianship
of the child with a view to regulating
matters such as these [i.e. giving
directions with regard to the child's
property, or, possibly, in relation to
the child's marriage, or to the child's
going out of the jurisdiction] in so
far as they fell outside the sphere of
the local authority's responsibilities.
So, too, if the case were one in which
there appeared to be an immediate
probability or an early likelihood of
a parent requiring the local authority
to transfer the child into the care of
that parent under s.l(3) of the Act of
1948, for in such a case the local
authority's power in respect of the
child would thereupon come to an end
and in consequence there would be a
prospective field in which the prerog¬
ative jurisdiction of the court might
be usefully employed." 61
The judgments of Pennycuick and Buckley JJ. seem therefore
62
to have modified the earlier views on the scope of the
58 1948 Act, s. 59(1), paragraph (b) of the definition
of "relative".
59 [1966] 1 All E.R. 560 at p.564.
60 [1964] Ch.455.
61 [1966] 1 All E.R. 560 at p.564 per Buckley J.
62 Paras.16.7 to 16.11.
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prerogative jurisdiction in a way not inconsistent
63
with these earlier views. Partly in response to this
and partly as a consequence of a different interpretation
of section 1 of the 1948 Act, the approach to section 1(3)
has also been modified. It is now less rigid, more
discretionary and, .in a sense, more consistent with the
administrative nature of the functions conferred upon
the local authority. Pennycuick J.'s view was more
fundamental than Buckley J.'s attitude simply because
the former discussed the first limb of subsection (3)
in this context, and the latter placed more weight upon
64
the second limb. The Court of Appeal has subsequently
endorsed Pennycuick J.'s interpretation.
(c) Policy, the Court of Appeal and the Court of Session
(i) Policy
16.16 Before examining the Court of Appeal's judgment,
there is a further argument relevant to this discussion
but one largely ignored by the courts. Section 12(1) of
the 1948 Act and section 20(1) of the 1968 Act set out
the general duty of the local authority towards children
63 The new approach is not inconsistent with the older
approach for it operates in addition to not in
substitution for it.
64 Krishnan v London Borough of Sutton [19 7 0] 1 Ch.181.
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in their care. There is no doubt that these
provisions applied to children received into care
under section 1 of the 1948 Act and section 15 of
6 6
the 1968 Act. It is axiomatic but important to
emphasise that it applies to children actually in care.
It would therefore not apply if care was no longer
authorised; for example, under the first limb of
subsection (3). It may however be argued that if
subsection. (3) were mandatory, section 12(1) would be
irrelevant, for, as soon as the parent were to give
notice of his wishes , the local authority would no
longer have any function to which section 12 would
relate. On the other hand, if subsection (3) were
not absolute, arguably there would be powers to which
section 12(1) would refer. The most fundamental question
however is whether section 12(1) is part of the scheme
of the Act relevant to and so available to assist in
an interpretation of section 1(3). There is no judicial
answer to this question. It is suggested that, if it is
proper to regard section 12(1) as illustrating the
fundamental policy of the legislation in regard to children
in care, it indicates a welfare approach rather than a
parental rights attitude.
65 It was "to exercise their powers with respect to him
[the child in their care] so as to further his best
interests, and to afford him opportunity for the
proper development of his character and abilities".
The reference to "powers" is important in the present
context. These provisions were superseded in 1975
when a new duty was formulated in relation to children
in care: Children Act 1975, ss.59 and 79. But that
does not affect the argument in this paragraph.
66 The 1968 Act, s.20(l) so provides specifically. The
1948 Act, s.ll similarly provides but in a much more
complex fashion.
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16.17 An analogous argument may be found in related
provisions which tend to indicate how that objective
may be achieved. They include in particular what use
may be made of what may generically be called "parental
67
resources". This phrase is used to distinguish it
from "parental rights". Subsections (2) of section 12
of the 1948 Act and of section 20 of the 1968 Act enact
that in providing for a child in their care, "a local
authority shall make such use of facilities and services
available for children in the care of their own parents
6 8
as appears to the local authority reasonable in his case".
Clearly this contemplates parents as a source of care not
as recipients of a statutory benefit. If subsection (3)
of section 1 of the 1948 Act were not regarded as mandatory,
thus giving the local authority a discretion in relation
to a parent's desire to take over the care of the child,
it would be juristically similar to subsection (2) of
sections 12 and 20. The existence of these provisions
does not require a flexible attitude to subsection (3)
but it is, it is suggested, entirely consistent with
such an attitude. The arguments set forth in the last
67 The 1968 Act, s.12(1) and (2)(a) in Scotland and the
Children and Young Persons Act 1963, s.l(l) in England
require the local authority to make available advice,
guidance and assistance where such assistance appears
to the local authority likely to diminish the need to
receive into or keep in care a child under the Act.
This provides a more general method of providing for
children in care. Presumably the assistance may be
made available to the parents arid as such would be
another but different example of "parental, resources".
68 These provisions were not amended in 1975.
1+76
two paragraphs have not apparently been used in an
attempt to unravel the meaning of subsection (3). They
are not conclusive but they may conceivably be of more
than peripheral relevance.
(ii) The Court of Appeal
69
16.18 Procedurally Krishnan v London Borough of Sutton
7 o
was a complicated case. But the intention of the father
of the child in care under section 1(1) and boarded out by
the council was clear beyond doubt: the return of his
daughter. The child in care was a girl of fourteen whose
7 1
parents were unable to accommodate and maintain her.
Circumstances changed. The father requested his daughter's
return. The local authority notified the foster parents
accordingly but the child was unwilling to return to her
7 2
father and remained with the foster parents. What makes
this case rather unusual, therefore, is that the dispute
7 3
was not so much between the parent and the local authority
but between the parent and his daughter. These circum¬
stances placed the local authority and foster parents in
7 9
an extremely difficult position.
69 [1970] 1 Ch.181.
70 The plaintiff took out an originating summons for an
order against the local authority to deliver the child
in terms of section 1(3) of the 1948 Act. By inter¬
locutory motions he sought two interim injunctions
which were refused and formed the subject of the appeal
to the Court of Appeal. Earlier he had attempted to
have his daughter made a ward of court but this was
refused by Buckley J. and on appeal by the Court of
Appeal.
71 [1970] 1 Ch. 181 at p.183: the details are not reported.
72 Ibid. at p.183.
73 Although that was the technical form of the action.
74 They could not give effect to the parent's wishes
without using force.
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16.19 The child's father had earlier attempted
unsuccessfully to have the child made a ward of court.
Subsequently he brought proceedings against the local
authority, seeking an order for the return of the child
and alleging conspiracy between the local authority and
the foster parents to deprive him of the child. Two
motions interim injunctions were the subject of the
appeal in question: one ordering the local authority to
remove the child from the foster parents' home and to
return her to him; and the second restraining the
7 5
authority from harbouring the girl against his will.
The second is of no current relevance. Since the remedy
sought was equitable, the issue was not simply the nature
of the statutory provision but also the desirability of
granting a discretionary relief. The point of fundamental
concern in this chapter arose only obliquely, as a
consequence of the procedural complexities of English law.
7 6
16.20 The judgment of Goff J. is in some respects more
7 7
illuminating than the judgments of the Court of Appeal.
7 8
He suggested that the court in In re AB (An Infant)
had accepted that "the first limb of subsection (3)
imported a mandatory obligation to return the child".
7 9
75 [1970] 1 Ch.181 at p.183.
76 Ibid. at pp.184 to 188.
77 Ibid, at pp.190 to 193: Megaw, Russell and Harman L.JJ.
78 111154] 2 Q.B. 385: para. 16.9.
79 [1970] 1 Ch.181 at p.185 per Goff J.
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But he did not think that that could be "quite right" ;
he preferred the construction adopted by Pennycuick J.
81
in In re R (K) (An Infant). Goff J. continued
"I need not consider what difficulties may
arise where a parent desires the return
of the child and the local authority in
the exercise of its discretion does not
consider it consistent with the welfare
of the child that it should be so returned
or returned to any of the other classes of
persons mentioned in subsection (3). In
practice, the local authority would
probably make an order under section 2 ..." 82
His reluctance to consider that point further is unfortunate.
It is an issue of considerable importance, for the use of
8 3
section 2 may not always be justified.
16.21 That apart, Goff J. clearly took the view that
section 1(3) did not impose a mandatory duty to return
the child to the parent. In a sense, however, even that
proposition was not essential to his judgment, for there
was no question that the local authority were willing to
return the child to the parent. The problem was
enforcement of that decision. It is suggested, therefore,
that Goff J. was correct when he indicated that "the duty
under the second part of the section has arisen". The
question then was what order, if any, should be made
against the local authority. The decision thus turned
on the second limb of subsection (3). Perhaps his comments
80 Idem.
81 IXX64] Ch.455.
82 [1970] 1 Ch.181 at pp.185 and 186 per Goff J.
83 E.g. Cheetham v Glasgow Corporation 1972 S.L.T. (Notes) 50.
84 [1970T~1 Ch.181 at p..186. Emphasis added. It is
suggested however that Goff J. meant "subsection" not
"section"; otherwise his statement is meaningless.
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on the subsection as a whole are dicta only. It was
thus entirely reasonable to refuse the motion for an
interim injunction, for the order could only be that
85
the authority should endeavour to return the child.
Such an order would lack specificity and should not
therefore be made. Although Goff J. advanced further
reasons against exercising the discretion sought, they
are not presently relevant.
16.22 The attitude of the Court of Appeal to section
1C3) was clear beyond doubt but there was no supporting
justification. Megaw L.J. stated:-
"In my judgment, there is one simple
answer to the plaintiff's appeal,
and that is this, that, on the true
construction of the relevant statute,
there is no absolute duty upon the
local authority to hand over the
child: the local authority may not,
therefore, be ordered by the court
under or by virtue of the statute,
to hand over the child regardless
of circumstances. It is, in my
judgment, in the circumstances of
this case, impossible for this
court to make this order. In my
judgment, In re R (K) (An Infant),
decided by Pennycuick J., which is
cited by the judge, is right, and
its effect is that section 1(3) of
the Children Act 1948 imposes no
mandatory obligation to return the
infant to its parents."
85 I.e. a reflection of the statutory provision.
Emphasis added.
86 [1964] Ch.455.
87 [1970] 1 Ch.181 at pp.191 and 192.
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This conclusion, it is suggested, is correct for three
reasons. Firstly, it is consistent with the admin¬
istrative flexibility of the Act as a whole. It is
also consistent with the policy in section 12(1) which
sets out the general duty of the local authority towards
children in care and with what has been described as the
use of "parental resources" in implementing that policy.
Finally, the grammatical structure of subsection (3),
if it is read as a whole and not as two unrelated parts,
indicates that the second limb is the effective provision
and the first limb merely renders the powers in the second
limb available when the local authority's authorisation
to receive the child into their care terminates. This
implies that a further decision to receive the child into
care again is a competent substitute for the other
possibilities set out in paragraphs (a) and (b) of
8 8
subsection (3).
(iii) The Court of Session
16.23 The attitude of the English courts towards
section 1(3) of the 1948 Act has at last crystallised.
In a sense it is a byproduct of the relationship between
prerogative powers and statute. The Scottish courts have
89
not needed to contend with that particular difficulty.
Their problems are different; they tend to be matters
of interpretation alone. But even Cheetham v Glasgow
9 0
Corporation and others had a long and complicated
background. In essence the parents of a child in the
8 8 Para.16.8.
89 There is no concept of wardship in Scotland.
90 1972 S.L.T. (Notes) 50.
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care of Glasgow Corporation under section 15 of the
1968 Act and boarded out by the Corporation with
foster parents wanted their child returned to them.
A petition by the foster parents for adoption had been
9 1
refused and an application by the local authority
for an order under section 16 of the 1968 Act had also
9 2
failed. The parents ultimately presented a petition
9 3
to the Outer House of the Court of Session for custody.
9 4
Lord Dunpark applied the paramountcy of welfare principle,
concluded that the child's best interests lay with the
foster parents and refused the petition.
16.24 No jurisdictional problems, such as those in
9 5
England, arose. The existence of an impediment upon
the courts created by the statutory scheme conferring
administrative functions upon another body was not even
contemplated. However one sentence in Lord Dunpark's
opinion indicates what his attitude would have been if
such an issue had been raised. He looked at the effect
of a judicial order upon the local authority rather than
91 The mother had refused her consent (now termed
agreement) and it was held not to have been unreasonable.
92 1968 Act, s.16(3). The threshold requirements had not
been fulfilled : i.e. proof of parental unfitness and
persistent failure to discharge parental obligations.
93 Not, it should be noted, for delivery : i.e. for
enforcement of their legal rights.
94 Guardianship of Infants Act 1925, s.l.
95 E.g., the conflict between the wardship jurisdiction




at the consequences of the legislation. As he said:-
"If I make an order for custody in the
Laws' [the foster parents'] favour, it
will extinguish the legal duties now
incumbent upon the Corporation, who
have the child in their care under
s.15(2) of the Social Work (Scotland)
Act 1968 . 97
This view gives an order of the court priority over the
statutory decision of a local authority. If this is the
position, it would contrast with the situation in England,
particularly in the older cases. The position in each of
the two jurisdictions is fundamentally different in any
event, for the Chancery (now Family) Division of the High
Court merely exercises the functions of the Court of
Chancery which derived its powers from the Chancellor
who was himself a mere delegatus of the Crown as parens
patriae. The foundation of the position of the court in
England is principally administrative. None of this
9 8
historical background applies to the Court of Session.
Thus in England the contest is more between two adminis¬
trative bodies; in Scotland it is rather between an
administrative and a judicial body. Too much weight
should not be placed upon this argument. The technical
argument sometimes used by the English courts, that the
Crown is not bound by statute unless expressly stated to
9 9
to be bound, is weaker, if indeed applicable, in
96 In a sense this is the reverse of the English attitude.
Lord Dunpark more or less assumed the superiority of the
court over the local authority and discounted the stat¬
utory position of the local authority as the creation
of Parliament.
97 1972 S.L.T. (Notes) 50 at pp.50 and 51 per Lord Dunpark.
98 Paras. 32.3, 32.61, 32.62, 32.63.
99 Maxwell, p. 161.
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Scotland. Arguably this could point to a considerable
difference between the two systems.
16.25 That issue apart, Lord Dunpark reached his
2 ...
conclusion upon an interpretation of section 1 of
3
the Guardianship of Infants Act 1925. Following J_ v C_
he took the view that section 1 "applied to all disputes
over the custody of children and was not limited to
4
disputes between parents". That presumably would
include disputes to which statutory authorities were
parties. It can thus readily be understood why Lord
Dunpark felt able to determine the dispute on its welfare
5
merits. On the face of it, J v C_ was a similar case,
for there the child whose custody was sought by parents
and foster parents was in the care of a local authority
6
under section 1 of the 1948 Act. The local authority
itself took the initiative in having the child made a
ward of court and then, in apparent contrast with the
other cases, asked for directions for custody, care and
control of the child. In a sense, therefore, the local
authority "delegated" its function to the court. But in
doing so it could be open to criticism on the ground of
failure to perform its statutory duty.
1 Somerville v Lord Advocate (1893) 20 Rettie 1050 at
pp.1070 and 1071 per Lord Kyllachy; Magistrates of
Edinburgh v Lord Advocate 1912 S.C. 1085 at p.1091
per Lord Dunedin L.P.
2 On the question whether he could "award legal custody
of this child to his foster parents" : 1972 S.L.T.
(Notes) 50 at p.50.
3 [1970] A.C. 668: para '43.39.
4 1972 S.L.T. (Notes) 50 at p.50 per Lord Dunpark summarising
the House of Lords' decision in J_ v C_ [1970] A.C. 668.
5 [1970] A.C. 668.
6 That fact played no part in the case, for the local
authority asked the court to deal with custody, care
and control.
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16.26 Lord Dunpark gave his opinion of what section 15(3)
of the 1968 Act meant. This was clearly not essential to
his decision. The application of the paramountcy of
7
welfare principle is probably a matter of discretion.
To have taken the view that section 15(3) was mandatory
in requiring the local authority to return the child to
his parents at their request would arguably have conflicted
directly with the discretion of the welfare doctrine. He
did not however take that view:-
"... I read the clause in subs.(3) of s.15
of the Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968,
saving the right of a parent or guardian
to take over the care of the child in the
care of a local authority, as subject to
the overriding duty imposed upon the
local authority by subs.(2) of the said
section 'to keep the child in their care
so long as the welfare of the child
appears to them to require it! This
interpretation of s.15 is consistent with
English authority (see0Krishnan v Sutton
London Borough Council and with the
decisions taken by gGlasgow Corporation
in this case ...."
Lord Dunpark supported his argument with more detailed
analysis than the English judges. His approach is similar
to but less general than the arguments adopted earlier in
this chapter. It would appear overall that his reliance
upon statutory policy to interpret an ambiguous provision
in a way consistent with that policy is fundamentally correct.
7 Paras. 35.92 to 35.96.
8 [1970] Ch.101.
9 1972 S.L.T. (Notes) 50 at p.51 per Lord Dunpark.
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Section *4 - Conclusion
16.27 This comparative analysis of the English and
Scottish cases throws into sharp relief the impact of
detailed interpretation upon the concept of welfare
generally and the welfare of the individual child.
If the first limb of section 1(3) of the 1948 Act were
treated as mandatory, it would involve, at least at
face value, giving effect to parental wishes. The
child's welfare would be liable to be overridden by the
parents' attitude. The parents, of course, might well
be justified in seeking the child's return, but their
decision would be virtually unchallengeable. On the
other hand, if the first limb of section 1(3) were not
absolute but subject to the general policy of the Act,
the situation would be governed by the local authority's
statutory responsibilities in general. They are clearly
directed towards the welfare of the child. The scheme
of the Act has been relatively widely drawn and the concept
of welfare implies on a purely semantic level a considerable
interpretational flexibility. The alternative approach
is thus much more consistent with the welfare principle.
16.28 It could be argued that the alternative approach
merely substitutes the local authority's view of welfare
for that of the parent. The local authority's decision
would be as unchallengeable as that of the parent. Neither
proposition is entirely valid. The protection and promotion
of the child's welfare is the fundamental statutory
objective of the local authority. The parents' decision¬
making process is not similarly circumscribed. Depending
U 8 6
on the meaning of subsection (3), for example, the
parents' position may be governed partially by the
local authority's attitude. In both jurisdictions
the courts exercise to some extent a form of overall
control.
16.29 The second feature of this comparative analysis,
which in a sense is a generalisation of the last point
discussed, indicates that the law is concerned principally
with the question to whom the decision on the child's
welfare is confided. There is probably no simple answer.
It is obviously a matter of extreme importance to the
child who makes the decision. In the English context
the issue is complicated by historical factors. In the
absence of mala fides and within its statutory limitations
1 o
the decision of the local authority is probably supreme.
The court will otherwise intervene only in support of the
11 12
local authority or at the request of the local authority.
The most extreme position would be that of Lord Denning M.R.:
namely, the wardship jurisdiction would always be available
unless specifically abrogated by statute. In that sense the
jurisdiction would operate as a general and overriding
supervisory jurisdiction protecting the child's welfare.
The parents' position would be pro tanto attenuated. In
Scotland it may be that the courts will accept final
10 This is a summary of the earlier English cases: paras.
16.7 to 16.11; Levin J. "The Control of Local
Authority Powers over Children" (1971) 1 Family Law 101.
11 E.g. Re R (K) (An Infant) [1964] Ch.455.
12 E.g. J7~v C_ L 19 70 J A. C 668.
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responsibility for the welfare of the child and are
prepared, almost against any person or body, either
parent, foster parent, step-parent, relative, friend,
voluntary association or statutory authority, to
investigate and decide upon the merits of the individual
case. This is restricted to a determination by the court
of the person most likely to protect and promote the welfare
of the child. In Scotland, unlike England, the court has
never fully accepted responsibility for the day-to-day
decisions affecting the child. If that is so, the
Scottish position would be more consistent with the
Denning approach. The desirability of any of these
positions is another matter but there seems to be a
real possibility that the role of the courts in the
1 3
two jurisdictions is different.
13 This is also true to some extent in the custodial
context.
